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

The New Architecture of American Politics: Building Up to 1988

Volume 10, Number 4 November December 1987

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The Soundness of Our Structure: Confidence in the Reagan Years

by Jack Citrin, Donald Green, and Beth Reingold

Ronald Reagan came to Washington to bury government rather than to praise it. Ironically he wound up presiding over a resurgence of trust in the country's political institutions. "America is back," exulted the president at the end of his first term, and the polls showed that an optimistic public agreed.

All this preceded the Iran-Contra fiasco and the stock market's fluctuations. Have the revelations about deceit and ineptitude tarnished Reagan's personal image? Are the rebuilt walls of faith in government crumbling once again?

Trust Redux

The rebound in political confidence after 1980 began with the public's expectation that Reagan would be a strong leader. His demeanor, whether natural or stage-managed, communicated a sense of pride in the nation and confidence in its future. By the end of 1982, lower inflation and belief in the president's personal abilities had reversed a fifteen-year slide in political trust, despite a severe economic recession (July 1981-November 1982).[1]

Table 1 shows that the resurgence of trust in the government's ability to "do what is right" intensified between 1982 and 1984. Other survey indicators all pointed in the same positive direction. The rise in confidence was based on the reviving economy and on continued approval of Reagan's personal leadership. This renewed trust focused most intensely on the presidency and was manifested by virtually every segment of society, including the people who identified themselves as strong Democrats.[2]

The Third Quarter

Since trust in government is built on presidential performance and good news about the state of the nation, a steady growth in confidence requires a sustained period of perceived success. Given the complexity of the problems facing American government in

Table 1

PERCENT TRUSTING THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT ALL OR MOST OF THE TIME, 1980-1987

	Nov. 1980	Nov. 1982	Nov. 1984	Feb. 1985	Mar. 1985	July 1985	Nov. 1985	Jan. 1986	Sept. 1986	Nov. 1986	Jan. 1987	Mar. 1987	June 1987
CBS/NYT			45%	46%			49%	42%		49%	44%	41%	
ABC/Post				43	37%	38%			40%		44		48%
NES	26%	34%	45							39			

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of March 1987; ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of June 1987; and Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, American National Election Study, latest that of 1986

1985-1986 and the likelihood that Reagan's previous accomplishments had raised expectations for the future, this was a difficult task.

The third quarter of the Reagan presidency lacked the dramatic triumphs of the first term. In the economic realm, continued growth and low rates of inflation and unemployment were counterbalanced by huge budget and trade deficits. In foreign policy, a popular air attack on Libya was followed by embarrassing questions raised about the Reykjavik summit.

Against this background, there was little change in the public mood. The president's vaunted likability remained intact, and all the major polls showed that Reagan's job performance rating was slightly higher in October 1986 than when he was reelected.

Evidence about the trend in political trust is more uneven. Louis Harris and Associates found that the proportion of the public with "great" confidence in those running the White House dropped from 42 percent in the afterglow of Reagan's triumphant reelection to 30 percent a year later. But the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) found no equivalent drop in ratings of the federal executive branch, and neither polling organization recorded a substantial or consistent decline in confidence in other political institutions.

As table 1 shows, the media telephone polls indicate a slight increase in trust in government between the beginning of Reagan's second term and the onset of the Iran-Contra affair. However, the 1986 Michigan National Election Survey (NES), based on personal interviews, found that the proportion of trusting responses declined from 45 percent to 39 percent and that agreement with the statement "public officials don't care what people like me think" also became more widespread.

Whether these inconsistent results are due to differences in the timing, interview method, samples, or content of the polls is unclear. But the main conclusion is that the overall decline in political trust between 1984 and 1986 was minor.

Table 2

TRUST IN GOVERNMENT BY POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS, 1984-1986

	1984	1986
Party identification		
Democrat	40%	32%
Independent	50	33
Republican	50	52
Approval of Reagan		
Approve	52	48
Disapprove	31	24
Beliefs about state of the economy		
Better	50	52
Same	45	42
Worse	36	30
Race		
White	47	43
Black	32	22
Region by race		
Northern whites	47	44
Southern whites	47	40
Religion		
Catholic	49	49
Protestant, Non-fundamentalist	46	43
Fundamentalist	52	39

Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, American National Election Study. Data for 1986 are preliminary.

Who Changed?

While the upswing in morale during Reagan's first term was pervasive, the slight dip in political trust recorded by the 1986 NES survey was concentrated among blacks, the poor, Democrats, and Independents. Republicans actually expressed a slightly higher level of confidence in 1986 than in 1984, so the link between party attachment and political confidence grew stronger.

A politically significant note is the hint of diminished trust among several of the social groups central to the Republicans' efforts to achieve a lasting political majority. The level of confidence among Catholics and union households remained essentially unchanged, but southern whites under thirty-five and fundamentalists, who were unusually trusting in 1984, registered declines of more than 10 percentage points in confidence. Even before the impact of the Iran-Contra affair could make itself felt, then, there were signs of uneasiness within the groups whose attraction to Ronald Reagan produced the 1984 landslide.

One reason for the drop in trust between 1984 and 1986 was renewed anxiety about the economy. The NES surveys revealed a 13 percentage point increase in the belief that national economic conditions were worsening. Iowa political scientists Arthur Miller and Stephen Borelli contend that growing disagreement with Reagan's policy agenda also contributed to the reduced sense of trust.

Reagan's Fall

Arguably the darkest day of the Reagan presidency was November 25, 1986, when the diversion of funds to the Contras became public knowledge, John Poindexter and Oliver North left the White House, and the president admitted that he had not been in full control of his foreign policy. As investigations of the Iran-Contra affair got under way, the public's reaction was decisively negative. Gallup found that public satisfaction with the state of the nation fell from 58 percent in September 1986 to 47 percent in December. All the polls conducted in the aftermath of news about the diversion of funds reported an unprecedented monthly decline in approval of the president's job performance (*Public Opinion*, Mar/Apr 1987, pp. 34-35).

The 1986 NES survey also revealed the first cracks

(Continued on page 59)

FOUNDATIONS OF CAMPAIGN '88

POLITICAL INDICATORS

Question: If the 1988 election were being held today, do you think you would vote for the Democratic or for the Republican candidate for president?


If the 1988 election were being held today, would vote for...
Don't know/no answer 2%
Volunteered responses* 10%
Republican candidate 46%
Democratic 44%

Note: *Volunteered responses — "Too soon" (1%), "Vote for other" (1%), "Wouldn't vote" (1%), "It depends on who is running". A Gallup/*Newsweek* poll taken October 7-9, 1987 showed a different result when a similar question was asked. Thirty-three percent said they would vote Republican, 43% Democratic.

Late Poll: A *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman poll of October 22 found that 41% thought "it would be better for this country to have a Democrat as our next president." Twenty-eight percent said a Republican.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 19, 1987.

Question: As of today, would you say that the Democrats or the Republicans have the best chance of winning the presidency next year?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 17-23, 1987.

Question: If Reagan could run again, would you vote for him?



Question: Would you vote for a president with a leadership style similar to or different from Ronald Reagan's?



Source: Survey by Gordon S. Black for *USA Today* and CNN, September 8-13, 1987.

Question: Which of these two statements comes closest to your own views:


55%
41%
After eight years of Ronald Reagan we need a president who can set the nation in a new direction
We need to keep the country moving in the direction Ronald Reagan has been taking us

Note: The responses "Somewhere in between" (vol.) and "Neither" (vol.) are not shown.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 17-23, 1987.

Party I.D.

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



	Dem.	Rep.
1977	49%	21%
1978	51	22
1979	44	20
1980	48	19
1981	42	27
1982	45	29
1983	46	24
1984	41	28
1985	36	35
1986	39	33
1987 Jan.	39	32
March	41	28
April	39	31
July	42	31
August	42	28
Sept.	42	30

Note: Percentage shown is the last one for each year.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 18-24, 1987.

Median Age of the Population

31.7 years

Median Age of the Voting-age Population

39.9 years

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

TEEN ATTITUDES

Question: When you are old enough to vote do you think you will be more likely to vote for the candidates of the Republican party or for the candidates of the Democratic party?



Note: Points shown are the last points for each year. In 1985 this question was asked only once, in May. In surveys taken by the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, high school seniors were asked to describe their political preference. In 1976, 17% called themselves Republicans, 26% Democrats, 30% Independents. Twenty-six percent said "Don't know" or "Haven't decided." In 1986, 28% described themselves as Republicans, 20% Democrats, 23% Independent.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Youth Survey, latest that of June 1987.

Ideology

Question: Now, thinking politically and socially, how would you describe your general outlook—as being very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-road, moderately liberal, or very liberal?



	Cons.	Mod.	Lib.
1977	41%	32%	22%
1978	41	31	24
1979	45	29	22
1980	47	26	21
1981	47	31	19
1982	44	34	19
1983	42	32	22
1984	45	30	21
1985	44	32	22
1986	44	31	21
1987	43	29	23

Note: Percentage shown is that ranking each year.
Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 87-6, "Latest Year of May 16-30, 1987").

VOTING AND REGISTRATION STATS

	Total population (millions)	Voting age population (millions)	Percent registered to vote Total	White	Black	Percent voted Total
1964	192.1	110.6	—			62
1968	201.1	116.5	74.3	75.4	66.2	61
1972	209.8	136.2	72.3	73.4	65.5	56
1976	218.0	146.5	66.7	68.3	58.5	54
1980	227.7	157.0	66.9	68.4	60.0	53
1984	237.0	169.9	68.3	69.6	66.3	53
1988 (projection)	245.3*	181.7	?			?

Note: *Census middle series projection.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Turnout figures from *Public Opinion*, December/January 1985.

Party

Question: Looking ahead for the next years, which political party—the Republican or the Democratic—do you think will do a better job of keeping the country prosperous?



	Rep.	Dem.
1978		
March	23%	42%
July	26	40
October	27	38
1980		
June	31	37
September	35	36
October	35	36
1981		
April	41	28
October	41	31
1982		
February	32	42
June	34	43
October	32	42
1983		
October	33	40
1984		
April	44	36
August	48	36
September	49	33
1985		
March	48	32
June	44	35
1986		
March	51	33
October	41	30
1987		
January	38	37

Question: Which political party do you think would be more likely to keep the United States out of World War III—the Republican or the Democratic party?



	Rep.	Dem.
1978		
March	25%	31%
July	31	31
October	27	31
1980		
June	28	32
September	25	42
October	24	45
1981		
April	26	39
October	30	34
1982		
February	24	41
June	26	42
October	27	38
1983		
September	26	39
1984		
April	30	42
August	36	40
September	38	38
1985		
March	39	33
June	35	37
1986		
March	39	36
October	34	29
1987		
January	29	39

Note: The responses "No difference" (vol.) and "No opinion" are not shown.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January 16-19, 1987.

Images

Question: (Hand respondent card) Now I'm going to read you a few phrases. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you think that the phrase better describes the Republican party or the Democratic party. How about . . . ? Does that more accurately describe the Republican party and its leaders or the Democratic party and its leaders?



Note: Democrats = Democrats plus those leaning Democratic; Republicans = Republicans plus those leaning Republican.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times-Mirror Corporation, April 25-May 10, 1987.

A Nation's Confidence

Question: How much confidence do you have in the future of the United States: quite a lot, some, very little, or none at all?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of June 9-16, 1986.

Question: Since the time this country was settled, the United States has been called the Land of Opportunity. Do you think there are more opportunities for Americans today than in the past, or less opportunities today, or about the same as in the past?



Note: "Fewer opportunities" = 34% in 1983, 24% in 1986. "Same" = 25% and 26%.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, 1983; the Roper for the *Wall Street Journal*, October, 1986.

Most Important

This is on open-ended question where respondents can give the pollsters any answer they wish. The responses are then coded into manageable categories by Gallup. The responses provide a striking picture of the public mood. Inflation and the high cost of living—an issue that dominated political discourse in 1977 and 1981—was mentioned by only 2% in 1987.



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April-May, 1987.

Problems

Question: Which political party do you think can do a better job of handling the problem you have just mentioned as the most important problem facing the country, the Republican party or the Democratic party?



	Rep.	Dem.
1977	14%	38%
1978	25	33
1979	25	33
1980	33	33
1981	36	21
1982	29	41
1983	26	37
1984	42	33
1985	32	32
1986	33	36
1987	29	37

Note: Percentage shown is latest available each year.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 10-13, 1987.

This question gives respondents a list of concerns. They are asked to select two or three that concern them personally. The results differ from the Gallup open-ended question, and give us a different perspective about Americans' concerns.

Question: Here is a list of things people have told us they are concerned about today (Card shown respondent) Would you read over that list and then tell me which 2 or 3 *you personally* are most concerned about today.

Personally most concerned about today (1987)



1983	17%	33%	17%	27%	27%	46%	17%	50%	14%	11%	8%	6%	13%
1977	21	40	9	27	28	48	22	19	8	17	13	7	31

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 87-2), latest that of January 10-24, 1987.

Our

Question: In your opinion, which of the following best describes Russia's primary objective in world affairs? (Card shown respondent)


Percent
100
40
30
20
10
0
(37)
Russia seeks global domination, but not at the expense of starting a major war 3
(34)
(31)
Russia seeks to compete with the U.S. for more influence in different parts of the world 2
(25)
(23)
(17)
Russia seeks global domination and will risk a major war to achieve that domination if it can't be achieved by any other means 4
Russia seeks only to protect itself against the possibility of attack by other countries 1
(9)
(7)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
6/78	7%	25%	34%	23%
10/79	9	30	37	18
2/80	5	18	34	39
11/80	5	21	38	28
9/81	6	18	35	34
3/83	9	23	34	29
9/84	7	28	38	20
9/85	8	29	35	20
3/86	8	30	36	18
5/87	9	31	37	17

Note: "Don't know" not shown. It was 11%, 6%, 4%, 8%, 7%, 5%, 8%, 9%, 9%, and 5%.
Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 87-5), latest that of April 25-May 2, 1987.

Question: Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about communism as a form of government?



	Communism is . . .			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1977	54%	24%	20%	1%
1980	59	27	13	1
1982	61	26	12	1
1983	57	26	15	2
1984	61	26	15	2
1985	59	27	13	1
1987	56	29	14	1

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April 1987.

World View

Question: Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in strength, or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?

	U.S. superior to Soviets	About equal	Not as strong
1978	12%	32%	42%
1979	11	30	43
1980	14	34	42
1981	11	39	42
1982	9	37	44
	9	33	47
1983	11	47	32
	12	36	42
1985	17	48	29
	16	50	26
	18	47	25
1987	14	44	31

Note: Sample size for September 1985 = 1,277. "No opinion" not shown.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of September 9-10, 1987.

Question: And which would tend to worry you more—someone who might not do enough in working for arms control with the Russians, or someone who might be too eager for an arms control agreement with the Russians?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, May 18-19, 1987.

Question: I'm going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Would you tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one? . . .



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 7-13, 1987.

Assessing the R

	Federal spending as percent of GNP	Federal deficit as percent of GNP
1977	21%	2.8%
1981	22	2.6
1983	24	6.1
1987	25	3.3

Source: *Economic Indicators.*

Defense Spending as a Percent of GNP	
1977	5.1%
1981	5.2
1983	6.2
1987	6.3

Source: *Economic Indicators.*

Poverty Statistics

	By current "poverty" definition		Alternate definition*	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1977	24.7 million	11.6%	NA	
1982	34.4	15	29.1 million	12.7
1986	32.4	13.6		

Note: *This measure takes into consideration "in kind" services (food stamps, Medicare, etc.) when calculating the poverty rate.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount? . . .



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April 1987.

ole of Government

Question: In electing the next president, which would tend to worry you more—electing someone who goes too far in cutting back on the role of government and domestic programs, or electing someone who goes too far in increasing the role of government and domestic spending?


Would worry you more...
Electing someone who goes too far in cutting back the role of government and domestic programs
Electing someone who goes too far in increasing the role of government
Don't know
38%
53%
9%

Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, May 18-19, 1987.

Question: When you think in general terms about electing a president, what would worry you more—electing someone who goes too far in cutting back on the role of government and domestic programs, or electing someone who goes too far in increasing the role of government and domestic spending?



Source: Survey by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for KidsPac, June 17-24, 1987.

Question: In which of the following people in government do you have the most trust and confidence?


Have the most trust and confidence in the people in charge of running...
Don't know/no answer 22%
Your local government 37%
The federal government 19%
State government 22%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June 6-14, 1987.

Question: Do you think that, in general, the federal government creates more problems than it solves, or do you think it solves more than it creates?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 19-23, 1987.

Employment by Sector

	Agriculture Number/Percent	Blue collar/ Production Number/Percent	White collar/ Service Number/Percent
1975	2.9 mil. 3.4%	28.3 mil. 33%	54.5 mil. 64%
1986	3.4 mil. 3.1	30.1 mil. 27.5	74.2 mil. 67

Number of Government Employees*

	Federal	State and local
1977	2,848 million	12,084 million
1981	2,865	13,103
1985	3,021	13,669

Note: * = civilian

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987.*

Question: In general, some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?



Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, American National Election Study, latest that of 1986.

Question: There are many problems facing our nation today. But at certain times some things are more important than others, and need more attention from the federal government than others. (Card shown to respondent) I'd like to know for each of the things on this list whether you think it is something the government should be making a major effort on now, or something not needing any particular government effort now. First . . .

Federal government should be making major effort on...

Trying to establish more controls to protect consumers on the products and services they buy



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 87-6), latest that of May 16-30, 1987.

Per Capita Income (1982 dollars)	
1977	$ 9,381
1980	9,722
1986	10,780

Source: *Economic Report of the President*, January 1987.

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that government is the problem or the answer?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, February 20-23, 1987.

Poverty Rates

	Percent of people under age eighteen in poverty	Percent of people over age sixty-five in poverty
1977	14.9%	24.6%
1980	17.9	15.7
1986	19.8	12.4

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Question: There were many government programs created in the 1960s to try to improve the condition of poor people in this country. Do you think these programs generally made things better, made things worse, or do you think they didn't have much impact one way or another?

Government programs created in the 1960s to try to improve the condition of poor people

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 19-23, 1987.

Education

Question: (see page 30)



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April 1987.

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Percent of adults with high school diplomas	24.5	34.3	41.1	55.2	68.6	73.9
Percent of adults with college degree	4.6	6.2	7.7	11.0	17.0	19.4
Percent of U.S. population engaged in education (student, teacher, administrator)	23	21	25	30	27	26
Expenditures for elementary secondary education (in billions of $)	3	6	17	43	103	149
Expenditures for higher education (in billions of $)	6	3	7	25	62	98
Combined math and verbal scores on Scholastic Aptitude Test	—	970	975	948	890	906
Percent of Gross National Product devoted to education	3.5	3.4	4.8	7.1	6.6	6.6

Source: U.S. Department of Education, Census Bureau, Educational Testing Service.

Question: How would you describe the education standards in our schools today? Would you describe them, in general, as being excellent or poor?

Education standards in schools today are ...



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, February 17-18, 1987.

Question: How about the public schools in the nation as a whole? What grade would you give the public schools nationally? . . .

Would give public schools nationally . . .

	A	B	C	D	Fail
1981	2%	18%	43%	15%	6%
1986	3	25	41	10	5

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Phi Delta Kappan* and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, latest that of 1986.

Economic

Question: We are interested in how people's financial situations may have changed. Would you say that you are financially better off now than you were a year ago, or are you financially worse off now?



	Better	Same	Worse
1981	33%	30%	35%
1982	25	26	46
1983	25	28	46
1984			
March	36	37	26
Nov./Dec.	43	32	24
1985			
March	48	26	25
October	38	34	27
1986			
March	46	24	30
September	40	29	29
1987			
January	39	33	28
March	46	23	30
June	43	24	32
Aug./Sept.	43	27	29

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of August 24-September 2, 1987.

Dow Jones Industrial Average	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986
12/31	821.51	1020.32	596.50	976.86	807.94	945.96	1033.08	1188.96	1924.07

	Inflation rate (December to December)	Labor force participation rate	Male labor force participation rate	Female labor force participation rate	Unemployment rate (All workers)	Unemployment rate for men who head families	Unemployment rate for women who head families	Median duration of unemployment (weeks)	Misery Index
					(Civilian)				
1970	5.5%	60%	80%	43%	4.8%	2.6%	5.4%	4.9	10.3
1971	3.4	60	79	43	5.8	3.2	7.3	6.3	9.2
1972	3.4	60	79	44	5.5	2.8	7.2	6.2	8.9
1973	8.8	61	79	45	4.8	2.3	7.1	5.2	13.6
1974	12.2	61	79	46	5.5	2.7	7.0	5.2	17.7
1975	7.0	61	78	46	8.3	5.1	10.0	8.4	15.3
1976	4.8	62	78	47	7.6	4.2	10.0	8.2	12.4
1977	6.8	62	78	48	6.9	3.6	9.4	7.0	13.7
1978	9.0	63	78	50	6.0	2.8	8.5	5.9	15.0
1979	13.3	64	78	51	5.8	2.8	8.3	5.4	19.1
1980	12.4	64	77	52	7.0	4.2	9.2	6.5	19.4
1981	8.9	64	77	52	7.5	4.3	10.4	6.9	16.4
1982	3.9	64	77	53	9.5	6.5	11.7	8.7	13.4
1983	3.8	64	76	53	9.5	6.5	12.2	10.1	13.3
1984	4.0	64	76	54	7.4	4.6	10.3	7.9	11.4
1985	3.8	65	76	55	7.1	4.3	10.4	6.8	10.9
1986	1.1	65	76	55	6.9	4.4	9.8	6.9	8.0

Note: The Misery Index = the unemployment rate + the inflation rate.
Source: *Economic Report of the President*, January 1987. Misery Index, *Public Opinion* calculation.

Median Household Income
(in 1986 dollars)

		Change
All households		
1980	$23,564	
1986	24,897	+6%
For married couple's households		
1980	$30,800	
1986	32,805	+7%
For female-headed households		
1980	$14,400	
1986	13,647	−5%
For households headed by 35-44 year olds		
1980	$31,400	
1986	32,787	+4%
For households headed by 45-54 year olds		
1980	$33,400	
1986	35,660	+7%

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Indicators

Question: Looking ahead, do you expect that at this time next year you will be financially better off than now or worse off than now?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of August 24-September 2, 1987.

	Better	Same	Worse
1981	41%	25%	26%
1982	37	24	29
1983	45	24	22
1984			
March	54	28	11
Nov./Dec.	50	28	17
1985			
March	57	26	12
October	49	32	12
1986			
March	61	16	18
September	57	19	16
1987			
January	51	26	16
March	59	18	17
June	57	18	17
Aug./Sept.	56	20	16

Late poll: Gallup/*Newsweek*

October 22-23, 1987

Better	52%
Same	16
Worse	21

Business Failures

	Number	Total failure liability (billions of dollars)	Failure rate per 10,000 listed concerns
1984	52,078	29	107
1985	57,253	37	115
1986p	61,232	44	120

Note: p = preliminary.
Source: The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, *Business Failure Record*.

Business Startups

	Number of firms	Number of employees
1985	249,770	1,360,015
1986	251,597	1,220,003

Source: The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, *Business Starts Record*.

Number of Farms and Land in Farms
(percent change)

	United States		Midwest		Iowa	
	Farms	Acres	Farms	Acres	Farms	Acres
1960-65	—14.2	-1.4	— 1.3	— .8	—11.0	0
1970-75	1.3	1.6	—11.8	- .9	— 3.1	1.8
1980-86	— 9.0	—3.0	— 9.9	—1.3	— 8.4	— .6

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Farm Real Estate Market Developments*.

Dollar Value of Farmland
(dollars per acre)

	United States	Iowa
1965	146	279
1970	195	392
1975	339	719
1980	737	1,840
1986	596	841

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Farm Real Estate Market Developments*.

Farm Failures

1984	1,988
1985	2,699
1986	2,622
1987*	2,804

Note: * = First 7 months.
Source: The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation.

GETTING BY

Question: What is the smallest amount of money your family needs each week to get along in this community?



	Median Estimate
1977	$152
1978	198
1979	199
1980	203
1981	248
1982	248
1983	249
1984	252
1985	298
1986	300

Note: The median estimate is the mid-point of the dollar amounts reported. One-half of the sample is above and one-half is below the median dollar amount.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 7-10, 1987.

McDonald's

	1977	1987
Hamburger and fries	$ .60	$1.07

Note: Suggested price. Prices vary by region.
Source: McDonald's.

Cost of Raising a Child to age 18*
(thousands of dollars)

1981	
in urban area	76.2
in rural area	71.1
1986	
in urban area	92.2
in rural area	85.9

Note: *In a husband-wife family with no more than 5 children present. Estimates are for Midwest (considered appropriate for a U.S. average).
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Family Economics Research Group.

Children and Poverty

	Poverty rate for children under 18 (percent)	
	In all families	In female-headed families
1970	14.9	53.0
1975	16.8	52.7
1980	17.9	50.8
1985	20.1	53.6

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

	Pupil-teacher ratio (K-12)	Expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance in public schools (constant 1985-86 dollars)
1970	22.3	—
1975	20.4	$3,329
1980	19.0	3,471
1985	17.9	4,051 (est.)

Source: U.S. Department of Education.

Food Prices

	1977	1987
5 lbs. sugar	$ .87	$1.83
1 gal. milk	1.27	1.99
1 lb. butter	.69	2.14
1 lb. hamburger	.69	1.49
1 doz. eggs	.69	.69
1 loaf bread	.44	.50

Note: Washington area prices.
Source: Supermarket advertisements (1977), Safeway (1987).

THE DEFICIT AND TAXES

Question: Basically, there are only a few ways this deficit can be reduced. Please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of each of the following ways to reduce the deficit.



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 10-13, 1987.

Question: Are you worried enough about the federal budget deficit to be willing to have your income taxes increased to reduce it, or not?



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, latest that of September 21-22, 1987.

Question: Now here is a list of some of the kinds of imported products now being sold in this country. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and for each one tell me whether you think the products are usually better quality than those made here, about the same quality as those made here, or not as good quality as those made here? . . . Now would you tell me for each of those products whether you think they are usually a better value for the dollar than those made here, about equal value for the dollar, or not as good value for the dollar as those made here? . . .



Note: In 1985, the "about the same" responses were (in the order shown above) 29%, 33%, 32%, 22%, and 24%. The "not as good quality" responses were 14%, 17%, 21%, 47%, and 64%. The "about equal value" responses were 31%, 34%, 32%, 23%, and 24%. The "not as good value" responses were 22%, 19%, 21%, 58%, and 44%.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-10), latest that of October 26-November 2, 1985.

	Exports of goods and services	Imports of goods and services
	(billions of 1982 dollars)	
1970	178	208
1971	179	209
1972	195	245
1973	242	274
1974	269	268
1975	260	241
1976	274	285
1977	282	317
1978	313	339
1979	357	353
1980	389	332
1981	393	343
1982	362	336
1983	348	368
1984	370	453
1985	362	471
1986p	371	521

Societal Indicators

Question: Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the right direction today, or do you feel that things have gotten seriously off on the wrong track?



	Right direction	Wrong track
1977	41%	44%
1978	34	53
1979	20	65
1980	20	70
1981	32	54
1982	27	63
1983	34	58
1985	49	39
1986	45	42
1987	31	57

Note: A September 17-23, 1987 ABC News/*Washington Post* question found that 43% said "going in the right direction" and 54% said "the country was off on the wrong track."
Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-3), latest that of February 14-28, 1987.

Question: How do you feel things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, pretty badly, or very badly? (1)

Question: In commenting on how things are going in the country, some people tell us that the problems we face are no worse than at any other time in recent years. Others say the country is really in deep and serious trouble today. Which comes closest to your own feelings—the fact that Problems are no worse than at other times. . . . The country is in deep and serious trouble? (2)

Source: Survey by Times Mirror/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman; latest that of October 22, 1987.

	Problems no worse than other times (2)	Things in this country are going well (1)
March 1977	57%	68%
May	56	64
July	59	69
November	57	64
March 1978	56	53
May/June	46	49
October	47	55
April 1979	33	36
October	27	33
December	33	36
January 1980	24	34
mid-March	20	24
late March	16	21
May	19	21
August	27	30
October	27	31
January 1981	31	27
May	38	50
September	46	53
December	41	43
March 1982	39	38
June	41	40
October	39	40
December	35	35
March 1983	39	45
June	51	58
September	49	56
December	51	60
February 1984	57	68
August	61	68
September	59	70
October	65	74
December	60	74
May 1985	55	68
July	58	69
September	58	67
November	58	69
April 1986	—	66
May	—	65
July	—	68
September	—	62
February 1987	53	60
May	—	60
August	—	61

CRIME

Question: Is there any area right around here—that is, within a mile—where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April, 1987.

Question: In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April, 1987.

Criminal Victimizations	
1981	41.5 million
1985	34.9 million
1986	34.1 million

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

DIVORCE

Question: Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April, 1987.

	Marriages	Divorces
1977	2,178,000	1,091,000
1981	2,422,000	1,213,000
1984p	2,487,000	1,155,000

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1987.*

EXTRAMARITAL SEX

Question: What is your opinion about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner—is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

HOMOSEXUALITY

Question: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April, 1987.

ABORTION

Question: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion. . . .

	Percentage of those who said yes	
	1977	1987
Should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain legal abortion . . .		
If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?	86%	79%
If she is married and does not want any more children?	47	42
If the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy?	91	89
If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?	54	45
If she becomes pregnant as a result of rape?	84	81
If she is not married and does not want to marry the man?	50	42
If the woman wants it for any reason?	33*	40

Note: * This question was not asked in 1977. This data is from 1978.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April 1987.

Abortions

	Number of legal abortions	Rate per 1,000 women
1975	1,034,000	21.7
1977	1,316,700	26.4
1981	1,577,000	29.3
1983	1,515,000	27.4

Source: U.S. Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia.

Religious Belief

Question: Did you, yourself, happen to attend church or synagogue in the last seven days?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1986.

Question: How important would you say religion is in your own life—very important, fairly important, or not very important at all?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1986.

CHARITABLE ACTIVITY

Question: Do you yourself happen to be involved in any charity or social service activities, such as helping the poor, the sick, or the elderly?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May 4-10, 1987.

Charitable Giving
(billions)

	Individuals	Corporations	Foundations
1977	$29.3	$1.7	$2.0
1980	39.9	2.5	2.4
1986	71.7	4.5	5.2

Source: *Giving U.S.A.*, 1986 Annual Report, American Association of Fund Raising Counsel, Inc., latest that of 1986.

Constructing A Winning Coalition

by Andrew Kohut and Norman Ornstein

For more than six years, through two presidential elections, Ronald Reagan was on a roll, attracting public support and admiration greater than any president since Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s. Reagan restored America's shattered confidence in its institutions, erasing notions of a misery index, malaise, and maladroit leadership.

No wonder, then, that the Gallup poll in November 1986 showed that nearly two-thirds of the American public approved of Reagan's performance in the White House—a rating significantly higher than the margin of victory he had achieved in the 1984 GOP landslide. Indeed, polls even showed some signs of softening opinion among Reagan's strongest opposition, black Americans, toward the Republican president. And in early 1985, Republicans looked like they were increasing the number and proportion of their party adherents—promising evidence of a long-promised partisan realignment, the possible extension of Reagan's popularity permanently to his party.

Seven years after the 1980 election, the situation is not quite so outstanding. Reagan has not dipped to Truman or Carter nadirs of approval, but he has moved from two-thirds support to a bare majority. While still basically bullish, people have less confidence in the nation's leadership and institutions. The gains in Republican party identification in 1985 have disappeared, dashing hopes that the Reagan coalition will become an enduring Republican coalition. By objective standards, Reagan and the Reagan presidency are healthy in the eyes of the electorate, but the forward roll of the first six years has stopped and begun to move backward.

What has happened to cause such bright hopes to dim? One major factor has been the Iran-Contra affair. In a matter of weeks, it sharply eroded a solid and previously unshakable bloc of public support. But one event alone was not responsible. The nature of the Reagan coalition—the kinds of voters and types of groups that made Reagan's two handsome victories possible and kept his popularity buoyant for so long—also helps explain the abrupt shift in momentum in the president's seventh year.

The Demographics of the Reagan Coalition

In partisan terms, the coalition forged by Ronald Reagan was a combination of three kinds of voters: traditional Republicans; voters who had leaned Republican for years but identified themselves as Independents; and Democrats and Independents who had never before shown any inclination to vote Republican. These partisan groupings reflect broader demographic tendencies.

In 1980 core Republican groups gave Reagan a level of support comparable to all the other postwar Republican candidates except Barry Goldwater. But in 1984, Reagan's support among these GOP partisans skyrocketed. Gallup found that 96 percent of Republicans voted for Reagan, matching or exceeding the highest levels ever recorded for Republican candidates. His support among the broader demographic groups that comprise the traditional Republican vote coalition reflected that partisan consensus (see table 1).

While Reagan captured 59 percent of the overall vote, he achieved 68 percent support among those earning $50,000 or more per year, 71 percent among white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and 68 percent among households headed by business people or professionals. In both elections, Reagan outpolled his Democratic opponents in small-town and suburban America—two solid Republican territories—and among white Americans, a group that has gone Republican in every presidential election since 1964.

One of the keys to both Reagan victories was the strong support he obtained from Catholics and southerners, two groups that have traditionally leaned Democratic but have at least flirted with the Republican party in national elections since 1968.

In 1980 Ronald Reagan brought a plurality of Catholics to the GOP side, with most exit polls showing his vote among Catholics at just under 50 percent and the Carter vote in the 41 to 46 percent range (the rest went to John Anderson).

But 1984 was another story. A full 61 percent of Catholics supported Reagan's reelection effort. What-

ever vestiges of the New Deal that had kept Catholics from moving to the GOP presidential column in the past were gone—possibly forever.

Like Catholics, southerners had longstanding historical Democratic party loyalties with rare glimmers of partiality to the Republicans. In 1980, Reagan achieved 52 percent of the vote in southern states. But in 1984, that modest margin exploded to a 63 to 37 percent Reagan landslide over Walter Mondale, with the margin considerably stronger among white southerners.

Ronald Reagan was also able to capture support from a demographic group that had shown no previous GOP tendencies. Throughout most of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, young people distinctly favored Democratic candidates over Republican. This tendency was still evident in 1980 when Reagan was only able to split the under thirty vote with Carter. But in 1984, Reagan broke through with a record 60 percent of the under thirty vote, exceeding John F. Kennedy's share in 1960. Among postwar presidents, only LBJ in 1964 outran Ronald Reagan among young people.

Reagan was also able to capture the solid allegiance of men. In 1984, Ronald Reagan got more votes from men than any other presidential candidate in the past nine elections.

Table 1

DECLINE IN REAGAN SUPPORT BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS

	Voted for Reagan in 1984	Approval April 25 – May 5, 1987*	Difference
Total	59%	47%	– 12
By sex:			
Male	64	52	– 12
Female	55	43	– 12
By race:			
White	66	52	– 14
Nonwhite	13	21	+ 8
By education:			
Coll. grad.	62	52	– 10
Some college	60	50	– 10
H. S. grad.	61	49	– 12
Less than H. S. grad.	50	38	– 12
By age:			
Under 30	60	54	– 6
18–24	59	55	– 4
25–29	61	52	– 9
30–49	60	48	– 12
50 +	59	42	– 17
By race religion:			
Prot.	61	49	– 12
Cath.	61	46	– 15
Black	8	19	+ 11
Hisp.	51	43	– 8
By Political ID:			
Rep.	96	81	– 15
Dem.	21	21	0
Ind.	67	50	– 17
By Household:			
Union	48	41	– 7
Non-union	62	49	– 13
By region:			
East	54	46	– 8
Midwest	58	43	– 15
South	63	50	– 13
West	60	49	– 11
By Metropolitan area:			
Central city	49	42	– 7
Suburb	62	50	– 12
Rural (non-SMSA)	65	47	– 18

*Times Mirror Typology Survey, n = 4,244

Reagan's Impact

Demographic groups overlap, and that limits the utility of pure demographic analysis. But what it can tell us is that the common link among the groups that have supported the president is neither ideology nor political ideas. Rather, it is opinions about Reagan himself and what he represented—and achieved—as a leader. Consider young people in 1984. Polls at the end of the 1984 campaign showed people under thirty consistently reporting that Walter Mondale came closer to their way of thinking than Ronald Reagan on most issues—yet they voted solidly for Reagan. For most voters in 1984, young and old alike, it wasn't where Reagan stood, it was what he accomplished.

If Reagan's performance more than his philosophy undergirded his support, it is not surprising that the level of support dropped with Iran-Contra. The public response was stark: the president's approval rating took the steepest plunge in the fifty-year history of the presidential approval tracking question. Ronald Reagan has lost support virtually across the board. If we compare Reagan's recent approval ratings to the percentage that voted for him in 1984, we find a twelve-point decline overall—from 59 percent of the vote to 47 percent approval (see table 1). The decline shows up in all but two groups: Democrats and blacks. Democrats remained stable: 21 percent approved of the president, matching the percentage who voted for him in 1984. Among blacks, ironically, Reagan's approval rating is actually *higher* than the percentage who voted for him three years ago.

A few groups stand out. In the Midwest and in rural areas fueled by economic problems, Reagan's approval rating fell more sharply than the norm, by 15 and 19 percentage points, respectively. Older voters are also more disillusioned. Young people, however, had a much greater propensity to stand by their man. Reagan's approval ratings were off only 6 points among those under thirty. Catholics, meanwhile, showed less faith in the president than Protestants, falling off by an average 15 points compared to 12 for Protestants.

Why have young people and older voters reacted in the opposite way? Why has Democratic support for Reagan not declined sharply from its already modest levels? Why have Catholics fallen away in greater numbers than Protestants? Answers to questions of this sort are key to understanding the Reagan coalition.

A Typological Look at the Reagan Coalition

Convinced that demographics, ideology, and partisan identification alone were not enough to explain voting patterns and election preferences, the Times Mirror Corporation commissioned Gallup to develop a way to segment the electorate using underlying values. Answers to seventy-two questions on the values that have in the past been tied to political choice elicited nine core beliefs. When those nine beliefs were related to partisan self-identification and to political involvement,

eleven distinct political categories emerged. The categories flesh out our demographic interpretation of the Reagan coalition.

It was Ronald Reagan's political genius that enabled him to weave together four disparate groups. But that success contained the seeds of subsequent decline, when events changed political reality.

Reagan's political foundation started with "Enterprisers" and "Moralists," equal size groups of rock-solid Republicans who voted 96 percent and 98 percent, respectively, for him in 1984. Party loyalty and voting patterns are what these two groups have in common. Enterprisers are driven by economic issues, from a pro-business, anti-government, and free-market position. They are moderately tolerant on lifestyle and social questions. Moralists are characterized by their préoccupation with the social agenda. They are less tolerant of lifestyles unlike their own. They are not hostile to an assertive role for government in the social welfare arena. Enterprisers tend to be affluent, married, suburban, and educated, and Moralists tend to be middle aged, middle income, and southern, from small towns or rural areas.

Despite their different concerns, these two groups showed equal enthusiasm for Ronald Reagan. He was able to motivate Enterprisers with his economic program and Moralists with his soaring and convincing rhetoric about his commitment to the conservative social agenda. The two groups turned out in massive proportions to cast their votes for Reagan; although combined they make up only 21 percent of the overall electorate, Enterprisers and Moralists comprise a full 30 percent of voters.

Thirty percent is a healthy foundation, but it is not enough to build a majority. Reagan went further in his coalition, including two additional groups of Independents who lean to the GOP but remain outside it in their own minds. These two groups, "Upbeats" and "Disaffecteds," voted 86 percent and 81 percent, respectively, for Reagan in 1984—but each voted over twenty percentage points less than that for GOP candidates for Congress in 1986.

Upbeats are clearly a legacy of Ronald Reagan and his presidency. Nine percent of the voting population and 9 percent of likely voters, Upbeats are young (largely under thirty-five), optimistic, white, middle income, strong believers in America, moderate on most issues, and not critical of government, business, or other institutions. Reagan's theme in 1984, "It's morning in America," fits their outlook nearly perfectly.

Disaffecteds—9 percent of the adult population, but only 7 percent of actual voters—are the mirror opposite of the Upbeats. Alienated, pessimistic, down on their own financial status and on most American institutions, middle aged, middle income, middle country, Disaffecteds were attracted to Reagan because of his image as an outsider coming in to clean up the mess in Washington. That worked in 1980; even in 1984, Reagan, the ultimate insider, railed against the "puzzle palaces on the Potomac" and effectively exploited the outsider symbol.

Support from these four groups was the backbone of the president's victory coalition. In addition, Reagan was able to attract a variety of voters from other groups, for a variety of reasons. He captured a majority of a small Democratic-leaning group, the "Followers"—a young, poorly educated, heavily minority group with little interest in politics, who are not high on America but not critical of American institutions. They were attracted to Reagan's incumbency and leadership. Although this group does not vote in large numbers, it still represents 4 percent of likely voters (7 percent of adults), and 54 percent of them voted for Reagan.

Reagan also managed to attract healthy support from several other groups of Democrats or near-Democrats. The "Seculars" are affluent, professional, bicoastal, sophisticated, knowledgeable, nonreligious, and in their mid-thirties to mid-forties. Despite their issue positions and orientations closer to the Democratic party platform than to the GOP or Reagan, more than one-third of them voted for Ronald Reagan in 1984. Many were attracted to Reagan because of the strong economy, but more were turned off by the Democratic party's continuing inability to get its act together.

In addition, Reagan attracted 30 percent each of the votes of "New Dealers," the largest segment of partisan Democrats (11 percent of the population, 15 percent of voters) and of the "Passive Poor," who make up 6 percent of likely voters. The New Dealers, largely in their fifties and sixties, blue collar, anticommunist, 29 percent Catholic, and conservative on social issues like abortion, were also alienated from their own party. They were put off by their perception of the Democratic party's incompetence and its ideological tilt. The Passive Poor were also anticommunist and more accepting of authority and more reverent of American institutions like the presidency.

Looking at the coalition from this typological vantage point, it becomes easier to see why Reagan's support had the demographic profile we described above. We suggested that the president had received substantial support from Catholics, southerners, young people, and men. In addition, Reagan did well in small towns and suburbs, and among professionals and upper-income families. Upbeats, Followers, New Dealers, and the Passive Poor have concentrations of Catholics greater than the national norm; Moralists, Followers, New Dealers, and the Passive Poor are concentrated more than average in the South. Reagan's votes from Catholics and southerners, in other words, came from specific types of Catholics and southerners.

The same phenomenon holds true with age and gender. The extraordinary support for the president among Upbeats—42 percent of whom are under thirty, and 68 percent under forty—provided the backbone for his strength among young people. Young people

show up in substantial numbers in other groups as well, but it is their core among Upbeats that matters for Reagan. Similarly, Enterprisers and Disaffecteds, two groups that are key components of the basic Reagan coalition, are disproportionately male. The electorate as a whole is 48 percent male, Enterprisers are 60 percent male, and Disaffecteds, 57 percent. By contrast, the most heavily female group in the electorate is "Sixties Democrats," a knowledgeable and politically active group that is pro-social welfare, peace-oriented, tolerant on lifestyle issues, and environmentalist. Finally, professional and upper-income people are heavily concentrated among Enterprisers, Seculars, and Sixties Democrats, three groups with sophisticated knowledge about politics but with dramatically different values. Reagan earned some support from each of these three conglomerations, the most from his impressive support among upper-income and professional voters built upon the near-universal backing from the Enterprisers.

Table 2 shows Reagan's decline among these eleven categories of voters, using his 1984 vote as a baseline and comparing it to his approval ratings in 1987. The greatest dropoff comes from the Disaffecteds. For Disaffecteds, cynical about politics and distrustful of politicians, Iran-Contra confirms their worst fears and deepest beliefs: Reagan's just like all the rest of them.

Table 2

DECLINE IN REAGAN SUPPORT BY GALLUP TIMES MIRROR GROUPS

	Voted for Reagan in 1984	Approved of Reagan May 5, 1987	Difference
Enterprisers	96%	84%	-12
Moralists	96	85	-11
Upbeats	86	71	-15
Disaffecteds	78	49	-29
Bystanders	0	--	--
Followers	54	41	-13
Seculars	34	27	-7
'60s Democrats	25	18	-7
New Dealers	30	27	-3
Passive Poor	31	30	-1
Partisan Poor	19	20	+1

Although the core Republican groups continue to have favorable opinions about the president, his ratings have declined by 12 percentage points among Enterprisers and 11 among Moralists. There is a slightly greater change among Upbeats, who lack the strong partisan anchor of Enterprisers and Moralists. Issue beliefs and partisan sentiments no doubt limit the negative feelings toward the president from the two GOP units; continuing good times and a bullish attitude have kept most Upbeats in the president's camp.

Interestingly, Iran-Contra and the events of the past year have affected the attitudes of Democrats and Democratic leaners toward Reagan less than those of Republicans and Republican leaners. Approval among Seculars and Sixties Democrats dropped only 7 points each; New Dealers and the Passive Poor have barely changed. Seculars, Sixties Democrats, and New Dealers who voted for and/or liked Ronald Reagan are still uneasy with the Democratic party. Lacking a deep commitment to Reagan, they did not feel as let down or disillusioned by the Iran-Contra mess. And, of course, for all of these Democratic or leaning groups, their base of support for the president was half or less of the base among the GOP or GOP-leaning groups, leaving less potential for dramatic dropoff.

An Unstable Coalition

The data have to be disturbing to the president's partisans and to those who have confidently predicted the coming of a new Republican era. The Republican party base had four sturdy legs in 1984—Enterprisers, Moralists, Upbeats, and Disaffecteds—but one, the Disaffecteds, has been sawed in half, and another, the Upbeats, is growing a bit wobbly. While Iran-Contra is the root of the Disaffecteds' defection, the problem goes deeper—back to the fact that, after nearly seven years of this president, the Upbeats and Disaffecteds remain stubbornly independent, unwilling to commit their enduring allegiance to the GOP. Each has liked the president for different reasons, but has not been willing to transfer that affection to a solid partisan attachment. And now their support for the president is diminishing, reducing the chance that they will commit to the GOP or even turn out to vote in 1988.

If the Disaffecteds' disillusionment remains at current levels through the campaign, it is hard to imagine them voting 80-plus percent for the Republican candidate—indeed, it is hard to imagine many of them voting at all. And if times should become more uncertain—and it would not take too many more stock market drops to make it so—the Upbeats would not be so enthusiastic about the GOP. Neither would many affluent Seculars. Moreover, if the Democratic party showed any signs of stability, cohesiveness, and predictability, the defections of New Dealers and Passive Poor would clearly be reduced.

The Reagan coalition cast an exceptionally wide net, attracting some voters for partisan reasons, some because of issues or themes or performance, and some for personality and image reasons. The breadth of the president's base was a major factor in his success in building such a coalition—but that very breadth also contributed to the longer-term instability of the coalition, and to the disappointment of those who hoped that Ronald Reagan could, at long last, build a Republican majority in America. ☑

Andrew Kohut is president of the Gallup Organization. Norman Ornstein is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Contra-dictions:

PUBLIC AND LEADERSHIP OPINION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

by Mark Falcoff

One of the changes in American foreign policy making in the last dozen years has been the use of foreign opinion to help shape the domestic debate over our international role. In the past Americans knew little about foreigners and foreign countries and professed not to care. Since the Vietnam War, however, a decline in our national self-confidence has raised the relative standing within the United States of "world opinion," usually—as Peter Berger recently noted in *Commentary*—not really the opinion of the citizenry of other countries, but of their leaders and intellectuals, which is quite a different matter.

Central Americans' Concerns

This disjunction between foreign leaders and those they lead is crucial: the value of what is represented as world opinion is not its objectivity, but its specific content. The principal appeal of the views of the United Nations, or the Organization of American States, or the Non-Aligned Movement to the liberal foreign policy community is that they tend to reinforce preexisting preferences, particularly on security issues, where there is a decided bias toward non-intervention, mediation, and diplomacy—what some conservative critics are pleased to call "appeasement."

In the case of the Central American conflict, this tendency has been evident from the very start. Americans leery of military involvement in the region, first in El Salvador in 1981 and subsequently in Nicaragua, have made frequent use of the pronouncements of the Latin American "majors," particularly Mexico and (since 1983) Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama, joined together in a diplomatic initiative known as the Contadora Four. These countries have generally tended to discount the Soviet and Cuban threat to the region, have regarded the conflicts in the Central American countries as having roots in poverty rather than com-

munist subversion, and favor a diplomatic solution. Such a solution would leave the Sandinista regime in control of Nicaragua, reduce outside (that is, U.S.) military and naval presence in the region, and above all, disarm and disperse the forces of the Nicaraguan armed resistance.

Until recently, the Contadora proposals lacked a basic element of credibility—namely, they were not endorsed (and indeed, frequently were rejected) by the four countries most deeply affected by the existence of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. These nations were reluctant to consign their future security to an international control commission representing a fictitious sovereignty.

Since September 1987, however, the situation appears to be changed, thanks to a peace plan put together by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, and now endorsed by all of the other Central American countries, including Nicaragua. In many ways the Arias plan resembles earlier efforts by Contadora, but with an additional agenda, which is to obtain some slight changes in the conduct and nature of the Nicaraguan government.

Many observers doubt that it is possible to reconcile non-intervention, self-determination, and internal democratization in Nicaragua; the Reagan administration has allowed its skepticism to become a matter of public debate. But it is difficult to claim, at least at the level of rhetoric, that the Central Americans do not know their own interests, particularly when the Arias plan originates with the oldest and firmest democracy in the area (Costa Rica) and is endorsed by elected governments in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Particularly since President Arias recently received the Nobel Prize for his efforts, it seems almost certain that the Arias plan will contribute to ending U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance, and consolidating the Sandinista regime in Managua. It also presages—whether President Arias realizes it or not—a gradual U.S. diplomatic and military withdrawal from the area.

The emergence of a Central American diplomatic consensus suggests that the threat to Central America—by Nicaragua, Cuba, or anyone else—has all along been a figment of Ronald Reagan's imagination. But is this the way ordinary people in the region see things? How do they line up on such issues as U.S. aid to the Contras, the role of other Latin American countries, Soviet and Cuban involvement (or non-involvement) in their affairs? To learn the answers, in January 1987 the Consultoria Interdisciplinaria en Desarrollo, S.A. (CID), the Gallup affiliate in Costa Rica, conducted an extensive U.S.I.A.-sponsored survey in that country and in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Between 1,200 and 1,300 adults in each country were interviewed.

Some of the things the CID pollsters discovered were not surprising, since there is a considerable overlap in public attitudes in all third world countries. Most Central Americans, for instance, are mainly concerned about unemployment, inflation, corruption, and lack of good housing; the overall mood is not particularly upbeat. When asked, "How would you say things are going in our country—well or badly?" a majority in all four countries say "badly"—53 percent in Costa Rica, 81 percent in Honduras, 97 percent in El Salvador, and 87 percent in Guatemala. Nor is there abundant optimism about the future: in all of the countries at least a plurality of respondents believe the economic picture will grow worse rather than improve. The most optimistic is Costa Rica (34 percent think the economy will improve; 40 percent think it will get worse); for El Salvador the figures are, respectively, 10 and 59; for Honduras, 28 and 26; for Guatemala, 27 and 41. In all of the countries approximately a quarter of respondents believe that economic conditions "will stay the same."

When we turn to specific political and geopolitical issues, the grim mood is honed into sharply defined views. In all four countries, for example, the government of Nicaragua is seen by between 64 and 79 percent as representing a minority rather than a majority of the people; as treating its own people unjustly (62 to 85 percent); either as undemocratic as it was a year before (40 to 48 percent) or even more so (33 to 42 percent). Between 57 and 83 percent believe that the Nicaraguan government is making little or no effort to protect human rights, and a question that sought an overall opinion of the Sandinista regime yielded lopsidedly unfavorable responses.

Table 1

OPINION OF SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT

Question: Now some questions about Nicaragua. What is your opinion of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua?

	Costa Rica	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala
Very favorable	2%	1%	1%	1%
Somewhat favorable	2	7	7	7
Total, favorable	4	8	8	8
Somewhat unfavorable	21	46	47	50
Very unfavorable	69	36	27	28
Total, unfavorable	90	82	74	78

Note: "No opinion" not shown. Sample size = 1,200-1,300 in each country.

Source: Surveys by Consultoria Interdisciplinaria en Desarrollo, S.A. (CID), the Gallup affiliate in Costa Rica.

The government of Nicaragua is seen not only as a problem for its own people, but also as a serious threat to its neighbors. Thus while in many quarters in the United States the Sandinistas are thought to be an expression of purely Nicaraguan nationalism, in the four other Central American countries, between 76 and 88 percent see the Managua regime as "an instrument of Cuba and of the Soviet Union in Central America and the Caribbean" (as opposed to "independent of Cuba and the Soviet Union" or "don't know"). Except in Honduras (52 percent), only a minority—between 20 and 38 percent—think it likely that their country

will be attacked militarily by another country within the next two or three years; among those who believe it likely, Nicaragua is the country they think will attack. In such a case, however, all four believe overwhelmingly—in percentages running from 83 to 91—that "the U.S. can be relied on to help us."

When asked to name "which country, if any, is trying to weaken our government," 73 percent in Costa Rica named Nicaragua (Cuba—8 percent, U.S.S.R.—6 percent); in Honduras, 72 percent chose Nicaragua (Cuba—10, U.S.S.R.—3); in El Salvador, 64 percent Nicaragua (Cuba—45, U.S.S.R.—11). Guatemala stands apart: only 39 percent named Nicaragua, though Cuba and the Soviet Union received 23 and 14 percent, respectively.

The generally low perception of threat from the Soviet Union seems due less to confidence in that country's benevolent intentions than to a widespread opinion that Cuba acts as its local surrogate (by majorities ranging from 73 to 83 percent). Notwithstanding the many authoritative foreign policy commentators in the United States who doubt that the Soviet Union is even interested in Central America, between 73 and 79 percent in all four countries answered in the affirmative when asked whether the U.S.S.R. does or does not "foment armed conflict" in the region (those in the negative ranged from 10 to 13 percent; the remainder —between 11 and 17 percent—did not know).

The negative views of Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union contrast sharply with perceptions of the United States. As a society, it is viewed favorably or very favorably by respondents in all four countries (between 89 and 95 percent), and majorities between 64 and 86 percent named the United States as the country that is "trying to keep our government stable."[1]

Support for Critics

In two areas the Central American sample shows an important division of opinion—on dealing with the causes of conflict in El Salvador, and on the sources of support for guerrilla activities in that country and others nearby. Specifically, respondents were asked to choose between two views of the conflict in El Salvador—"there would be no war. . .if Cuba and Nicaragua were not supporting the leftist revolutionary forces," or "there would be a war even if Cuba and Nicaragua were not involved." The former proposition was chosen by an important plurality in Costa Rica (42 percent) and near or bare majorities in Honduras (50 percent) and Guatemala (54 percent). In El Salvador, a 45 percent plurality said there would be a war even without Cuba and Nicaragua.

Also some uncertainty exists (up to 57 percent "don't know") about "which country, if any, provides support for guerrilla or insurgent forces here in our country," with the exception of El Salvador, where 80 percent of the respondents named Nicaragua, 62 percent said Cuba, and 12 percent named the Soviet Union. On the other hand, El Salvador is the only one of the four to have a serious guerrilla movement (the insurgency in Guatemala is in sharp remission), so that this factor may have skewed the answer. Otherwise this response would appear to contradict the overall notion of the regional role of Cuba and the Soviet Union cited above.

In the United States the nature of the insurgencies in El Salvador and Nicaragua have provoked the sharpest foreign policy debates since the Vietnam War, but the same issues appear far less divisive within Central America itself. In all four countries, for example, people firmly oppose Cuban involvement with the Salvadoran rebels, and they support moderately to strongly U.S. military assistance to the Duarte government.

Table 2

CUBAN MILITARY AID TO LEFTIST REBELS IN EL SALVADOR

Question: As you may know, Cuba provides military aid to the leftist revolutionary forces in El Salvador. What is your opinion about the shipment of arms from Cuba to leftist revolutionary forces?

	Costa Rica	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala
Approve	5%	11%	8%	15%
Disapprove	76	76	86	79
No opinion	19	13	6	6

Table 3

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO DUARTE GOVERNMENT

Question: As you may know, the U.S. is giving military aid to the government forces in El Salvador. What is your opinion about U.S. military aid to the government forces in El Salvador?

	Costa Rica	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala
Approve	56%	81%	75%	70%
Disapprove	25	9	22	25
No opinion	19	10	3	5

When asked, "Will it be better for El Salvador if the government forces win the war, or if the leftist revolutionary forces win?" people sided with the government.

Table 4

EL SALVADOR'S FUTURE

Question: Will it be better for El Salvador if the government forces win the war, or if the leftist revolutionary forces win?

	Costa Rica	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala
Better for El Salvador if . . .				
Government wins	62%	79%	71%	76%
Rebels win	6	4	4	10
No opinion	32	17	25	14

Views on the civil war in Nicaragua—between the Sandinistas and the U.S.-supported resistance forces —are even more decisive. Again, in contrast to the United States where polls have generally shown two out of three Americans opposed to aiding the Nicara-

guan resistance, nearly three out of four Central Americans affirmed that it would be better for Nicaragua if the Contras win, and also "better for our own country."

Table 5

NICARAGUA'S FUTURE

Question: Will it be better for Nicaragua if the Sandinista government forces win the war, or if the Contra opposition forces win?

	Costa Rica	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala
Better for Nicaragua if . . .				
Sandinistas win	6%	6%	15%	17%
Contras win	76	79	62	70
No opinion	18	15	23	13

It is not surprising, then, that by majorities of between 68 to 81 percent, the Central Americans favor U.S. military aid to the Contras, and by slightly higher proportions—74 to 82 percent—approve the dispatch of non-military aid. Perhaps the area where much U.S. opinion diverges most sharply from the Central American sample has to do with the character of the resistance itself. Those polled in the four countries tend to have a higher opinion of the way Contra forces treat Nicaraguans living in areas of armed conflict than of Nicaraguan government forces (by between 46 and 74 percent). They also seem largely convinced—by between 54 and 69 percent—that in the event of a Contra victory, "their leaders will have free elections and restore democracy." And while in three of the four countries low pluralities believe the Sandinistas are *presently* winning the war (with almost as many "no opinions" as other choices), all four countries expect an ultimate Contra victory.

Table 6

NICARAGUA'S EFFECT ON ITS NEIGHBORS

Question: Will it be better for our own country if the Sandinista government forces win, or if the Contra opposition forces win?

	Costa Rica	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala
Better for us if . . .				
Sandinistas win	5%	5%	10%	14%
Contras win	76	77	70	70
No opinion	19	18	20	16

Table 7

OUTCOME IN NICARAGUA

Question: Who do you think will eventually win the war in Nicaragua—the Sandinista government forces or the Contra opposition there?

	Costa Rica	Honduras	El Salvador	Guatemala
Sandinistas will win	20%	15%	22%	21%
The Contras will win	48	51	26	54
No opinion	32	34	52	25

The relatively high vote of confidence in the Contras may represent a masked affirmation of the power of the United States, with whom they are ultimately identified. Some of the respondents may simply be assuming that, given the commitment of U.S. prestige to the outcome, Washington cannot afford to see its local allies fail. On the other hand, it seems remarkable that the Sandinistas are given so little chance of success, particularly in light of their superior armaments from the Soviet bloc, their police-state control of Nicaraguan cities, their control of the media, and the array of international forces behind them. Here there may be some confusion between perception and desire on the part of respondents; either that, or the Central Americans know something we do not. In either case their views are certainly different from those that currently prevail in the United States.

Special Cases

Responses in two of the four countries deserve additional comment. In Guatemala it is apparent that there is far less engagement in the El Salvador-Nicaragua controversy and less inclination—often by considerable percentages—to support U.S. policy in the region. In part this can be explained by geography and history—unlike Honduras or Costa Rica, Guatemala shares no contiguous borders with Nicaragua, and in contrast to El Salvador, its guerrilla movement has never had important links to the Sandinistas. (In fact the Guatemalan guerrillas predate the FSLN in Nicaragua by several years.) In its ethnography and social structure, Guatemala more nearly resembles the southern states of Mexico, and though its history is full of class and racial conflict—much like Mexico itself—the problems it faces as a society are vastly different from those of the relatively homogeneous national communities of Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador.

Moreover Guatemala's relations with the United States have been quite different. Until recently, American involvement in the internal political affairs of other Central American countries has been minimal, but the United States was deeply implicated in a military coup that in 1954 ousted leftist President Jacobo Arbenz, which unleashed decades of bloodletting. In addition, in recent years Guatemala has been subject to stringent U.S. sanctions for its appalling human rights record. The Carter administration suspended military assistance and training in 1977, and the Reagan administration felt obligated to continue the policy until 1986, when Christian Democrat President Vinizio Cerezo Arevalo took office—the first civilian elected in twenty years, and the first to win a genuinely free election in more than thirty.

The result is that both left and right in Guatemala have reasons to dislike and fear the United States. Though small and badly decimated by persecution, kidnapping, and murder, the Guatemalan left vividly recalls the role played by the United States in ending the Arbenz regime and in supplying the military with

weapons and training for nearly twenty-five years thereafter. As for the Guatemalan right, it deeply resented the Carter administration's human rights policy, which—in its recollection—forced the country's armed forces to face a guerrilla movement alone and unaided by the one foreign power that should have been its natural ally. The failure of the Reagan administration to rectify matters promptly in 1981 gave the grudge a new lease on life.

These feelings are particularly evident in responses to two questions. One asked, "Would you say U.S. treatment of our country generally has been very fair, somewhat fair, or not at all fair?" Guatemala scored the highest "unfair" rating (28 percent), compared to El Salvador (19 percent), Honduras (13 percent), and Costa Rica (10 percent). When asked to evaluate bilateral relations to determine "which country benefits most"—the United States, the surveyed country, or "are the relationships more or less equally beneficial?"—again, Guatemala stands apart. In it alone did a majority (51 percent) think that the relationship was one-sided in favor of the United States; in the other three, strong pluralities believed the relationship "equally beneficial," and between 10 to 20 percent actually perceived it to be more beneficial to the surveyed country than to the United States.

Honduras

Until recently Honduras ranked extremely low on the list of foreign policy priorities for the United States, even within the Central American region. Today, however, Tegucigalpa is a key diplomatic assignment because of that country's crucial propinquity to El Salvador and Nicaragua. United States intelligence sources have long believed that Honduras was a point of transshipment of arms and other supplies from Nicaragua destined for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Also, though officially denied by both U.S. and Honduran governments, it is apparent that Honduran territory serves as a base for Nicaraguan resistance forces moving in and out of their homeland. To underscore this country's new importance, the United States has stationed 700 troops there and periodically holds joint exercises with an expanded version of the permanent military party and with Navy forces stationed on the Caribbean side of the isthmus.

The sudden military and political presence of the United States in a country with no real tradition of close relations has raised all manner of objections in both countries. Yet in the question on the effect of bilateral relations, 45 percent of Hondurans found them "equally beneficial"—second only to Costa Rica (51 percent). A specific question about joint military maneuvers drew a complex—or perhaps merely a sophisticated—response. Some 79 percent agreed that the maneuvers "link Honduras too closely with the United States." Further, 59 percent believe that they "are dangerous [and] could lead to conflict with Nicaragua." Yet 85 percent of the same sample approved of the maneuvers nonetheless—40 percent "strongly," an additional 45 percent "somewhat." (Only 11 percent disapproved; 4 percent had no opinion.) It would appear that given their choices, Hondurans believe the U.S. presence in their country is by far the lesser of two evils. Another possible interpretation is that Hondurans are deeply ambivalent about the relationship, and that under a given set of circumstances the bottom line could change radically in short order. Honduran politicians have recently expressed consternation at the Iran-Contra hearings, which they see as a sign of profound policy incoherence in Washington, and they have wondered aloud if they are too closely identified with a policy that may soon be abandoned.

Public vs. Private Opinions

The one question the data raise is: If this is what Central Americans think of the situation in the region—of the Sandinistas and their allies and the United States—why do their presidents, particularly Arias in Costa Rica, so strongly oppose our policy, especially continued funding for the Nicaraguan resistance? One possibility is that in three of the four countries surveyed, democratic traditions are extremely weak, and foreign policy has always been the province of a tiny elite. Even in sturdily democratic Costa Rica, interest-group politics is poorly developed except for key economic groups and the labor movement. It should be recalled, however, that even in the United States, the Reagan administration has prevailed over well-organized and well-funded opposition constituencies; insofar as Central America is concerned, since 1981 anywhere from two to three out of four Americans have opposed American policy, and two out of three object to U.S. assistance to the Contras. So perhaps the disjunction between opinion and policy in Central America is not so exotic.

Another is that with the entry of West European political internationals into Central America, local politicians have become far more sensitive to continental opinion, which tends to be generally critical of the United States and inclined to give its enemies in the region (and often, indeed, elsewhere) the benefit of the doubt.[3] This is particularly true of the Socialist International, whose Costa Rican affiliate, Liberacion Nacional, is the party of President Arias. So enthusiastic was the SI about the Nicaraguan revolution that Arias's predecessor, Luis Alberto Monge, found it necessary in 1981 to make a special trip to Western Europe to remind his comrades that the Costa Rican version of democratic socialism, not the Sandinista dispensation, was closest to their own values and practices. The West European countries also loom larger in the foreign policy perspectives of the Central American countries

because they are seen as an alternate source of foreign aid, and if not precisely as a substitute for the United States, at least another leg to stand on to balance that perennial bugaboo, U.S. "hegemonism." At a minimum, West European countries—whether governments, parties, or institutions like the European parliament—offer Central American politicians and intellectuals new opportunities for travel, residence, and economic benefit, often in places quite a bit nicer than Miami, provided that they do not appear to be too closely identified with the U.S. world view.

A third possibility—which does not necessarily exclude the first two—is that the leaders of the Central American four take positions in private at considerable variance from those they assume in public. The Reagan administration has rather undiplomatically suggested as much, but it may be true anyway, since many private American citizens who have discussed matters with Presidents Arias, Duarte, Azcona, and Cerezo—as well as Nicaraguan resistance leaders who have visited with Venezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi—have come away with some fairly sensational tales. Probably the basic difference between the U.S. position on aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and the presidents of the four Central American democracies is that the latter do not believe—in contrast to their citizens—that the resistance forces can win. What is needed is a full-scale U.S. military invasion to displace the Sandinistas from power. This is a posture no Latin American president can assume publicly, however, so that it is far easier to oppose Contra aid without specifically recommending an alternative. There is a strong assumption in all four Central American countries—in both the government palaces and public opinion—that the United States will "take care" of the Nicaraguan problem one way or the other, and there is no particular need to get too far out in front of it. This allows leaders to take purposely vague positions that are not fundamentally at variance with public opinion, *given the implicit understanding*.

All of this may be too sophisticated, of course. Perhaps, indeed, as critics of Reagan policy in the United States insist, the Central American presidents and foreign ministers favor a diplomatic solution in the region because they sincerely believe it is the only one that has a chance to work. Perhaps so, but if that is the case, it runs strongly against the conventional wisdom at all levels of society in all four countries. Only time will tell who is right—"public opinion" as represented at the top of the pyramid of power, or public opinion as generally understood in the United States and other democratic societies. ☑

[1]At the time this question was asked, all four countries had democratically elected governments, so that there could be no confusion about the political import of a favorable U.S. disposition toward the local government.

[2]For a fuller discussion, see my article, "Why Europeans Support the Sandinistas," *Commentary*, August 1987.

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THE VERDICT ON FEDERAL JUDGES

by Althea K. Nagai, Stanley Rothman, and S. Robert Lichter

Judges on both the left and right generally see themselves as the public sees them: first and foremost as judges, not partisan political actors who use the bench to further a president's political platform. It is the mystique of the independent judiciary that acts as the basis of the courts' legitimacy. And it was this presumption of independence that was challenged when President Reagan proposed Robert Bork for the Supreme Court. Critics of the Bork appointment charged that Reagan was using a court selection to wage political warfare. They warned of a judiciary polarized by right-wing ideologues and legal decisions dictated by conservative dogma.

Neither side in the Bork battle was innocent of political motives. But just how independent of partisanship have past judicial appointments been? A survey of federal judges offers some answers. First, ideology has played its part in the past, and it appears that it's played a bigger part in Democratic than Republican appointments. In fact Democratic presidents have appointed self-described liberals to the courts more often than Republicans have appointed conservatives. Second, Democratic appointees are more willing to translate their own perspectives into legal principles than are their Republican counterparts, who put greater stress on judicial precedent and legislative discretion.

These findings emerge from a 1984 survey of federal district and appellate judges. Fifty-six percent of those contacted completed the questionnaire. Our sample consists of 111 judges—47 appointed during a Republican presidency and 64 appointed during a Democratic administration. As far as we know, this is the first study to analyze the relationships between judges' social backgrounds, political attitudes, and the jurisprudential values they apply when making decisions.

Background

Like most other elite groups, American federal judges are predominantly white (89 percent) and male (95 percent). At a median age of sixty, they are also relatively old. One in four earns $100,000 a year or better, with over twice as many Democratic appointees (32 percent) as Republican appointees (15 percent) reaching this figure.

Table 1
SOCIAL AND PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL JUDGES

Background	Republican appointees	Democratic appointees	Total
White	89%	89%	89%
Male	100	91	95
Median age	61	60	60
Current personal income ($100,000 +)	15	32	25
Attended selective college	62	52	56
Parents' income below average	19	28	24
Parents' income above average	53	40	46
Father's education college +	48	45	46
From a metro area	63	71	68
Discussed politics at home			
frequently	62	49	55
sometimes	31	43	38
never	6	8	7
Father a Democrat	23	61	44
Republican	77	38	56
Father a liberal	24	35	30
moderate	24	26	25
conservative	51	37	43
Political ideology			
liberal	28	75	54
moderate	35	14	23
conservative	37	11	23

Federal judges come from politically active homes. Fifty-five percent report that they had discussed politics "frequently" at home while growing up, about eight times the proportion of those who never did so. Proportionately more Republican than Democratic appointees learned about politics at home: 62 percent of the Republican compared to 49 percent of the Democratic judges claim to have discussed politics frequently with their parents.

Most judges appointed by Democrats had fathers who were Democrats (61 percent), and those appointed by Republicans tended to have Republican fathers (77 percent). Party affiliation, however, is not necessarily the same as ideology. We asked the judges to rate their fathers' political ideology on a seven-point scale, with one being extremely conservative, four being moderate, and seven being extremely liberal. Only 35 percent of Democratic appointees recall their fathers being politically liberal (a ranking of five or more); half of the Republican appointees (51 percent) label their fathers as conservative.

Our data demonstrate that judges' political ideolo-

gies do not necessarily correspond to the party affiliation of the presidents who appointed them. While the Democratic appointees are mostly liberal, the Republican appointees are almost evenly divided ideologically. Seventy-five percent of the Democratic appointees classify themselves as liberal, 14 percent regard themselves as moderate, and 11 percent see themselves as conservative. Of the Republican appointees, 28 percent think of themselves as liberal, 35 percent as moderate, and 37 percent as conservative.

Voting and Political Issues

Voting records closely match party appointment. In overwhelming numbers, judges appointed by Democratic presidents have voted for Democratic candidates, and judges appointed by Republican presidents supported Republican candidates.

Table 2
VOTE FOR PRESIDENT

	Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
1968		
Nixon	79%	14%
Humphrey	20	86
1972		
Nixon	93	25
Humphrey	7	75
1976		
Ford	91	14
Carter	9	86
1980		
Reagan	85	23
Carter	10	75
Anderson	5	2

Federal judges, regardless of party, are firm believers in rewarding individual merit. An overwhelming majority of both Republican and Democratic appointees believe that those with more ability should earn more money (98 percent and 86 percent, respectively). The Democratic appointees, however, are more pessimistic about the rewards of hard work. While 85 percent of the Republican appointees think that hard work pays off, a significantly smaller majority of those appointed during Democratic administrations (59 percent) agree. Given their views, it is no surprise to find the latter less likely to hold the poor responsible for their economic plight. Fifty percent of them compared to one-third (33 percent) of the Republican appointees believe the condition of the poor is a result of circumstances beyond their control.

Not surprisingly, economic ideology divides federal judges. Republican appointees are more receptive to laissez-faire principles while most Democratic appointees support an expansive welfare state. Large majorities of both groups agree that private enterprise is fair to workers (87 and 70 percent, respectively). But while 85 percent of judges appointed by Republican presidents believe that less regulation of business is good, only a slight majority (54 percent) of those appointed by Democratic presidents agree. Seventy percent of the Republican appointees think that the government should not guarantee jobs for all—twice that of the Democrats.

On the other side of the coin, 57 percent of those appointed by Democratic presidents endorse the idea of having the government insure a good standard of living for all, compared to a little over one in four (27 percent) of those appointed by Republican presidents. An even larger percentage of Democratic appointees (78 versus 44 percent of Republicans) want the government to substantially reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. One in ten Democratic appointees, but only 2 percent of Republican judges, agree that big corporations should be taken out of private ownership, while almost one in five Democrats (19 percent) versus 4 percent of the Republicans, think that the United States "should move toward socialism."

Support for the welfare state does not translate into alienation from American society as a whole. Less than half of the Democratic appointees (41 percent) and a slightly smaller percentage of Republican judges (37 percent) believe that the American legal system favors the wealthy. Only 24 percent of the Democratic judges and 13 percent of the Republican appointees agree that American institutions need to be overhauled, although 38 percent of the Democrats (compared to 22 percent of the Republicans) believe that American society alienates its citizens.

Sex and Morality

Republican appointees hold more conservative attitudes toward sexual behavior and the moral codes that surround it than do Democrats, although some surprising similarities emerge. Seventy-one percent of the Republican appointees, as well as 63 percent of the Democratic judges, believe that adultery is wrong. Sixty percent of Republicans hold the position that gays should not teach in public schools, compared to only 22 percent of those appointed by Democratic presidents, while 77 percent of the Republican appointees versus 59 percent of the Democratic judges agree that homosexual relations are wrong. On the hotly debated abortion issue, however, four out of five from both groups agree that a woman has the right to decide for herself whether or not to have an abortion. The question wording may be tapping a factual understanding of *Roe v. Wade* rather than personal pro-choice attitudes.

Minorities and Women

Democratic appointees express somewhat more liberal attitudes toward minorities and women than do Republicans. Fifty percent of the Republican appointees and 57 percent of the Democratic judges believe that blacks don't have the chance for the education it takes to rise out of poverty, while only 25 percent of the

Table 3
ATTITUDES ON SELECTED ISSUES

Economics	Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
Agree:		
The more able should earn more	98%	86%
U.S. offers opportunity for financial security to all those who work hard	85	59
The poor are such due to circumstances beyond their control	33	50
Private enterprise fair to workers	87	70
Less regulation of business is good for country	85	54
Government should not guarantee jobs	70	36
Government should insure good standard of living	27	57
Government should reduce the income gap between rich and poor	44	78
Big corporations should be taken out of private ownership	2	10
U.S. would be better off if it moved toward socialism	4	19
American legal system favors wealthy	37	41
U.S. institutions need complete restructuring	13	24
Social structure causes most to feel alienated	22	38
Sex and morality		
Extramarital sex is wrong	71	63
Homosexuals should not teach in public schools	60	22
Adult homosexual relations are wrong	77	59
A woman has right to decide on abortion	80	81
Blacks and Women		
Almost all blacks' recent gains have come at expense of whites	6	3
Special preference should be given to blacks in hiring	41	62
Blacks don't have the chance for education it takes to rise out of poverty	50	57
Blacks don't have motivation or willpower to pull themselves out of poverty	25	14
Special preference should be given to women in hiring	22	47
Women with young children shouldn't work unless financially necessary	47	34
The Environment		
Environmental problems not as serious as thought	47	19
Foreign Policy		
U.S. morally obligated to prevent destruction of Israel	69	83
U.S. foreign policy's main goal to protect business	24	33
We should be more forceful with USSR even at risk of war	47	21
American military should be strongest no matter what cost	43	20
Sometimes necessary for CIA to undermine hostile governments	66	33

Republican appointees and 14 percent of the Democratic appointees believe that blacks lack the motivation to advance. Judges almost uniformly reject the notion of a zero-sum conflict between blacks and whites: only 6 percent of the Republican judges and a mere 3 percent of the Democratic judges view black gains in recent years as coming at whites' expense. The biggest gap appears in a question about affirmative action for blacks. Sixty-two percent of the Democratic judges but only 41 percent of the Republicans believe that blacks should receive special preference in hiring.

Judges are less supportive of special hiring preferences for women. Forty-seven percent of Democratic appointees and less than a quarter of the Republicans (22 percent) favor special hiring preferences for women. Nor are judges wholehearted supporters of the working woman. Forty-seven percent of the Republican judges and one in three Democrats (34 percent) believe that women with young children should not work outside the home unless financially necessary.

Who Rules and Who Should Rule?

The survey asked judges to rate several leadership groups in terms of the influence each wields over American life. We then asked them to rate the same groups according to the amount of influence they believe each *should* exert. The ten groups include black leaders, feminists, consumer groups, intellectuals, business leaders, labor unions, the military, the federal government, religious leaders, and the news media.

The judges show a remarkable consensus in their

Table 4
JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE IN AMERICA

Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
1) News media	1) News media
2) Business	2) Business
3) Federal government	3) Federal government
4) Labor	4) Military
5) Intellectuals	5) Labor
6) Consumer groups	6) Intellectuals
7) Religious leaders	7) Religious leaders
8) Military	8) Consumer groups
9) Feminists	9) Black leaders
10) Black leaders	10) Feminists

JUDICIAL PREFERENCES CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE IN AMERICA

Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
1) Business	1) Intellectuals
2) Intellectuals	2) Consumer groups
3) Religious leaders	3) Business
4) Consumer groups	4) Labor
5) Black leaders	5) Black leaders
6) News media	6) News media
7) Labor	7) Feminists
8) Feminists	8) Religious leaders
9) Federal government	9) Federal government
10) Military	10) Military

sense of who exercises influence, but some partisan differences emerge over who should wield it. Both Republican and Democratic appointees rate the news media as the most influential group in America, followed by business leaders and bureaucrats in the federal government. Both view labor, intellectuals, consumer groups, and religious leaders as having moderate influence, although in somewhat different order. The only notable difference concerns the military, which Democratic appointees rate as substantially more influential than do their Republican counterparts. Both groups see blacks and feminists as having the least influence.

When listing their preferences, Republicans and Democrats alike indicate a desire to change the current influence hierarchy in America. Both groups would drastically reduce the influence of the media—the media drops from first to sixth. As expected, Republican judges end up wishing to give business more power than do Democratic appointees. Business leaders rank first among the Republican judges, but only third among Democrats. Intellectuals also do well among the judges. They come out second among Republican appointees, first among Democratic judges. Both groups would increase the influence of consumer groups and black leaders, but only the Republican appointees would give a boost to religious leaders and reduce the labor movement's clout.

Finally, Republican and Democratic judges agree on which groups should be least influential. They both rank federal government agencies and the military at the bottom of the list.

Heroes and Villains: Judges Rate Public Figures

Judges' political ideologies are further reflected in their ratings of major public figures. We asked them to rate a number of figures on a scale of one (strongly disapprove) to five (strongly approve).

As table 5 shows, differences in party appointment roughly match differences in approval of various public figures and political movements. Republican judges hold mainstream conservative public figures and groups in higher esteem than they do liberal or radical individuals or groups (although the conservative Moral Majority emerges at the bottom end of the scale). Republican judges' strongest approval goes to such conservatives as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Milton Friedman, and Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Those appointed by Democratic presidents, in contrast, give their highest marks to liberals. Their favorite is John Kenneth Galbraith, followed by Ted Kennedy, Ralph Nader, Andrew Young, and Gloria Steinem. They rate Ronald Reagan just above the Sandinistas and Fidel Castro, and the Moral Majority dead last.

Table 5
JUDGES' APPROVAL RANKINGS FOR PUBLIC FIGURES

Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
1) Margaret Thatcher	1) John Kenneth Galbraith
2) Ronald Reagan	2) Ted Kennedy
3) Milton Friedman	3) Ralph Nader
4) Jeane Kirkpatrick	4) Andrew Young
5) John Kenneth Galbraith	5) Gloria Steinem
6) Andrew Young	6) Jeane Kirkpatrick
7) Gloria Steinem	7) Margaret Thatcher
8) Ralph Nader	8) Milton Friedman
9) Ted Kennedy	9) Ronald Reagan
10) Moral Majority	10) Sandinistas
11) Sandinistas	11) Fidel Castro
12) Fidel Castro	12) Moral Majority

What Do Judges Read?

Last, we wanted to know what judges read and what news sources they trust. We asked our sample to rate the reliability of a dozen media sources of fact and opinion, including journals of the left and right (*The Nation* and *Commentary*) for example, as well as avowedly nonpartisan sources of information (*New York Times*, nightly network news, PBS). They rated each outlet on a scale from one (lowest reliability) to seven (highest reliability). We then ranked the news sources on the basis of their mean scores.

Table 6
ESTIMATES OF RELIABILITY OF VARIOUS NEWS SOURCES

Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
1) *U.S. News*	1) *New York Times*
2) PBS	2) PBS
3) *New York Times*	3) *New York Review of Books*
4) *Commentary*	4) *Newsweek*
5) *Time* magazine	5) *Washington Post*
6) *Newsweek*	6) *U.S. News*
7) *New York Review of Books*	7) *New Republic*
8) *National Review*	8) *Time* magazine
9) *Public Interest*	9) *Public Interest*
10) *New Republic*	10) *The Nation*
11) *The Nation*	11) *Commentary*
12) *Washington Post*	12) TV Network News
13) TV Network News	13) *National Review*

As in all other comparisons, the Republican judges tend to trust conservatives while the Democratic judges generally trust liberals. However, many judges felt that they were not in a position to rate opinion journals such as *Commentary*, *National Review*, *The Nation*, and *Public Interest*.

Republican judges view *U.S. News & World Report* as the most reliable source of news, followed by PBS, the *New York Times*, and the conservative opinion magazine *Commentary*. They consider *Time*, *Newsweek*, and the *New York Review of Books* moderately reliable, but rate the conservative *National Review* as more reliable than television news or the *Washington Post*.

Mainstream newspapers fare better among Democratic judges. The Democrats hold the *New York Times* in highest regard, followed by PBS, and then the *New York Review of Books*. The weekly magazines, the *Wash-*

ington Post, and *The New Republic* (a liberal-to-moderate journal of opinion) receive lower reliability ratings. *Commentary*, television network news, and *National Review* receive the lowest ratings of all news sources.

Judges on Judging

To what extent do judges consciously *make* law, and how much should they? To what extent are they constrained by precedent, and to what extent do they regard it as legitimate to read their personal conceptions of justice into law?

Table 7
INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL DECISIONS*

Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
1) Precedent	1) Your views of justice in the case
2) Your views of justice in the case	2) Precedent
3) The needs of the public	3) The needs of the public
4) Community values	4) Community values
5) Views of law clerks	5) Views of law clerks
6) Views of respected members of the Bar	6) Views of respected members of the Bar
7) Amicus curiae briefs	7) Amicus curiae briefs

* The judges were asked: In reaching your decisions, how influential do you consider the following factors. Please rate each item on a scale of one to seven where one is "very little," four is "moderate," and seven is "a great deal."

Our sample of judges provides a unique opportunity to look at the relationship between the presidential party under which a judge was appointed, his political ideology, and his judicial philosophy. Most Republican appointees hold to the belief that their job is to apply the law, not to make it, while Democrats are about evenly split on this question. Sixty-nine percent of Republican appointees, compared to 51 percent of Democratic appointees, agree that judges should just apply the law and leave the rest to legislators. In at least some concrete cases, however, the majority of both Republican and Democratic justices believe judicial intervention may be necessary. Despite general advocacy of judicial restraint, a majority of both groups also agree that judges often must supervise the activities of public bureaucracies like schools, mental health institutions, and prisons. Republican appointees, however, are less enthusiastic about this (64 percent versus 81 percent for the Democrats). The largest difference is a conflict over the treatment of criminals in court (see table 8). In seeming dissent from the judicial innovations of the Warren court, nearly half the Republican appointees (44 percent) believe that there is too much concern in court for criminals. Only one in six Democratic appointees (16 percent) believe that. All told, these findings support the thesis that judges appointed by Democratic presidents tend to have a more liberal set of attitudes, not only on substantive issues, but on basic ideas of legal philosophy and procedure as well.

Judges show a similar mixture of judicial restraint and judicial activism in their descriptions of judicial decisions. Our sample of judges was asked, "In reaching your decisions, how influential do you consider the following factors: *amicus curiae* briefs, community values, the needs of the public, precedent, the views of law clerks, the views of respected members of the bar, and the judge's personal view of justice in the case?" Table seven gives the rankings of each factor.

Table 8
ATTITUDES ON JUDICIAL ISSUES

	Republican appointees	Democratic appointees
Too much concern in court for criminals	44%	16%
Judges should just apply the law, leave the rest to legislators	69	51
Judges need to supervise public bureaucracies	64	81

Republican judges claim legal precedent to be the most influential factor in judicial reasoning and put their personal view of justice second. Democratic judges reverse this order. They hold personal views of justice as the most influential factor, followed by precedent. Republican and Democratic appointees rank other factors in identical order.

This difference in judicial reasoning should not be exaggerated; both groups acknowledge their incorporation of personal values into decisions. That most Republicans and Democrats claim to rely heavily on their own views of justice attests to this. A widely acknowledged reliance on precedent, on the other hand, curtails the indiscriminate exercise of judicial power. Such adherence forms a foundation for judicial authority by framing the judicial act in history and tradition, as opposed merely to power or current opinion.

Again, judges appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents strongly adhere to precedent. Nonetheless there is a difference in degree, with Republican appointees giving greater weight to precedent and Democratic appointees placing their own views above past decisions.

Judicial appointments have often had a strong political component. Yet a central assumption of the American political culture is that the Court is above politics. Both things can be true. What we have yet to learn is whether federal judges transmit their individual political beliefs into their judicial decisions. ☑

This is part of a larger study of social and political change directed by Stanley Rothman, sponsored by Smith's Center for the Study of Social and Political Change.

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percent advantage on making America "more competitive in the world." Though respondents felt that big business and the rich benefited during the Reagan years, by a 48-35 percent plurality they felt they had fared well, too.

Those results suggest the Democrats face many of the same problems they did in 1984. As it did then, the public today prefers the Democrats on a host of secondary issues—protecting the environment, safeguarding women's rights, helping farmers, caring for the elderly—but on the bedrock issue of running the economy, the Republicans hold a clear lead. That lead may wither in light of the market decline, but for now, like Mondale, most of the Democratic contenders have been reduced to arguing that things are not as good as people think.

In that, they are not without facts to muster, a point hammered home by the market's uncertainty. Economists worry that the twin pillars of debt—the budget deficit and the trade imbalance—threaten long-term prosperity. Even the current picture has its flaws: there is distress in parts of the country, the recovery has not reached all groups, millions of Americans remain mired in unacceptable poverty, and the economy has its problems, including the market's erratic performance.

Pessimistic Prospects

Even before the stock slide put the word "panic" into the headlines, the public was not Panglossian about the economy. Surveys find that voters worry about the economy's long-term health and its ability to produce quality jobs for their children. These anxieties represent what Democratic pollster Gregory W. Schneiders calls "a low-grade fever about the economy." But those concerns haven't yet solidified into fear that a recession is imminent, and so they lack political bite. The stiff challenge for the Democrats—unmet at present—is to make those unfocused anxieties relevant without overstating the case and undercutting their credibility. Dramatic and visceral, the frightening stock market decline may provide the Democrats with the opportunity they lacked to convince voters that things aren't quite as rosy as they seem. The market *might* do that, but even the cautionary note sounded in New York could well have only limited impact on the voters unless it is in fact reveille for a coming recession.

No matter how skillfully the Democrats marshal their arguments about unstable prosperity—or how relentlessly they draw their analogies to 1929— most voters will continue to see the future through the lens of the present. Voters tend to vote on their immediate economic experience; they don't reach back, or look forward, very far. "The condition of the economy is far and away the single most important factor in this election; whatever is second is in eleventh place," says Republican pollster Robert M. Teeter. So if the market collapse does not produce an economic collapse, and the nation remains both peaceful and prosperous, the Democrats will probably have a hard time regaining the White House. But if the doom the Democrats and some market analysts are predicting arrives before next November, the Republicans will have heavy debts to pay.

This summer's Louis Harris survey for the Democrats decisively underscores the point: those who felt they had done well during the Reagan years planned to vote Republican in 1988 by 66-29 percent; the smaller group, who felt they had been neglected, looked to the Democrats by 69-22 percent. Particularly troubling for the Democrats is that most of the voters they need to reclaim identify with the group that has enjoyed prosperity. "Among those key groups who especially feel they have benefited during the Reagan tenure are residents of the South, people under thirty, Yuppies, those with a college education, men, whites, professional and business executives, white-collar people, and those who earn over $25,000 a year," Harris wrote. Clearly the stock market crash left many of those people feeling less wealthy. Whether it has also left them less satisfied with Republican stewardship of the economy won't be clear until next fall.

Global Gloomers

Ironically, while the public has been at peace, opinion leaders and intellectuals of varied ideological stripes are bubbling with concern about America's place in the world. In the late 1950s, when a similar divergence between elite and mass opinion occurred, liberal intellectuals argued that the United States was not assuming world leadership aggressively enough; now a diverse assortment of analysts maintains that the United States must adjust to an inexorable decline in its relative power and influence. Call this phenomenon the emergence of global gloom. Striking for its repudiation of Reagan's basic message, the global gloom school has been popularized by Republican political analyst Kevin Phillips in his well-read political newsletter, by author David Halberstam in his best-selling book, *The Reckoning*, and author Walter Russell Mead in his book *Mortal Splendor: The American Empire in Transition*. The global gloom school warns that the inexorable diffusion of economic power now underway will force the retrenchment of U.S. international influence. many of them also see threats to the U.S. living standard from our profligate accumulation of private and public debt, excessive defense spending, and failure to respond to the challenge of ascendant trading partners. By seem-

ing to underscore these analyst's deepest fears, the stock market turbulence can only add to their prominence in number. (Indeed, one way to analyze the events of Black Monday is that the market itself converted, in a sudden shudder, to the global gloom analysis.)

In a recent *Atlantic Monthly* cover story entitled *The (Relative) Decline of America*, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy, another global despondent, summarized the case. Kennedy argued persuasively that the United States' military commitments, made in the triumphant flush of post-World War II enthusiasm, now exceed our economic capacity. "Ultimately, the only answer to whether the United States can preserve its position is no," Kennedy wrote, "for it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others. . . ."

Kennedy's argument has the ring of both historical inevitability and common sense, but it is not an easy concept for politicians to embrace. Jimmy Carter seemed to acknowledge limits on America's ability to influence world events, called for sacrifice, and paid for it dearly when the Iran hostage crisis fused those heresies into an image of weakness and impotence. Reagan may go down in history as the president who came to office telling America that it could regain unquestioned world preeminence and then decisively proved that it couldn't. Still, Reagan has never backed away from his insistence that America is standing tall, even though the unprecedented trade deficits and the transformation of the United States from the world's largest creditor to its largest debtor suggest otherwise. Reagan's untethered optimism has never lost its appeal, largely because the visible indicators of economic health have reinforced it since 1982. The huge trade and budget deficits stand as monuments to the contradictions in Reagan's claim, but until the stock market sank, most economists believed that the bill on those debts would not come due in time to help the Democrats next year.

Now the campaign in some sense has been reduced to a race against time for the Republicans. As long as the economy that directly touches people's lives—inflation, interest rates, unemployment—remains healthy, voters may see the stock market's fall as an isolated event. But if the pain radiates from Wall Street to Main Street, it will connect the voters' immediate experience with the concerns of those who see America facing a reckoning for living beyond its means. In recent months, Americans have seemed to share those fears at a gut level, but good times prevented them from rising to the surface. The flow of good times may be evaporating. If it does, the gloomy Democrats are well-positioned. If not, like Mondale they will find their experience with gloom an unhappy one. ☑

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(Continued from page 19)

in Reagan's overwhelmingly favorable personal image. Before November 26, 78 percent described Reagan as a strong leader, but only 69 percent felt the same after that fateful day.

Public approval of Reagan's job performance hit bottom immediately after the Tower Commission report appeared. Only 40 percent gave him a positive rating in the late February Gallup poll. The ratings recovered gradually; in mid-June Gallup found that 53 percent approved and 40 percent disapproved of the way the president was handling his job.

While there is no doubt that the Iran-Contra affair has rocked faith in Reagan's leadership, evaluations of specific aspects of his job performance vary. A February 1987 *Los Angeles Times* poll showed that 53 percent rated the president's management of the economy favorably, but far fewer approved his handling of America's foreign relations (45 percent), Central American policy (38 percent), and the Iran-Contra incident itself (26 percent).

Table 3

CHANGES IN PERCEPTIONS OF REAGAN'S IMAGE

Adjectives describing Ronald Reagan	November 1986-January 1987	May-June 1987
Decent	89%	86%
Inspiring	60	58
Moral	82	77
Intelligent	75	55
Compassionate	65	60
Provides strong leadership	75	56

Note: Entries are percent saying that an adjective describes Reagan "well" or "extremely well." Panel study = 459 interviews.

Source: Survey by Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, National Election Study, panel back study, 1987.

The most compelling evidence about how the Iran-Contra affair damaged Reagan's image comes from an NES panel study in which a subset of 459 respondents in the 1986 postelection survey were reinterviewed in May and June 1987. As table 3 shows, the public had absorbed the sustained criticism of the president's flawed management style. There was a net decline of fully 20 percentage points in the perception of Ronald Reagan as "intelligent" or "able to provide strong leadership." Significantly, this change in Reagan's image occurred among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents alike. Still the public's reassessment was discriminating. Even though skepticism about his competence grew, there were only slight changes in evaluations of the president as "inspiring," "moral," and "compassionate."

The verdict of the polls, then, is that the aura of invincibility that surrounded President Reagan has faded. The Iran-Contra affair was a blow to his image not because the events themselves were so traumatic to the public, but because the revelations about the president's behavior were so clearly discrepant with his distinctive reputation for self-confidence, decisiveness, and strength. Although still widely admired, Ronald Reagan now is regarded as fallible. Whereas in March 1986, Gallup reported that 62 percent of the public predicted history would judge Reagan as either an outstanding or above average president, only 39 percent felt this way in July 1987.

Even so, the Iran-Contra affair's negative impact on Reagan's standing has been minor in comparison to Watergate's effect on Richard Nixon's. The main reason for this, of course, is the lack of definitive evidence that the president knew of or approved the diversion of money from Iran to fund the Contras. In the absence of a smoking gun, Republican backing for Reagan slipped but did not collapse. In July 1987, approximately 75 percent of his party's followers continued to approve of the president's job performance.

It is already obvious that the Iran-Contra affair has emboldened the president's opponents. The narrowing of support for Reagan thus undermines his familiar strategy of appealing directly to the public in the administration's protracted conflict with congressional Democrats.

The Impact on Trust in Government

Approval of the incumbent president and trust in government are strongly interrelated. Given that the Iran-Contra affair lowered support for Ronald Reagan, one would anticipate a concomitant decline in trust. The Harris survey that was conducted right after the bombshell about the diversion of funds found that only 19 percent of the public still had "great confidence" in "the people running the White House," a drop of 11 percentage points from the previous year's measurement. But it does not appear that the first wave of truly bad news resulted in a renewed sense of malaise about government as a whole. In fact, the media polls tracked in table 1 indicate a small *rise* in political trust between September 1986 and January 1987. And in the 1986 NES survey, the level of trust among respondents interviewed before and after November 26 was virtually identical.

More detailed analysis of the NES data confirmed that news about Iran-Contra did not immediately lower faith in government. Relying on a content analysis of relevant *New York Times* and CBS News stories generously provided by Richard Brody of Stanford University,[3] we grouped respondents surveyed in November according to the volume of news and the tone of the stories about the scandal published or aired during the week preceding their interview. In the first month of revelations, neither the amount nor the content of media coverage altered people's trust in government. This held true regardless of party identification, education, or political sophistication.

Did trust decline as news about the scandal accumulated? Unfortunately, evidence about later trends in

political confidence is fragmentary. The CBS News/*New York Times* survey conducted right after the Tower Commission's severe critique of White House policy making registered an 8 percentage point drop in political trust from its late November measurement. But the more recent ABC News/*Washington Post* poll recorded a 4 percentage point increase in trust between January and June 1987.

The NES panel study also suggests that confidence in government rose over the first half of 1987. Belief in the trustworthiness of the "government in Washington" spread from 42 percent to 54 percent of these respondents, with Democrats, Independents, and Republicans all moving in the same direction. The panel study also found that 10 percent fewer people felt that public officials don't care about what they think.

The polls consistently show that the trend in public opinion becomes increasingly negative when the survey questions focus on the institutions or actors involved in the Iran-Contra affair. This is hardly surprising. What is puzzling is the hint that trust in government and evaluations of the president may have moved even temporarily in opposite directions.

What might account for this? It is not that the public was unaware of or uninterested in the Iran-Contra affair. A July *Los Angeles Times* poll found that 56 percent of the public said they were following the story closely. The CBS News/*New York Times* poll indicated that 77 percent said they were at least somewhat interested in the hearings, and Gallup reported that a bipartisan majority felt the hearings were "good for the nation."

This suggests that news coverage of the incident might have reinforced rather than eroded confidence in government by showing that the political system worked, that error could be detected and corrected. This, after all, was a frequent reaction of fundamentally patriotic citizens to the Watergate affair. When Reagan adopted a low profile after responding to the Tower Commission, the televised congressional hearings thrust the legislature into the spotlight. In this unusual context, it is plausible that the term "government in Washington" elicited attitudes toward institutions and authorities beyond the president and his administration.

Finally one must consider the impact of the economic situation on maintaining the level of trust in government. Between January and July 1987, the seasonally adjusted index of leading economic indicators rose by an impressive 6 points. Consumer confidence, which had dipped in the last half of 1986, also rose steadily during this period (*Public Opinion*, Sept/Oct 1987, p. 28). Unemployment and inflation remain low. While the fundamentals of the economy appear sound, what reverberations—if any—the stock market's performance will have on confidence simply can't be known yet. Only the most preliminary indicators of public reaction to the stock market's fluctuations of late October are now available, and thus it is not possible to assess the effect on confidence. An October 19 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll found that 70 percent of Americans said it was unlikely that the country would suffer a depression in the next year or two. In another question, 58 percent said the stock market's fall would not lead to an economic downturn, while 37 percent said it would. A *USA Today*/CNN/*Detroit News* poll of October 20-22 found only 4 percent were very frightened about the future, while 23 percent were somewhat frightened. Just as Ronald Reagan's personal appeal boosted trust in government in the midst of the 1982 recession, reassuring economic news could do so even as his personal hold on the public recedes.

What is the likely future for public trust in government as the Reagan presidency draws to a close? History suggests that important political events, approval of the president's leadership, and confidence in government do not stay uncoupled for long. Even if the Iran-Contra affair has played itself out, the preservation of faith in government, especially in the current climate of partisan bickering, will depend on success in achieving the uncontroversial goals of international harmony and economic prosperity.

In this regard, a summit meeting with Mr. Gorbachev presents President Reagan with an obvious opportunity to bolster his image. And until the dramatic collapse of stock prices, most experts were predicting continued economic growth through 1988, which would have shored up confidence in national leadership. The economic future now looks more cloudy, and if the blow to Wall Street is followed by a recession in early 1988, one should expect more erosion in the president's standing and a subsequent decline in political trust.

Despite these uncertainties, we see little prospect of a return to either the pervasive malaise of the Carter years or the euphoria of late 1984. Thus, Ronald Reagan's legacy should include a higher sense of national morale and confidence in government than when he took office. This inheritance can be a mixed blessing, however. Recent presidents have made their greatest blunders when the reservoir of popular support was relatively full. ☑

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[1]Jack Citrin and Donald P. Green, "Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1986, pp. 431-453.

[2]*Ibid.*

[3]Richard A. Brody and Catherine R. Shapiro, "Policy Failure and Public Support: Reykjavik, Iran and Public Assessments of President Reagan," unpublished paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1987.

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Attitudes about the Media: A Five Country Comparison

by Laurence Parisot

The press has become the most powerful force in Western countries. It has surpassed in power the executive, legislative, and judiciary.
—Alexsander Solzhenitsyn
Harvard University, June 1978

In France, the press is a fourth power of State; it attacks all yet no one attacks it. It reprimands recklessly. It asserts a domination over politicians and men of letters that is not reciprocated, claiming that its protagonists are sacred. They say and do horribly foolish things; that is their right! It is high time we took a look at these unknown, second-rate men who hold such importance in their time and who are the moving force behind a press with a production equal to that of books.
—Honoré de Balzac
1840

Critiques of the press have spanned a century and several continents. Whether or not one would go as far as Solzhenitsyn and Balzac, nearly everyone acknowledges that the media play a powerful role in our public and private lives. Opinions about the media and estimates of their influence on society's other institutions can be important barometers of democracy's functioning. Various organizations have assessed the media's standing in individual countries, but little systematic work has been done to compare those evaluations from nation to nation. In early April 1987, Louis Harris France undertook such a project for *L'Express* and the Institut International de Géopolitique, and surveyed adults in France, West Germany, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States.

The Media: A Controversial Institution

Access to information is essential if the democratic process is to work. It is not surprising, then, that

Table 1
CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

Question: How would you rate your confidence in the following (name of country) institutions? Would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, hardly any confidence, or no confidence at all in . . .?

	France	Germany	Britain	Spain	United States
Confidence:					
The schools					
Great deal/some	82%	82%	53%	59%	82%
Hardly any/no	14	17	43	35	17
The church					
Great deal/some	53	66	56	38	85
Hardly any/no	43	34	41	60	14
The military					
Great deal/some	59	69	79	36	86
Hardly any/no	36	31	16	60	13
The police					
Great deal/some	72	80	80	44	88
Hardly any/no	27	20	20	54	12
The Supreme Court					
Great deal/some	58	80	—	38	86
Hardly any/no	21	19	—	43	13
The judicial system					
Great deal/some	32	72	56	35	77
Hardly any/no	35	28	40	61	21
The media/press, radio/television					
Great deal/some	48	41	38	46	69
Hardly any/no	49	59	60	51	30
Labor unions					
Great deal/some	36	43	29	26	52
Hardly any/no	59	56	66	65	45
Business community					
Great deal/some	30	44	55	26	84
Hardly any/no	55	55	34	58	15
Congress					
Great deal/some	55	64	52	30	83
Hardly any/no	32	36	46	61	16

Source: Survey by Louis Harris France, April 9-13, 1987; Emnid Institute GMBH and Co. (Germany) April 1-13, 1987; The Harris Research Centre (Great Britain), April 3-5, 1987; SOFEMASA (Spain), April 4-9, 1987; and Louis Harris and Associates (United States), April 10-15, 1987.

Table 1A
RANK ORDER
CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

France	Germany	Britain	Spain	United States
Schools +68	Schools +65	Military +63	School +24	Police +76
Police	Council	Police	Council	Supreme Court
Council	Police	Business	Mass media −5	Military
Judiciary	Judiciary	Judiciary	Police	Church
Legislature	Military	Church	Church	Business
Military	Legislature	Legislature	Military	Legislature
Church	Business	Mass media −22	Judiciary	Schools
Mass media −1	Labor unions	Labor unions −37	Legislature	Judiciary
Labor unions	Mass media −18		Business	Mass media +39
Business −25			Labor unions −39	Labor unions +7

Note: Percentages represent confidence minus lack of confidence for all institutions shown above.

Europeans cite freedom of information as a fundamental value. (See table 2.) It ranks first on a list of six freedoms in Britain and Spain, and second in France and Germany. The United States stands out on this question in that four other values—the freedom to vote, freedom to worship, freedom of education, and freedom to open your own business—rank higher. This could simply be a manifestation of phrasing unfamiliar to Americans, who tend to think in terms of "freedom of speech" and "freedom of the press."

One way to gauge our impressions of the media is to compare our confidence in them to confidence in other institutions. In their 1983 book, *The Confidence Gap*, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider explored the extent to which Americans had confidence in society's institutions. The authors documented a decline in confidence in virtually every major institution, but they also found that faith in the legitimacy of the system was strong and abiding. The 1987 Louis Harris France survey gives us pieces of the same kind of information for Europe and the United States, and enables us to look at confidence in nine key institutions. Although freedom of information is regarded as fundamentally important, the disseminators of information, the media, fare less well.

Perhaps the most striking finding is that Americans have significantly greater confidence in their institutions than Europeans have in theirs. This is as true for the media as for other institutions; majorities in three countries—Germany, Great Britain, and Spain—have only a little or no confidence in the media, while 69 percent of Americans have complete or some confidence. In France opinion is split with 48 percent saying they have at least some confidence in the media, and 49 percent saying they have little or none. With the exception of Spain, the media rank near the bottom of the list of all institutions surveyed. (See tables 1 & 1A.)

Do the media have too much power? Pluralities in three countries—Spain, Britain, and the United States—said they do. In France and Germany strong pluralities felt that the media have "just about the right amount" of power, but in France twice as many respondents said the media have too much, as opposed to too little power (29-14 percent). In Germany one-third believed that the media have too much power, while a slim 6 percent said they have too little. In each of the countries where the survey was conducted, the percentage saying the media have too much power exceeds the percentages saying "not enough power." (See table 4.)

Do the media influence other key institutions of society? That is, how much power do they really have? Substantial majorities, ranging from 88 percent in the United States to 70 percent in Spain, say that the media have a large influence on public opinion. The media's actual influence cannot be measured by this survey, despite our respondents' strong belief in the power of the press. A number of sociologists who specialize in communications, particularly Paul Lazarsfeld, have demonstrated the partly illusory, partly mythical, character of media influence. But the public believes the influence is there, and that is when myth can become reality. Public opinion, according to this survey, exerts

(Continued on page 60)

Table 2
FREEDOMS

Question: Of all the following freedoms, which two do you consider the most fundamental?

	France	Germany	Britain	Spain	United States
Freedom of religious worship	18%	37%	17%	25%	53%
Freedom to vote	47	59	47	43	54
Freedom of information	40	37	48	49	18
Freedom to join unions	11	25	19	12	9
Freedom of education	34	22	42	47	40
Freedom to open your own business	35	14	20	17	21

Note: "Not sure" not shown.

SECRETS

IN OUR PRIVATE LIVES

Question: Here are some different kinds of personal information that might exist on various people. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each one tell me whether it is information that a business corporation has a right or does not have a right to know about a person they are considering hiring? First, . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 87-8), August 22-29, 1987.

Question: Do you believe that personal information about yourself is being kept in some file somewhere for purposes not known to you, or don't you believe this is so?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, February 1977.

Question: How likely do you think it is that your employer has ever released any information from your personal file improperly —very likely, somewhat likely, or not likely at all?



Note: This question was asked of those who are employed.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Sentry Insurance, November 30-December 10, 1978.

Question: How important do you think it is that an employer should inform employees before releasing any personal information from employment files, except the regular reporting required by law—very important, somewhat important, or not important at all?


Not at all important 3%
Somewhat important 12%
Very important that employer contact employee before releasing personal information 85%

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for Sentry Insurance, November 30-December 10, 1978.

Question: Do you think that parents should or should not be notified if they have an unmarried female child under eighteen who is provided with birth control devices or pills by public agencies or clinics?


Parents should not be notified
33%
Parents should be notified if they have an unmarried female child under the age of 18 who receives birth control devices or pills from public agencies or clinics
67%

Note: Sample size = 1,200.
Source: Survey by The Merit Report, May 3-6, 1982.

Question: (I'm going to read you a list of things some people say should be done to prevent the spread of AIDS [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome].) For each, please tell me if you think it should be done or should not be done . . . ?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 5-9, 1987.

Question: Would you favor a policy that would require (name of group) to be tested to determine whether they have used illegal drugs recently, or would that be an unfair invasion of privacy?


Favor policy that would require to be tested for illegal drug use recently...
Would be invasion of privacy
Workers in general
50%
50%
Professional athletes
70%
30%
Those responsible for the safety of others, such as surgeons, airline pilots, and police officers
88%
12%

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, August 18-21, 1986.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? . . . It's people's right not to be tested for drugs at work if they don't want to be.



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, September 8-10, 1986.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If a person refused to be tested for drugs at work, that person would probably have something to hide.



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, September 8-10, 1986.

IN PUBLIC LIFE

Question: Do you feel news organizations often invade people's privacy or do they generally respect people's privacy?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, December 27, 1986-January 4, 1987.

Question: I am going to mention some things that television news reporters sometimes do in getting a story. After each, please tell me whether you tend to approve or disapprove of it.


Approve of television news reporters doing this
Disapprove
Interviewing friends or relatives of people who have been killed or injured in airplane crashes or similar accidents
31%
69%
Waiting outside the home of a person on the chance of getting an interview about a news event involving that person
31%
69%
Following famous people around town in hopes of getting their picture or a story about their personal lives
25%
75%

Note: Sample size = 520.
Source: Survey by ABC News, July 29, 1982.

Question: Some people feel a news reporter should always reveal the source of his story to his readers; others feel that sometimes a reporter should be able to keep his sources confidential if that is the only way to get his information. Which position is closer to your opinion?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Times Mirror Company, June 22-July 13, 1986.

Question: When the *Miami Herald* reported that Gary Hart spent part of a weekend with a woman he is not married to, was it doing a good job of investigative reporting, or was it unfairly probing into a candidate's private life?


In reporting that Gary Hart spent part of a weekend with a woman he is not married to...
The Miami Herald was doing a good job of investigative reporting
The Miami Herald was unfairly probing into a candidate's private life
No opinion
29%
56%
15%

Note: Sample size = 749.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 5-6, 1987.

Question: Some people say the newspaper (the *Miami Herald)* went too far in following Gary Hart's movements and invaded his privacy. Others say that most of the actions of a presidential candidate are fair game for reporting. Which of those two views comes closer to yours?


The Miami Herald went too far in following Hart's actions
Most actions of a presidential candidate are fair game for reporting
54%
46%

Note: Sample size = 529.
Source: Survey by ABC News, May 4, 1987.

Question: Is it important for the press to tell the American people that a candidate (Read from list) or isn't that any of the press's business?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 5-6, 1987.

Question: (Respondents were asked to pretend they were editors.) For each of the following stories, please say whether that story should almost always be reported, whether it should sometimes be reported depending on the particular circumstances, or whether it should almost never be reported.


A reporter discovers that someone who holds public office is a homosexual
Should almost always be reported 23%
Almost never 36%
Sometimes, depending on circumstances 41%

Source: Survey by MORI Research, Inc., for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, December 1984-January 1985.

GOVERNMENT SECRETS

Question: Government, business, labor, indeed most institutions in our society are concerned about what the public-at-large thinks of them and their activities, and they spend a lot of time and effort informing us as to what they are doing. Some say we are getting the real story, others say we are getting manufactured publicity. I'd like to ask you about these groups. (Hand respondent card) Do you think (read item) almost always open and frank about what it is doing and why, is usually open and frank, is only sometimes open and frank, or is almost never open and frank about what's going on inside?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 87-8), August 22-29, 1987.

Question: Should a president be allowed to conduct secret operations in foreign countries without notifying even the top congressional leaders of both parties if he thinks it is necessary to do that?


President should be allowed to conduct secret operations without notifying even the top congressional leaders
He should not
36%
64%

Note: Sample size = 665.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, July 16, 1987.

Question: Do you think it was right or wrong for the Reagan administration to conceal its secret operations in Iran and Nicaragua from Congress?


It was right for the Reagan administration to conceal its secret operations in Iran and Nicaragua from Congress
It was wrong
31%

Note: Sample size = 612.
Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 9, 1987.

Question: Now I'd like to know what you think about secrecy in government. Which of these three statements comes closest to your views on this? . . .


Secret operations in government are...
Sometimes necessary but only in special circumstances
Often necessary to achieve important objectives
Never justified in our system of government
27%
15%

Note: Sample size = 612.
Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, July 9, 1987.

Question: In his testimony (to the Iran-Contra investigating committee) today, Colonel (Oliver) North said he believes the U.S. government is sometimes justified in conducting secret foreign policy operations in order to protect the national security and further U.S. interests abroad. Do you agree or disagree with North?



Note: Sample size = 510.
Source: Survey by ABC News, July 7, 1987.

Question: Under what circumstances do you think the government ought to withhold information from the press? . . . Should that kind of information always be withheld from the press, or sometimes withheld and sometimes not depending on particular circumstances, or should that kind of information never be withheld from the press?


Information should always be withheld from the press
Sometimes depending on circumstances
Never
Suppose...
The publication of information could jeopardize national security
28%
9%
The armed forces are afraid that information about troop movements will be published
47%
41%
12%
The government feels that the press will twist certain information in order to make the government look bad
20%
49%
31%
There are certain official documents that might embarrass a friendly government
11%
67%
22%
A public agency has information that might embarrass a government official
54%
40%

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, November 11-17, 1983.

AMERICA: A REGIONAL REVIEW



Note: Bureau of Economic Analysis regional groupings: *New England* = Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island. *Mideast* = New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia. *Southeast* = Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana. *Southwest* = Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico. *Rocky Mountain* = Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Utah. *Far West* = Nevada, California, Oregon, Washington. *Plains* = Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas. *Great Lakes* = Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois. Not classified: Alaska, Hawaii.

Regional per capita incomes as a percent of U.S. average

Region	1900	1930	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980	1985
New England	134	129	107	110	100	103	98	115
Mideast	138	143	117	116	113	109	110	112
Great Lakes	106	110	111	108	104	104	102	98
Plains	97	62	95	93	95	98	94	96
Southeast	48	50	68	73	82	86	83	86
Southwest	68	64	87	87	89	93	93	94
Rocky Mountain	145	86	97	94	91	94	94	92
Far West	163	131	120	116	111	111	109	112

Source: *Regional Growth: Historical Perspective*. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, June 1980, p. 11. 1985 figures supplied by ACIR.

Unemployment by Region

	1980	1986
New England	5.9%	3.9%
Middle Atlantic	7.5	6.2
South Atlantic	6.3	5.7
East South Central	7.9	9.4
West South Central	5.6	9.5
East North Central	9.2	7.9
West North Central	5.8	5.8
Mountain	6.4	7.4
Pacific	7.1	7.0
United States	7.1	7.0

Note: *New England* = CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT; *Middle Atlantic* = NJ, NY, PA; *South Atlantic* = DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV; *East South Central* = AL, KY, MS, TN; *West South Central* = AR, LA, OK, TX; *East North Central* = IL, IN, MI, OH, WI; *West North Central* = IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD; *Mountain* = AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY; *Pacific* = AK, CA, HI, OR, WA.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics.

POLITICS:

REPUBLICAN PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR



Source: For 1952 and 1956, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, Vol. 2, p. 1,077-8. For 1960, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1976, p. 456. For 1964-1980, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981, p. 483; 1984, p. 281.

POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

Question: In politics, do you consider yourself a Republican, Socialist, Independent, or Democrat?



Note: "Other" category which included Socialist calculated out for comparison purposes.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization July 21-28, 1940.

Question: Regardless of how you voted today, in politics today do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, Independent or something else?



Note: Sample = 17,620 voters.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Question: Regardless of the party you may favor, do you lean more toward the liberal side or the conservative side politically?



National 21% /36% /43%

Note: Sample = 11,023 voters.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 6, 1984.

THE REGIONS

VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, 1952-1984



BY REGION

Question: Are you better or worse off financially than you were at the start of Reagan's term back in 1981?


Better off than at start of Reagan's term
Same
Worse off
New England 48% 37% 14%
Middle Atlantic 38% 40% 23%
East North Central 38% 38% 24%
West North Central 36% 38% 28%
South Atlantic 48% 34% 18%
East South Central 44% 35% 22%
West South Central 36% 31% 33%
Mountain 38% 38% 24%
Pacific 43% 34% 23%
National 41% /36% /24%

Question: Overall, which party, the Republicans or Democrats, do you trust to do a better job in coping with the main problems the nation faces over the next few years?


Trust Republicans to do a better job in coping with main problems the nation faces over next few years
New England 48%
Middle Atlantic 49%
East North Central 52%
West North Central 52%
South Atlantic 55%
East South Central 53%
West South Central 48%
Mountain 53%
Pacific 50%
National 51%

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



Note: Sample = 17,620 voters.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 17-23, 1987.

DIFFERENCES ON SOCIAL

Question: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Homosexual relations always wrong/almost always wrong



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, 1984, 1985, and 1986 combined.

Question: There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and woman have sexual relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Premarital sex always wrong/almost always wrong



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, 1985 and 1986 combined.

Question: Should abortion be . . . ?


Abortion should be legal
Legal only in extreme circumstances
Should not be legal
New England 49% 27% 25%
Middle Atlantic 49% 24% 27%
East North Central 42% 27% 31%
West North Central 43% 27% 30%
South Atlantic 45% 24% 31%
East South Central 26% 41% 33%
West South Central 31% 33% 37%
Mountain 40% 28% 32%
Pacific 58% 20% 22%
National 44% /27% /29%

Note: Sample = 9,174 voters.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 6, 1984.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men.

Women should take care of homes and leave running of the country up to men



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, 1985 and 1986 combined.

Question: Do you think white students and black students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?

Black and white students should go to same schools



Note: 1985 sample, half sample only.

Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, 1984 and 1985 combined.

Question: The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in schools. What are your views on this—do you approve of the Court ruling?

Approve of Supreme Court ruling that no state or local government may require reading of Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in school



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, 1984-1987 combined.

AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Question: (Hand respondent card) I'd like your opinion of some people and organizations. As I read from a list, please tell me which category on this card best describes your overall opinion of who or what I name. Probably, there will be some people and organizations on this list that you have never heard of. First how would you describe your opinion of . . .

Favorable rating of Gorbachev



Favorable rating of the nuclear freeze movement



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, April 25-May 10, 1987.

Question: Some people feel the U.S. should try to develop a space based "Star Wars" system to protect the U.S. from nuclear attack. Others oppose such an effort because they say it would be too costly and further escalate the arms race. Which position comes closest to your view?

U.S. should try to develop a space based "Star Wars" system



Question: I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please say whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all . . .


Containing communism is very important goal of U.S. foreign policy
Somewhat important
Not an important goal
New England 43% 41% 16%
Middle Atlantic 52% 34% 15%
East North Central 63% 33% 5%
West North Central 56% 29% 15%
South Atlantic 66% 26% 7%
East South Central 57% 36% 7%
West South Central 66% 30% 4%
Mountain 75% 15% 10%
Pacific 66% 33% 9%
National 60%/31%/9%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 30-November 12, 1986.

Question: What should the U.S. do first: negotiate a nuclear freeze with the U.S.S.R., or strengthen our defenses before negotiating?

U.S. should negotiate a nuclear freeze with the U.S.S.R. first



Note: Sample = 9,174 voters.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 6, 1984.

Question: Do you think that we should expand our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut back?


Expand spending on national defense
Keep it same
Cut back
New England 17% 53% 30%
Middle Atlantic 26% 53% 21%
East North Central 15% 62% 23%
West North Central 14% 52% 34%
South Atlantic 25% 56% 20%
East South Central 23% 56% 21%
West South Central 28% 55% 18%
Mountain 20% 70% 10%
Pacific 16% 54% 30%
National 21%/56%/23%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 30-November 12, 1986.

RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES

Question: Which statement comes closest to describing your practices or beliefs? The devil really exists; the devil is a convenient term for evil; neither of the above.

The devil exists



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-3), February 9-23, 1985.

Question: Which statement comes closest to describing your practices and religious beliefs? Have been born again; have not been born again; neither of the above.

Have been born again



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 85-3), February 9-23, 1985.

Question: Let me ask you about completely hypothetical or make-believe races. Suppose you had a choice between two candidates and the *only* thing you knew about them was that one was born-again and the other was not—which one do you think you'd vote for?


Would vote for born-again candidates
Would vote for other candidate
Can't say
Southern whites 35% 17% 48%
Southern blacks 62% 7% 31%
Born and raised in South 48% 11% 41%
Lived there more than 10 years 28% 25% 48%
Lived there less than 10 years 28% 25% 47%

Note: Survey taken in 12 southern states.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the *Atlanta Journal* and *Constitution*, September 18-28, 1987.

The South before Super Tuesday

For all the nationalization of social and political life of the last quarter century, the South remains, as we have seen, a distinctively conservative part of the United States. Now, we add to this picture by comparing the views and values of groups that are key to the region's politics: blacks and whites; Republicans and Democrats within the white population; newcomers and lifelong residents; young and old.

A brief assessment of the first of these group comparisons follows. Within the white population, the Republican and Democratic electorates differ little on social and cultural issues. On matters where their parties have staked out competing positions, however—including foreign and defense policy, attitudes toward business, and role of government issues—rank-and-file white Democrats and Republicans do differ significantly. The Republican electorate is clearly more conservative. On social and cultural questions, the big differences are not those between blacks and whites, or Republicans and Democrats, but by age.

Question: Now, thinking politically and socially, how would you describe your own general outlook? . . .

Political and social outlook





Note: Survey taken in 12 southern states.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the *Atlanta Journal* and *Constitution*, September 18-28, 1987.

SOCIAL OUTLOOK

Question: There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Premarital sex always wrong/almost always wrong



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1985 and 1986 combined.

Question: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

Homosexual relations always wrong/almost always wrong


Southern whites
86%
Southern blacks
92%
Living in the South now, and lived there at age 16
89%
Living in the South now, and did not live there at age 16
76%

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1984, 1985, and 1987 combined.

Question: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason.

Should be possible for pregnant woman to obtain legal abortion for any reason



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1984, 1985, and 1987 combined.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men.

Women should take care of homes and leave running of country to men



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1985 and 1986 combined.

FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS

Question: Do you think that we should expand our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut back?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 30-November 12, 1986.

Question: From what you have heard of the proposed "Star Wars" system, which of the following statements best represents what you think the U.S. should do?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 30-November 12, 1986.

GOVERNANCE AND CONFIDENCE

Question: Some people think that the government in Washington, D.C. should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans, other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself—Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, 1984, 1986, and 1987 combined.

Question: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987 combined.

Question: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with black/white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? White people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should respect that right.



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1984, 1985, and 1987 combined.

Question: As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? . . .









Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, 1984, 1986, and 1987 combined.

POLITICAL OUTLOOK

The black electorate in the South is, the preceding pages show, much less distinct from the white electorate than is often assumed. In partisan terms, the differences are, of course, enormous. Blacks are more supportive of governmental action than are whites—in the region as well as nationally—and a few other issues, such as the death penalty, yield sharp differences by race. On a great many questions, though, whites and blacks differ little, and the common view of the black electorate as very liberal is simply wrong. On most social and cultural issues, southern blacks are conservative.

A growing body of recent survey research shows a significant diminution of race as a point of cleavage in the American polity. The question below, in which respondents were asked whether they would vote for the black candidate or the white candidate—in a contest where this racial difference was the only one they knew about—fits the emerging pattern. Large majorities of both blacks and whites responded to this hypothetical choice by indicating that they couldn't say how they would vote. Survey response and actual behavior are different matters, to be sure, but normative assumptions are clearly changing.

Question: Are you registered as a Democrat, as a Republican, as an Independent, or aren't you registered to vote in (name of state) at the present time?



Note: Survey taken in 12 southern states.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the *Atlanta Journal* and *Constitution*, September 18-28, 1987.

Question: Regardless of how you voted today, in politics today do you consider yourself . . .?



Note: Sample = 17,620 voters.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Question: Overall, which party, the Republicans or Democrats, do you trust to do a better job in coping with the main problems the nation faces over the next few years?



Note: Sample = 17,620 voters.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Question: Let me ask you about some completely hypothetical or make-believe races. Suppose you had a choice between two candidates and the only thing you knew about them was that one was black and the other was white—which one do you think you'd vote for?



Note: Survey taken in 12 southern states.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the *Atlanta Journal* and *Constitution*, September 18-28, 1987.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES

VIEWING THE REGIME

Question: (Notice that the ten boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus 5 for a country you have a very favorable opinion of, all the way down to the lowest position of minus 5 for a country you have a very unfavorable opinion of.) How far up or down the scale would you rate South Africa?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, April 25-May 10, 1987.

Question: Do you think the South African government has or has not made significant progress during the last year in trying to resolve its racial problems?



Note: Based on 57% of the sample who said they "were following recent events in South Africa" very or fairly closely.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 13-17, 1986.

Question: Do you think the U.S. should put more pressure on the South African government to end its apartheid racial system, less pressure, or about the same amount of pressure as now?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 13-17, 1986.

Question: If there were a trade embargo between the United States and South Africa, do you think this would make the South African government end its policy of legal segregation of blacks and whites, or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, August 11-12, 1986.

ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA

DEALING WITH IT

Question: Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view of how the United States should respond to the situation in South Africa?



Note: *Actual wording of first category is "ban all trade with or investment in South Africa if South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system." The wording of the second category is "impose limited economic sanctions if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system." "Don't know" not shown.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 30-November 12, 1986.

Question: Which of the following statements most closely reflects your views? . . .



Source: Survey by Media General for the Associated Press, August 7-17, 1987.

Question: Given the current situation in South Africa, do you think American companies should continue to do business there or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, August 11-12, 1986.

BUSINESS INVESTMENT

Question: Do you think a trade embargo would hurt the economic situation of blacks in South Africa, or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, August 11-12, 1986.

Question: There is a growing debate in this country about whether U.S. business investments in South Africa help or hurt the black people who live under the white minority government. Some people say U.S. investment in South Africa helps the blacks because it provides jobs at higher pay and better conditions than South African firms provide. Other people say it hurts the blacks because it reinforces the power of the white minority government and thus the apartheid system of segregation in South Africa. How do you feel—on balance, do you think U.S. investments in South Africa help the blacks or hurt the blacks or haven't you followed this closely enough to have an opinion?



Note: Black responses for 1987 were 23%, 45%, 17%, 11% and 4%, respectively.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-7), latest that of July 18-25, 1987.

CAMPAIGN '88: CANDIDATE STANDINGS

THE DEMOCRATIC FIELD

(Expressed in percentages)	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Clinton	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Gore	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	Simon	White
Gallup (1985 and 1986, first and second choices combined; 1987 first choice only)																								
6/7-10/85 (1)	1	1	—	—	5	4	2	—	x	15	—	2	—	—	31	11	14	46	1	3	3	x	—	1
1/10-13/86 (1)	1	1	—	—	8	8	2	—	1	22	—	3	2	—	47	18	16	—	3	3	6	1	—	5
4/11-14 (1)	1	1	—	—	7	6	2	—	x	27	—	4	1	—	39	14	18	—	2	5	6	2	—	2
7/11-14 (2)	#	#	—	—	7	7	#	—	#	22	—	3	#	—	34	26	17	—	#	3	6	#	—	#
10/24-27 (2)	#	#	—	—	7	8	#	—	#	27	3	#	#	—	32	26	14	—	#	3	6	#	—	3
1/16-19/87 (2)	1	2	—	—	—	11	4	—	—	23	3	—	1	—	53	29	21	—	5	6	—	—	—	—
4/10-13 (2)	4	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	6	6	—	—	27	—	—	—	—	—	0	—
5/6-7 (2)	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	7	6	—	—	22	—	—	—	—	—	9	—
6/8-14 (2)	2	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	7	5	—	—	18	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
7/6-19 (2)	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	5	5	25	—	13	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
7/10-13 (2)	2	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	3	8	—	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
8/24-9/2 (2)	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	6	8	—	—	19	—	—	—	—	6	7	—
10/23-26 (2)	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	5	7	—	—	22	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
Harris (1985 is first and second choice combined. 1986 and 1987 are first choice)																								
4/1-3/85 (1)	1	—	—	—	—	4	2	—	—	14	—	—	*	—	20	—	—	31	2	3	—	—	—	3
4/1-3 (2)	1	—	—	—	—	6	2	—	—	14	—	—	1	—	24	—	—	27	2	3	—	—	—	4
2/22-3/3/86 (1)	*	*	2	—	—	6	2	—	—	21	2	—	2	—	40	—	—	—	3	3	—	—	—	3
2/22-3/3 (2)	1	*	2	—	—	8	2	—	—	19	3	—	3	—	37	—	—	—	3	4	—	—	—	3
10/29-11/1 (2)	1	1	1	—	—	9	2	—	—	19	2	—	1	—	31	—	—	—	3	4	—	—	—	—
4/10-15 and 5/8-12/87 (13)	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	11	—	8	8	—	—	19	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
5/8-12 (13)	2	2	—	—	—	7	—	2	—	25	7	—	5	6	—	—	12	—	6	—	—	—	4	—
6/25-30 (2)	3	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	5	6	—	—	16	—	—	—	—	2	6	—
6/25-30 (1)	2	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	26	7	—	5	6	—	—	15	—	6	—	—	—	3	—
6/25-30 (2)	2	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	25	7	—	5	6	—	—	12	—	6	—	—	—	4	—
10/2-7 (1)	2	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	17	8	—	5	7	—	—	21	—	3	—	—	—	5	—
10/2-7 (2)	2	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	18	9	—	5	7	—	—	18	—	4	—	—	—	5	—
10/2-7 (1)	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	6	11	—	—	23	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
10/2-7 (2)	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	7	10	—	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
Los Angeles Times																								
2/20-25/86 (1)	—	1	—	—	2	3	—	—	—	15	—	0	—	—	23	10	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2/20-23/87 (1)	1	1	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	4	—	2	—	22	—	8	—	3	—	—	—	—	—
5/7-8 (7)	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	12	—	6	6	—	—	7	2	—	—	—	—	4	—
5/29-6/1 (6)	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	6	—	4	3	—	—	13	—	3	—	—	—	3	—
10/29-11/2 (6)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	11	7	—	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
ABC News/Washington Post (May/June 1987 = first choice. As of May/June, Nunn and Cuomo are volunteered)																								
2/6-12/86 (2)	—	1	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	19	—	—	1	—	39	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5/15-19 (2)	*	1	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	16	—	—	2	—	33	19	18	—	—	5	—	—	—	—
1/15-19/87 (16)	2	*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	—	1	—	39	—	13	—	4	3	—	—	—	—
3/5-9 (3)	1	1	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	4	—	3	—	46	—	14	—	4	2	—	—	—	—
5/4 (2)	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	4	1	36	—	12	—	5	3	—	—	4	—
5/28-6/2 (3)	5	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	13	—	11	6	—	—	22	—	0	—	—	—	13	—
9/17-23 (3)	4	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	8	7	—	—	21	—	—	—	—	8	5	—
10/14-18 (3)	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	10	7	—	—	24	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
12/15-18 (3)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	2	5	30	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
ABC News																								
5/4/87 (1)	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	4	1	36	—	12	—	5	3	—	—	4	—

(Expressed in percentages)	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Clinton	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Gore	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	Simon	White
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for Time (First choice)																								
5/20-22/86 (2)	1	*	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	11	—	—	1	—	34	18	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5/20-22 (1)	1	0	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	12	—	—	1	—	35	17	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1/5-7/87 (2)	1	1	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	14	—	—	1	—	37	—	13	—	4	—	—	—	—	—
1/5-7 (1)	1	1	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	14	—	—	1	—	38	—	17	—	3	—	—	—	—	—
5/7 (2)	2	2	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	18	7	—	4	—	26	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
5/7 (2)	2	2	—	—	—	10	—	—	—	20	8	—	6	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
8/30-31 (16)	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	5	5	—	—	26	—	—	—	—	9	6	—
8/30-31 (1)	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	6	6	—	—	28	—	—	—	—	9	5	—
10/22 (16)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	5	8	—	—	23	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
NBC/Wall Street Journal																								
8/11-12/86 (3)	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	—	—	—	32	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1/22-23/87 (8)	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	—	2	—	31	—	8	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
3/15-17 (8)	2	2	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	5	—	2	—	36	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4/12-14 (7)	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	4	3	41	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5/6 (7)	0	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	6	5	27	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5/18-19 (7)	3	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	7	4	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	9	—
9/21-22 (7)	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	5	5	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
10/25-27 (7)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	6	7	—	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
11/30-12/1 (7)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	—	5	5	—	—	13	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
CBS News/New York Times																								
11/4/86 (1)	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	1	—	26	—	7	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
11/4/86 (2)	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	—	—	1	—	24	—	7	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
1/18-21/87 (7)	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17	1	—	2	—	33	—	9	—	3	—	—	—	—	—
3/28-9 (7)	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	3	—	2	2	38	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5/5-6 (7)	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	6	—	4	1	32	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
5/11-14 (7)	3	1	—	—	—	6	—	2	—	25	6	—	3	4	—	—	12	—	4	—	—	—	5	—
5/11-14 (7)	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	11	—	4	5	—	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
7/21-22 (7)	3	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	3	7	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	5	6	—
10/18-22 (7)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	—	3	7	—	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
11/20-24 (7)	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	5	6	—	—	25	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
Gordon S. Black Corporation for USA Today (After 5/87 polling is also done in conjunction with Cable News Network)																								
5/8-10/87 (6)	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	*	1	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	0	—
10/25-30 (4)	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	4	—	3	2	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	4	—
The Gallup Organization for Newsweek																								
5/6-7/87 (2)	*	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	4	5	40	—	15	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
5/6-7 (2)	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	7	6	—	—	22	—	—	—	—	—	9	—
The Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company																								
4/25-5/10/87(16)	1	1	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	5	—	2	2	38	—	18	—	3	3	—	—	—	—
9/18-28 (14)	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	7	6	—	—	24	—	—	—	—	3	7	—
Cambridge Reports, Inc. for the Cook Political Report and Government Research Corp.																								
5/16-6/1/87 (8)	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	7	4	—	—	19	—	9	—	—	—	6	—

(Expressed in percentages)	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Clinton	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Gore	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	Simon	White
KRC Research for WBZ-TV/Boston Herald in IOWA																								
4/21-27/87 (11)	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	3	—	6	1	47	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
5/6 (11)	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	4	—	5	0	47	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
8/8-9 (11)	7	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	13	2	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	1	12	—
10/2-4 (11)	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	12	2	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	15	—
Des Moines Register and Tribune Company, "IOWA POLL" in IOWA																								
5/14-20/86 (4)	1	0	—	—	—	2	0	—	—	24	0	—	1	—	44	—	2	—	0	1	—	—	—	1
12/8-16 (6)	3	1	—	—	—	5	1	—	—	13	1	—	1	—	56	—	4	—	1	0	—	—	—	—
1/26-2/4/87 (1)	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	x	—	3	—	59	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4/20-29 (1)	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	7	1	65	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
5/5 (1)	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	9	x	56	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
5/12-15 (1)	6	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	11	—	24	1	—	—	13	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
8/17-26 (1)	9	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	18	2	—	—	10	—	—	—	—	6	13	—
10/29-11/2 (11)	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	14	3	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	24	—
12/7-14 (11)	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	11	3	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	35	—
12/15-18 (11)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	—	6	4	29	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	18	—
Arizona Republic Poll in IOWA (First choice)																								
6/16-20/87 (15)	12	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	7	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
Wiese Research Associates for WMJX Radio (Boston) in IOWA (Candidates were not listed in question wording)																								
5/87 (6,11,15)	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	11	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
8/9-11 (6,11,15)	4	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	7	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
Wiese Research Associates for WMJX Radio (Boston) in IOWA																								
8/9-11/87 (6,11,15)	9	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	15	2	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	12	—
CBS News/New York Times in IOWA																								
10/18-22/87 (11)	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	13	2	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	16	—
NBC News in IOWA																								
11/15-21/87(11)	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	10	1	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	21	—
Scripps Howard News Service with Birmingham Herald, Memphis Commercial Appeal, Knoxville News-Sentinel in 14 Southern States (First choice)																								
8/30-9/2/87 (7)	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	8	15	—	—	23	—	—	—	—	2	2	—
Roper Organization for Atlanta Constitution/Atlanta Journal in 12 Southern states																								
2/27-3/8/87 (9)	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	35	—	21	—	11	—	—	—	—	—
9/18-28 (9)	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	5	13	—	—	27	—	—	—	—	—	5	—
The Bailey Poll in 8 Midwestern States																								
10/2-16/87 (6)	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	8	6	—	—	19	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
Peter Hart Research for the Chicago Tribune in 5 states																								
10/9-15/87 (7)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	—	7	5	—	—	34	—	—	—	—	—	12	—

(Expressed in percentages)	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Clinton	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Gore	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	Simon	White
Bannon Research in NEW HAMPSHIRE																								
5/8-11/86 (5)	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	27	—	0	—	42	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
9-10/86 (7)	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	26	—	—	1	—	47	—	6	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
9-10/86 (7)	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19	27	—	1	—	33	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
University of New Hampshire Poll with WMUR-TV in NEW HAMPSHIRE (First choice)																								
1/24-2/1/87(2)	0	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	16	19	—	0	—	41	—	4	—	1	0	—	—	——	
10/16-27 (2)	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	52	—	6	3	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
KRC Research for WBZ-TV/Boston Herald in NEW HAMPSHIRE																								
2/20-21/87 (7)	0	1	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	28	—	1	—	41	—	3	—	2	—	—	—	—	—
4/21-27 (7)	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	32	—	2	1	32	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
5/5 (7)	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	27	—	1	0	17	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
8/8-9 (7)	1	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	52	—	7	2	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	3	2	—
9/22 (7)	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	51	—	8	1	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	5	5	—
10/1 (7)	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	46	—	5	2	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
12/2 (7)	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	37	—	5	6	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	7	—
12/2 (7)	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24	32	—	2	3	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
Orren/Lemieux for Boston Globe in NEW HAMPSHIRE																								
3/19-27/87 (7)	1	1	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	41	—	1	—	38	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12/15 (7)	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	—	1	2	21	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	13	—
The New Hampshire Poll in NEW HAMPSHIRE																								
9/4-15/87 (7)	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	35	—	6	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—
NBC News in NEW HAMPSHIRE																								
11/15-21/87 (5)	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	49	—	3	4	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	13	—
Late Polls																								
Peter Hart for Philip Morris Magazine in NEW HAMPSHIRE																								
12/15/87	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	36	—	3	3	23	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
KRC Research for WJLA-TV, WBZ-TV, and Boston Herald in NEW HAMPSHIRE																								
12/15/87	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	39	—	2	2	19	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	10	—
KRC Research for WRC WBZ-TV in IOWA																								
12/15/87	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	14	1	22	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	17	—
Cable News Network/USA Today																								
12/15/87	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	—	6	5	29	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	6	—
ABC News																								
12/15/87	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	2	5	28	—	22	—	—	—	—	—	11	—
CBS News/New York Times																								
12/15/87	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	1	5	21	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	4	—

NOTE: 1 = Self-described Democrats; 2 = Democrats and Independents; 3 = Registered and Leaning Democrats; 4 = Registered voters; 5 = Likely Democratic voters; 6 = Registered Democrats; 7 = Likely Democratic primary voters; 8 = Democrats and Democratic-leaning likely voters; 9 = Likely Democratic primary voters in 12 southern states; 10 = Adults of all parties in Missouri; 11 = Potential Democratic caucus participants in Iowa; 12 = Adult Democrats in Maricopa County, Arizona; 13 = Democratic and Independent voters; 14 = Adults; 15 = 1984 Democratic caucus attendees in Iowa; 16 = Democrats and Democratic leaners; * = Less than 0.5%; x = Less than 1%; # = 2% or less.

The Bailey Poll in 8 Midwestern States was conducted in: Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.
The Atlanta Constitution/Journal polls of the South were conducted in: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
The Scripps-Howard poll of the South was conducted in: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
The Peter Hart Research poll for the Chicago Tribune was conducted in Illinois, Texas, California, Florida and New York.

Footnotes refer to polls (many of which are not shown here) from the Public Opinion Campaign '88 file.

ASSESSING THE REPUBLICAN FRONTRUNNERS: A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL POLLS

1987	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
ABC News/ *Post*	35B 20D		42B 30D		35B 28D				46B 32D	52B 24D		44B 35D
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time*	40B 20D				30B 23D			45B 21D		32B 22D		
CBS News/ *NYT*	36B 15D		33B 19D		41B 18D[1] 35B 19D[2]		34B 23D			43B 22D	48B 20D	
Gallup	34B 15D			34B 18D[1] 33B 13D[2]		39B 21D	40B 18D	40B 19D		47B 22D		
NBC News/ *WSJ*	32B 17D		28B 23D	31B 25D	27B 20D[1] 30B 20D[2]				30B 29D	34B 23D	45B 31D	
LA Times		36B 13D			27B 27D[1] 35B 22D[2]					47B 22D		
Gallup/ *Newsweek*										41B 24D		

Note: 1 = first asking in the month. 2 = second asking in the month. B = George Bush; D = Robert Dole.

Note to readers: Space limitations did not permit the publication of the Republican field data. A copy is available upon request from Graham Hueber, Public Opinion's Assistant Editor who compiles this information.

"Dole—who needs him? Kemp—forget it! Bush—are you kidding? Dukakis—gimme a break! Babbitt—who? Biden—no way! Haig—don't make me laugh!"

Drawing by Stevenson; © 1987 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

Black Attitudes

by Diane Colasanto

Blacks and whites hold different beliefs and values on many political and social issues. More important, blacks and whites believe that racial differences that cut across class lines exist. These social facts indicate the continued existence of some of the key underlying factors highlighted by the Kerner Commission as leading to racial conflict.

In recent years the Gallup Organization has conducted a series of in-depth personal interviews of large samples of the black population in the United States. These studies have focused on racial, social, and political attitudes. All have included comparative samples of the white population.

Two of the surveys, conducted during the summers of 1984 and 1986 were sponsored by the Joint Center for Political Studies (JCPS) in Washington, D.C., as part of its continuing effort to understand and document the extent of black political participation in America. Another survey, conducted in the spring of 1987, was sponsored by the Times Mirror Company as part of its project to develop a new political typology—beyond Republican, Democrat, and Independent—to better capture Americans' political thoughts and behavior. The fourth survey, sponsored in part by Gallup, was conducted in the summer of 1987.

These surveys provide a framework for evaluating the extent that attitudinal changes affect relations between blacks and whites since the Kerner Commission issued its dire pronouncements. To alter the course of racial polarization in society, the commission recommended national action aimed at establishing "a true union—a single society and a single American identity." The objectives of national action would include "opening up opportunities. . .[in] jobs, education, and housing, removing the frustration of powerlessness among the disadvantaged. . .[and] increasing communication across racial lines to destroy stereotypes, to halt polarization, end distrust and hostility, and create common ground for efforts toward public order and social justice."

Gallup's available attitudinal data do not allow us to evaluate progress on all aspects of the commission's mandate. Nor are trend data from the late 1960s to the late 1980s always available to allow for measurement of change on the attitudinal dimensions of interest. The Gallup data, however, provide snapshots of the landscape of race relations over a significant period. Not only does this period mark two decades of change since the urban disorders analyzed by the Kerner Commission, but it also has been a time of great confusion about the meaning of race in America.

Twenty Years Later

Two key events involving race in the late 1980s illustrate the confusion—the Howard Beach incident and the presidential candidacy of the Reverend Jesse Jackson. The Howard Beach incident in New York on December 20, 1986 was a shocking attack, apparently racially motivated, by a group of young white men against three black men, one of whom subsequently died. One of the most remarkable pieces of public opinion data related to that incident was released by the *New York Times*/CBS News poll on January 8, 1987. The poll showed that 31 percent of New Yorkers thought it likely that the incident in Howard Beach *could have happened in their neighborhoods.*

In contrast to the bleak image of American race relations presented by the Howard Beach incident,

consider recent public opinion measures about the current contest for the presidency. A Gallup poll conducted from October 23-26, 1987 showed a black man as the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination. The Reverend Jackson is the first choice of 22 percent of the 726 Democrats and Independents who lean Democratic, Governor Michael Dukakis receives 14 percent of the first-choice votes, the remaining four declared candidates share 21 percent of the first-choice votes, and 43 percent of the sample of Democrats are either undecided or favor a different candidate.

Twenty years ago the Kerner Commission report emphasized that the kind of national action needed to avoid a deepening racial division would require from every American "new attitudes, new understanding, and above all, new will." This investigation of race relations over the past twenty years focuses on those aspects of the commission's objectives that relate to attitudes. Specifically:

- Has the experience of frustration and powerlessness among blacks been reduced?
- Has racial distrust and hostility diminished?
- Has a "common ground" been established between blacks and whites to replace the racially polarized society described by the commission?

Frustration and Powerlessness

To measure how the feeling of powerlessness among blacks has changed since 1968, we first look at a series of survey questions developed as part of the University of Michigan's National Election Study to measure "internal and external political efficacy." Internal political efficacy represents how well a person thinks he or she can understand and participate in politics. External political efficacy represents how responsive an individual thinks government institutions are to ordinary citizens' attempts to influence them. The internal political efficacy scale is the sum of the number of "disagree" responses to the following three questions:

1. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.
2. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

The external political efficacy scale is the sum of the number of "disagree" responses to these three questions:

1. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
2. Generally speaking, those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly.
3. Parties are only interested in people's votes but not in their opinions.

Table 1

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY BY RACE AND INCOME
JCPS/GALLUP 1986

		Blacks			Whites		
		Total	Less than $12,000	$40,000 or more	Total	Less than $12,000	$40,000 or more
Internal Efficacy							
Low	0	43%	55%	26%	25%	36%	10%
	1	38	35	42	36	44	28
	2	15	8	23	25	16	34
High	3	5	2	9	13	4	28
External Efficacy							
Low	0	65	69	54	41	51	25
	1	18	21	10	20	24	16
	2	10	7	22	20	15	26
High	3	7	3	14	19	10	33
N =		868	387	62	916	204	158

In the 1986 Joint Center for Political Studies/Gallup study we found that 43 percent of blacks had the *least* efficacious score on the internal efficacy scale, and 65 percent of blacks had the least efficacious score on the external scale, compared to 25 percent and 41 percent, respectively, for whites (see table 1). Conversely, only 5 percent of blacks in 1986 (vs. 13 percent of whites) had the *most* efficacious scores on the internal political efficacy scale. On external political efficacy, 7 percent of blacks and 19 percent of whites had the most efficacious score.

The large racial differences in political efficacy that JCPS and Gallup found in 1986 were not a result, as might be expected, of the persistent economic differences between blacks and whites. Statistically significant racial differences remain when household income is controlled. Only 9 percent of blacks with household incomes above $40,000 per year, for example, were most efficacious on the internal scale, compared to 28 percent of high-income whites. High-income blacks were also much less likely than similar whites to be most efficacious on the external scale, 14 percent compared to 33 percent.

Most important, these racial differences in political efficacy represent *no improvement* over the situation at the time of the Kerner Commission's report. In fact, on the measure of external efficacy, racial divergence has grown over this period. The Michigan researchers have used a percentage difference index (PDI) to summarize both the internal and external political efficacy scales. The measure is computed as the proportion "most efficacious" minus the proportion "least efficacious" on each scale. Table 2 presents PDI scores for the two indexes for 1968, 1978, and 1986.

Thus, in 1986 the internal PDI for blacks was -38 and for whites it was -12. In 1968, a similar racial difference existed with the PDI at -32 for blacks and -9 for whites. The intervening years registered only minor fluctuations in the size of the racial gap for this index.

Table 2

PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE INDEX FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY, BY RACE
1968 (SRC), 1978 (SRC), AND 1986 (JCPS/GALLUP)

	1968	1978	1986
Internal Efficacy			
Blacks	−32	−31	−38
Whites	− 9	−14	−12
External Efficacy			
Blacks	−11	−37	−58
Whites	+ 4	−23	−22

Both blacks and whites have decreased substantially in their sense of external political efficacy since 1968. At the same time, however, the racial gap on this measure has increased. In 1986, the external PDI for blacks was -58 and for whites it was -22. This compares with PDIs for blacks and whites of -37 and -23, respectively, in 1978 and -11 and +4, respectively, in 1968.

Racial Distrust and Hostility

In the 1984 JCPS/Gallup study we asked all respondents:

- On the whole do you think most white people want to see blacks get a better break, or do they want to keep blacks down, or don't you think they care either way?

As shown in table 3, blacks and whites have different views about the feeling of whites toward blacks. Blacks are much more likely than whites (40 percent vs. 18 percent) to say that whites want to keep blacks down. Whites are much more likely than blacks (43 percent vs. 23 percent) to say that whites want to give blacks a better break.

Blacks' perceptions of the extent of white racial hostility have deteriorated considerably since the time of the Kerner Commission report.

Table 4 presents data from two earlier surveys that asked the racial hostility questions. The 1968 survey was conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center and released by the Kerner Commission in July 1969. The respondents for this survey were residents of fifteen major cities who were interviewed in their homes. The 1978 survey is a telephone survey conducted by the *New York Times*/CBS News poll of the residents of large eastern and midwestern cities and released at the end of February 1978. For purposes of comparability, the 1984 JCPS/Gallup data are presented only for central city residents in urban areas.

Table 3

PERCEPTIONS OF WHITE HOSTILITY, BY RACE
JCPS GALLUP 1984

	Blacks	Whites
Whites want blacks to get a better break	23%	43%
Whites want to keep blacks down	40	18
Whites don't care	29	30
N =	902	1,365

Table 4

TREND IN PERCEIVED WHITE HOSTILITY AMONG BLACKS
1968 (SRC), 1978 (NYT/CBS NEWS), AND 1984 (JCPS/GALLUP)

	1968	1978	1984
	15 Cities	Eastern and Midwestern Cities	Central Cities
Whites want blacks to get a better break	29%	25%	20%
Whites want to keep blacks down	28	17	41
Whites don't care	33	44	32

Only 28 percent of the blacks interviewed in the 1968 survey and 17 percent of blacks interviewed in 1978 thought that most whites wanted to keep blacks down. In contrast, forty-one percent of central city blacks interviewed in 1984 thought that most whites wanted to keep blacks down.

In the 1987 Gallup survey we asked about stronger forms of racial hostility. We asked whether, in the last five years or so, the respondent or someone he/she knows well had been physically attacked by a person of the other race, or had been harassed by a person of the other race without being physically harmed. One-fifth (20 percent) of the blacks and 15 percent of the whites reported a personal experience of interracial attack, and greater proportions (28 percent of blacks and 23 percent of whites) reported a recent personal experience with racial harassment. All rates were higher for young respondents and, for whites, they varied by type of community as well (rural respondents reported the lowest rates of experience with interracial violence).

To measure the extent to which these overt acts of racial activity might be perceived by respondents to be part of a pattern of negative race relations where they live, we asked the following:

- How common do you think it is in your (city/town) for whites to harass or physically attack blacks? Is it very common, does it happen only occasionally, or does it never happen?
- How common do you think it is in your (city/town) for blacks to harass or physically attack whites?

About one in ten blacks thought that interracial violence was common (12 percent for white attacks on blacks, 10 percent for black attacks on whites). Whites perceived about the same level of black hostility directed against whites (8 percent) as blacks perceived. But whites perceived significantly less white hostility directed against blacks (4 percent), than blacks perceived.

A Common Ground?

In 1987 the Times Mirror Company included an extensive battery of attitude questions designed to tap Americans' basic values and political orientations in a survey that was part of its continuing investigation of *The People, The Press and Politics*. The six underlying values revealed by a factor analysis of these survey items represent the key dimensions that structure individuals' political behavior and political choices. The six factors are presented below, along with one of the survey questions that illustrates the types of questions used to construct each value scale.

Intolerance/Tolerance measures the degree to which civil liberties, free speech, and personal choice in lifestyle are valued. A sample question from this scale asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement "Books that contain dangerous ideas should be banned from public school libraries."

Social Justice measures beliefs about welfare and the role of government in providing for the needy. For example, "The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep (agree or disagree?)."

Militant Anti-Communism measures perceptions about the threat of communism, the use of force to further American interests and ethnocentrism. For example, "Communists are responsible for a lot of the unrest in the United States today."

Government Attitudes measures beliefs about the size and effectiveness of government. For example, "When something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful."

American Exceptionalism measures a belief in America that combines love of country with the view that the United States has boundless ability to solve its problems. For example, "I don't believe that there are any real limits to growth in this country today."

Business Attitudes measures beliefs about the power and influence of American "big business." For example, "There is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few big companies."

Table 5 presents a comparison of the political values of blacks and whites measured by the 1987 Times Mirror/Gallup survey. For this analysis each value is categorized by quartiles, and the percent of black and white respondents in the top quartile is presented. The "top" part of the scale is represented by the particular value named in the table; "intolerance" in this table, for example, is the top part of the Intolerance/Tolerance scale.

There are statistically significant differences between blacks and whites on each of the six political values. The differences are particularly great for values about social justice, where there is a 41 percentage point gap between blacks and whites, and values about American exceptionalism, where there is a 17 percentage-point racial gap. These differences do not diminish when household income is controlled. It is only for values about intolerance, militant anti-communism, government effectiveness, and business influence that no racial difference exists for high-income ($25,000 or more) households. Racial differences remain on all values for respondents with less than $25,000 annual household income.

Table 5

PERCENT IN TOP QUARTILE ON SIX POLITICAL VALUE SCALES, BY RACE
TIMES MIRROR/GALLUP 1987

	Black	White
Intolerance	20%	26%
Social Justice	58	17
Militant Anti-Communism	20	26
Anti-Government	16	25
American Exceptionalism	11	28
Anti-Business	19	27
N =	755	3,397

On specifically racial issues also, the attitudes of blacks and whites diverge. Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, in *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*, note a racial difference in perception that continues to exist, despite considerable narrowing of attitude differences between blacks and whites since the late 1960s. In particular they focus on the gap between beliefs about principles of racial equality and about implementing specific policies to speed the pace of racial equality. This gap between principles and implementation is about half as large for blacks as for whites in the data they examine.

Schuman et al. further note that "as civil rights activism has declined over the past fifteen years, whites have moved from believing that civil rights leaders are pushing 'too fast' to saying that their speed is 'about right'; but blacks have moved from seeing the civil rights push as 'about right' to believing it to be 'too slow.'" The 1986 JCPS/Gallup survey shows a widening of the racial differences in perception on this issue. Despite recent increases among both blacks and whites toward viewing the pace of the civil rights push as "too slow," the percentage-point difference between blacks and whites in this response moved from 31 to 48 between 1976 and 1986.

Table 6 presents data from the 1987 Gallup survey that highlights differences between blacks and whites in beliefs about racial inequality. In a two-part question that asked respondents to pinpoint the reason for the continued existence of widespread poverty among blacks, more whites (49 percent) placed the blame on blacks themselves ("not enough motivation," "less inborn ability," "not enough education" through their

Table 6

REASONS FOR BLACK POVERTY, BY RACE AND RESIDENCE
GALLUP 1987

"Please look at this card and tell me what you think is the **main** reason poor blacks have not been able to rise out of poverty."

Job discrimination
Discrimination in education
Not enough motivation
Less inborn ability
Not enough education
Not enough jobs available

Why do you think poor blacks don't have enough education? Is it **mainly** the fault of the blacks themselves or is it **mainly** the fault of society?

	Blacks		Whites	
	Total	Central City Residents	Total	Central City Residents
Discrimination/society	61%	61%	39%	35%
Blacks themselves	30	31	49	52
Don't know	9	8	12	13

own fault), whereas most blacks (61 percent) placed the blame on society ("job discrimination," "discrimination in education," "not enough available jobs," "not enough education" through society's neglect).

Although trend data on this question do not exist, a similar question was asked of whites in the 1968 fifteen-city survey conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. Fifty-six percent of whites in 1968 blamed blacks directly for socioeconomic differences between blacks and whites, 19 percent attributed the racial inequality to discrimination, and 19 percent cited a mixture of causes when asked:

> On the average, negroes in (your city) have worse jobs, education, and housing than white people. Do you think this is due mainly to negroes having been discriminated against, or mainly due to something about negroes themselves?

These attributions from 1968 are remarkably similar to the 1987 attributions of white central-city residents presented in table 6. Fifty-two percent of these whites in 1987 blamed blacks directly for their poverty, 35 percent attributed the cause to discrimination or other societal factors, and 13 percent could not give a main reason for black poverty.

The lack of a common ground between blacks and whites stands out most sharply in the data presented in table 7. Here we consider issues that are not political or social or racial. Rather, we consider aspects of daily life—individual interests, living standards, and personal values. Relatively few blacks (27 percent) and whites (20 percent) see themselves as sharing a lot of common interests with the members of the other race in their own social class. And relatively few blacks and whites (24 percent among both races) see themselves sharing most of the same values with members of the other race in their own social class. Even with respect to standard of living, which many people hold to be a

Table 7

WHAT BLACKS AND WHITES HAVE IN COMMON
BY RACE
GALLUP 1987

	Blacks	Whites
"Do you feel you have a lot of common interests with (blacks/whites) in (your social class), some common interests, or very few common interests?"		
Lot	27%	20%
Some	47	45
Few	22	28
"Do you feel you have the same standard of living as (blacks/whites) in (your social class), a higher standard of living, or a lower standard of living?"		
Same	53	58
Higher	8	25
Lower	34	6
"Think about the values of people in (your social class). By 'values,' I mean the things that people view as important, or their general way of thinking. Do you feel you share most of the same values with (blacks/whites) in (your social class), some of the same values, or very few of the same values?"		
Most	24	24
Some	47	47
Few	21	18

key determinant of social class in America, just slightly over half of blacks (53 percent) and whites (58 percent) feel that they share this with the members of the other race in their own social class.

A Mixed Picture

The last two decades have seen some positive changes in race relations, but the picture is decidedly mixed. First, the racial attitudes of blacks and whites have converged somewhat since the late 1960s. Important gaps in understanding and perception exist here too, in particular with respect to beliefs about the causes of black poverty and beliefs about the appropriate pace of change in race relations. Blacks are now much more skeptical about whites' feelings toward them. And significant percentages among both races believe that racial hostility and violence are pervasive and common problems.

Finally, blacks and whites hold reasonably similar political values in some areas. Most disappointing, however, is that blacks and whites differ a great deal in their beliefs about what the goals of the political system should be in social justice. They also differ greatly in their feelings about their own abilities to participate in and to affect the system. The persistent frustration of blacks—both poor and affluent—with the political system points to our failure to live up to the central challenge of the Kerner Commission to create a "true union." ☑

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Persistent Slums

by John C. Weicher

The summer of 1967 again brought racial disorders to American cities, and with them shock, fear, and bewilderment to the nation. . . .

It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the major unfinished business of this nation. It is time to adopt strategies for action that will produce quick and visible progress. It is time to make good the promises of "American democracy to all citizens. . . ."

These programs will require unprecedented levels of funding and performance, but they neither probe deeper nor demand more than the problems which called them forth. There can be no higher priority for national action and no higher claim on the nation's conscience. . . .

—Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The "Kerner Commission") February 29, 1968

Twenty years after the Kerner Commission demanded immediate action to correct the conditions that bred—and were bred within—American ghettos, the nation's urban problems are still with us. Recent studies show a large and growing poverty population within our largest cities, and a greater concentration of the poor within poverty neighborhoods. Neighborhoods that were poor in 1960 remained poor in 1970 and 1980.

Yet at the same time, urban issues have become a less prominent part of the public debate, and policy is at a standstill. The South Bronx, once a favorite backdrop for campaign promises and photo opportunities, gets less attention from politicians than it used to: Governor Carter in 1976 and Governor Reagan in 1980 both made front-page visits to reproach the incumbent for the obvious failure of his urban policy. Candidate Mondale's brief visit in 1984 went largely unreported. President Reagan's long-avowed solution for urban problems, the enterprise zone, has yet to be approved by Congress, but that body has put forward no alternative.

Seven Neighborhoods

Meanwhile, the neighborhoods that concerned the Kerner Commission have deteriorated since its report—at least through 1980, which is the latest year for which information on neighborhoods is available from the Bureau of the Census. Many of the people who used to live in the neighborhoods are no longer there, however, and it seems likely that most of them are better off. An analysis of seven neighborhoods (several of which were studied for the Kerner Commission) shows dramatic changes between 1960 and 1980.

The seven neighborhoods are some of the best-known in the nation. They have been persistently poor and persistently slums: Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn, Watts in Los Angeles, Hough in Cleveland, Woodlawn and East Garfield Park in Chicago, as well as neighborhoods in Philadelphia and St. Louis. What has happened to them is interesting for its own sake and because it might illuminate changes elsewhere.

There is a distinction between being poor and living in a poverty neighborhood. Poverty status for individuals depends only on their own incomes; poverty status for neighborhoods depends on the incidence of poor individuals within a geographic area. A poverty neighborhood is a collection of adjacent Census tracts with at least 20 percent of its population below the poverty line. In 1980 most poor people in big cities lived in poverty areas, but most people in poverty areas were not poor. For this study, all tracts in the neighborhood must have been classified as poor in the past three censuses—the maximum possible criterion for "persistence."

These neighborhoods lost about half their population from 1960 to 1980. Nearly all the white population

Table 1

NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGES, 1960–1980
Seven Persistent Slums

	1960	1970	1980
Population	63,700	48,300	32,800
White*	15,500	4,100	2,000
Black*	45,000	41,000	27,300
Hispanic	3,100	3,000	3,300
Other races	100	200	200
Median Household Income*	$9,500	$10,400	$7,900
Housing Units	19,200	16,000	12,900
Occupied	18,100	14,500	11,000
Vacancy Rate (%)	6.0	9.1	13.1
Percent single-family	36.0	30.1	32.2
Percent owner-occupied	17.4	26.6	29.2
Persons per unit	3.64	3.35	3.07
Rooms per unit	4.11	4.44	4.56
Percent crowded	23.0	17.3	13.0
Percent lacking complete plumbing	16.2	4.8	5.5
Median Value*	$45,500	$33,300	$22,400
Median Rent*	$151	$139	$129

Notes: * – Non-Hispanic only. x – In 1980 dollars.
Sources: Special tabulations of 1960 Census tracts by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and 1970 and 1980 tracts by Princeton University Computer Center.

moved out in the 1960s, and half of the small remainder moved out during the next decade. The black population declined slightly in the 1960s and substantially in the 1970s; its share grew in the first decade and was stable in the second. None of these neighborhoods had a large Hispanic or other population at any time. They are perhaps representative of the older slums in the older cities.

Households in these areas fared much worse than the typical American household. While real family income in the seven neighborhoods increased modestly over the 1960s, it fell by 25 percent in the 1970s; the net effect was a substantial decline. The number of housing units declined, the vacancy rate increased, and real rents fell over both decades. People had more room: over both decades the number of people occupying each unit decreased, the number of rooms per unit increased, and the percentage of housing classified as "crowded" diminished.

The quality of the housing available is trickier to gauge. The presence of plumbing is the one measure of housing quality reported in every decennial Census of housing since the first one in 1940; it's been included in every definition of adequate or standard housing since World War II. This is one thing that has improved steadily, for the population as a whole, for the poor and minorities, and in all poverty neighborhoods—including in the seven we've looked at—until 1980, when that progress appears to have halted and even reversed. This is mainly a statistical quirk, however, created by the number of boarded-up buildings that are counted as part of the vacant housing stock, especially in New York and Philadelphia, where boarded-up buildings account for most of the vacancies. In the other five neighborhoods, the percentage of housing units without complete plumbing declined in both the 1960s and 1970s.

Homeownership rose in both decades, although the value of homes declined. This can also be misleading, since few poverty neighborhoods have many single-family homes—only the Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and St. Louis neighborhoods in our sample of seven. The Philadelphia neighborhood accounted for more than half the total number of owner-occupied units; the other two neighborhoods, nearly all the rest. In the 1960s, only Watts experienced an increase—about 10 percent—in home values. All the others had a nominal increase of less than 10 percent, or a slight nominal decrease. The 1970s saw a similar regional disparity. The average changes shown in the table slightly understate the declines in the East and Midwest—declines that really matter only for Philadelphia and St. Louis—and completely misrepresent what happened in Watts.

Seventy Neighborhoods

The number of neighborhoods is small, but they appear to be representative of poverty neighborhoods in the older big cities of the Northeast and Midwest.

A more detailed analysis of seventy neighborhoods in ten of these cities shows similar patterns: sharply declining population, including both blacks and whites; falling real incomes; fewer housing units, higher vacancy rates, better and cheaper housing. In addition, the analysis for the 1970s shows some disturbing demographic trends. The "feminization of poverty" is noteworthy. The number of married couples fell by half, while the number of female-headed households remained about the same. About half the households in the typical neighborhood in 1970 consisted of married couples; about half in 1980 were headed by a single woman. At the same time, the population became older, on average, as the number and incidence of children under 18 declined, and the incidence of the elderly increased slightly.

These changes suggest that a filtering process is at work in the metropolitan areas as a whole, with the poverty neighborhoods as the dregs. The filtering process begins when economic growth makes it possible for higher-income families to move into new housing. As they move out, their old housing becomes available and more affordable to middle-income families, who then are able to move to the suburbs that the high-income families are leaving. Their housing in turn becomes available to families with somewhat lower incomes. Eventually some poor people living in poverty neighborhoods are able to move into housing outside the neighborhood that moderate-income families are leaving. These poor people are likely to be relatively the best off and most stable, economically and socially. They leave behind the poorest of their neighbors. As the poverty neighborhoods empty out, the worst housing within them drops out of the housing stock or stands vacant. The smallest

and least desirable units are often, but not always, the oldest. The decline in population reflects a decline in the desirability of the neighborhood, so rents and values fall even though the housing stock, on average, is better.

The filtering metaphor has some limitations, however. The neighborhoods do not empty out so much as they "churn." Mobility data for all poverty neighborhoods in these cities (not limited to the persistent slums) show that the overwhelming majority of residents in 1980 moved into their residences after 1970. Between 45 and 62 percent had moved in since 1975; between 63 and 78 percent during the full decade. If most of the residents have come from some other neighborhood, and few stay for more than a few years, then any effort to revitalize an area is likely to be difficult. Community development would be hampered because the community would be changing rapidly, and few people would be likely to have much sense of belonging to a community.

Los Angeles neighborhoods stand in sharp contrast to those in the East and Midwest. Population grew in most of the Los Angeles neighborhoods as they shifted from predominantly black to predominantly Hispanic. (Watts is an exception.) Real incomes rose. More people were working. Most lived in traditional married-couple families. The population growth put pressure on the housing stock: real rents and home values increased, and the stock was utilized more intensively. The vacancy rate declined and crowding increased.

Immigration spurs a different process in Los Angeles. The poverty neighborhoods in Los Angeles in the 1970s served as ports of entry similar to the function that eastern and midwestern slums served in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Housing is much more crowded in Los Angeles than in the East, though the density of dwelling units per acre is clearly lower. In these Los Angeles neighborhoods people are working and doing better, rather than living on transfers and doing worse.

The eastern and midwestern neighborhoods clearly have persistent problems, and they may be deteriorating. Public policy has at best kept them from getting worse during the last decade; it has not made them better. Transfer payments—both social security and welfare—are surely helping the people, but they are probably not doing much to make the neighborhoods more desirable places to live. Some current welfare reform proposals might help. They have several features intended to deter the formation of single-parent families, and they have workfare components.

The picture of decline should not be overstated. Necessarily, the analysis focuses on places rather than people. The people living in these places in 1980 are on the average worse off than the people living there were in 1970, but it is questionable if they are the same people. There are certainly far fewer of them—about one-third less. Any real individual has probably done better than the hypothetical average "person living in the neighborhood." These neighborhoods have been among the worst in America for a long time; it is reasonable to expect people to move away if they have a chance, leaving their less fortunate neighbors behind.

Looking at places rather than people is inherently discouraging. The slums persist, but many of the people have moved on. The prognosis in most of these neighborhoods is for further population decline, and in many respects the neighborhoods may look worse statistically in 1990 than they did in 1980. This does not mean that the people now living in them will be worse off, however.

Finally, discouraging as the experience of the 1970s may seem, there is no reason to believe that it has been repeated in the 1980s. The 1970s was a period of slow overall economic growth.; since the end of the 1981-1982 recession, the 1980s have been a decade of good growth. ☑

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I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

(Signed)
Edward Styles
Director of Publications

Table 3

INFLUENCE

Question: Would you say that the influence exerted by the media on (name institutions) is very large, somewhat large, not very large, or not large at all?

	France	Germany	Britain	Spain	United States
Influence exerted by media on . . . is large*					
Judiciary	46%	29%	40%	32%	69%
Legislature	37	44	48	38	78
Executive branch/ government	48	46	44	41	81
Public opinion	77	71	80	70	88

Question: Would you say that the influence exerted by the media on (name institutions) is very large, somewhat large, not very large, or not large at all?

	France	Germany	Britain	Spain	United States
Influence of . . . on the media is large*					
Judiciary	27%	31%	46%	31%	52%
Legislature	31	36	56	39	55
Executive branch/ government	52	40	59	61	58
Public opinion	46	44	52	37	65

Note: Large = Very + somewhat large.

Table 4

MEDIA POWER

Question: In general, would you say that, in (name of country) the media have too much power, not enough power, or just the right amount?

	France	Germany	Britain	Spain	United States
Media have . . .					
Too much power	29%	32%	43%	46%	49%
Not enough power	14	6	10	22	10
Just the right amount of power	45	48	41	26	39

Table 5

WAYS TO EXPRESS ONESELF AND DEFEND RIGHTS

Question: In order to express yourself and defend your rights, which one of the following is the most efficient way for you?

	France	Germany	Britain	Spain	United States
Most efficient way to express yourself and defend rights is through . . .					
The media	13%	21%	19%	27%	18%
Your congressman/ deputy	10	8	26	2	26
An association	21	20	6	20	11
Your mayor or local representative	20	11	19	15	15
A political party	5	14	6	6	6
A union	6	10	5	13	4
A poll	11	7	13	5	16

(Continued from page 19)

far less influence on the media than the media exert on it.

Separation of Powers: The Fourth Power

The survey also assesses the media's influence on three central institutions of government—the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. Here, the media are controversial. Some accuse the media of undermining the separation of powers that is the foundation of democracy. Our survey cannot say whether the media actually impede the operation of the other three institutions, but it does document the public's evaluations of media influence on government.

Here, Americans diverged from Western Europeans once again. In the United States, 81 percent of the respondents said that the media's influence on the executive branch is very or quite strong, compared to 48 percent in France, 46 percent in West Germany, 44 percent in Great Britain, and 41 percent in Spain. Americans were also far more likely than Western Europeans to believe that the media have a substantial influence on the legislature. Seventy-eight percent of Americans said that the media's influence on the legislature was strong, compared to 48 percent in Great Britain, 44 percent in West Germany, 38 percent in Spain, and 37 percent in France. The same pattern appeared with the judiciary. Sixty-nine percent of Americans considered the influence of the media on the judiciary to be strong, compared to 46 percent in France, 40 percent in Great Britain, 32 percent in Spain, and 29 percent in West Germany.

There are some important differences in the responses of Europeans to the issue of media influence. The Spanish see the fourth estate's power as more limited than others did. The French believe the media have less influence on the legislature than on the judicial system or the executive. In Germany, Britain, and Spain, respondents felt that the media have more influence on the legislature and the executive than on the judicial system.

The other side of this coin is the influence of each of these institutions on the media. Does the public see the media as tools of these institutions? Those in the United States believe that the media have far more influence on government institutions than the institutions have on the media. The British answers are precisely the opposite: all three government branches exert more influence on the media than the reverse.

The press has become, as Solzhenitsyn said, a powerful force in our societies. As such, it invites much scrutiny. Public perceptions—on both sides of the Atlantic—will be an important part of the critique. ☑

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

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New Family Ties: How Well Are We Coping?

by William Beer

Most of us learned about stepfamilies from Cinderella and her wicked siblings. Her pre-prince fate is one all children pray to be spared, and until recently, most of their wishes have been granted. But if present trends continue, by the end of the twentieth century, according to some estimates, more children will be part of a second marriage than a first, and the stepfamily will be the most common familial configuration. Five states now observe Stepparents' Day, for which stores carry the appropriate cards.

Stepfamilies are created when remarriage follows divorce or bereavement, or when single mothers marry. The growth of divorce and unwed motherhood explains the current explosion in the number of stepfamilies. Most estimates put today's divorce rate at about 50 percent. About three-quarters of divorced persons remarry, and every divorce involves an average of slightly less than one child. One out of four marriages in 1983 was a remarriage following a divorce or bereavement; approximately 5.5 percent of all families come from marriages of single mothers. What all this means is that at least one of five children born in 1980 will live in a stepfamily before the age of eighteen.

Although stepfamilies look like intact nuclear families—composed of married adults and children living in the same household—they are different in at least ten ways:

- They are far more complex. They create new roles, such as remarried absent parents, stepsiblings, half-siblings, and stepgrandparents.
- In a stepfamily, the cast of characters living in a household can change continuously.
- The boundaries between who is a member of a stepfamily and who is not are unclear. Who can decide, for instance, if a child's parent's new spouse's parents are a part of that child's family or not?
- Roles are not defined. Should a child, for example, be expected to obey the new spouse of his noncustodial parent?
- There is no single, legal center of gravity in a stepfamily. Because they are not solely responsible for their stepchildren, stepfathers in particular must cede considerable financial control over the family to an absent and frequently capricious male.
- There are no words for many stepfamily relationships. The new spouse of a divorced parent, for instance, has a definite kinship link to the new spouse of the other divorced parent, but there is no word for it. If we cannot talk about a relationship, we cannot think clearly about it.
- Adjustment of family members must come after the family is formed, rather than gradually as the family is formed.
- Most adults and children feel guilty— rightly or wrongly—about a divorce or bereavement, and this feeling often persists after remarriage.
- Grief follows divorce as well as bereavement, and both children and parents come to terms with the loss of the previous family in their own time. Because they have *different* grieving schedules, children may very likely not have adjusted to the divorce when remarriage takes place.
- It is impossible to make a stepfamily in the image of any other family. In spite of the "myth of instant love," there is no reason why members of the family—aside from the remarrying parents—should automatically feel any sort of familial relation to one another.

We are thus witnessing the emergence of a truly new pattern of family life, and questions naturally arise about the stepfamily's effectiveness in raising children. Do stepfamilies work as substitutes for biological fami-

lies? While in the short term stepfamily dynamics are different, do these differences have long-term consequences, or do they tend to iron themselves out? How do stepfamilies compare when it comes to preparing children to be emotionally healthy, socially well adapted, and capable of forming their own family relationships?

The General Social Survey, carried out annually by the National Opinion Research Center since 1972, provides information on the long-term consequences of stepfamily upbringing. The survey asks respondents whether they were living with their own mother and father around the time they were sixteen. Those who were not, categorize themselves according to living arrangements: father and stepmother, mother and stepfather, father only, mother only, other male relative, other female relative, other relatives, and other. To compare stepfamilies with intact nuclear families, we looked at people who answered "mother and father," "father and stepmother," "mother and stepfather." We pooled samples from 1972 through 1984 in order to obtain enough respondents from stepfamily backgrounds to compare with those from nuclear families. This method does not provide details about family background—how long a child had been living in a stepfamily when he or she was sixteen years old; how long the child had lived in a single-parent household prior to formation of the stepfamily; how many stepsiblings, half-siblings, and siblings, and of what sex, were in the family; how old the respondent was when the divorce or bereavement took place; or how old the respondent was when remarriage took place. All these are factors known to be important in predicting a child's short-term adjustment. But the survey does provide us with a large and statistically representative sample of Americans from intact families and stepfamilies.

Answers by respondents from each of the three types of family background compare the long-term effects of stepfamily upbringing with those of intact family upbringing. We focused on ten questions to measure emotional adjustment, social adjustment, and family adjustment.

The emotional adjustment questions are:

1. Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?
2. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
3. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?
4. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
5. In general, do you find life exciting, pretty routine, or dull?

The social adjustment questions are:

6. On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do—would you say you are very satisfied, moderately satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?
7. For each area of life I am going to name, tell me the number that shows how much satisfaction you get from that area (a very great deal, a great deal, quite a bit, a fair amount, some, a little, none). . .Your friendships.
8. Do you sometimes drink more than you should? (yes, no)

The family adjustment questions are:

9. Taking things all together, how would you describe your marriage? Would you say that your marriage is very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?
10. (Same question as #7). . .Your family life.

We compared male and female responses separately, since some previous research has suggested that stepfamily life may be more difficult for girls than for boys. This analysis includes only white Americans because of the great differences in family structure among black

(Continued on page 57)

Table 1

LONG-TERM ADJUSTMENT BY TYPE OF FAMILY BACKGROUND

	Males At age sixteen, lived with:			Females At age sixteen, lived with:		
	Mother and father	Father and stepmother	Mother and stepfather	Mother and father	Father and stepmother	Mother and stepfather
Emotional adjustment:						
Say they are very happy	34%	38%	23%	39%	24%	34%
Believe most people try to be helpful	51	41	43	60	56	57
Believe most people try to be fair	63	66	54	69	66	60
Believe most people can be trusted	51	41	41	46	44	42
Find life exciting	50	34	44	44	32	49
Social adjustment:						
Very satisfied with job	50	43	41	51	48	50
Get a very great deal of satisfaction from friendships	29	27	24	35	25	37
Respond "no" when asked if they drink more than they should	52	49	48	69	73	55
Familial adjustment:						
Very happily married	70	65	66	67	57	67
Get a very great deal of satisfaction from family life	42	43	36	47	30	49

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, 1972 through 1984

Thoughts of Youth

by Burns W. Roper and Edward B. Keller

Every generation's youth attracts bad press, and this one is no exception. When observers look at our young people, much of what they find tends to be discouraging. Educators, psychologists, and parent groups have all taken their turns examining kids, but the children themselves rarely have the opportunity to speak for themselves. The American Chicle division of Warner Lambert gave them their chance recently—a survey of eight-to-seventeen-year-olds conducted by the Roper Organization.

Most youth surveys in the past have had a marketing orientation: what products children want, buy, and consume and their brand preferences. The American Chicle Youth Poll asked no questions about chewing gum, candy, or any other product. It focused instead on young people's assessments of their own lives—how satisfied they are, how they get along with their parents, what they think of their schools, and how concerned they are about adult problems as well as those peculiar to young people.

The conclusion we draw from the poll is that children are far happier about their lives, their families, and their schools than most outsiders (adults) believe. Kids do have problems; not all young people are happy with their lot, and most think at least some things can stand to be improved. But on balance, the survey indicates that eight-to-seventeen-year-olds are happy, well adjusted, and content.

The survey began by asking respondents how they liked "living in this (town/city)." Sixty-nine percent said "a lot" and 23 percent said "a little." Just 8 percent said "not too much." We then asked whether certain things made them feel good or did not make them feel good—95 percent said that being an American made them feel good, 92 percent said the friends they had made them feel good, and 79 percent said the neighborhood they lived in made them feel good. The only noteworthy lack of pleasure showed up with the amount of money they had to spend and singing the Star Spangled Banner! (They probably have trouble reaching the high notes—just like the rest of us do.) One in four young people said each of these things did not make them feel good, even though six in ten said they did.

Close to nine in ten said that the way they get along with their family and what their parents do for a living were things that made them feel good—evidence of young people's overall satisfaction with their families. And when they were asked, "Generally, would you say your home life is happy or not too happy?", exactly 90 percent said it was happy. While the 10 percent who did not say this is small, that figure translates to several million unhappy kids—certainly enough to help explain teenage suicides, the children who run away from home, and the kids who get in trouble with the law. This is more than enough to warrant serious national attention.

Another query about family life asked children whether they were happy or not too happy about each of five aspects of family life. The items in the order of recorded happiness are as follows:

Table 1

HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS

	Happy about it	Unhappy
The amount of love your parent(s) show you	93%	3%
The size of your family	91	6
The amount of time your parent(s) spend with you	79	16
The amount of work you have to do around the house	75	17
How well you get along with your brother(s) or sister(s)	62	21

Thus far we have talked about attitudes, beliefs, and views of all children. It will come as no surprise that some groups of youngsters are happier or more satisfied than others. What may come as a surprise is that the differences between subgroups are as small as they are on the question of happiness with home life. Hap-

piness with home life, for example, is 10 points higher among kids whose parents have not divorced than among kids who have been through a divorce (93-83 percent). Economic status would also seem to affect happiness with home life—and it does, but not much. A uniform 93 percent of children in upper-class, upper middle-class, and lower middle-class homes say they have happy home lives. Only in lower-class homes does the happiness percentage drop, and then only to 81 percent. There are virtually no differences between children and teenagers, between boys and girls, and between blacks and whites. The figure is just about 90 percent for every group.

One would expect that those who have been through a divorce would report lower satisfaction with the amount of time their parents spend with them than their peers who have not experienced divorce. And they do. But again, the difference is slight—73 percent versus 81 percent report satisfaction with time spent.

School Days

Since school is such a big part of children's lives, it was also a large segment of the survey. Better than three in four young people said they like school; only one in ten said they don't, with the balance volunteering mixed feelings. Eight in ten reported that the school they go to makes them feel good. Asked whether they were generally satisfied with the specific school they go to, 84 percent said they were; only 8 percent were not.

When we asked the children to assign grades to their school, 29 percent gave it an A, 48 percent a B, 16 percent a C, 4 percent a D, and only 2 percent a failing grade.

Of specific items, the cafeteria food received the lowest grades, which suggests that nothing has changed since we were young. Two-thirds or more gave all other items an A or B, and more than three in four gave their school an overall A or B grade.

Table 2

RATING THE SCHOOLS

	A	B	C	D	F
The teaching of basics—reading, writing, arithmetic	58%	29%	8%	1%	1%
How safe you feel in school	60	26	9	2	1
Preparing students for college*	47	34	11	3	2
Helping you become a good citizen	52	28	13	3	1
How well you and your teachers get along	50	30	12	4	3
The quality of your teachers	41	39	15	3	2
Preparing students to get a job*	41	39	14	2	2
The sports and gym classes	46	32	12	3	3
The girls in your school	37	41	15	4	3
The elective courses your school offers*	39	39	13	6	1
The school library	43	32	15	4	2
The boys in your school	29	39	20	6	5
The cafeteria food	16	20	25	13	18
Overall grade for own school	29	48	16	4	2

Note: *Asked only of teenagers.

When students were asked whether their teachers expect too much or too little from them, three out of four said that their teachers' expectations were about right. One in five, however, said their teachers expect too much. Six in ten said they have about the right amount of homework, one in four said it is too much, and one in eight said too little (!). So, even on the easy targets for complaints—teachers and homework—kids are basically satisfied with school.

We separated teenagers from preteens and asked which subjects they thought were most important (the lists varied slightly for each age group). Our teenagers thought math was the most important subject they studied (94 percent). Arithmetic topped the list for the younger group (92 percent). English came in second for teens (91 percent); reading and grammar for preteens (92 percent). Science, history, and social studies were in the eighties for the younger ones; computer skills and social studies for the teens. Neither group attached nearly as much importance to foreign languages, named by 53 percent of the older children and 51 percent of the younger ones. Music and art finished last for both groups.

We asked which of nine changes would do most to improve the quality of education in the schools. Topping the list was more modern equipment, such as computers and VCRs (60 percent). Well behind and bunched closely together were more attention to the teaching of basics (47 percent), more parental attention to what their children are doing and learning (46 percent), more parental involvement in what the schools are doing (41 percent), better textbooks (40 percent), better teachers (37 percent), and smaller classes (35 percent). Bringing up the rear were making the school day longer (8 percent) and making the school year longer (0 percent)!

Overall, seven in ten felt the discipline in their school was about right, less than one in five felt it was too strict, and a smaller one in nine felt it was not strict enough. The teenagers were asked about specific aspects of discipline: should schools have the right to spank or physically discipline students?—fewer than one in five felt they should. Should they have the right to ban books that they feel are unsuitable for students? Close to half believed they should. Should they have the right to search students' lockers or cars for drugs and liquor?—just over half said yes. And finally, should schools be able to search students' lockers or cars for weapons?—six in ten felt they should.

Because so much of the attention paid to teenagers lately is devoted to their failings, we asked them how much or how little various undesirable goings-on occurred at their school (see table 3).

While kids were quite satisfied with school in general and their schools in particular, they recognized that their schools had problems. To the students, however, these do not seem to translate into a crisis. The

(Continued on page 58)

REAGAN'S LEGACY: DEFENSE

Question: The federal government has undertaken a major buildup of our military defense during the past several years. Do you feel this military buildup has been necessary or unnecessary?


Registered voters
Not sure 4%
It has been unnecessary 27%
Buildup of our military defense over the past few years has been necessary 69%

Note: Sample size = 1,002 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Marttila and Kiley for Americans Talk Security, October 15-19, 1987.

Question: Do you feel the nation is stronger militarily since President Reagan has been in office, weaker militarily, or about the same as before?



Note: Sample size = 1,014 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for *Time*, September 17-19, 1985.

Question: Over the last six years the United States has increased its military spending. Has this military buildup made you feel more secure, about the same, or less secure than you felt six years ago—or haven't you thought much about this?

Registered Voters
The military buildup of the last six years has made me feel...
Don't know 7%
More secure 31%
Less secure 20%
About the same 42%

Note: Sample = registered voters.

Source: Survey by Mellman and Lazarus for the World Policy Institute, October 15-20, 1987.

Question: Finally, I would like to read you some statements that people have made and, for each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with that statement . . . Military defense is one area of the budget that we must spend whatever is needed rather than only what we can afford.


Don't know/refused 1%
In between/both(Vol.) 1%
Disagree 35%
Agree, military defense is one area of the budget where we must spend whatever is needed rather than only what we can afford 63%

Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, January 18-February 1, 1986.

HANDLING RELATIONS



HANDLING



WITH THE SOVIETS



FOREIGN POLICY



DEFENSE SPENDING: KEEP IT ABOUT WHERE IT IS

Question: Should federal spending on military and defense programs be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 17-21, 1988.

	1950	1952	1960	1969	1971	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Gallup	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Expanded/ Increased/ More/Too little	64	29	21	8	11	13	12		22	27	32	34	49	58	51	19	24	16	14	21	
Cut back/ Decreased/ Less/Too much	7	26	18	52	50	46	44		36	23	16	22	14	11	15	36	34	41	45	37	
Kept same/ About right	24	25	45	31	31	30	32		32	40	45	33	24	25	22	36	36	31	33	36	
Roper																					
Too little					15	14	13	20	22	23	31	41		56	29	19		21		14	
Too much					35	32	32	27	22	24	23	16		12	27	38		32		37	
About right					33	40	42	41	44	40	35	35		24	38	37		40		43	
NORC																					
Too little						11	17	17	24	24	27			56		29		24		17	
Too much						38	31	31	27	23	22			11		30		32		38	
About right						45	45	46	42	45	44			26		36		38		41	
Harris																					
Increase					10											22	36	28		9	
Decrease					44											33	15	20		38	
Keep it as now					36											42	47	47		50	
CBS News/ *New York Times*																					
Increase												34	64	60	61	17		32	24	17	17	19	16	17	18	14	18
Decrease												16	6	8	7	23		18	23	27	22	26	30	26	28	39	26
Keep about same												47	23	24	28	58		40	50	50	54	53	51	53	51	44	53
ABC News/ *Washington Post*																					
Increase															72			33						22		31	
Decrease															7			23						34		25	
Left about the same															20			43						43		43	
Los Angeles Times*																					
More																57		42	48	35		36	35	35		12	15		14
Less																36		47	41	44		53	54	54		46	49		44
Same amount																										38	30		32
NBC News/ *Wall Street Journal*																					
Increase																24	15			23		19	17			16	
Decrease																25	34			26		34	25			26	
Kept about the same																47	47			46		42	53			55	

Note: *The option of keeping defense spending at current level was not asked until 1986. For exact wording see *Public Opinion*, June/July 1985, page 34.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 10-13, 1987; the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-1), December 6-13, 1986; the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1987; Louis Harris and Associates July 14-22, 1987; CBS News/*New York Times*, January 17-21, 1988; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 13-19, 1987; *Los Angeles Times*, October 29-November 2, 1987; NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, January 22-23, 1987.

THE MILITARY: TOP GUNS

Question. I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one—a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 10-13, 1987.

WASTE AND FRAUD: HOW THE MILITARY STACKS UP

Question: Do you think there is proportionately more (waste/fraud) in defense spending or in (private business spending/non-defense spending) by the federal government?



Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, January 18-February 1, 1986.

Dealing wit

SOVIET AIMS . . .

Question: In your opinion, which of the following best describes Russia's primary objective in world affairs? (Card shown respondent)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
6/78	7%	25%	34%	23%
10/79	9	30	37	18
2/80	5	18	34	39
11/80	5	21	38	28
9/81	6	18	35	34
3/83	9	23	34	29
9/84	7	28	38	20
9/85	8	29	35	20
3/86	8	30	36	18
5/87	9	31	37	17
1/88	12	34	33	11


Percent
100
40
30
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
Russia seeks global domination, but not at the expense of starting a major war 3
Russia seeks to compete with the U.S. for more influence in different parts of the world 2
Russia seeks global domination and will risk a major war to achieve that domination if it can't be achieved by any other means 4
Russia seeks only to protect itself agains the possibility of attack by other countries 1

Note: "Don't know" not shown. It was 11%, 6%, 4%, 8%, 7%, 5%, 8%, 9%, 9%, 5% and 9%.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 88-2), latest that of January 9-23, 1988.

AND INTENTIONS

Question: In reaching agreements on nuclear arms control, do you think the Soviet Union can be trusted to keep their part of the bargain or not?



Note: * = registered voters.

Source: Surveys by the *Los Angeles Times*, latest that of November 2-7, 1985 and Market Opinion Research for Americans Talk Security, latest that of January 7-14, 1988.

Question: Do you think the Soviet Union/United States can or cannot be trusted to keep its part of the agreements in the treaty?



Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for Americans Talk Security, January 7-14, 1988.



Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for Americans Talk Security, January 7-14, 1988.

the Soviets

Question: In addition to calling for cuts in nuclear arms, Gorbachev says he hopes to reduce Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, to cut back his country's military spending, and find new ways to cooperate with the U.S. in nonmilitary areas like trade. In view of this, which of these two opinions is closer to your own: Gorbachev's leadership represents the best chance in decades to achieve breakthroughs and we should *seize the opportunity* or, we have learned that we cannot trust what Soviet leaders say, so we should *proceed slowly*.


Registered voters
Gorbachev's leadership represents the best chance in decades to achieve real breakthroughs with the Soviet Union and we should seize the opportunity and respond with boldness 28%
Not sure 3%
Neither 2%
We have learned from the past that we cannot trust what Soviet leaders say and so we should proceed slowly and with caution in responding to Gorbachev 68%

Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Marttila and Kiley for Americans Talk Security, October 15-19, 1987.

BE WARY . . .

Question: I am going to read you some statements that have been made recently. Please tell me whether you are inclined to agree or disagree with each statement. . . .


Agree
Disagree
Not sure
Registered voters
Because the Soviets will not keep their end of the bargain, we should not sign any agreements limiting nuclear arms
50%
45%
5%
It's no use negotiating with the Soviet Union, we simply have to be stronger than they are
34%
64%
2%

Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Marttila and Kiley for Americans Talk Security, October 15-19, 1987.

Question: Some people say we should try to reach agreement on this proposal as soon as possible. Others say we should delay that agreement until we know if the Soviet Union lives up to the agreements in the treaty they signed last month. Which of these two opinions do you most agree with?


Don't know/Refused 4%
We should reach an agreement as soon as possible 30%
We should delay further arms reduction agreements until we see if the Soviets live up to the last one 66%

Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for Americans Talk Security, January 7-14, 1988.

BUT RECEPTIVE TO AGREEMENTS

Question: The United States and the Soviet Union have signed a treaty to eliminate all of their nuclear missiles which are based in Europe or the Soviet Union and can hit targets between 300 and 3,000 miles away. This treaty now goes before the United States Senate. Should the Senate approve this treaty, or not?


Don't know/No answer 7%
Depends (vol.) 3%
Should not 23%
The Senate should approve the treaty eliminating intermediate-range missiles 67%

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 17-21, 1988.

Question: Do you favor or oppose the ratification of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate their intermediate-range nuclear weapons?


Don't know 12%
Oppose 11%
Favor ratification of treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear weapons 77%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, January 4-11, 1988.

Question: The United States and the Soviet Union are talking about cutting their long-range nuclear forces in half. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal?


Registered voters
Don't know/ Refused 7%
Disapprove 12%
Approve of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. cutting their long range forces in half 81%

Note: Sample = 1,000 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for Americans Talk Security, January 7-14, 1988.

PARTY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Question: Now I would like you to think about the Democratic and Republican parties. When it comes to issues involving foreign policy, do you feel there are very important differences between the Republicans and the Democrats, fairly important differences, or that there are really only minor differences between the Republicans and Democrats on most foreign policy issues?



Note: Sample size = 1,002 registered voters.
Source: Survey by Marttila and Kiley for Americans Talk Security, October 15-19, 1987.

Question: I'm going to read a list of foreign policy issues. For each one I mention, please tell me whether you feel the Democrats or the Republicans would do a better job of handling that particular area of foreign policy . . .



Note: The responses "Both equal" (vol.), "Neither" (vol.) and "Not sure" are not shown. Sample size = 1,002 voters.
Source: Survey by Marttila and Kiley for Americans Talk Security, October 15-19, 1987.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES: A FOUR-COUNTRY COMPARISON

Question: On balance, do you think an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit nuclear weapons would make this country a safer place to live, not as secure a place to live, or wouldn't such an agreement make a difference?

An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit nuclear weapons would ...



Question: How likely is it in your view that the Soviet Union would honor an agreement with the United States to limit nuclear weapons? How likely is it that the United States would honor such an agreement with the Soviet Union?



Note: Sample size = 1,599 for the United States; 2,004 (quota) for Britain; 990 (quota) for France; 2,073 (probability) for West Germany

Source: Surveys by NBC News for United States, November 30-December 1, 1987; by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) for Britain, November 6-10, 1987; by Brulé Ville Associés for France, November 14-19, 1987; by Sample Institut for West Germany, November 7-11, 1987.

Question: Who do you trust more to reduce tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States . . . President Ronald Reagan or Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev?



Question: On balance do you regard (Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev/United States President Ronald Reagan) favorably or unfavorably?



Note: Sample size = 1,599 for the United States; 2,004 (quota) for Britain; 990 (quota) for France; 2,073 (probability) for West Germany.

Source: Surveys by NBC News for United States, November 30-December 1, 1987; by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) for Britain, November 6-10, 1987; by Brulé Ville Associés for France, November 14-19, 1987; by Sample Institut for West Germany, November 7-11, 1987.

ELECTION PREVIEW: FRANCE

THE MOOD

Question: What do you think is the most important problem for France at the present time?



Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, October 1-6, 1987.

Question: (1) In your opinion, should the government be conciliatory or firm with strikes in the public sector? (Jan.), (2) Right now, if a strike movement took place in your workplace, would you be ready to take part? (Jan.), (3) Do you favor or oppose the privatization of T.F. 1 (TV channel 1) ? (Aug.), (4) Do you yourself favor or oppose the program of privatization of banking groups and nationalized enterprises? (Feb.), (5) Do you wish the policy of France toward the U.S.S.R. were one of conciliation or firmness ? (March), (6) Should New Caledonia remain French or become independent? (March), (7/8) In the matter of European unification, do you favor or oppose . . . creation of a single European currency . . . an integrated European defense system? (June).



Source: Surveys by Brulé Ville Associés, 1987.

Rating Mitterrand

Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in François Mitterrand to resolve the problems facing France today? (SOFRES)

What is your opinion of Mr. François Mitterrand as president of the Republic? (BVA)

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. François Mitterrand as president of the Republic? (IFOP)



Source: Surveys by *Figaro* magazine-SOFRES, Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, and IFOP for *Journal du Dimanche*, all latest that of February 1988.

	Mitterrand		
Year	Confidence (SOFRES)	Good opinion (BVA)	Satisfied (IFOP)
1981			
January	na	na	na
February	na	na	na
March	na	na	na
April	na	na	na
May	na	61%	na
June	74%	na	54%
July	71	na	na
August	na	na	na
September	62	49	48
October	64	na	47
November	60	na	46
December	57	59	46
1982			
January	59	na	51
February	58	na	51
March	58	51	49
April	56	na	54
May	58	na	54
June	63	56	48
July	57	56	41
August	na	na	na
September	54	52	
October	51	52	44
November	53	48	43
December	49	53	37
1983			
January	50	48	39
February	50	55	42
March	48	48	45
April	54	46	38
May	49	39	33
June	46	37	35
July	40	39	35
August	na	na	35
September	43	40	33
October	38	41	32
November	42	na	39
December	46	45	37
1984			
January	48	43	34
February	44	43	35
March	43	41	32
April	44	36	34
May	40	35	33
June	41	44	na
July	40	35	33
August	na	na	32
September	40	33	33
October	na	37	31
November	37	37	26
December	36	33	28
1985			
January	36	32	31
February	39	34	33
March	41	35	35
April	39	37	33
May	38	37	33
June	41	42	31
July	38	34	35
August	na	na	33
September	38	32	34
October	38	36	35
November	41	35	32
December	41	39	34
1986			
January	44	39	36
February	45	44	39
March	48	45	39

Chirac
—
—

and Chirac



Year	Confidence (SOFRES)	Mitterrand Good opinion (BVA)		Satisfied (IFOP)
April	54	54	47	44
May	55	61	52	55
June	55	59	49	55
July	56	57	—	55
August	56	57	—	56
September	58	57	44	56
October	55	57	50	58
November	55	58	48	58
December	56	57	48	56
1987				
January	58	56	39	50
February	56	52	40	52
March	51	55	39	53
April	54	58	44	56
May	57	56	40	52
June	54	55	41	55
July	57	55	42	52
August	na	57	42	52
September	61	na	—	56
October	64	60	46	53
November	58	58	42	51
December	56	59	43	56
1988				
January	58	61	52	60
February	62	61	47	55

Question: If François Mitterrand wins the next election, how will it affect your everyday life, your standard of living, will it have a favorable effect, an unfavorable effect, or will it have no effect at all?



Source: Surveys by SOFRES for *L'Express*, latest that of January 16-20, 1988.

Question: If François Mitterrand is reelected as president of the Republic, do you think French society will undergo a profound change, a moderately profound change, little change, or no change?



Source: Surveys by SOFRES for *L'Express*, latest that of January 16-20, 1988.

IF THE ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY . . .

Question: If you had to choose among the following presidential candidates on the first round, for whom would you be most likely to vote?



Note: Candidates with less than 5% not shown.
Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, January 14-20, 1988.

Question: If in the second round of the presidential election you had to choose between the two following candidates, for whom would you be most likely to vote?



Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, January 14-20, 1988.

DIVISIONS ABOUT DIVIDED GOVERNMENT

Question: Do you think the "cohabitation" between a president of the left François Mitterrand and a prime minister of the right Jacques Chirac is a good or bad thing for France?



Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, November 28-December 3, 1987.

Question: Tell me where you would place yourself personally on this political scale . . .

Consider self:



By age:



By education:



By income:



Note: Left = very much to the left plus to the left; Center = somewhat to the left plus neither left nor right plus somewhat to the right; Right = to the right plus very much to the right. *Education categories are as follows: (1) primaire (32% population) = elementary; (2) primaire superieure ou secondaire jusqu 'a la 3e (15%) = junior high school; (3) secondaire niveau bac (14%) = secondary to baccalaureate; (4) technique ou commerciale (20%) = technical or business; (5) superieure (18%) = university.

Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, June 1987.

Question: And if the new legislative elections were held next Sunday, for which candidate would you be most likely to vote?



Note: Since March 1984, the right has led the left in regular askings of this question.

Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, January 1988.

DE GAULLE DE RIGUEUR

Question: Who in your opinion has been the best president of the Fifth Republic?



	de Gaulle	Mitterrand	Pompidou	d'Estaing
18-29 years	37%	30%	13%	7%
65 and over	61%	16%	13%	5%
Less than $14,000	58%	20%	11%	4%
Over $34,000	50%	16%	20%	5%
Primaire	63%	13%	14%	5%
Superieure	34%	33%	13%	4%

REAGAN'S

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



	Gallup	ABC/*Post*	CBS/*NYT*
1/81	51/13		
2/81	55/18	68/15	
3/81	60/24	72/17	
4/81	67/19	73/19	67/18
5/81	68/21	66/25	
6/81	59/29		59/23
7/81	56/30	62/29	
8/81	60/29		
9/81	52/37	64/33	53/33
10/81	53/35	59/33	
11/81	49/40	52/38	
12/81	49/41	52/41	
1/82	47/42	52/39	49/38
2/82	47/43	48/46	
3/82	46/45	50/46	43/42
4/82	43/47	51/45	
5/82	45/44	46/45	43/44
6/82	44/46		42/45
7/82	42/46		
8/82	42/46	49/47	
9/82	42/48	46/50	42/44
10/82	42/48	49/44	48/42
11/82	43/47		
12/82	41/50	45/48	
1/83	35/56	42/54	41/47
2/83	40/50	45/50	
3/83	41/49		
4/83	41/49	49/47	43/45
5/83	46/43	53/42	
6/83	47/44	53/44	47/39
7/83	42//47	52/44	
8/83	43/46		
9/83	48/42	52/42	46/41
10/83	49/41	57/40	48/38
11/83	53/37	63/31	
12/83	54/38	59/37	
1/84	55/37	57/39	57/32
2/84	55/36	59/38	56/35
3/84	54/39		
4/84	52/37		
5/84	54/38	57/37	
6/84	54/36		57/33
7/84	52/37	54/41	
8/84	54/38		54/33
9/84	57/36	58/38	58/29
10/84	58/33		58/32
11/84	62/30		
12/84	59/32		
1/85	64/28	68/28	62/29
2/85	60/31	62/35	59/29
3/85	56/37	60/36	
4/85	52/37	54/42	
5/85	55/37	57/38	59/29
6/85		66/30	
7/85	63/28	65/31	65/24
8/85	65/26		
9/85	60/30	62/34	62/27
10/85	63/29	63/33	
11/85		67/28	65/26
12/85		66/27	
1/86	64/27		65/24
2/86		65/31	
3/86		65/32	
4/86	62/29	70/26	64/27
5/86		70/27	68/21
6/86			67/23
7/86	63/28		
8/86			62/25
9/86			63/27
10/86	63/29		67/25
11/86		57/40	46/45
12/86	48/43	49/47	47/40

Note: When survey organizations ask the approval question more than once in a month, we have used the latest polls in the month.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup organization, latest that of December 4-7, 1987; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 17-23, 1988; CBS News/*New York Times*, January 17-21, 1988; NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, January 20-22, 1988.

APPROVAL



	Gallup	ABC/*Post*	CBS/*NYT*
1/87	49/42	50/47	52/38
2/87	40/53	44/51	42/46
3/87	47/44	50/47	45/43
4/87	49/43		49/40
5/87		52/47	46/43
6/87	53/40	50/49	
7/87	51/41		51/39
8/87		50/47	51/38
9/87	49/42	52/45	54/37
10/87		54/44	52/38
11/87		50/48	45/44
12/87	49/41	55/41	56/33
1/88		54/45	50/35

NBC News

	Excellent/Good	Only fair	Poor
2/85	59%	26%	13%
5/85	51	31	16
6/85	57	29	12
7/85	64	26	8
10/85	56	29	13
11/85	67	24	8
12/85	60	28	10
1/86	58	31	9
2/86	63	26	10
4/86	65	23	10
6/86	64	25	10
7/86	63	26	10
8/86	62	26	11
9/86	63	26	10
10/86	61	27	11
11/86	57	28	14
12/86	50	29	19
1/87	49	31	19
3/87	45	35	19
4/87	44	34	20
5/87	46	33	20
7/87	46	33	20
8/87	48	35	17
10/87	46	36	18
12/87	44	35	20
1/88	48	35	16

CONSUMER



MICHIGAN INDEX OF CONSUMER SENTIMENT

The Index of Consumer Sentiment is a composite number that takes into account the answers to this series of questions:

1. Would you say that you and your family are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?
2. Now, looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you and your family will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same?
3. Now, turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the next twelve months, we'll have good times financially or bad times, or what?
4. Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole, we'll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment, or depression, or what?
5. About the big things people buy for their homes—I mean furniture, home furnishings, refrigerator, stove, television, and things like that. In general, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy such household items?

Note: For data prior to 1962 the base is Fall 1956 = 100. In 1962 and later years, the base is February 1966 = 100; a date selected because the index value on the old base happened to be 100 in February 1966, thus linking the two sets of data.

Source: Surveys by Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of April-June 1987.

CONFERENCE BOARD CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDEX

The Consumer Confidence Index is a composite number that takes into account the answers to this series of questions:

1. How would you rate the present general business conditions in your area? Good, normal, or bad?
2. Six months from now, do you think they will be better, same, or worse?
3. What would you say about available jobs in your area right now? Plenty, not so many, hard to get?
4. Six months from now will there be more, fewer or same?
5. How would you guess your total family income to be six months from now? Higher, the same, lower?

Note: Survey is a mail survey. 1985 = 100.

Source: Survey by National Family Opinion, Inc. for the Conference Board, latest that of April-June 1987.

CONFIDENCE


Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
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1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
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1977
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1987


Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment
Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index
1987
January 90 86
February 90 93
March 91 98
April 93 97
May 91 103
June 92 102
July 94 106
August 94 111
September 94 116
October 89 115
November 83 101
December 87 108
1988
January 91 111

CAMPAIGN COUNTDOWN

Question: I am going to read you a list of events that will occur in the coming year. As I read each one, please tell me whether or not this is an event you are especially looking forward to. The first one is . . .



I KNOW THE NAME, I JUST CAN'T PLACE THE FACE

Question: (Interviewer: Please shuffle photos A-U and hand to respondent) Here are some photographs of well-known people and some people who are less well-known. For each person you recognize, please give me the letter from the photo and the name of the person. If you don't recognize a person, just let me know and go on to the next one. . . . Will you please look over this list of (Republicans/Democrats) and tell me which of them you have heard of.



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, January 4-11, 1988.

The Southerners' Minds

by Celinda Lake and Kevin Kramer

The key role the South will play in the electoral fortunes of both parties becomes more apparent every day. The South has changed dramatically in the last twenty years, and its new political landscape is a product of industrialization, migration, generational change, and the civil rights struggle. Today, the South is a region of consensus and conflict.

In the South today there is a strong affection for conservative philosophy and approaches, support for a strong defense, and belief in traditional morality, with three-fourths of both blacks and whites feeling that new lifestyles are breaking down American families. Added to this is a strong streak of individualism. There are also short-term and abiding cleavages. Race, religion, economic change, the unique cultural socialization represented by being born in the South, and differences between the Deep and Border South that are rooted in race and economics still divide southern voters in their attitudes and their opinions. The civil rights movement was clearly a key political turning point in the South for both blacks and whites. This shows up in surveys; whether a respondent moved to the South or came of age politically before or after 1965 becomes an important influence on attitudes. Other divisions in the South cluster around views about the role of government, the state of the economy, and social issues.

The Republican party's emergence is mixed in with the South's social and economic changes. New migrants brought their support for the party with them, and it took especially strong hold among younger voters. Ronald Reagan's personal popularity, still evident after the 1986 elections, reinforced the movement, particularly among the young. Many older voters, especially those who were born in the South, maintain their traditional Democratic party identification and—to a lesser extent—voting behavior, but they have warmed to Republican party policies.

Using the 1986 University of Michigan Center for Political Studies national election study, we have divided the southern electorate into eleven distinct political groups. This analysis uses thermometer ratings (0 is "very cool" feelings toward a party and 100 is "very warm"). We subtracted the Republican rating from the thermometer rating for the Democratic party to distinguish the groups. Then we looked at how most groups of possible voters in the Deep and Border South "clustered" in their relative evaluations of the parties. These groups are produced by combinations of race, age, sex, income, occupation, church attendance/religious commitment, region within the South, length of residency, union membership, education, marital status, and whether the respondent is native born or currently lives in an urban area. We wanted to identify those groups whose assessments of the two parties are most similar to one another and most different from other groups. Feelings toward the parties give a more accurate measure of the way the electorate's attitudes are moving than party identification or voting behavior do. The sample was 800 voters interviewed after the 1986 elections. The 1986 study tells us about the divisions in the southern electorate that will influence the 1988 elections.

Race is still the strongest predictor of partisan feelings among southern voters. Among white voters, residency, church attendance, occupation, age, region, and marital status are most important. There are also

important differences among blacks by age, religious commitment, and whether they live in an urban area.

We have ranked the groups in order of their support for the Republican party, with the most supportive first. Certain attitudes and political behavior characterize each of the clusters.

1. Contemporary Carpetbaggers (13 percent of the southern population). These are young, white, married voters with middle incomes who have moved to the South recently and live in towns and suburbs. They are stable residents of their communities, attending church one to two times a month, but they are not yet engaged fully in politics. Only 30 percent of this group turned out in the 1986 election, although a higher percentage can be expected in a presidential year. This bodes well for the Republicans. This group considers itself moderate and conservative and is the most Republican group of voters in the South, with a majority registered and identifying with the Republican party. Two-thirds voted for a Republican for governor, though many still voted for the Democratic House incumbent in their district. They have been reinforced in their Republican identification by their approval of Ronald Reagan's presidency and the personal warmth they feel toward him.

These voters look a lot like southern yuppies. A large majority feel that government services should be reduced, that our defenses should be maintained, and that the government should stay out of the economy. At the same time they believe that the government does have a role in ending segregation, and they are liberal on some foreign policy and racial questions.

2. Entrepreneurial Upper Crust (7 percent). This is the traditional economic elite of the South—white, married, older, highly educated, upper-income professionals who have lived in the South for more than twenty years. They have the highest voter turnout of any group and are the most interested in politics. They split between the parties in their identification and voting, and while they personally feel positive about Reagan, they are less approving of his job performance. These voters think the economy is doing well, reflecting their own economic situation, but are worried about the federal deficit more than any other group. They are, therefore, conservative about spending and want the government to stay out of the economy. Yet they are fairly progressive on abortion, religion, and racial issues, though they do not support affirmative action. They are the least protectionist and the least isolationist of southern voters.

3. Social Progressives (12 percent). These are younger, white, new residents who attend church irregularly. They have lower turnout and look like many of the northern baby boomers. Two-thirds identify themselves as Democrats or Independents and voted for Democratic governors, but they tend to be ticket splitters for other offices.

They are most marked by their progressive attitudes on social policy. They are also willing to have the government play a role in providing jobs and desegregating schools and jobs. This group is most supportive of abortion and of sanctions against South Africa. The Social Progressives' lack of strong religious affiliation is key in distinguishing them from other southern voters. They are less likely to take the Bible literally, less supportive of prayer in school, and the least likely to believe that newer lifestyles have caused a breakdown in American families. They are cool toward Pat Robertson and warm toward the women's movement.

Table 1

WILLING TO INCREASE SPENDING FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Clusters:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
					(in percent)						
Environment	43	35	50	52	43	44	59	42	49	48	57
Student Aid	33	41	30	41	11	44	60	57	13	72	76
Social Security	54	45	65	73	61	65	79	79	62	91	76
Food Stamps	21	17	16	21	26	22	42	42	23	46	48
Contra aid	12	9	9	11	10	5	15	21	2	10	24
Unemployed	27	25	47	44	36	44	66	71	32	70	67
Space Research	28	32	44	37	14	29	29	27	22	16	39
Blacks	12	17	16	19	7	12	67	57	11	71	76

MEAN THERMOMETER SCORE FOR POLITICAL FIGURES GROUPS

Clusters:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Reagan	76	74	66	72	65	63	51	48	61	49	47
Cuomo	52	57	60	54	61	53	51	66	56	72	65
Dole	58	59	62	59	72	57	54	59	57	62	60
Kemp	54	54	53	52	63	65	52	53	51	60	52
Robertson	48	44	30	52	47	39	55	46	40	58	43
Hart	51	53	53	52	61	61	56	61	54	65	56
Bush	61	60	57	63	67	56	58	51	60	60	51
Jackson	41	39	43	41	37	40	73	75	33	77	69
Blacks	68	66	61	64	60	62	78	83	55	85	81
Unions	50	41	48	54	47	64	68	67	54	72	66
Women Mvmt	56	62	64	66	54	57	77	67	57	73	68
Pple on Welfare	47	50	45	50	54	45	58	58	55	57	54
Poor	74	74	74	76	84	73	81	84	76	78	89

4. County Seat Backbone (18 percent). People in this group form the backbone of the traditional southern electorate—white, living in the Deep South, natives and long-term residents, average income blue- and white-collar folks. While most are Democrats or Independents in their party identification, they have split their votes between the parties for Congress and governor. The Republican party has made great inroads with these voters. This group also likes Reagan and approves of the job he has done, in part because they support a strong defense and think America has grown stronger in the last few years. They want to be tough on the Soviets, and they believe in intervening internationally to defend our interests.

The Democrats still have strength among this group because of economic issues. Of all white voters, these are least worried about the deficit, are much more worried about the economy, and are most supportive of the government guaranteeing everyone a job. These voters show how stereotypes fail to portray much of the mainstream southern electorate today. These voters are both warm to Robertson and the women's movement and are the least likely of all whites to think that the government has gone too far in pushing equal rights.

5. Mothers of the Good Ole Boys (7 percent). These are older white widows who are poorly educated and living on low incomes. They identify with the Democratic party, turn out to vote, and vote for Democratic candidates. They dislike Ronald Reagan, primarily because of his economic stands and his position on social security. They are the least likely to think things in the country are getting better. These women are personally very conservative and religious. They support prayer in school, oppose abortion, and take the Bible literally. Polarized on racial issues, they are the most likely to believe that there is reverse discrimination in favor of blacks and that the government should get out of desegregating schools and businesses. They do not support government aid for minorities and are coolest to Jackson of all the groups. Their foreign policy positions are isolationist and anti-Communist. Interestingly, they are the most trusting of government.

6. Old Industrial Base (6 percent). These voters represent workers who went South more than twenty years ago during the industrial expansion of the economy. They are white, upper-income blue- and white-collar, often union members, who live in Border states. They consider themselves conservative but identify themselves as Democrats. Many did, however, vote Republican in the 1986 gubernatorial elections. They resemble blue-collar voters in the North on economic and foreign policy issues: they believe in spending to provide jobs; they want to be tough with the Russians; and they are least supportive of aid to Central America. They do, however, support government action to end discrimination. Among whites, they are in fact the most supportive of an active government role in desegregating jobs and schools.

7. Disengaged Youth (10 percent). These voters are low-income, black, and eighteen to forty-four years of age. They are disengaged from politics and their community. They attend church irregularly, most do not vote, two-thirds are unmarried, they have little interest in politics, and they have less information on many policies. Much of the group identification and politicization that is apparent among most black voters is missing here. Among black voters, they are the most individualistic, less supportive of some government initiatives to deal with racism, and think the economy has grown worse but is likely to improve. They strongly support government efforts to guarantee everyone a job.

8. Traditionalists (7 percent). These are the poorest black voters. They are forty-five years and older, live outside cities, and have lower education levels. They consider themselves conservatives but vote solidly Democratic and identify with the Democratic party. These voters have been mobilized by politics in their area. Their conservatism shows itself in moral and social issues. They support prayer in school, and of all blacks, they are least supportive of abortion. They are particularly supportive of government spending for the economy and services and aid to minorities, and in general believe the economy is getting worse.

9. Wallace Democrats (9 percent). These are older blue- or white-collar white voters who are native-born or long-time residents of the South. Among whites these are the most Democratic voters in the South. They have the highest registration rates and identification with the Democratic party, vote most frequently for Democratic candidates, and are least approving of Ronald Reagan of any southern voters. Their identification with the Democratic party, however, is rooted in tradition more than policy agreement. They want to reduce government spending, they think the government has gone too far in pushing equal rights, they believe that new lifestyles have led to a breakdown in society, they are least supportive of the government playing a role in desegregating schools and businesses, and are the most protectionist of all voters. Of any group in the South, they are the most supportive of defense spending.

10. New Torchbearers (7 percent). These are young, black voters with higher education who attend church regularly. Two-thirds are women. They consider themselves liberal and vote Democratic. Currently, their turnout is low, but these voters provide potential for mobilization in the future. Currently, they are most worried about the economy. They expect their own situation to improve, however, in the next year. As they worry about economic security for themselves and their extended families, they are most supportive of any group of increasing social security, and they want to be less involved abroad and more involved at home. They are religious and most likely of all blacks to take the Bible literally and to agree that our families are subject to moral decay.

11. Original Civil Rights Activists (5 percent). These are older black voters who live in cities. Their turnout is high, and they have the most interest in politics of any black voters. They are Democratic in their behavior and identification. They are religious and conservative on moral issues and on some foreign policy issues. They support prayer in school, and they are the most anti-Communist of any black voters. Of all blacks they are the most likely to agree that there is systemic discrimination. Their group identification and their blame of the system has led them to political activity. In general, they support government services and increasing most government programs.

Some of these groups will dominate Super Tuesday (in descending order of importance—cluster numbers 8 and 11 among black voters, and, again in descending order of importance, 9, 2, 5, and 6 among whites in the Democratic party—2, 1, and 4 in the Republican party), but they will play a far more important role in shaping the politics of the South for generations to come. ☑

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to hate this one. Child-care providers in this country are the most underpaid profession there is. That indicates clearly how we feel about the importance of our children. There's no question that just licensing—you are quite right about that—would not affect quality to the extent that a decent respect for the child-care profession might. I just wanted to add that.

Gilder: The child allowances that Allan is proposing would allow more mothers to stay home. And it's demonstrable that mothers want to stay home. Because the more income in the family, the more likely it is that she does stay home, the smaller her work effort, the less she exploits her educational credentials.

Women in families earning more than $100,000 a year are almost totally out of the work force. Only about 14 percent of women in families earning more than $100,000 choose to enlist themselves in the work force. In intact families that are committed to raising their children into civilized, productive citizens, women earn less than 20 percent of the family income.

What we have today is increased family breakdown, not a drive of women to work more or pursue careers more persistently than they did in the past. When the United States was an agricultural society, women worked very hard on the farms.

One problem is that feminism thought that men and women should be treated equally in divorce. I disagreed. I thought that divorces should favor women and children massively. It should be difficult rather than simple to divorce. The belief that female-headed families can ever function successfully bringing up teenage boys and disciplining them is false. There's no way female-headed families can work. The focus of policy must be to reinforce existing two-parent families. That's the thrust of Allan's proposals and my proposals. Once these families break down, you've lost. There isn't really much that can be done after that.

The effort to accommodate female-headed families will increase the incidence of female-headed families and thus lead to more abandonment and abuse of children. There is no way that you can replace the kind of commitment that a full-time mother offers. That is the extraordinarily expensive sacrifice that mothers make. The idea that this sacrifice is unnecessary is an illusion. And governments that propagate that illusion contribute to child abandonment.

Guggenheimer: Someone who uses someone to care for a child during all or part of a week is not abandoning a child. It doesn't mean the parent isn't spending time with that child.

A mother who uses some kind of other care to augment what she can give is not necessarily a bad mother.

Wattenberg: *After all is said and done, it seems to me there is a potential consensus out there between liberals and conservatives. Everybody's saying we ought to do this or that. I'll give some to Carlson, some to Hewlett, some to Guggenheimer, some to Gilder. It's a big country. There's a lot of money around. Let's get the show on the road. It's very important.* ☑

Beer

(Continued from page 15)

Americans, among whom there are much higher rates of out-of-wedlock children. Because black families are so different, they should be the subject of a separate study. The results of the comparison appear in table 1.

Males from nuclear family backgrounds are relatively better adjusted than males from stepfamilies on seven of the ten measures, while those from father/stepmother families score higher on overall happiness and satisfaction from family life. The males from mother/stepfather families were never the best-adjusted of the three types of family background. Females from intact families appear more adjusted than females from stepfamilies on five of the measures—happiness, belief in others' fairness and helpfulness, belief that others can be trusted, and job satisfaction. Females from father/stepmother families are more likely than those from nuclear or mother/stepfather families to say they never drink more than they should. And females from mother/stepfather families tend more than those from other families to say they find life exciting, are satisfied with their friendships, and satisfied with their family lives.

Although the differences are slight, a pattern does seem to emerge. For males, nuclear families are apparently relatively more successful than either type of stepfamily, and mother/stepfather families are the least successful. The relationship is less evident for females, since on three of the measures of adjustment, people from mother/stepfather families outscore those from intact nuclear families. Women from father/stepmother families outscore the others on only one measure. People from families with opposite-sex stepparents appear slightly less well adjusted than the others.

In general, people from intact families are better adjusted, and children from stepfamilies fare somewhat better if the parent is of the same sex as the child. But the disparities between people from the different types of families are no cause for alarm. Statistical measures of association between family type and adjustment are negligible. Overall, the emotional, social, and family adjustment of Americans from stepfamilies is not drastically different from that of people from intact nuclear families. This is good news for stepfamily members, who in their everyday lives are encountering family situations few are prepared for. They can take comfort in the knowledge that, in the long run, stepfamilies can be successful in helping children to grow up. ☑

Note: *This research was supported in part by a grant from the City University of New York PSC-BHE Research Award Program.*

William R. Beer is a professor of sociology at Brooklyn College and author of Relative Strangers, *forthcoming from Littlefield, Adams, and Co.*

(Continued from page 17)

Table 3

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

	A lot	Some	Very little
Smoking	52%	29%	18%
Drinking	37	31	28
Sexual activity	30	37	27
Marijuana use	23	32	38
Drug abuse	19	39	38
Crime, stealing, vandalism	19	39	39
Teenage pregnancy	13	30	50
Students promoted to next grade without deserving it	11	24	56
Students who can't read/write adequately	8	24	60
Use of cocaine/crack	6	17	61

problems are those of everyday life, which apparently students learn to take in stride.

The survey respondents were asked whether their schools offered sex education classes and also whether they offered drug and alcohol abuse education. One in three said their schools had sex education classes, and two-thirds of them characterized these classes as good. Half reported the existence of drug and alcohol abuse education, and three-quarters of them said those classes were good, too.

Society's Concerns

Several issues that concern society at large also involve schools. The youngsters interviewed were asked whether they favored school prayer or not, and if not, would they favor a moment of silence? Four in ten favored organized school prayer, and an additional one-third favored a moment of silence. On school busing for racial integration, two-thirds were in favor, and only one in four opposed it. We also asked whether students with AIDS should be allowed to attend public school. In a close vote, 40 percent said they should, 43 percent said they should not. Five percent—mostly the younger children—didn't know what AIDS is, and the balance were undecided. When we asked the teenagers whether homosexuals should be allowed to teach in school, five in ten said yes, four in ten said no.

Respondents rated their concern about seven other problems. Topping their concerns was the kidnapping of children and teenagers (76 percent "very concerned"). Next was the spread of AIDS and the possibility of nuclear war (65 percent each). Drug use by professional athletes followed (52 percent). Tied for fifth were air and water pollution and the possibility that the respondent might have to fight in a war someday (47 percent each). Of lowest, but by no means insignificant, concern was the increase in divorce among parents (39 percent)—no doubt reflecting the personal adjustments that many of these kids have made themselves or have observed among their friends.

Adult's Views

To validate our hypothesis that young people would put a different light on their own condition than outsiders (adults) would, we asked adults some of the questions from the American Chicle Youth Poll. We had asked the young people about the effects on children when both parents work outside the home. We asked preteens about preteens and teenagers about teenagers. We then asked adults about effects on both. Adults view the implications of working mothers with far greater alarm than children themselves do.

Table 4

WORKING PARENTS AND EFFECTS ON CHILDREN

Question: (1) In a lot of families these days both mothers and fathers work outside the home. Do you personally feel this has a good effect, a bad effect, or no effect at all on children 12 years or younger? (2) What about both mothers and fathers working outside the home and its effects on teenagers. Do you feel it has generally had a good effect, a bad effect, or no effect at all on teenagers?

	(1) Working Parents Effects on Preteens		(2) Working Parents Effects on Teens	
	Adult Response	Preteen Response	Adult Response	Teen Response
Good effect	10%	25%	11%	26%
Bad effect	62	39	48	18
No effect	21	29	31	46

Question: (3) When mothers work outside the home, do you think their children generally get into more trouble, less trouble, or about the same amount of trouble as children whose mothers do not work outside the home?

	(3) Get in trouble	
	Adult response	Youth response
More	49%	40%
Less	3	7
Same	43	48

Question: (4) When mothers work outside the home, do you think their children generally do better in school, worse in school, or do they do about the same in school as young people whose mothers do not work outside the home?

	(4) Performance in School	
	Adult Response	Youth Response
Better	6%	7%
Worse	35	26
Same	51	62

Question: (5) Do you feel that young people whose mothers work outside the home are generally more independent, less independent, or are they about the same as young people whose mothers do not work outside the home?

	(5) Degree of Independence	
	Adult Response	Youth Response
More	62%	48%
Less	5	7
Same	27	38

On a different subject, both adults and teenagers were asked when young people are old enough to do each of a number of things. Consistently, young people named a younger age than their elders.

Table 5
THE AGES OF RESPONSIBILITY

Question: Now here is a list (Hand respondent card) and, for each one I'd like you to tell me how old you feel people should be before they make their own decisions on those things. (Name item) How old do you think people should be to make their own decisions?

	Median age	
	Adult response	Teenage response
People should be able to make own decisions about . . .		
Whether or not to drink liquor	21 years	19 years
Whether or not to smoke marijuana	21	18
Whether or not to buy pornography	21	18
Whether or not to drink beer or wine	21	18
Getting married	20	19
Whether or not to have sex	18	17
Staying out at night as late as they want	18	17
Whether or not to quit school	18	17
Choosing own clothes	under 14	under 14

First, we were amused to find that both teenagers and adults reported an older median age for buying pornography than for having sex! Second, adults seem to have a way of forgetting at what an early age they, themselves, did things.

Both young people and the parents of people with children age seventeen or younger were asked two questions about time spent together. First, we asked both groups whether the family spends too much or too little time together. Parents of the younger children were less inclined than children themselves to think the amount of time spent together was about right and were more inclined to think that too little time was spent together:

	Parents	Youth
Too much time	6%	3%
Too little time	39	22
Right amount of time	55	74

Parents also found the time spent together more enjoyable than the children did:

	Parents	Youth
Enjoy time spent together		
A lot	88%	78%
A little	9	15
Not too much	3	5

The final question asked of both parents and kids concerned how freely and comfortably adults—specifically parents—and young people can talk with each other. This question reveals one of the biggest differences that exists between children and parents. Parents who have teenagers were asked about teenagers, and parents who have children eight to twelve were asked about preteens. For the children, answers of the teenagers and the preteens are shown separately.

Table 6
COMMUNICATIONS

Question: Here is a list of some different things. For each one, please tell me whether you feel that this is something about which you feel you can talk comfortably with your parents children or not?

	Answers about Teenagers			Answers about Preteens		
	Responses by: Parents	Teen-agers	Net dif-fer-ence	Responses by: Parents	Pre-teens	Net dif-fer-ence
School	96%	94%	-2	96%	93%	-3
Money	96	91	-5	92	84	-8
Drinking or alcohol use	95	81	-14	91	na	na
Drugs or drug use	94	80	-14	92	na	na
The way you and they get along	93	78	-15	94	81	-13
Religion	92	87	-5	93	88	-5
Problems they have	90	71	-19	92	82	-10
Their friends	90	84	-6	96	88	-8
Clothing	89	95	+6	92	92	—
Their privacy	85	65	-20	90	65	-25
Sex	81	59	-22	72	na	na

Note: na = not asked

Communication is probably the stickiest issue between parents and children—particularly with respect to sex, children's privacy, and what children see as their personal problems. Both the youth and parents' studies highlight this as a problem area.

Grim stories about teen pregnancies, suicides, drunk driving, and drug abuse paint a rather lopsided picture of the nation's young people. This substantial survey helps even things up. Young people are—by and large—well adjusted, and the problems they have do not point to an impending crisis. This study provides solid ground for optimism about their future—and our own. ☑

About the American Chicle Youth Poll

Young people aged eight to seventeen are not an easy group to interview—particularly those in the eight to twelve category. Interviewing has to be done by older people, and that has an inhibiting effect.

To maximize rapport, this survey used face-to-face interviews among a representative sample of one thousand school-age children between the ages of eight and seventeen.

Two forms of the questionnaire were developed. The longer and basic one was for teenagers. A few questions deemed inappropriate for eight-to-twelve-year-olds (about sex, drugs, and alcohol, for example) were eliminated from the form used for the preteenagers. In addition to eliminating inappropriate questions, certain questions (particularly about school) were slightly modified for the younger age group.

Burns W. Roper is chairman, and Edward B. Keller is senior vice chairman, of the Roper Organization in New York.

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Public Opinion

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The Pursuit of Happiness
Edward Banfield
Allan Bloom & Charles Murray

THE MYTHS OF MODERN CAMPAIGNS

Also:
Proposition 13 Ten Years Later;
The New Facts of Life: AIDS and Heterosexuals;
Current Attitudes Toward the Middle East;
The European Gender Gap

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MISREADING MOMENTUM

by S. Robert Lichter

How far the mighty media have fallen. Not long ago pundits and politicians worshiped at the shrine of media momentum before going out to do battle in the primaries. Entire campaigns were staked on gaining enough media bounce from a good early showing to keep the ball rolling into the later big-delegate contests. The model was Jimmy Carter, a political unknown who rode the media wave from Iowa to the Democratic nomination in 1976. A Carter staffer later admitted, "We had planned only for the short haul. After [that] it was all NBC, CBS, and the *New York Times*."[1] Losers have been even more blunt. After his 1980 pasting, dollar rich but delegate poor John Connally lamented, "On a scale of importance the media is at least eight and everything else is two."[2]

That's all old news, according to David Broder, the dean of Washington political reporters. He writes that the "conventional wisdom" about media momentum "has been jettisoned this year."[3] Political scientist Michael Robinson, who practically invented the idea of the mediated campaign, now admits that "1988 is confounding almost all the political wisdom we had built up from 1976, 1980, and 1984. . . .We thought momentum was everything, and it turned out to be ephemeral, if not meaningless." Even the *Des Moines Register*'s editor now muses, "I just wonder if the candidates will decide it ain't worth all that effort in Iowa."

So Big Mo has finally been cut down to size. The old conventional wisdom is dead. Long live the new conventional wisdom. The problem is that one myth is being substituted for another. Media momentum wasn't the big enchilada in elections past, but neither is it small potatoes now. As William C. Adams concluded in these pages four years ago, "Media attention alone does not guarantee a constituency but only offers an opportunity to assemble one."[4] It was and is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for ultimate victory.

Net Propulsion

We can pin down the effects of momentum by comparing candidate movement in the CBS News/*New York Times* preference polls with data from an ongoing Center for Media and Public Affairs content analysis of TV news election coverage. As table 1 shows, all the preprimary jockeying for position produced virtually no change in either party's standings (with the obvious exceptions of Gary Hart and Joe Biden). The TV coverage paralleled the poll results, as table 2 indicates. The networks set front-runner Hart apart from the rest of the crowded Democratic field. (Hart generated by far the most coverage even before the Donna Rice story.) Among Republicans, the networks placed their bets on George Bush, Bob Dole, and Pat Robertson to win, place, and show, respectively.

Table 1

PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE POLLS

	Dukakis	Jackson	Gore	Gephardt	Simon	Hart
Jan. 1987	1%	9%	—	2%	—	33%
May 1987	6	10	1%	4	1%	32
May 1987*	11	17	5	4	6	—
Jan. 30, 1988	6	17	4	4	9	23
Feb. 21	21	13	8	12	6	10
Mar. 22	29	22	14	8	6	—

	Bush	Dole	Robertson
Jan. 1987	36%	15%	5%
Jan. 30, 1988	41	22	7
Feb. 21	42	27	7
Mar. 22	63	20	7

Note: * = after Gary Hart's first withdrawal.
Source: Survey of Democratic and Republican partisans by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of March 22, 1988.

Table 2

SHARE OF TV NEWS COVERAGE*

	Democrats					
	Dukakis	Jackson	Gore	Gephardt	Simon	Hart
1987	10%	13%	10%	12%	12%	22%
1988						
1/1-2/8	15	8	6	21	19	16
2/9-2/16	21	8	12	23	22	6
2/17-3/8	19	19	19	22	11	4
3/9-4/5	26	34	15	14	9	2

	Republicans		
	Bush	Dole	Robertson
1987	30%	22%	13%
1988			
1/1-2/8	33	31	14
2/9-2/16	27	23	26
2/17-3/8	23	23	36
3/9-4/5	29	57	10

Note: * = number of times quoted as a percentage of all candidates.

Jesse Jackson was the only candidate who might reasonably claim that his level of early coverage didn't match his popular support. But when he did manage to take the stage, he commanded the spotlight. Twice as many TV stories ran on Jackson as on Michael Dukakis, Richard Gephardt, Paul Simon, or Al Gore during 1987.

It would be difficult to persuade Hart and Biden that media no longer matter in election coverage, and Dukakis, a near casualty of bad press over his campaign's role in skewering Biden, might take some convincing, too. Hart's and Biden's early exits should remind us that the importance of media lies not only in producing momentum for winners but also in winnowing the field of losers. Winners are defined by media coverage as well as vote tabulations (as in "better than expected" finishes); losers include those who stumble in the media mine field where verbal or behavioral gaffes can blow up in their faces.

Once 1988 arrived, journalists turned from the polls to the early primaries to handicap the field. The big stories in Iowa were Gephardt's breakout from the pack, Dole's victory, and Robertson's surprisingly strong finish. All three were rewarded with proportionate jumps in media attention. From Iowa to Super Tuesday, Gephardt led all Democrats in amount of TV coverage, and Dole and Robertson were even with 1987 front-runner Bush.

What about the allegedly missing Iowa bounce this year? It propelled the victors upward in New Hampshire, but not to the top. As table 3 shows, the results for both parties were remarkably similar. On January 30 both Gephardt and Dole were running far behind the front-runners in New Hampshire. After their Iowa victories, each closed the gap by 14 percentage points—not a bad little hop. Unfortunately, that left Gephardt still nineteen points behind Dukakis, and it kept Dole eight points behind Bush in the tracking polls conducted on February 9 and 10.

Table 3

CBS NEWS TRACKING POLLS

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Dukakis	Gephardt	Bush	Dole
Jan. 30, 1988	40%	7%	42%	20%
Feb. 9-10	38	19	35	27
Feb. 10-11	39	16	29	32
Feb. 12-13	42	18	30	31
Feb. 13-14	37	15	32	31
Feb. 14-15	38	13	34	30
New Hampshire Vote - Feb. 16	36%	20%	38%	29%

Note: Sample = New Hampshire likely primary voters.

Despite daily fluctuations during the next week, that's about the way it ended. Dukakis finished 16 percentage points ahead of Gephardt in New Hampshire, and Bush beat Dole by a 9-percentage-point margin. In each case a well-known incumbent (Dukakis locally, Bush nationally) held on to a core of supporters ranging from 35 percent to 40 percent of the primary electorate. Iowa victories helped their challengers close this gap substantially, but not entirely.

The narrowness of Dole's defeat reflected a continued surge that carried him to a three-point lead in the polls on February 11, a remarkable twenty-five-point turnaround since Iowa. But the lead proved short-lived, as the polls tracked a gradual but steady shift back to Bush. The bounce was there, it just wasn't high enough to surmount the superior organization and the twenty-two-point lead held by Reagan's self-designated heir.

The Rewards of Defeat

Many pundits—and Dole himself—attributed the New Hampshire defeat to a late (and unanswered) negative TV ad that Bush had run. That may have had an effect, but so might the free media attention Bush was receiving. The week between the Iowa and New Hampshire votes was the only time during the entire campaign that Bush received mainly good press on

network TV. Suddenly there were stories about his loyalty, steadiness, and experience, rather than his wimpiness, evasiveness, and possible involvement in the Iran-Contra affair. (In fact Iran-Contra virtually disappeared as an issue on the news before New Hampshire, after topping the charts before Iowa.)

For one brief but critical moment, George Bush became a media favorite, as table 4 shows. The one time that Bush was the underdog, his on-air evaluations leaped from 39 percent to 66 percent positive. While everyone was focusing on Bush's Iowa defeat, his decline in the polls, his campaign's "desperation," his "last-ditch effort," and so forth, he was also being portrayed as a good guy for a change. This follows a classic news pattern: attack the front-runners but let up on the underdogs. The portrait of a good man in desperate straits may have been just the right image to shore up Bush's supporters and get them out to the polls.

Table 4

POSITIVE CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS*

	Democrats					
	Dukakis	Jackson	Gore	Gephardt	Simon	Hart
1987	67%	86%	—	80%	92%	40%
1988						
1/1-2/8	59	83	—	49	33	44
2/9-2/16	45	—	—	40	39	—
2/17-3/8	40	74	50	40	—	—
3/9-4/5	63	79	42	38	—	—

	Republicans		
	Bush	Dole	Robertson
1987	49%	79%	61%
1988			
1/1-2/8	39	53	82
2/9-2/16	66	68	65
2/17-3/8	44	56	33
3/9-4/5	60	75	—

Note: * = Proportion of positive statements from all sources on TV news. This excludes horse-race assessments. Dash = fewer than five evaluations.

By contrast Gephardt—for all his new-found attention—fell victim to the media malaise that has enveloped the Democratic field this year. Every candidate except Jesse Jackson received more bad press than good press during the critical (and heavily covered) New Hampshire and Super Tuesday campaigning. This is partly the product of this year's bumper crop of debates and attack ads, whose zingers provide perfect ten-second sound bites for the evening news shows. As a result each campaign organization strove to outdo the others in crafting pithy put-downs and devastating one-liners that would reverberate across the airwaves. Nobody came up with another "Where's the beef?" but their efforts produced plenty of footage indicting Gephardt's flip-flops, Simon's rose-colored economics, Gore's sudden hawkishness, and Dukakis's prosaic persona.

The negative coverage may also reflect preemptive media strikes by journalists. Ever since Jimmy Carter took them by surprise, journalists have tried to counter campaign media strategies by stepping up their scrutiny of anyone who seems likely to break out of the pack. If they can't keep the primaries from becoming media lotteries, they may prevent the winners from cashing in their chips. Table 4 shows how quickly media criticism caught up with both Simon and Gephardt after they moved forward in Iowa. Gephardt never got out from under the dark cloud of bad press. Simon's bad press quickly faded into no press. Dukakis began taking his lumps as soon as the campaign shifted to New Hampshire, where he was cursed with the front-runner status that virtually guarantees increased news scrutiny. Even Gore saw his modest level of good press drop after his Super Tuesday victories.

What Jesse Gets

So who is the latest candidate to benefit from a media boost? Why, Jesse Jackson, who has 80 percent positive press in our evaluation between January and April 5 this year. Jackson's share of the coverage more than doubled after New Hampshire and continued to gain after Super Tuesday. The content analysis also revealed that he has been the subject of over three times as many TV news stories as any other Democrat since March 8. During that time he has jumped nine points in the polls to claim "co-front-runner" status with Dukakis. Equally important, virtually all his gains were among whites. And the ABC News/*Washington Post* poll reports that the proportion of the public who regard Jackson unfavorably has dropped even further during the same period, from 45 to 30 percent.

Thus Jackson becomes the latest beneficiary of media-generated momentum. His good fortune is not unearned. It resulted from skillful campaigning and a growing ability to attract white votes, along with a big Super Tuesday showing. But it also reflects the subjective process of news judgment. Jackson's airtime increased and his horse race coverage improved after journalists decided that his appeal among both blacks and whites had increased sufficiently since 1984 to make him the likely winner of several southern primaries. This prospect, more than Jackson's actual accomplishments, qualified him as a "serious" candidate in the minds of the media. Jackson's share of the white vote in Iowa and New Hampshire, along with projections of Super Tuesday success, created a great story, and the media ran with it.

Jackson's media gain was Gore's loss. Gore actually won as many primaries on March 8 (five, plus the Nevada caucuses) and a larger share of the popular vote than Jackson (29 to 26 percent). But Super Tuesday gave a turbo boost to Jackson's media charge, which had already been picking up speed. His share of the Democratic candidates' TV coverage leaped from only 8 percent before New Hampshire to 19 percent during the Super Tuesday campaign to 34 percent during the Illinois and Wisconsin primaries and the Michigan

(*Continued on page 57*)

WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE VOTERS THIS YEAR

REPUBLICANS

CANDIDATES	Total (Actual Vote)	Sex		Age				Education				Ideology	
		Male	Female	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60 and over	< High school	High school grad.	Some college	College grad.	Liberal	Conservative
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Alabama													
GB	64	64	64	62	57	68	69	70	59	64	66	74	56
RD	16	16	17	17	20	11	17	10	19	14	21	21	16
PR	14	12	17	12	19	16	9	16	17	15	5	0	19
Arkansas													
GB	47	54	41	38	37	49	61	36	49	64	27	38	44
RD	26	23	21	34	13	19	23	10	27	13	53	40	23
PR	18	10	30	10	32	29	7	45	14	8	8	14	24
Florida													
GB	62	63	61	65	51	61	66	65	59	58	63	62	58
RD	21	22	21	18	22	22	22	17	25	27	20	28	19
PR	11	9	13	11	19	12	7	14	11	7	10	5	18
Georgia													
GB	54	56	52	52	49	52	61	53	55	53	55	55	50
RD	24	21	26	22	25	25	22	22	21	27	26	27	19
PR	16	16	17	17	19	18	12	20	20	13	11	13	25
Louisiana													
GB	58	60	54	54	51	57	68	64	50	54	63	64	61
RD	18	18	17	25	17	18	13	12	19	17	22	19	16
PR	18	14	23	11	28	15	14	17	24	21	7	13	15
Massachusetts													
GB	59	60	60	56	51	62	70	68	63	55	50	53	57
RD	26	27	27	35	32	23	21	17	23	32	42	41	23
PR	5	5	5	5	7	6	2	6	6	6	2	1	6
Maryland													
GB	53					NA						40	52
RD	32											47	28
PR	6											4	10
Mississippi													
GB	66	67	64	78	57	67	65	68	61	58	68	66	58
RD	17	16	17	15	20	15	15	17	16	20	17	17	14
PR	13	11	15	6	18	12	15	11	17	16	11	11	21
Missouri													
GB	42	44	44	32	43	43	49	47	50	37	34	37	45
RD	41	43	39	44	41	43	40	43	40	46	43	55	33
PR	11	8	13	18	13	9	7	8	9	9	12	3	17
North Carolina													
GB	45	51	42	37	38	54	54	50	46	40	46	43	47
RD	40	35	40	43	38	36	26	37	35	43	38	44	37
PR	10	9	13	15	15	5	6	9	13	11	8	6	11

DEMOCRATS

CANDIDATES	Total (Actual Vote)	Race		Age				Education				Ideology	
		White	Black	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60 and over	< High school	High school grad.	Some college	College grad.	Liberal	Conservative
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Alabama													
MD	8	12	1	8	7	6	9	5	6	5	12	16	5
JJ	44	6	96	54	55	41	37	60	44	43	45	54	24
RG	7	12	1	4	6	9	8	3	11	8	5	4	10
AG	37	64	2	32	28	39	44	32	37	38	34	19	53
Arkansas													
MD	19	22	2	29	22	17	16	14	19	19	29	19	19
JJ	17	6	91	13	16	13	18	23	14	13	16	41	14
RG	12	14	0	10	7	12	19	10	17	9	9	8	13
AG	37	42	4	36	40	34	39	39	36	44	28	21	38
Florida													
MD	41	49	2	25	31	35	53	39	41	43	39	48	31
JJ	20	9	91	36	39	27	11	35	18	24	25	29	13
RG	14	16	3	10	9	15	16	14	17	13	9	8	15
AG	13	14	2	16	11	13	11	6	11	12	14	6	24
Georgia													
MD	16	23	3	21	16	11	16	7	11	17	21	19	15
JJ	40	7	94	41	43	44	25	40	37	39	35	53	27
RG	7	11	—	9	7	8	6	4	9	8	6	4	8
AG	32	52	2	22	26	32	51	44	37	30	31	17	42
Louisiana													
MD	15	25	3	13	15	21	19	10	19	15	20	12	16
JJ	35	4	92	53	42	29	31	54	37	39	28	64	33
RG	11	17	—	8	12	15	6	7	11	12	12	7	10
AG	28	42	2	16	23	28	36	18	27	21	35	10	32
Massachusetts													
MD	59	64	36	55	58	56	72	64	70	52	59	59	54
JJ	19	17	63	27	26	21	7	26	11	18	24	27	13
RG	10	10	1	11	7	7	13	5	11	14	8	4	16
AG	4	5	0	1	3	9	5	0	3	14	2	3	8
Maryland													
MD	46	59	7	40	36	40	61	70	44	45	42	45	41
JJ	29	8	88	36	42	30	16	26	25	32	33	38	21
RG	8	12	0	8	6	11	8	1	15	7	6	3	9
AG	9	11	3	6	6	12	8	0	10	8	10	4	17
Mississippi													
MD	9	14	3	9	7	10	10	6	10	10	8	9	12
JJ	44	4	91	55	52	37	31	49	41	36	43	65	25
RG	6	9	2	2	7	5	7	7	7	5	4	3	10
AG	34	59	2	23	28	37	44	30	33	42	36	14	42
Missouri													
MD	12	14	—	7	9	17	11	9	12	10	16	16	10
JJ	20	8	86	21	28	20	16	9	22	19	26	29	12
RG	58	67	12	59	51	57	65	71	60	59	47	42	64
AG	3	4	0	3	3	3	3	1	2	2	6	2	3
North Carolina													
MD	20	28	2	18	24	23	19	14	17	21	27	30	19
JJ	33	6	95	36	39	31	23	40	34	29	28	43	22
RG	6	8	—	7	6	6	5	6	4	9	5	3	10
AG	35	49	2	30	26	33	50	39	40	37	31	18	41

REPUBLICANS

	Total (Actual Vote)	Sex		Age				Education				Ideology	
		Male	Female	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60 and over	High school	High school grad.	Some college	College grad.	Liberal	Conservative
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Oklahoma													
GB	37	36	39	28	33	35	52	42	37	39	31	39	35
RD	35	37	33	41	32	37	36	26	37	41	35	44	26
PR	21	22	21	24	30	19	8	23	23	14	26	8	32
Tennessee													
GB	60	70	53	49	55	64	73	67	51	73	44	58	57
RD	22	15	27	27	23	18	15	15	29	14	30	22	17
PR	12	12	13	16	15	11	9	14	13	10	12	14	21
Texas													
GB	64	64	57	63	53	62	69	64	60	59	60	61	67
RD	14	15	15	16	17	13	14	16	13	17	18	21	11
PR	15	13	18	16	19	17	9	16	18	14	13	13	15
Virginia													
GB	53	53	52	45	45	53	65	60	46	54	50	36	56
RD	25	26	26	28	28	28	22	22	26	29	27	51	20
PR	15	13	16	16	19	14	8	13	21	9	14	7	15
Illinois													
GB	55	54	50	41	49	57	56	57	54	47	47	58	56
RD	36	38	35	44	32	35	39	33	33	42	44	36	31
PR	7	5	12	10	14	8	2	8	11	7	8	4	10

LATE POLL: New York Democrats

	Total	White	Black	Hispanic
MD	51	69	5	38
JJ	37	15	93	61
AG	10	14	1	1

DEMOCRATS

	Total (Actual Vote)	Race		Age				Education				Ideology	
		White	Black	18-29 years	30-44 years	45-59 years	60 and over	High school	High school grad.	Some college	College grad.	Liberal	Conservative
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Oklahoma													
MD	17	18	6	18	19	17	17	13	17	19	20	21	15
JJ	13	9	90	19	21	15	4	18	9	14	20	26	8
RG	21	23	0	17	18	24	24	21	19	28	17	15	24
AG	41	43	0	39	32	39	50	39	46	36	36	28	48
Tennessee													
MD	3	5	0	0	5	5	3	2	3	6	4	7	4
JJ	21	6	91	40	36	23	22	41	17	21	37	44	17
RG	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	—	1	1
AG	72	87	8	59	56	72	73	57	78	69	59	46	73
Texas													
MD	33	38	7	32	30	29	37	33	29	34	33	37	31
JJ	24	9	89	35	31	30	21	35	28	27	28	40	18
RG	14	18	1	7	9	16	18	13	17	11	10	5	12
AG	21	27	3	20	22	18	17	12	24	18	22	8	30
Virginia													
MD	22	34	2	20	25	21	25	11	20	21	29	26	16
JJ	45	12	95	40	43	45	33	53	41	38	36	44	30
RG	4	7	1	4	4	6	6	1	8	5	4	3	6
AG	22	39	—	23	22	25	32	28	28	27	24	20	39
Illinois													
MD	17	24	1	17	18	17	17	15	19	16	19	15	19
JJ	31	7	91	35	34	32	26	45	32	30	26	42	21
RG	2	3	—	4	3	2	1	2	2	3	3	1	3
AG	5	9	—	7	6	6	6	5	5	7	6	4	9
Wisconsin													
MD	47	51	9	40	41	50	58	54	54	42	42	37	43
JJ	28	23	88	38	34	26	18	22	26	31	31	44	24
RG	—	1	0	—	—	2	1	—	1	1	—	1	1
AG	17	18	2	16	19	16	18	21	15	18	18	11	25

Source: Total = actual vote (latest estimates, usually 99% complete); Race, age, education, sex from CBS exit poll in each state; Ideology from ABC exit poll in each state.

THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

Question: During the next year, do you think the nation's economy will get better, get worse, stay about the same, not sure?



Source: NBC News exit polls. New York Democrats, 15% get better, 40% stay about the same, 30% get worse.

THE ISSUES

Question: Which issues mattered most in deciding how you voted (check up to 2 boxes)?



Source: CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls.

Question: Mark an "X" if you approve of any of the following programs and leave it blank if you disapprove.

	Voters in Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina and Texas	
	Republicans	**Democrats**
Approve of . . .		
A tax increase to help balance the budget deficit	14%	18%
More domestic spending	16	28
Restrictions on foreign imports	35	32
Less defense spending	16	31
A Constitutional amendment to ban abortions	36	21
Mandatory testing for AIDS	46	37
Military aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua	40	15

Source: *Los Angeles Times* exit polls.

Question: Do you think the trade amendment Richard Gephardt has proposed will . . .

	Help the economy	Make no difference	Hurt	Not sure
Democratic voters in . . .				
AL	26%	20%	16%	38%
AR	22	23	14	41
KY	19	22	16	43
LA	23	25	12	40
MD	16	23	20	41
MA	15	24	26	35
MS	17	26	12	45
MO	49	14	12	25
NC	17	22	17	44
OK	34	21	13	32
RI	12	20	27	41
TN	13	22	18	47
TX	25	24	15	36
VA	15	21	24	40
IL	17	22	17	44

Source: NBC News exit polls.

Question: All in all, has economic competition from other countries . . .

	Helped your community		Not had much impact		Hurt	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
Voters in . . .						
AL	15%	20%	35%	24%	42%	45%
AR	16	14	28	30	46	47
FL	17	18	42	40	33	33
GA	16	19	40	34	38	41
LA	10	16	20	19	66	59
MD	na	14	na	38	na	42
MA	18	18	48	30	34	39
MS	17	22	40	30	34	39
MO	19	10	32	28	48	57
NC	14	16	36	30	44	47
OK	10	9	24	24	61	61
TN	21	19	37	31	32	40
TX	12	12	24	21	56	61
VA	17	19	45	37	30	37

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls.

Question: Are you worried enough about the federal budget deficit to be willing to have your income taxes increased, or not?

	Worried enough about federal budget deficit to have your income taxes increased	
	Republican	Democratic
Voters in . . .		
AL	30%	32%
AR	28	28
KY	33	39
LA	32	28
MD	39	48
MA	35	50
MS	33	30
MO	33	38
NC	36	45
OK	29	32
RI	41	47
TN	32	32
TX	32	34
VA	39	52
IL	36	35

Source: NBC News exit polls.

Question: Which of these statements do you agree with more?

Voters in Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina and Texas



Source: *Los Angeles Times* exit polls.

Question: How much influence do you think religion has on American politics?



Source: *Los Angeles Times* exit polls in Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas.

THE CANDIDATES

THE REPUBLICANS

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?

	Republican Primary Voters		
	Bush voters	Dole voters	All
% approve of Reagan handling of job			
AL	92	71	87
AR	78	65	71
FL	86	62	80
GA	91	65	83
LA	92	84	88
MA	84	63	77
MS	88	76	85
MO	91	70	81
NC	89	72	82
OK	86	74	79
TN	87	80	86
TX	89	68	84
VA	89	74	84
IL	83	64	75

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls.

Question: Regardless of how you voted today, is your opinion of George Bush favorable or unfavorable?

	Republican Primary Voters
	Favorable opinion of Bush
AL	82%
AR	63
FL	73
GA	71
LA	75
MA	74
MS	80
MO	67
NC	70
OK	62
TN	75
TX	77
VA	73
IL	70

	How Voters Who Identify Themselves As Born-Again Voted	
	Bush	Robertson
AL	56%	25%
AR	38	33
FL	46	36
GA	45	32
KY	51	21
LA	45	35
MD	42	25
MA	43	25
MS	56	25
MO	36	27
NC	44	16
OK	30	41
TN	56	21
TX	52	30
VA	45	27
CT	43	32
WI	60	31

Note: Across the South, 39% of Republican primary voters identified themselves as born-again.
Source: ABC News exit polls.

THE DEMOCRATS

Question: Regardless of how you voted today, is your opinion of Michael Dukakis/Jesse Jackson favorable or unfavorable?

	Democratic Primary Voters	
	Favorable opinion of Dukakis	Jackson
AL	44%	53%
AR	53	34
FL	67	43
GA	54	52
LA	50	49
MA	72	59
MD	72	51
MS	42	51
MO	50	46
NC	60	48
OK	50	34
TN	44	45
TX	64	53
VA	60	61
WI	73	55
IL	60	49
NY	72	49

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls.

Question: Do you think the country is or is not ready to elect a qualified black as president?



Question: Do you think the country is or is not ready to elect Jesse Jackson as president?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report*, March 30-31, 1988.

When NBC News asked Democratic primary voters "Do you think the voters in this country are ready to elect a black as president," the "yes" responses were as follows: AL 26%, AR 12%, KY 13%, LA 28%, MD 25%, MA 21%, MS 25%, MO 14%, NC 19%, OK 14%, TN 16%, TX 20%, and VA 24%.

LOOKING AHEAD TO NOVEMBER

Question: In the 1988 November election for president, do you think you will . . .


In the November election will . . .
Definitely vote for the Democratic party
Probably vote for the Democratic party
Probably vote for the Republican party
Can't say now
Democratic voters in:
Alabama 50% 18% 10% 22%
Arkansas 33% 19% 18% 30%
Florida 40% 17% 13% 24%
Georgia 40% 20% 8% 24%
Louisiana 43% 15% 19% 22%
Massachusetts 46% 21% 9% 24%
Maryland 43% 18% 13% 27%
Mississippi 40% 18% 21% 21%
Missouri 46% 20% 8% 25%
North Carolina 41% 19% 15% 25%
Oklahoma 38% 19% 14% 29%
Tennessee 51% 18% 11% 21%
Texas 45% 19% 13% 24%
Virginia 50% 23% 6% 21%
Wisconsin 49% 24% 5% 26%
Illinois 50% 21% 3% 26%

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls.

Question: In the 1988 November election for president, do you think you will . . .


In the November election will . . .
Definitely vote for the Republican party
Probably vote for the Republican party
Probably vote for the Democratic party
Can't say now
Republican voters in:
Alabama 72% 13% 2% 13%
Arkansas 54% 10% 8% 28%
Florida 62% 15% 4% 18%
Georgia 64% 15% 3% 18%
Louisiana 64% 18% 3% 15%
Massachusetts 58% 17% 5% 20%
Mississippi 64% 13% 4% 18%
Missouri 56% 21% 3% 22%
North Carolina 63% 15% 3% 19%
Oklahoma 53% 18% 6% 25%
Tennessee 66% 14% 4% 15%
Texas 61% 18% 2% 19%
Virginia 63% 19% 1% 17%
Illinois 59% 15% 4% 23%

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls.

HOW REAGAN HAS FARED WITH KEY G

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?

FOR DATA, SEE PAGE 60.





Note: "Don't know enough" asked only in 1981. "No answer" not shown.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 17-21, 1988.

ROUPS THROUGHOUT HIS PRESIDENCY

Question: How do you feel about President Reagan—at the present time, would you describe yourself as a strong Reagan supporter, a moderate Reagan supporter, a moderate critic of Reagan, or a strong critic of Reagan?





Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-6), latest that of May 16-30, 1987.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?

FOR DATA, SEE PAGE 60.





Question: How do you feel about President Reagan—at the present time, would you describe yourself as a strong Reagan supporter, a moderate Reagan supporter, a moderate critic of Reagan, or a strong critic of Reagan?





Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?

FOR DATA, SEE PAGE 60.





Question: How do you feel about President Reagan—at the present time, would you describe yourself as a strong Reagan supporter, a moderate Reagan supporter, a moderate critic of Reagan, or a strong critic of Reagan?





THE MOOD

Question: Are you satisfied with the way Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as prime minister?

FOR DATA, SEE PAGE 34.


Percent
100
70
60
50
40
30
20
Thatcher/Prime Minister
Unemployment reaches 1.9 million
(Highest since 30s)
Rioting, July 1981
Falklands, April 1982
Thatcher re-elected, June 1983
A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) London, latest that of March 24-28, 1988.

Question: How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow? (To those "undecided" or "refused") Which party are you most inclined to support?



Note: In March 1988, the results were Conservative, 46%; Labour, 37%; SLD (the Democrats), 8%; and SDP, 6%.
Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) London, latest that of March 24-28, 1988.

IN BRITAIN


Percent
100
70
60
50
40
30
20
Thatcher assassination attempt, October 1984
Thatcher grants overflight request to U.S. for Libyan strike, April 1986
Thatcher re-elected
Dissatisfied
Satisfied
D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988


Percent
100
50
40
30
20
10
Conservative
Labour
Liberal/SDP
D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J
1986
1987
1988

THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN BRITAIN

Question: What would you say is the most urgent problem facing the country at the present time? (Gallup 1979)
What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today? (MORI 1983-1988)



Source: Surveys by Social Surveys Ltd. (Gallup), July 11-16, 1979, and MORI latest that of February 26-March 1, 1988.

Data for pages 32 and 33

Thatcher

	Sat.	Dis.
1981	%	%
Jan.	33	61
Feb.	32	63
Mar.	29	65
Apr.	33	60
June	34	61
July	31	62
Aug.	29	64
Sept.	28	65
Oct.	30	65
Nov.	28	64
Dec.	25	66
1982		
Jan.	32	61
Feb.	30	63
Mar.	36	57
Apr.	41	53
May	56	40
June	59	36
July	51	41
Aug.	49	43
Sept.	46	48
Oct.	46	46
Nov.	48	45
Dec.	46	45
1983		
Jan.	49	45
Feb.	49	45
Mar.	48	46
Apr.	49	44
May	53	40
July	51	42
Aug.	53	40
Sept.	50	43
Oct.	47	46
Dec.	47	48

1984		
Jan.	48	45
Feb.	47	47
Mar.	43	52
Apr.	42	51
May	43	52
June	39	54
Aug.	41	52
Sep.	41	51
Oct.	48	46
Nov.	44	47
Dec.	41	51
1985		
Jan.	44	49
Mar.	37	56
Apr.	38	57
May	35	58
June	38	54
July	38	55
Aug.	33	60
Sept.	35	58
Oct.	39	55
Nov.	39	55
Dec.	39	53
1986		
Jan.	34	58
Feb.	29	64
Mar.	32	61
Apr.	32	61
May	29	64
June	30	62
July	30	63
Aug.	27	65
Sept.	32	59
Oct.	35	55
Nov.	37	54
Dec.	39	55

1987		
Jan.	37	56
Feb.	38	54
Mar.	44	50
Apr.	47	46
May		
June	51	41
July	54	38
Aug.	48	45
Sept.	48	45
Oct.	49	43
Nov.	49	44
Dec.		
1988		
Jan.	46	47
Feb.	45	48
Mar	46	49

	Conservative	Labour	Liberal/SDP
1983	%	%	%
June	43	27	29
July	44	30	25
Aug.	46	30	22
Sept.	45	27	26
Oct.	42	37	19
Dec.	44	37	18
1984			
Jan.	42	37	19
Feb.	41	38	19
Mar.	41	40	17
Apr.	40	39	20
June	39	39	21
July	37	40	20
Aug.	39	39	21
Sept.	42	36	20
Oct.	44	35	20
Nov.	43	35	19
Dec.	40	36	22
1985			
Jan.	42	34	21
Feb.	39	35	24
March	36	40	23
April	38	37	24
May	33	35	30
June	35	36	27
July	33	34	31
Aug.	31	35	31
Sept.	30	33	35
Oct.	37	36	25

	Conservative	Labour	Liberal/SDP
Nov.	36	36	25
Dec.	35	35	28
1986			
Jan.	33	38	28
Feb.	34	35	30
March	34	36	28
April	34	39	25
May	32	40	26
June	34	40	23
July	36	37	25
Aug.	37	37	24
Sept.	35	37	26
Oct.	39	41	17
Nov.	41	39	18
Dec.	39	38	21
1987			
Jan.	39	38	21
Feb.	41	35	20
March	41	29	29
April	44	31	23
May	44	31	23
June	43	32	23
July	49	33	17
Aug.	48	36	14
Sept.	49	36	12
Oct.	47	37	14
Nov.	50	38	11
1988			
Jan.	50	36	12
Feb.	46	38	14

COMPARING THATCHER AND KINNOCK

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your views of Mrs. Thatcher/Mr. Kinnock?


I like . . . and I like his/her policies
I like . . . but I dislike his/her policies
I dislike . . . but I like his/her policies
I dislike . . . and I dislike his/her policies
Thatcher
14%
15%
Kinnock
32%
9%

Source: Survey by Social Surveys Ltd. (Gallup), December 2-7, 1987.

Question: Here are some things people have said about Mrs. Thatcher. For each of them would you tell me whether you agree or disagree.


Agree a lot/a little that . . .
Neither agree nor disagree that . . .
Disagree a little/a lot that . . .
Mrs. Thatcher is not in touch with the working class/ordinary people
6%
24%
Mrs. Thatcher is catty/bitchy
14%
Mrs. Thatcher is trying hard in her job
8%
11%
Mrs. Thatcher knows what she is talking about
9%
23%

Source: Survey by Social Surveys Ltd. (Gallup), July 29-August 3, 1987.

Question: I am going to read out some things people are saying about the Labour party. Could you please tell me for each whether you agree or disagree?


Agree
Disagree
Labour has become too extreme
36%
Labour is too split and divided
24%
Labour is the only party that looks after ordinary working people and their families
41%
59%
It's not very clear what a vote for Labour means these days
32%
The economy would be in a better state under Labour
31%
69%

Note: "Don't know" calculated out. All were under 10% except for "Economy would be in a better state under Labour", which was 14%.

Source: Survey by Social Surveys Ltd. (Gallup), September 16-21, 1987.

ARE YOU BETTER OFF?

Question: In general terms, would you say that . . . are better off or worse off than they were eight years ago when the Conservatives took over as government?



Note: The "better off" responses in November 1986 were: 77%, 60%, 35%, 17% and 26% respectively.

Source: Survey by Social Surveys Ltd. (Gallup), September 23-28, 1987.

UNIONS' CLOUT

Question: I am going to read out some statements relating to trade unions. For each one please tell me if you would agree or disagree. . . .



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of October 1987.

THE MONARCHY'S MAGIC

Question: On balance, do you think Britain would be better off or worse off if the monarchy was abolished, or do you think it would make no difference?



Note: Among conservatives, 2% said Britain would be better off if the monarchy was abolished, 22% said no difference, and 76% said worse off. Among Labourites, the responses were 8%, 44%, and 47%.

Source: Survey by Market & Opinion Research International, November 1987.

AIDS: A MULTI-

Question: Have you heard or read about the disease known as AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome)?

Question: How concerned are you that you, yourself, will get AIDS—very concerned, a little concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned?


Heard or read about AIDS
Very/A little concerned that you will get AIDS
Not very/Not at all concerned
Canada 100% 30% 69%
Brazil 100% 55% 45%
United States 99% 42% 58%
Colombia 99% 45% 55%
Great Britain 99% 22% 76%
Norway 99% 23% 75%
Finland 99% 19% 79%
Iceland 99% 4% 95%
Austria 99% 25% 73%
South Africa (whites) 99% 34% 64%
Australia 99% 28% 72%
Switzerland 98% 10% 86%
Sweden 98% 10% 84%
Uruguay 97% 35% 62%
France 97% 16% 82%
Belgium 97% 8% 88%
Luxembourg 97% 18% 78%
Ireland 97% 21% 74%
Netherlands 96% 10% 89%
Denmark 96% 25% 72%
Chile 95% 25% 68%
Greece 95% 45% 54%
Japan 95% 15% 84%
Spain 93% 33% 65%
Germany 92% 20% 69%
Argentina 91% 37% 62%
Turkey 87% 53% 41%
Portugal 86% 36% 59%
Korea 84% 23% 77%
India 78% 36% 58%
Philippines 78% 56% 43%
El Salvador 76% 16% 58%
South Africa (blacks) 73% 59% 36%
Ecuador 70% 46% 52%
Nigeria 46% 51% 44%

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization (U.S.) and

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT

Question: As I read off each item, one at a time, would you tell me whether you think it is, or is not, a way for people to catch AIDS from someone who has it?



the Gallup affiliates in the countries shown, during 1988.


Being coughed or sneezed on
Is a way to get AIDS
Is not
Receiving blood transfusions
Is a way to get AIDS
Is not
Insect bite
Is a way to get AIDS
Is not
Canada 18% 70% 84% 13% 22% 60%
Brazil 31% 61% 97% 2% 56% 36%
United States 25% 65% 86% 11% 30% 55%
Colombia 52% 44% 97% 3% 51% 41%
Great Britain 9% 83% 75% 19% 14% 65%
Norway 15% 67% 84% 10% 23% 54%
Finland 3% 76% 82% 11% 29% 56%
Iceland 24% 60% 89% 8% 44% 26%
Austria 6% 75% 70% 15% 15% 48%
South Africa (whites) NA NA NA
Australia NA NA NA
Switzerland 6% 92% 58% 41% 13% 84%
Sweden 10% 79% 84% 13% 21% 58%
Uruguay 23% 57% 87% 1% 36% 37%
France 12% 75% 73% 20% 22% 56%
Belgium 12% 85% 90% 8% 22% 74%
Luxembourg 13% 71% 88% 5% 20% 57%
Ireland 12% 71% 90% 2% 19% 50%
Netherlands NA NA NA
Denmark 8% 75% 94% 1% 20% 46%
Chile 31% 54% 85% 6% 32% 40%
Greece 20% 65% 86% 7% 27% 51%
Japan 26% 69% 79% 16% 18% 76%
Spain 23% 61% 81% 7% 36% 39%
Germany 6% 80% 72% 19% 17% 56%
Argentina 31% 48% 92% 2% 43% 24%
Turkey 38% 37% 83% 4% 53% 19%
Portugal 27% 42% 79% 7% 38% 27%
Korea 49% 30% 94% 2% 75% 9%
India NA NA NA
Philippines 54% 39% 89% 7% 57% 36%
El Salvador 46% 25% 70% 4% 41% 28%
South Africa (blacks) NA NA NA
Ecuador 20% 69% 96% 4% 11% 52%
Nigeria 56% 29% 84% 7% 67% 22%

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization (U.S.) and

Question: I am now going to read some statements about AIDS. As I read off each statement, one at a time, tell me whether you agree or disagree with it?



the Gallup affiliates in the countries shown, during 1987.

OLIVER NORTH'S STORY

NORTH POLLS

Questions: Is your opinion of Oliver North very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable or very unfavorable? (Gallup); I'm going to name some public figures and ask what you think of them. If you haven't heard much about someone I name, just tell me. Is your opinion of Oliver North favorable, not favorable, undecided, or haven't you heard enough about Oliver North yet to have an opinion? (CBS/NYT); In general, what is your impression of Col. Oliver North? As of today, is it very favorable, or somewhat favorable, or somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable, or haven't you heard enough about him yet to say? (LAT); Do you generally have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Oliver North or don't you know enough about North to have an opinion? (ABC)

Source: Surveys latest that of March 19-22, 1988


Unfavorable
Favorable
35% Gallup December 1986 23%
14% CBS News/NYT July 9, 1987 43%
20% LAT July 10-13 67%
12% ABC News July 11-12 60%
13% ABC News/WP July 15 66%
13% CBS News/NYT July 16 56%
12% ABC News/WP July 21 64%
28% ABC News/WP August 3-5 69%
23% LAT August 15-19 61%
34% Gallup September 1-13 57%
22% CBS News/NYT March 19-22, 1988 39%

Question: Do you think Oliver North . . . (CBS News/*NYT*)

Question: In your opinion is Oliver North a . . . (Gordon Black/ *USA Today*)


CBS News/NYT
Don't know 15%
Is not 27%
Is a real patriot 58%
CBS News/NYT
Oliver North . . .
Don't know 13%
Did not 29%
Were not for with his actions in the Iran-Contra affair 58%

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, March 18-22, 1988.



Source: Survey by Gordon Black for *USA Today*, April 7-8, 1988.

PARDON HIM?

Question: Do you think Oliver North should be sent to jail for his role in the Iran-Contra affair?

20% sent to jail 69% no

Source: Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time*, July 9, 1987.

Question: Do you think Reagan should or should not grant a pardon to North so the government cannot charge North with a crime in the Iran-Contra affair? (If "no" or "no opinion") Suppose North is charged with a crime in connection with the Iran-Contra affair, do you think Reagan should or should not grant a pardon to North so he cannot be tried?

60% grant pardon immediately 6% only if charged with crime
31% should not grant pardon

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 21, 1987.

Question: Do you think Reagan should or should not grant a pardon to Oliver North so the government cannot charge North with a crime in the Iran-Contra affair?

51% should grant pardon 46% should not

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, August 3-5, 1987.

Question: If Lt. Col. Oliver North is found guilty (of crimes in connection with the Iran-Contra affair), do you think he should be punished, or do you think he should be pardoned?

51% should be pardoned 41% punished

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 24-September 2, 1987.

Question: If Oliver North is indicted for the role he played in the Iran-Contra affair, should President Reagan pardon him for any crimes he may have committed, or not?

49% Reagan should pardon 41% should not

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Times Mirror*, January 8-17, 1988.

Question: A federal grand jury has indicted Oliver North on charges of theft, fraud and conspiracy in connection with the Iran-Contra matter. If he is convicted, do you think the president should pardon him, or don't you think so?

43% should be pardoned if convicted 43% should not

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, March 19-22, 1988.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

by Mark J. Penn and Douglas E. Schoen

The recent escalation of unrest among the Arabs on the West Bank and in Gaza has raised all kinds of questions for the United States. One is how this situation will affect traditional American support for Israel. Another is whether we will see any erosion in the American government's strong commitment to Israel. These questions take on additional urgency during a presidential campaign, a time when shifts in public opinion—even if temporary—can become established in the policies of a new administration.

Between January 20 and 24 of this year, when disturbances were being widely reported in the media, Penn + Schoen Associates conducted a national public opinion poll on attitudes about the Middle East for the Anti-Defamation League. We then compared the data from this poll with data from a similar 1981 poll that measured attitudes during a relatively quiescent period. At that time, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty still provided a sense of optimism about the future, Begin had just been reelected, and the invasion of Lebanon had not yet begun.

A comparison of the two polls yielded several important conclusions:

1. The American people still support Israel. In fact that support has eroded hardly at all. The Palestine Liberation Organization has a strongly negative image, and two-thirds of those familiar with it view it as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, even with the emotionally charged media coverage of Israeli soldiers beating Palestinian civilians, the American public still places the blame for the riots on the PLO, not on Israel.

2. Even though the American people view the PLO negatively and believe it remains committed to the destruction of Israel, they still overwhelmingly favor negotiations. Americans have a bias toward trying a reasonable approach; they feel you can discuss anything, no matter how intractable or emotional the issues may be.

3. While black support for Israel is lower than white support, black sympathy still leans slightly toward Israel, particularly when it comes to the question of active U.S. support.

Traditional Loyalties

Let's look at some of the results in detail. First, bedrock support for Israel remains strong. Forty-seven percent of Americans said their sympathies were more with Israel, compared with 14 percent who said they sympathized more with the Arabs. On the question of to whom the United States should give stronger support, there was remarkably little decline in support for Israel from our earlier poll and no gain at all for the Arab nations.

Table 1

TO WHOM SHOULD UNITED STATES GIVE STRONGER SUPPORT?

Israel		Arabs	
1981	1988	1981	1988
47%	43%	11%	11%

Source: Surveys by Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc. for the Anti-Defamation League, latest that of January 20-24, 1988.

In fact a substantial majority (60 percent) were satisfied with the current relationship between the United States and Israel or wanted even stronger ties, while only 29 percent thought we were too closely tied to Israel.

Second, Israel continues to be seen as a strong and reliable ally in a volatile and unfriendly region. In our 1981 poll, Israel's strategic importance was selected by 23 percent as the key reason the United States should support Israel, compared with 18 percent who cited our moral obligation, 13 percent who said we should

support Israel because it was a democracy, and 14 percent who believed its anti-Communist role was most important. Our poll this year showed that 57 percent regarded Israel as a direct military and strategic asset to the United States; only about half as many, 30 percent, disagreed.

In this respect the turmoil on the West Bank could even reinforce concern over keeping Israel secure. This year's poll yielded 47 percent of the American public who viewed Israel as the United States's strongest ally in the Middle East—an increase from 41 percent in 1981. And follow-up questioning showed that the perception of Israel's reliability as an ally has improved.

Table 2

VIEWS OF ISRAEL

Reliable Ally of U.S.		Israel's Actions Threaten U.S.	
1981	1988	1981	1988
45%	52%	35%	28%

Source: Surveys by Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc. for the Anti-Defamation League, latest that of January 20-24, 1988.

Furthermore, Israel was still seen as the strongest opponent of Soviet expansionism in the region, with a 29 percent plurality taking this position this year and 31 percent in 1981.

In part Israel's image among the American public has always benefited from the powerful negatives of other areas in the Middle East. Forty-nine percent identified Iran as the greatest threat to peace, and 14 percent selected the PLO. (Iran has the dubious distinction of taking over that role from the PLO: in 1981 the PLO was seen as the greatest threat to peace by 31 percent of our sample, compared to 28 percent who saw Iran as the greatest threat.) In 1981, 7 percent said Israel was the greatest threat to peace in the region. This year only 4 percent took this position, and only 3 percent of our sample said that Israel is the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Negotiations Now

The American public is determined to pursue peace in Israel, despite obstacles. A powerful majority (78 percent) said that an international peace conference should be convened, while only 15 percent were opposed. Also, 74 percent of those who favored the conference believed the PLO should be invited to participate; 24 percent opposed the idea.

This is true even though perceptions of the PLO continue to be negative: 51 percent unfavorable this year and 9 percent favorable, a marginal change from 1981 when opinions were 58 percent unfavorable and 7 percent favorable. Among those who were familiar with the PLO, only 23 percent said it represented the Palestinian people, while 61 percent said it did not. Further, only 17 percent described the PLO as a liberation organization, while 66 percent said it was a terrorist group. Finally, 65 percent said Arafat and the PLO were not sincere about wanting to make peace with Israel; 18 percent thought they were sincere.

The American people support negotiations in the abstract, even if those discussions are held with groups they deeply distrust. Despite their suspicions, 48 percent favored the United States having direct contact with the PLO, and 42 percent opposed it. A follow-up question that sharpened the issue by presenting the arguments for and against contact—that the PLO is an important part in the peacemaking process and that the PLO still refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist—actually produced a still higher 56 percent in favor, with only 35 percent opposed. When we presented the facts as they exist, with the Arabs refusing to negotiate unless the PLO is part of the process, and the Israelis refusing because of the PLO's call for Israel's destruction, 43 percent still said Israel should negotiate with the PLO. A 46 percent plurality said they should not.

This support for negotiations came through in spite of a strong perception that neither side is willing to negotiate. Only 29 percent said the Arab nations are willing to negotiate directly with Israel; 44 percent believe they are unwilling. Nor did people think that Israel is willing to negotiate with the Arab nations: 35 percent said the Israelis are willing to negotiate, and 40 percent said they are not.

What do the American people think is the solution? Thirteen percent said they would like to see a Palestinian state set up on the West Bank and in Gaza under the PLO, while 31 percent opted for a state federated with Jordan. Twenty-six percent opposed the creation of any Palestinian state. But when we asked those who favored federation with Jordan whether they would still favor it if it meant the state would be ruled by the PLO, support eroded dramatically: only 35 percent said they would favor it, and 53 percent said they would oppose it.

Responses were mixed on the role of West Bank settlements and on the impact of a Palestinian state. Thirty percent said that Israeli settlements help protect the country's security, but 47 percent thought settlements contribute to greater instability in the region. There is also a clear sentiment that a Palestinian state would threaten Israel's existence. Overall, 48 percent said such a state would be a threat, while 32 percent said it would not.

Finding Fault

Obviously, the effect of the West Bank situation on American public opinion will hinge to a large degree on perceptions of who is at fault. We found widespread awareness of the violence that has taken place. Most of the blame fell on the PLO, although there was some sense that the Israeli reaction has been too extreme. Our sample did not believe the problem is Israel's alone or that the unrest is caused by legitimate grievances of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs.

Overall, 72 percent had heard about violence and unrest in the Middle East, and 52 percent had heard of the conflict on the West Bank and in Gaza. A substantial 36 percent said Israel's reaction to the demonstrations had been too harsh, 12 percent said it had not been harsh enough, and 29 percent indicated it was appropriate under the circumstances. Forty-three percent held the PLO responsible for the violence, while 16 percent each chose Israel and the West Bank Arabs.

Table 3

REACTIONS TO DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE WEST BANK

Question: As you may know, there have recently been demonstrations by Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza against the Israeli occupation of those territories. From what you know, has Israel responded to those demonstrations too harshly, not harshly enough, or has their response been appropriate under the circumstances?

Israel's response to demonstrations has been:	
Too harsh	36%
Appropriate	29
Not harsh enough	12
Don't know	23

Question: Who do you think is most responsible for the unrest that has broken out in Israel . . .

Most responsible for unrest:	
Israel	16%
West Bank/Gaza Arabs	16
PLO	43
Don't know	26

Question: Do you think the Arabs on the West Bank and in Gaza have been demonstrating because they have legitimate grievances against Israel or because they have been mobilized for political reasons by the PLO?

Reasons for demonstrations:	
Legitimate grievances	33%
Political reasons	39
Both	10
Don't know	19

Question: Is the responsibility for the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza that of Israel alone, or is it the responsibility of Israel and the Arab states in the Middle East?

Responsibility for Palestinians on West Bank is that of . . .	
Israel alone	15%
Arab states	56
Don't know	30

Thirty-three percent said the West Bank Arabs were demonstrating because they have legitimate grievances against Israel, while 39 percent said they have been mobilized for political reasons by the PLO. Further, only 15 percent said that the responsibility for the Palestinians on the West Bank is Israel's alone, while 56 percent said it was the responsibility of both the Arab states and Israel.

These two similar polls taken during dissimilar times point to the American people's persistent support for Israel. Israel enjoys a special place in their hearts and minds that has been able to recover even from major shocks.

One telling illustration of the depth of that tie can be seen in what we discovered about attitudes toward Israel and Egypt in our 1981 study. In 1981 Egypt was riding high in American public opinion as a result of Anwar Sadat's role in helping bring about an unprecedented breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli stalemate. Sadat himself was seen as a reliable ally by 67 percent of the sample, compared with only 40 percent who described Begin as a reliable ally. Egypt was seen as a reliable ally by 58 percent of our respondents, while only 45 percent were willing to describe Israel as a reliable ally. Yet when we forced the issue by asking people which of these two countries they would choose if they had to choose one as a United States ally, there was a striking turnaround: 56 percent chose Israel, compared with 24 percent—less than half as many—choosing Egypt. (Egypt's favor with the American people has eroded substantially since our 1981 poll: in 1981, 20 percent of our sample saw Egypt as our strongest ally in the Middle East, compared with 41 percent choosing Israel; this year only 9 percent selected Egypt as our strongest ally in the Middle East, with Israel being selected by 46 percent.)

But in spite of the deep attachment that Americans feel, Israel is by no means immune to criticism or to a decline in public support. A review of other studies suggests that specific events can play a substantial role, at least in the short run, in influencing public attitudes toward Israel. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this was the impact of the Beirut massacres in alienating American public opinion. A *Newsweek*-Gallup poll conducted on September 22-23, 1982, showed a record low of 32 percent who sympathized more with Israel and a record high of 28 percent who sympathized more with the Arabs. From a statistical point of view, that represents a virtually even split—an astonishing departure from attitudes before and since. (We should note that an ABC News/*Washington Post* poll conducted September 24-26, 1982, showed a 48-27 percent split: while this was high for the Arabs, it did not suggest a catastrophe for the Israelis.) Yet by January 1983, another Gallup poll showed a return to a level of 49 percent supporting Israel and only 12 percent favoring the Arabs.

Similarly, the *Achille Lauro* incident prompted a dramatic increase in public sympathy for Israel—64-14 percent in a Louis Harris poll conducted in October 1985—which later returned to its normal level.

The current disturbances on the West Bank and in Gaza, then, *can* be expected to have some impact on American public opinion. One clear criticism that emerged in our study this year was that 49 percent said the United States did the right thing in voting for a United Nations resolution condemning Israel for its deportation of nine Palestinian Arabs, while only 33

percent said the United States did the wrong thing. Furthermore, it is clear both from our study and others that Americans are uncomfortable with what they have been hearing about events on the West Bank. More than one-third (36 percent) of the respondents, for example, felt Israel had reacted too harshly against the riots on the West Bank and in Gaza.

One indication that some erosion may already be taking place can be seen in a Gallup poll conducted on February 3-4 of this year. It reports that almost a third (30 percent) viewed Israel less favorably as a result of its anti-riot measures. Sixty-one percent said their views were unchanged, and 5 percent felt more favorably disposed toward Israel. The unchanged and positive opinions still total more than twice the percentage of those with a less favorable view, but this is hardly grounds for complacency.

A profound disparity exists between American and Israeli perceptions of the West Bank situation. A recent *Newsweek* poll by Gallup-Israel showed that a mere 7 percent of Israeli Jews objected to anti-riot measures as being too harsh, while 46 percent felt they were appropriate, and 40 percent regarded them as too lenient! This does not bode well for proponents of negotiations or for a united American and Israeli approach.

Presidential Politics

How the current disturbances in Israel will play out has important implications for our presidential campaign. Over the past several elections, the mainstream candidates from both major parties have consistently avowed their strong support of Israel and have confined policy differences to a delicate and even treacherous political minuet. In the 1980 election, for example, Jimmy Carter, who had engineered the Camp David breakthrough, was seen as less pro-Israel than Ronald Reagan. The Carter administration's failure in early 1980 to veto a series of United Nations resolutions condemning Israel's occupation of the West Bank, and the feeling that Carter was closer to Sadat than to Begin in the Middle East negotiations, actually led to a sharp drop in his support among Jewish voters. Yet by 1984 Reagan's sponsorship of arms sales to the Saudis and to Jordan made him look potentially less pro-Israel than Walter Mondale. Does this suggest that Reagan has ever been viewed as anti-Israel? Hardly. Sixty-one percent of our sample said the Reagan administration's sympathies lay with the Israelis, while only 12 percent said the Reagan administration sympathized with the Arab nations.

This year, however, the unexpected strength of Jesse Jackson's campaign for the Democratic nomination has thrown the question of support for Israel into a new light. Although Jackson has, in fact, declared himself in support of Israel's right to exist and has announced that he would not begin talks with the PLO until it acknowledged that right, his political record on this is unique. He has met with Yasser Arafat in the past and has praised him as "a true hero." Compared with the other candidates' long and carefully scrutinized record of support for Israel, Jackson's represents a significant departure. And regardless of the results of the remaining primaries, Jackson has already acquired enough delegates to claim a major voice in shaping the Democratic national platform for 1988.

Although our black sample was small, and the data from the poll do suggest that blacks are significantly less pro-Israel than whites, there is no indication that an anti-Israel policy will do anything to draw the black vote. Asked who they sympathized with more, a slight plurality sympathized with Israel over the Arabs. On to whom the United States should give stronger support, however, a third chose Israel, while less than a quarter said the Arabs.

The actual degree to which the disturbances on the West Bank may affect the policy debate within this campaign and the policies of the new administration will, of course, be influenced by how much attention the American people are paying to the situation. Thus far, even the continuation and intensification of violence on the West Bank has not made this a focus for American concern. A CBS News/*New York Times* poll conducted March 19-22 of this year showed only 4 percent choosing Palestinian unrest as the most important international problem, compared with 48 percent who were most concerned about drug traffic, 22 percent who were most concerned about Central America, 13 percent who were most concerned about arms control, and 9 percent whose major concern was terrorism.

What, then, can we conclude from our study? American support for Israel remains unmoved. The American public blames the current disturbances on the PLO, not on Israel, and feels the protesters have been mobilized principally for political purposes. While our review of earlier data does suggest that there could be a short-term drop in support, it is unlikely to be broad-based or lasting.

And what do the American people want? The American people want peace in the Middle East. They want all sides to sit down at the negotiating table. Even the PLO is seen as part of this process, though not as a central player. And they believe that some kind of entity on the West Bank—perhaps federated with Jordan—must be part of that solution, though not any kind of state governed by the PLO.

That is the message of the American people to President Reagan, to Secretary of State Shultz, to all the Democratic and Republican candidates, to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and to all the leaders of the Arab world. ☑

Mark J. Penn and Douglas E. Schoen founded Penn + Schoen Associates, Inc. in 1975. The firm has worked for a variety of corporate clients and politicians, including Walter Mondale, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Edward Koch, and Edward Kennedy.

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT WOMEN VOTERS IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND WEST GERMANY

by Nancy J. Walker

Whenever the consequences of women's suffrage have been studied, it would appear that women differ from men in their political behavior only in being somewhat more frequently apathetic, parochial, conservative, and sensitive to the personality, emotional, and aesthetic aspects of political life in electoral campaigns.

—*Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba, 1963

When *Civic Culture* was written, voting patterns and political attitudes showed women in Europe to be the more conservative—and more Conservative—of the two sexes. According to one popular saying of the time, if women had not been granted suffrage, the Labour party would have held office in Great Britain since the end of World War II. Further, in the early sixties "everyone" knew that women formed the base of support for the Christian parties on the continent. Two and a half decades later, we're about due for a new set of conclusions about gender and politics.

Great Expectations

German women fought for and won the right to vote in 1919. Propertied British women could go to the polls in 1920, but it was only in 1928 that universal suffrage was put on the books. And the nineteenth amendment to the American Constitution was signed into law in 1920. French women lagged behind their European and North American sisters, waiting until 1944 for the right to cast a ballot, partly because of strong opposition in the Senate. One anti-suffrage French senator quoted ancient authors to justify his position: "The woman of the Latin race does not think, does not feel, does not develop like the woman of Anglo-Saxon or Germanic races."

Women's entrance into the formal political sphere raised great hopes. They were expected to bring morality into politics and change the conduct of public life by waging battles against corruption, alcoholism, and even war.

Despite raised expectations, turnout among women was initially below that of men in all countries. It increased slowly but steadily with each election. After World War II the turnout gap was still evident, particularly in France, but it continued to narrow. Table 1 shows the percentage of men and women who've gone to the polls since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and indicates the percentage of British men and women claiming to have voted, from 1964 to 1987. In both cases the gender difference decreased over time, becoming extremely small or disappearing by the mid-sixties. When controlled for age, the gender difference is much smaller among the young and over time has closed among the older age groups, as the older cohort has moved out of the electorate.

The Euro-barometre poll suggests that turnout

Table 1

TURNOUT BY GENDER WEST GERMANY, 1953-1987

	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987
Men	88%	90%	89%	88%	88%	91%	91%	88%	89%	84%
Women	85	86	86	85	85	90	90	87	88	82
Difference	3	4	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	2

TURNOUT BY GENDER GREAT BRITAIN, 1964-1987

	1964	1966	1970	1974	1974	1979	1983	1987
Men	91%	85%	81%	89%	85%	85%	83%	
Women	87	83	82	87	85	86	84	
Difference	4	2	−1	2	0	−1	−1	0

Source: For Germany, Joachim Hofmann-Goettig (1953-1983), Representative Wahlstatistik (1987); For Great Britain, British Election Studies.

among French women is not quite as high as among British and German women, possibly because suffrage was granted in France so recently. As in Great Britain and Germany, younger French women are as likely to vote as younger men are.

Voting is only one measure of political participation, and by other gauges women in these three countries still lag behind the men, although the gaps are narrowing. Women are less likely than men to be members of a political party, less likely to give money to a party or candidate, and less likely to work for a political campaign. Among certain social groups, however—the upper and upper-middle classes in Britain, for example—women form the core of Conservative party workers. The Tory party could never manage to complete its mailings and canvassing without the aid of its loyal ladies.

Gender differences also persist in expressions of interest in politics and campaigns. In the early 1950s in Germany and France, women were two and a half times more likely than men to express *no* interest in politics—a majority of women in both countries. The gender difference was not quite so large in Great Britain. By the mid- to late sixties, about a third of all women—but only a fifth of the men—were uninterested in politics. The British gender gap narrowed in the late seventies, when both men and women plummeted into apathy, but even then women were more apathetic than men. This gender difference was always smaller among the younger and college-educated men and women in all three countries, but it persists today.

Talking about politics used to be a male prerogative, but this too has changed with the times. A 1959 question from *Civic Culture* and one from the Euro-barometre (1983) shows that the ratio of women to men who discuss politics has increased in both Great Britain and West Germany. In 1959 sixty German women for every one hundred German men discussed politics, but in 1983 it became ninety to one hundred. The number in Great Britain started out higher, with eighty-two women for one hundred men engaging in political conversations, and ninety-five British women for every one hundred men by 1983. Educated, working, younger women talk politics as often as men do in all three countries (see table 2).

Table 2

INTEREST IN POLITICS
BY GENDER
GREAT BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY, FRANCE

	Great Britain			
	1959	**1964**	**1974**	**1979**
Not interested				
Men	31%	24%	28%	32%
Women	48	35	41	46
	West Germany			
	1952	**1959**	**1965**	**1980**
Men	18%	20%	6%	5%
Women	50	45	28	14
	France			
	1953	**1969**	**1978**	
Men	28%	34%	13%	
Women	60	47	20	

Source: *For Great Britain*, 1959: *Civic Culture* response was "Pay no attention to elections or politics"; 1964: British Election Survey, "Not much"; 1974 October: British Election Study, "Not much" plus "None at all"; 1979 British Election Study, same as 1974. *For West Germany*, 1952, 1965, and 1980: Allensbach Institute; for 1959: *Civic Culture*. *For France*, 1953, 1969, and 1978: Mossuz-Lavau/Sineau.

POLITICAL AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
BY GENDER
GREAT BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY, FRANCE
(RATIO: WOMEN TO MEN)

	Talk Politics		Belong to Group	
	1959	**1983**	**1959**	**1983**
Great Britain	.82	.95	.45	.78
West Germany	.60	.90	.36	.75
France		.98		.74

Source: For 1959, *Civic Culture*; for 1983, Euro-barometre, Men and Women of Europe.

If Political, Then Conservative?

Women were long thought to be apolitical, but if they were political then they were supposed to be conservative. Women's greater church attendance was one influence that led in this direction. But women's conservative inclinations seem to be changing.

In Great Britain the Conservative party's lead among women voters had disappeared in 1983, as shown in table 3. The Conservative lead declined during the late 1970s even among older voters (over sixty-five), virtually disappearing in the last two British elections. Younger voters, known to some as "Thatcher's children," display greater gender differences in voting, but in no persistent direction (see table 4). In some elections since 1964, the under twenty-five-year-old women were more likely than the youthful menfolk to support the Conservatives, in others they were more likely to throw their support to Labour. Since the Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance was formed in 1981, it seems that young women are slightly more inclined than young men to take the middle road, as both 1983 and 1987 election results suggest. In 1987 the MORI poll shows a huge lead for the Conservatives among

Table 3

PARTY VOTE BY GENDER
GREAT BRITAIN, 1964-1987

	1964	**1966**	**1970**	**1974**	**1974**	**1979**	**1983**	**1987**
Conservative								
Men	40%	36%	43%	37%	35%	45%	46%	43%
Women	43	40	48	39	37	49	45	43
Labour								
Men	47	54	48	42	45	38	30	32
Women	47	51	41	40	40	38	28	32
Liberal/SDP								
Men	12	9	7	17	16	15	23	23
Women	10	8	8	21	20	13	26	23

Note: Two elections were held in 1974.
Source: British Election Studies (1964-1983); Market & Opinion Research International (1987).

Thatcher's boys, but a lead for Labour among Thatcher's girls. It's too early for definitive statements, though.

Table 4

PARTY VOTE BY GENDER AND AGE
GREAT BRITAIN, 1964-1987

	1964	1966	1970	1974	1974	1979	1983	1987
65 years and over								
Conservative								
Men	48%	40%	45%	47%	46%	52%	50%	47%
Women	46	46	61	51	46	57	51	46
Labour								
Men	46	49	44	38	38	37	32	30
Women	44	50	30	34	37	32	26	33
Liberal/SDP								
Men	7	11	5	13	12	9	17	22
Women	9	4	8	14	16	10	21	20
Under 25 years								
Conservative								
Men	47	43	35	20	17	44	46	42
Women	33	33	40	30	32	36	40	31
Labour								
Men	45	50	51	39	53	38	33	37
Women	56	63	51	44	51	47	29	42
Liberal/SDP								
Men		7	12	28	23	23	19	19
Women		3	6	25	16	15	28	24

Source: See Table 2.

In the Federal Republic of Germany the right-of-center Christian Democratic party (CDU) used to boast a significantly higher percentage of women's votes than men's, but since the mid-1970s this lead has dwindled (see table 5). The left-of-center Social Democratic party (SPD) used to assume that more men than women voted for it, but since 1972 this is no longer the case, and the SPD is looking to younger women to provide its margin of victory in future elections. Men have always been slightly more likely to vote for the liberal-leaning Free Democrats (FDP), but the gender difference was never vast. The coming of the left-wing Greens into the Bundestag in 1983 certainly shook up German politics, but despite their excellent record on sexual equality, the Greens attract slightly fewer women than men.

Table 5

PARTY VOTE BY GENDER
WEST GERMANY, 1953-1987

	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987
SPD										
Men	33%	36%	40%	44%	46%	47%	44%	43%	38%	39%
Women	28	29	33	36	40	46	43	44	39	38
CDU/CSU										
Men	39	45	40	42	41	43	47	44	48	43
Women	47	54	50	52	51	46	49	44	49	45
FDP										
Men	11	9	14	10	6	9	8	11	7	9
Women	10	7	12	9	5	8	8	11	6	8
Greens										
Men								2	6	8
Women								1	5	8

Note: Other parties not shown.
Source: Joachim Hofmann-Goettig (1953-1983); Representative Wahlstatistik (1987).

The German gender difference in voting patterns is still somewhat evident today. Women over sixty did support the CDU in 1987 with much more fervor—and ballots—than older men did. But demographics may explain this as much as anything—there are many, many more women than men over sixty. The youthful vote in Germany started to diverge from the general pattern in 1972, with young women no more likely than young men to vote CDU, unlike the older generations. From 1972 until today, younger women cast more SPD ballots than young men. This margin shrank somewhat in 1987, to the dismay of the Social Democrats. The Greens drew their support heavily from the votes of "Kohl's children," with boys and girls in equal proportions (see table 6).

Table 6

PARTY VOTE BY GENDER AND AGE
WEST GERMANY, 1953-1987

	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987
60 years and over										
SPD										
Men	30%	32%	36%	41%	42%	43%	42%	41%	40%	38%
Women	25	26	30	33	37	42	42	43	40	37
CDU/CSU										
Men	42	47	43	44	45	50	51	51	51	50
Women	51	57	54	56	56	52	53	49	54	54
FDP										
Men	11	8	13	10	6	7	6	7	7	8
Women	10	7	11	9	4	6	5	8	5	7
Greens										
Men									2	2
Women									1	2
Under 25 years*										
SPD										
Men	34	38	41	43	48	54	49	48	38	38
Women	29	31	35	37	45	55	50	50	41	39
CDU/CSU										
Men	41	46	43	46	40	35	40	36	42	37
Women	48	53	50	53	47	36	40	33	40	35
FDP										
Men	12	8	12	8	7	10	9	11	5	9
Women	10	7	12	8	6	9	9	12	5	8
Greens										
Men								5	14	15
Women								4	14	17

Note: * = under age 30 (1953-1969). Other parties not shown.
Source: See Table 4.

French trends were similar to those in Britain and Germany, with women forming the solid base of support for the Christian right and providing substantially fewer ballots than men to the French Communists. A decline in church attendance, coupled with an increase in college-educated and working women, helped diminish the gender differences on the right. Since Mitterrand came to power in 1981, the parties of the right

no longer have a lead among women voters and are unlikely to regain it in this election.

Trends in the three countries suggest that the stereotype of the conservative and Christian woman voter no longer holds. Changes in age and family structure and work expectations, decline in church attendance, and new issues in the political marketplace have all contributed to the voting shift in the last twenty to thirty years. There is no reason to assume it will stop here in the late 1980s.

Wooing Women Voters

Once the political parties in Britain, France, and Germany realized that women voters were no longer more conservative than men voters, they changed their approach to capture the "women's vote." But the election of June 1987 in Britain and January 1987 in Germany saw the parties of the left making the same mistakes in interpreting these movements that the Democrats in the United States did in 1984. Attempts to woo women voters in France have evolved differently.

Under the conservative government of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the French established a State Secretariat for the Concerns of Women as early as 1974, which was elevated to ministry status in 1978. The justification was that in post-1968 France, women were starting to become more active politically, making demands about equal rights, divorce, pro-choice legislation, and job opportunities.

At the time, analysts decided that women were going to make their voting decisions on women's issues and that the parties should respond in order to reap the benefits of women's votes. It is probably true that some women decided to support the Socialists in the 1970s and 1980s because of the party's more liberal position on divorce, abortion, and equal opportunity. But the left never persuaded some of the older and more conservative women (or men) to cross party lines because of these positions. The Socialists made appeals to young working women in 1981, a more receptive audience. There is some evidence that turnout among this group increased, to the benefit of the Socialists. This is the correct strategy—appeal to a group of women (or men) who have reasons, usually economic, to cast their ballots for one party or another.

During the most recent British election the Labour party promised to establish a Ministry for Women should they be elected to power. The theory behind the decision, in addition to the belief that a women's ministry should exist, was that it would bring in women's votes. The logic is dubious. The women (and men) who would support the idea of a Ministry for Women are likely Labour supporters anyway. The number of women who might switch from the Alliance to Labour because of this particular campaign promise was small at best (the number of men switching even smaller). In addition, the Labour party did not consider that the promise might lose votes for them among the older (and more socially traditional) Labour supporters who might have felt that this contributed to the image of Labour as a party of special-interest groups.

The Labour party in Britain has a chance to pick up more votes among women, particularly white-collar workers and those in the helping professions. These women have been drawn to the more moderate but less traditional Alliance during the last two elections. Labour, in trying to modernize its image, could target these low-paid women by making the argument that the Labour party is best suited to serve their economic needs. The Labour party failed to make a pitch to older voters, mainly women, who are dependent on the welfare state for their livelihood. Mrs. Thatcher may be popular, but her party continues to make cuts in social services, not something older women support.

The German Social Democrats did not promise to elevate the women's section of the Ministry for Health, Family, Youth, and Women to a separate ministry. But in a postelection internal memo analyzing the 1987 campaign, they suggested that women's votes could provide the future margin of victory, noting that turnout among younger women had been particularly low in the contest. They discussed a need to promote women's issues as one key to the "women's vote." This might be somewhat successful for the women under thirty-five but would probably not be a big vote winner. The SPD realizes the stark generational difference in voting in the Federal Republic, but they don't go beyond that to note which issues are likely to matter to younger working women or older women who are dependent on social security.

Issue Differences

The expectation that women—as a bloc vote—would provide the margin of victory for the left is misguided. Women are no more a bloc vote than men are.

Men and women do tend to differ on some issues, even when age, religion, education, and labor force participation are factored out. Women on both sides of the Atlantic are in general less inclined to support government policies that involve the use of force, for example. They are more peace-minded than men on siting cruise missiles in Germany, stationing troops in Northern Ireland, and increasing the defense budget. National interest sometimes overtakes their objections, though: French men and women of the left and right are rather in favor of an independent *French* nuclear deterrent; British women are more inclined than British men to think *American* nuclear missiles are a threat to peace, but a majority of these same women join their compatriots in believing that *British* nuclear weapons increase their overall security.

In Britain during the last two elections, men and women alike saw unemployment as the most important problem facing the country. But women were less likely than men to identify national defense or interna-

(*Continued on page 55*)

THE NEW FACTS OF LIFE: HETEROSEXUALS AND AIDS

by Hal Quinley

Wanton sex, the singles scene, one-night stands, and adultery are out; monogamy, abstinence, safe sex, and condoms are in. So goes the accepted version of heterosexual sex in the Age of AIDS. But are such assumptions valid?

National surveys indicate that this perspective on AIDS and sexual behavior is only partially true. A recent study by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman among young singles in New York City, however, suggests that many young people *are* adjusting their sexual behavior to respond to the AIDS threat. They are not being as cautious as many experts believe they should be, but they are conforming at least in part to the new facts of life.

The Message Is Out

National opinion surveys show that Americans have gotten the message about AIDS. They know that AIDS is a deadly disease for which there is no cure. They know that it can be transmitted through blood transfusions, hypodermic needles, and heterosexual as well as homosexual sex. They know that abstaining from sex, limiting partners, and using condoms reduce the risk of contracting AIDS.

Americans clearly take the AIDS threat seriously. Seven in ten name it as the country's most serious health problem today. Eight in ten believe that AIDS will become widespread in the heterosexual population in the years ahead. Only a minority (22 percent) believe that the media have exaggerated the health risk involved with AIDS.

People are reasonably well informed. They correctly identify the main means by which AIDS is transmitted and know that it is not spread through casual contact. Americans want the government to do more to fight the AIDS threat. A majority are critical of current governmental efforts; more than seven in ten think that government spending to help fight AIDS should be increased.

Large numbers favor anti-AIDS actions that in other contexts would be offensive and would elicit lower levels of support. Three in four favor distributing educational pamphlets that contain explicit language and frank references to sexual practices; six in ten think condoms should be distributed in public high schools; and one in two would give drug addicts free, clean needles.

Tough Measures

Consistent with such beliefs, the public supports tough measures to deal with the AIDS threat. They are willing to sacrifice some civil liberties in order to protect the public, and they are strong supporters of AIDS testing. Eight in ten agree that controlling the spread of AIDS should be more important than protecting the privacy of those who have the disease. Seven in ten say they view the AIDS crisis as a community health issue rather than a civil rights issue.

Eighty-four percent of Americans favor a law that would make it a crime for anyone in the AIDS high-risk group to donate blood. Sixty-eight percent support a law making it a criminal offense for someone with AIDS to have sex with another person.

Seven in ten Americans think that public agencies should be allowed to trace the sexual partners of people who have tested positive for AIDS. Seven in ten say it would be their duty to warn health professionals and past and present partners about someone they knew had tested positively.

Americans also support mandatory testing as a way to fight the AIDS threat. Eighty percent-plus favor mandatory testing for such groups as immigrants, prison inmates, and military personnel. Almost as large majorities favor mandatory testing for members of high-risk groups, couples about to get married, and

people admitted to hospitals. About one in two members of the public favor mandatory testing for all Americans.

Safe Sex

Does all this mean that people are taking precautions against AIDS or are engaging in safe sex? The answer —at least among the public at large—is no. Despite such views, only a minority of Americans are being more careful in their sexual relations. Only 9 percent, according to a recent Gallup poll, are using condoms for the first time to reduce the chances of catching AIDS; only 13 percent are taking more care in their choice of sexual partners.

The fact is that most Americans see AIDS as a societal threat, but not a personal one. Various surveys place the number who do feel threatened at between 10 and 15 percent of the public. In a Yankelovich Clancy Shulman poll for *Time* magazine, 13 percent of the public said they were very or fairly worried that they might get AIDS. In a Harris survey, 15 percent feared being personally at risk. The *Los Angeles Times* asked respondents to locate the degree of their personal risk of contracting AIDS along a seven-point scale. Only 1 percent of the public placed themselves in a high-risk category, while 9 percent felt they were at medium risk. Eighty-four percent said they were in the very-low ("1") risk group.

Thus for most people the AIDS threat has had little direct impact on their behavior. They do not believe they are at risk and so are not worried about condoms and safe sex. The situation among singles, however—especially sexually active singles—is quite different.

The Singles Scene

A study conducted last fall by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for New York Life Insurance Co. examined how single Americans are responding to the AIDS crisis. The purpose was to evaluate the effectiveness of an anti-AIDS advertising campaign directed at single heterosexuals in New York City. Interviews were carried out with 400 New York City singles between eighteen and thirty-four years of age, including 98 blacks and 109 Hispanics.

As table 1 shows, most young singles in New York—66 percent—are at least somewhat worried about contracting AIDS, and 38 percent are very or fairly worried. The degree of worry is higher still among blacks and Hispanics, on whom the AIDS epidemic is taking a disproportionate toll. Forty-eight percent of unmarried blacks and 45 percent of unmarried Hispanics say they are very or fairly worried about getting AIDS, compared with 29 percent of unmarried whites.

Young singles nationally are also much more worried about contracting AIDS than is the public at large. Sixty-three percent of young (thirteen to thirty-four)

Table 1

WORRY ABOUT CONTRACTING AIDS

	National		Single New York City Residents, 18-34 years			
	All	Singles 18-34 years	All	White	Black	Hispanic
Very worried	6%	15%	20%	12%	29%	26%
Fairly worried	7	15	18	17	19	19
Only somewhat worried	25	33	28	34	20	24
Not worried at all	62	37	34	37	32	31

Source: (National) Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time*, January 1988. (New York City singles) Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for New York Life, October 1987.

singles are at least somewhat worried about contracting AIDS, compared with 38 percent of the public at large. Twenty-nine percent are very or fairly worried, compared with 13 percent of the general public (which drops to 8 percent, if young singles are excluded).

Young singles are at greater risk as a result of their greater sexual experimentation. They also have more direct knowledge of AIDS. Twenty-two percent of unmarried New Yorkers say they know someone who has contracted AIDS, compared with about 6 percent among the public at large.

What actions are young singles taking to reduce the risk of AIDS infection? A lot, according to these New York City singles. More than one in five (22 percent) say they have taken the ultimate step and stopped having sex altogether. Among the rest, 77 percent report taking more care in choosing sex partners, 62 percent have used condoms or asked their partners to use a condom, and 57 percent have discussed ways to reduce the AIDS risk with their sex partners. Significantly, the youngest age group studied, eighteen to twenty-one year olds, most frequently report taking more care in choosing sex partners and using condoms when they have sex. Eighty-one percent are being more careful in their choice of sex

Table 2

CHANGES IN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR BECAUSE OF FEARS ABOUT CONTRACTING AIDS

	Single New York City Residents, 18-34 years			
	All	White	Black	Hispanic
Stopped having sex	22%	16%	24%	33%
Taken more care in choice of sex partners*	77	77	77	79
Used condom or asked partner to use condom*	62	66	61	61
Discussed with sex partner ways to reduce AIDS risk*	57	58	63	57

Note: Data exclude 4% who have not had sex. * = excludes those who have stopped having sex for fear of contracting AIDS.

partners; 68 percent are using condoms or asking their partners to.

Many young people are fearful of AIDS and are altering their sexual conduct in response to the AIDS threat. A more disquieting finding, however, involves actual condom use. The anti-AIDS ad campaign evaluated in this study emphasized condom use as a way to reduce the AIDS risk, and most single New Yorkers had heard and agreed with the message. Ninety-seven percent agreed that "people should always use condoms when having sex with someone they do not know well." Ninety-five percent agreed that "women should tell their sex partners to use condoms." And 93 percent agreed that "sexually active people should carry condoms with them."

Despite such beliefs, the majority of unmarried New Yorkers are not using condoms on a regular basis. Among singles who reported having sexual intercourse in the previous month, four in ten (39 percent) said they never used condoms at all when having sexual intercourse, while 23 percent did so just some of the time. Only one in five sexually active single New Yorkers (22 percent) use condoms regularly, according to the reports given in this study.

The main message of the anti-AIDS ad campaign was that heterosexuals should use condoms when having sexual intercourse. The research found that the advertising campaign *was* effective in making people more aware of this message and in contributing to their acceptance of it. After the campaign, a larger percentage of single New Yorkers agreed that people should carry and use condoms when having sex than had been the case prior to the campaign (as measured in a pre-advertising benchmark survey). Condom use did not change, however, nor was there any change in the other preventative measures shown in table 2. Single people know what they should be doing to reduce the risk of AIDS, but many are still failing to take adequate protective measures.

Table 3

FREQUENCY OF CONDOM USE AMONG SEXUALLY ACTIVE SINGLES*

	Single New York City Residents, 18-34 years			
	All	White	Black	Hispanic
All the time	23%	23%	20%	24%
Most of the time	15	18	10	15
Just some of the time	23	23	20	24
Never	39	36	50	37

Note: * Among those having sexual intercourse in the past month.

Thus as in many areas of human behavior, attitudinal change is easier to engender than behavioral change. Safe sex is being practiced, but—based on the evidence currently available—it remains more the idealized goal than the practical norm. ☑

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Walker

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tional relations as the next most important issue. Rather, slightly more women felt that education and the National Health Service should be given greater government attention.

On women's issues such as abortion and equal rights, women as a whole are no more liberal than men. Older women are sometimes more conservative on these issues than are older men. Younger women are sometimes—but not often—more liberal than their contemporaries among men, as younger men today also support liberal abortion legislation and equal rights. The intensity of feeling about women's issues is higher among women, whether in strong support or strong opposition. With the abortion issue, for example, any gain a party makes in picking up a woman voter because of a liberal position on women's issues would probably be negated by comparable losses.

In addition to gender differences of opinion, the persistence of the "Don't Know Woman" is a curious phenomenon. On questions of economics, defense, international relations, and to some extent civil rights, women in these three countries are much more likely than men to answer "Don't Know" or "No Opinion." True in all three countries, the tendency is found in the United States as well. This gender difference is smaller for highly educated women but does not go away entirely. On education, health policy, and local issues, the "Don't Know Woman" is less in evidence. And interestingly, on women's issues, particularly abortion questions, men give more frequent "Don't Knows" than women. Differing "Don't Knows" should provide additional clues to the political parties in attracting women and groups of men as voters.

The biggest change in the women's vote since *Civic Culture* was written a quarter century ago is that women now vote at a rate roughly comparable to the rate for men. They have made a more subtle shift away from predictable conservatism and toward a collection of issue concerns that is not substantially different from men's. This makes the political parties' task more difficult than if women voted as a bloc. For the parties to succeed, they're going to have to woo and win the women just as they do the men. ☑

British data are taken from the British Election Studies, which started in the early sixties and are based on national samples of eligible voters. The British Election Studies asked respondents if they had voted, and while the resulting turnout rates are higher than the actual rate, we have no reason to believe that either men or women are more likely to exaggerate. German data, on the other hand, are actual representative election statistics. In some 200 representative constituencies, voters put their ballot papers into boxes according to age and gender, an unthinkable concept in the United States or Great Britain, but one that allows for highly accurate electoral analysis based on age and gender.

Nancy J. Walker is completing a doctoral dissertation at Oxford.

Lichter

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caucus. By contrast Gore's share of the coverage actually declined after Super Tuesday, from 19 percent to 14 percent.

Rather than negating the lessons of past elections, Jackson's sudden surge at Gore's expense recalls Gary Hart's media bonanza in 1984.[5] Reporters picked long-shot Gary Hart over George McGovern as the hot prospect that year after both did better than expected in Iowa. McGovern actually came within 2,000 votes of Hart but received even less coverage after Iowa than before, while Hart's share increased fivefold on CBS News and tenfold on NBC News.

In fact Jackson's coverage after New Hampshire looked a lot like Hart's after Iowa four years earlier. Each rocketed upward in the polls *by doing better than expected and following up with impressive victories*. Each received that sought-after combination of great press and a great deal of it. The question is how long the parallel will hold up. Hart's trajectory turned downward after a barrage of critical network reports just before Super Tuesday apparently pushed late deciders into Mondale's camp. Whether Jackson's new "serious" status likewise leads to more negative coverage remains to be seen.

Signs of a downturn have appeared in attacks from syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, who likened Jackson to Mussolini, and *New Republic* writer Fred Barnes, who criticized factual errors in Jackson's rhetoric. Both the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* have printed long stories probing his issue stands and his record as a civil rights activist. On the medium that matters most, however, Jackson continues to run away from the field. His level of good press actually increased on TV news, from 74 percent before Super Tuesday to 79 percent thereafter.

Thus media momentum is still with us, but it is not now and has never been inexorable. It doesn't guarantee you a touchdown, only a chance to keep the ball for another play. And if you should fumble that ball, you may never recover. Tables 1 and 2 tell the story. Bursts of media attention brought shifts in the polls—Hart's fall last year; the February surges of Dukakis, Gephardt, and Dole; and the Jackson boomlet in March. But primary results don't always follow national polls, and media attention can turn sour.

The lesson is that strong Iowa showings didn't guarantee the nominations for Gephardt and Dole any more than they did for Bush in 1980 or Hart in 1984. Bush thought he had the Big Mo after he beat Reagan by a mere 2 percentage points, then jumped 18 percentage points in the preference polls. But the road to the White House ran through Nashua that year. After Reagan reminded him who owned the microphone (and the media skills) in their debate, Bush's popularity plummeted in New Hampshire. Four years later, Hart's Iowa surprise and subsequent New Hampshire victory made Mondale look like the latest in a long line of front-runners who faded in the stretch. In both those campaigns, the eventual winner staggered out of the gate, but he soon hit his stride as the fast starters failed to keep the pace. Sound familiar? *Plus ça change.*

I would like to thank Dan Amundson and Richard Noyes for their help in conducting the content analysis of 1988 TV news election coverage. ☑

[1] Quoted in F. Christopher Arterton, "Campaign Organizations Confront the Media-Political Environment," in James David Barber, ed., *Race for the Presidency* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 7.
[2] "John Connally Critiques the Press," *Washington Journalism Review*, July/Aug. 1980, p. 20.
[3] This and the following quotations are from David Broder, "Among Super Tuesday Losers: Conventional Wisdom," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1988, p. A29.
[4] William C. Adams, "Media Coverage of Campaign '84," *Public Opinion*, April/May 1984.
[5] The discussion of 1984 election coverage follows Adams, ibid.

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Jeffe

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property tax reductions meant there was significantly less money in the pot. By 1983, the state was facing a short-lived budget deficit. And last year, California came smack up against the ceiling on government spending installed by the 1979 Gann initiative.

Something had to give. Said Doerr, "Probably the most serious problem created by Prop. 13 is the neglect of infrastructure. California's infrastructure has not kept pace with the state's growth, and existing infrastructure has been allowed to deteriorate as funds that should have been devoted to maintenance have gone to attempt to provide services." For similar reasons, libraries, parks, and trauma centers in several California counties have been shut down.

The failure of the infrastructure to keep pace with population and economic strides has helped make growth a hot political issue in many California communities, including Los Angeles. With traffic and congestion intensifying, people react to a deteriorating way of life by opposing further development in their neighborhoods.

Another ramification has been the centralization of fiscal authority at the state level. Prior to Prop. 13, the property tax provided the major source of local government revenues. But as property tax revenues decreased, local agencies began looking to state government for a quick-fix bail-out. Today, the power of the purse strings is clearly in Sacramento. The Teichner poll cited earlier found that 64 percent of the public now believe that the state is in large measure responsible for funding local government services. And 70 percent indicated that the state is not doing enough.

Proposition 13 has also triggered an era of fiscal policymaking by initiative. In the face of fiscal reality

DATA FOR PAGES 26-31.

CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES

	1/26-1/29/81	9/22-9/27/81	1/11-1/15/82	9/13-9/18/82	11/2/82	1/16-1/19/83	9/24-9/28/83	2/21-2/25/84	9/12-9/16/84	2/23-2/27/85	9/15-9/18/85	1/19-1/23/86	9/28-10/1/86	11/4/86	1/18-1/21/87	9/21-9/22/87	1/17-1/21/88
National	46/11	53/33	49/36	42/44	49/45	41/47	46/41	56/35	58/29	59/29	62/27	65/24	63/27	60/35	52/38	54/37	50/35
Age																	
18-29	35/17	56/34	56/33	47/44	48/47	42/51	48/40	60/33	62/28	63/25	69/24	70/21	69/23	64/31	59/33	58/33	59/28
30-44	53/10	58/28	51/36	42/46	53/43	40/49	48/39	60/34	62/28	62/29	64/26	68/25	66/26	61/35	50/41	54/36	50/37
45-59	50/10	53/34	42/45	40/45	49/45	41/48	45/41	50/38	59/30	57/32	56/30	65/24	64/28	60/36	51/40	57/37	46/40
60 or over	52/05	46/35	43/38	40/39	45/46	39/43	43/43	54/36	47/33	53/30	56/29	55/28	53/34	57/37	45/39	39/48	41/37
Sex																	
Male	49/9	61/28	54/34	45/43	54/42	47/44	53/38	62/31	64/29	64/26	66/24	72/20	67/24	64/32	58/35	60/33	56/31
Female	44/13	47/37	44/41	40/44	44/48	35/50	39/43	51/38	53/30	56/31	59/29	58/27	59/29	57/37	47/42	48/41	45/39
Education																	
< High sch.	41/10	38/42	36/45	33/48		34/54	35/48	47/40	46/33	52/31	60/26	58/24	47/36	49/43	40/43	40/49	44/35
Hi sch. grad.	42/10	53/33	51/35	42/44		43/45	47/39	56/34	62/27	57/30	62/27	63/25	67/23	58/37	56/36	54/36	52/33
Some college	57/13	67/24	56/36	47/43		43/46	58/32	62/34	60/29	68/24	65/26	71/21	70/22	65/31	58/37	59/32	51/38
College grad.	60/16	73/22	60/34	55/36		45/44	47/44	64/31	63/30	67/27	63/29	72/24	65/30	61/35	50/42	63/35	54/39
Race																	
White	51/10	59/28	55/32	47/39	53/41	45/42	50/36	62/29	63/25	64/24	66/23	68/21	69/22	63/32	57/35	59/33	54/32
Black	14/19	14/69	8/75	13/75	15/78	15/81	12/77	15/76	20/60	26/62	33/54	37/49	29/52	22/71	18/63	23/67	24/60
Religion																	
Protestant	48/9	54/33	49/38	41/45		42/46	45/54	55/36	59/29	60/28	64/25	65/24	65/25	64/32	52/38	56/35	50/35
Catholic	47/13	54/31	48/39	48/39	46/47	41/47	48/39	59/30	59/29	58/31	60/30	65/25	65/28	61/35	55/38	51/41	57/34
Jewish	30/21	51/42	25/56	26/57	24/72	24/59	35/49	39/57	45/38	43/44	50/37	66/29	63/32	46/47	37/51	34/63	42/39
None	28/25	46/32	50/39	34/45	36/61	30/57	45/30	59/28	58/32	85/11	54/33	66/30	45/35	44/50	49/35	51/42	36/42
Region																	
Northeast	44/11	52/33	43/42	38/46	42/51	38/49	41/44	55/36	59/28	58/32	59/30	66/22	71/23	60/35	50/40	58/36	49/35
Midwest	47/10	56/31	51/38	45/41	53/41	41/50	46/40	56/35	55/30	58/31	57/28	57/31	60/28	56/40	51/40	53/37	48/40
South	45/9	51/36	48/38	41/45	50/44	43/44	45/41	56/35	59/29	62/25	69/23	69/21	62/24	63/32	52/37	51/40	54/32
West	52/18	56/29	56/31	47/41	52/42	39/46	51/37	58/34	60/30	59/30	60/28	65/23	60/34	64/30	54/37	57/35	49/36

Note: "Don't know enough" asked only in 1981. "No answer" not shown.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 17-21, 1988.

ROPER ORGANIZATION

	3/21-3/28/81	7/11-7/18/81	3/20-3/27/82	9/11-9/18/82	1/8-1/22/83	7/9-7/16/83	2/11-2/25/84	7/7-7/14/84	3/23-3/30/85	9/21-9/28/85	3/15-3/22/86	9/20-9/27/86	3/21-3/28/87	5/16-5/30/87
National	62/30	61/32	46/50	44/52	40/56	44/52	50/46	49/47	56/41	53/40	56/38	56/37	48/48	48/47
Age														
18-29	57/35	60/33	43/49	44/51	39/57	44/51	51/43	50/44	57/38	58/35	56/36	60/31	48/45	50/43
30-44	64/29	63/30	46/50	45/51	39/58	44/51	48/48	48/47	59/39	50/44	60/36	57/38	50/46	51/44
45-59	66/27	57/38	47/50	43/53	38/57	42/54	48/47	49/48	52/46	54/42	55/41	54/40	47/49	44/53
60 or over	61/28	64/28	47/50	44/51	43/52	46/50	51/45	47/48	52/45	53/41	53/42	55/38	45/52	46/48
Sex														
Male	67/25	66/27	51/45	49/47	44/53	48/48	55/41	51/45	58/39	59/36	58/38	59/37	49/49	51/45
Female	58/33	58/35	44/51	41/55	39/57	41/50	48/47	47/49	52/44	50/44	54/38	55/38	47/48	46/47
Education														
< High school	52/33	48/42	35/60	31/63	34/59	32/60	43/52	36/57	47/48	47/46	52/39	52/38	40/52	37/53
High school grad.	64/28	61/33	48/46	46/49	41/55	47/49	51/43	51/45	55/41	55/38	56/37	58/36	51/44	50/44
Some/Col. grad.	67/29	69/27	50/47	51/47	43/54	49/48	54/43	56/42	61/38	57/40	58/39	58/37	48/50	53/45
Race														
White	67/25	66/27	51/45	49/47	44/53	48/48	55/41	53/43	60/37	59/37	61/34	61/34	51/45	52/43
Black	20/70	19/72	11/82	5/90	8/89	11/81	11/85	15/78	19/76	24/66	31/64	30/60	26/68	19/69
Religion														
Protestant	63/30	63/31	49/48	47/49	43/54	48/47	50/46	50/47	58/39	54/40	58/37	59/34	51/46	50/45
Catholic	62/28	60/34	43/51	43/53	37/58	40/56	51/44	49/47	54/43	53/41	54/40	61/34	46/50	50/45
Region														
Northeast	59/26	58/34	41/51	44/50	33/60	40/54	48/46	50/45	56/41	52/42	54/40	56/36	45/52	42/53
Midwest	63/31	61/32	48/49	42/55	39/57	45/52	52/46	48/47	51/46	51/46	51/44	53/43	51/46	48/46
South	60/31	61/33	45/52	45/52	40/56	44/51	47/48	45/49	55/40	52/41	60/33	59/34	48/48	51/44
West	67/29	64/32	50/48	47/50	51/47	49/49	54/43	54/44	60/39	63/30	56/37	60/34	47/47	52/42

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-6), latest that of May 16-30, 1987.

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

WHEN DOES A PROBLEM BECOME A VOTING ISSUE?

see Opinion Roundup

Articles: Values, Special Interests, Community, Nonvoters, and Unintended Consequences.

Public Opinion

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CAN VALUES SAVE GEORGE BUSH?

by Michael J. Robinson

If trial heats worked perfectly, George Bush could save some time and public funding by conceding the election right now. Michael Dukakis has been leading him in every national match-up conducted since early May.[1] But trial heats—particularly such early ones—are neither sophisticated nor certain. A more comprehensive and useful way to look at the political climate takes into account five key variables: significant events of the campaign, party strength, perceptions of the candidates, the real-world situation, and finally, the values Americans bring to the campaign. Right now three of these confirm the picture painted by the trial heats: Dukakis leads on the conduct of the campaign, on party strength, and on perceptions of the candidates. But Bush and the GOP have a real advantage on values.

The Campaign Variable: Advantage, Dukakis

The campaign variable is the least amenable to survey research and, at this point, the variable we know the least about. This category includes telltale incidents such as gaffes and bloopers—all the land mines that can undo the best campaign plans. Some are legendary.

At this point in 1976 Jimmy Carter had jeopardized his chances for the Democratic nomination in July by telling an AP reporter that he believed white Americans had a right to maintain ethnic purity in their neighborhoods. By this time in 1980 Teddy Kennedy had sided with the Ayatollah in the dispute over the Shah and, to a lesser degree, criticized Carter about the hostages. And around this point in 1984 Walter Mondale had decided that America needed both a tax increase and Geraldine Ferraro. Enough said. Michael Dukakis hasn't done anything like this yet.

George Bush, on the other hand, already has a colorful history of campaign snafus: the fiasco at the Nashua debate in 1980 and the humiliation of the "kick ass" comment following the vice presidential debate in 1984 are just two examples.

He hasn't helped matters recently. Four months before the Iowa caucuses, Bush explained a straw poll defeat by noting that his absent supporters were probably at their daughters' coming out parties or on the back nine at the country club. And in May Bush uttered the single most incredible misstatement by a candidate ever recorded on sound or videotape. Bush said, and I quote, that he and Reagan had "had some sex" during the last eight years. He meant setbacks. The record so far is easy to read. Michael Dukakis is the favorite.

The Party Variable: A Democratic Advantage

Despite all the premature extrapolation from the Republicans' 1984 landslide, the evidence here is unequivocal. The Democrats still hold a comfortable lead in partisan loyalty. The most recent national Gallup poll indicates that Democrats outnumber Republicans by 38 to 28 percent. Even factoring in the Republican advantage in turnout rates, Dukakis wins.

The Candidate Variable: Dukakis by a Mile

Since 1952 the Republican nominee has projected a more positive image than the Democrat in every election but 1964—the Goldwater debacle.[2] Republicans have traditionally compensated for their minority status by producing "better" nominees. But in 1988 tradition is being rewritten.

The Times Mirror Company/Gallup survey from late May 1988 found that while 51 percent of the national electorate hold a favorable view of George Bush, 42 percent express an unfavorable opinion for a net score of +9. Dukakis's favorable-to-unfavorable percentages are 66 to 22, thirty-five points ahead of Bush.

Table 1
CANDIDATE QUALITIES

Question: Please look down this list and tell me which items you think apply to George Bush. . . . And what about Michael Dukakis?

	George Bush	Michael Dukakis
Has the record and experience for the job of president	51%	17%
Well informed	44	33
Steady and dependable	33	26
Can get things done	29	29
Honest and ethical	28	34
Thoughtful	25	28
Concerned about the needs of people like me	19	35
Can bring about the changes the country needs	19	31
Strong and forceful	18	22
Too extreme on issues	13	12
Has a fresh approach	9	35
Excites and inspires people	9	21

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988.

Looking more closely at the specifics of candidacy, Bush does somewhat better. But he's still way behind (see table 1). For the first time in twenty-five years, and only the second time since 1948, the Republicans enter the election campaign losing the candidate variable.

The Values Variable: Advantage, GOP

Last year the Gallup Organization conducted a national survey of more than 4,200 people for the Times Mirror Company. As part of this project Gallup factor-analyzed more than seventy items dealing with political issues, policy questions, and the political process, and came up with nine dimensions of mass political thinking.[3] Gallup used those dimensions to build an eleven-group classification of the electorate. While the classification has received lots of attention, until now no one has made much use of the original factor analysis.[4]

The factors themselves don't tell us much about what public opinion *is*. Unless one goes a step further the data tell us only that a factor divides opinion. The next step involves looking more closely at all the factors and determining the shape of opinion on each.

The Median American and Basic Values

Gallup identified nine basic factors (dimensions) of American public opinion. Taking some liberties with the original labels, I've identified them as: (1) Religious Consciousness; (2) Political Tolerance; (3) Beliefs about Economic Justice; (4) Attitudes toward Communism and Defense-related Issues; (5) American Exceptionalism; (6) Orientations toward Big Business and Corporate Power; (7) Feelings about Government Efficacy; and (8) Level of Political Alienation.[5] The trick is to convert each of these dimensions into something that tells us where Americans fall on each.

Each of these dimensions has a *midpoint*, defined here as the median of that dimension.[6] People who stand at (or near) the midpoint on each dimension are, therefore, "Median Americans."

By learning what the Median American believes on each of these dimensions and by making a seat-of-the-pants assessment of what each party traditionally believes, one can evaluate which party lives closer to the Median American.

On five of the dimensions of public thinking originally identified by Gallup, the Median American sits closer to the traditional Republican position than to the traditional Democratic position. On only two do the Democrats hold the values advantage. One final dimension, Political Alienation, is something of a wash.[7] The values advantage of five to two should, by November, be helping Bush and the GOP.

Republican Advantages

The Median American stands closer to the Democrats on issues related to economics; that's an old story. What may be more surprising is that the Median American appears closer to the GOP on almost all the rest.

Take American Exceptionalism as a dimension, for example. It is composed of half a dozen items. At one end of that dimension are those who believe that America is "unique in its mission" and "limitless in its possibilities." At the other end are those who say the opposite. Median American opinions about this value sound like the political rhetoric of the GOP.

One item that correlates very closely with the di-

mension is one that asks whether Americans can always find a way to solve their problems and get what they want. On this item the entire public lists to the political right: a full 68 percent of the national sample agree that we can always solve our problems and get what we want. Among Median Americans 76 percent say that we can always get what we want and solve the problems we face.

The Median American is even more likely to espouse American Exceptionalism because the distribution on this entire dimension bulks in favor of the traditional Republican point of view. And so it goes with four other dimensions as well.

Consider Government Efficacy. The item that loads most heavily on this dimension is one that asks whether government programs are usually inefficient and wasteful. Sixty-three percent of the sample said yes, in essence adopting a plank that has been part of the Republican party platform for about the last hundred years. And among the Median Americans—those at the midpoint on the entire dimension—a full 75 percent say yes. Again the advantage is to the GOP, especially among Median Americans.

Religious Consciousness provides a GOP advantage, too. The best indicator of Religious Consciousness is an item asking whether God performs miracles even today; 82 percent of the national electorate agree that God still performs miracles. Among Median Americans that percentage climbs even higher to 96 percent.

What's more, on policy questions relating religion and politics, the population at large sounds more like George Bush than Michael Dukakis. Seventy-one percent of the entire populace favor a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in public schools. But because the distribution on the entire factor bulks to the right—statistically and ideologically—Median Americans sound even more conservative than the average American; 76 percent say yes to a prayer-in-public-schools amendment, reflecting more the politics of a Jerry Falwell than a Madalyn Murray O'Hair.

On Political Tolerance the pattern is slightly different but still an advantage for Bush and the Republicans. Americans think school boards should have the right to fire homosexual teachers, think dangerous books should be banned from public schools, think too many children are raised in day care centers, and that AIDS is God's punishment for immoral behavior. And, even though Median Americans don't show any greater tendency to express those views, Median Americans and the electorate at large are equally intolerant of deviance.

The same pattern holds for the Anti-Communism/Defense dimension. While the Reagan administration has made it hard to continue to hold the view that the Republican party is more anti-Communist than the Democrats, it still makes sense to see the GOP as more hawkish. And the public at large also sounds rather hawkish in believing that "the best way to ensure peace is through military strength." A majority also feel that one should be willing to fight for one's country "whether it is right or wrong" and that "Communists are responsible for a lot of the unrest in the United States today."

Because the distribution on this overall dimension is almost "normal," statistically, Median Americans wind up feeling about the same way as the general public on Anti-Communism and Defense. But that still means that on most of the policy-related issues associated with national security matters like these, average Americans and Median Americans both express "peace through strength" attitudes.

Democratic Advantages

Looking at table 2, however, we see that the Democrats are not shut out. While the Democratic position loses overall, the Democrats win on two of the most powerful factors—Economic Justice and Orientation toward Big Business and Corporate Power.

Table 2
EIGHT BASIC DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION

Dimension name	Dimension advantage to:	Item correlating most heavily on each dimension (% agree)
Economic Justice	Democrats	The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep. (62%)
Orientation Toward Big Business	Democrats	There is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few big companies. (77%)
Attitudes Toward Communism/ Defense	Republicans	Communists are responsible for a lot of the unrest in the U.S. today. (56%)
American Exceptionalism	Republicans	I don't believe that there are any real limits to growth in this country today. (66%)
Political Tolerance	Republicans	Books that contain dangerous ideas should be banned from public school libraries. (51%)
Government Efficacy	Republicans	When something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful. (63%)
Religious Consciousness	Republicans	Even today miracles are performed by the power of God. (82%)
Political Alienation	Neither party	People like me don't have any say about what government does. (52%)

Economic Justice represents the single greatest value advantage for the Democrats in 1988. On four of five items that come together to produce this dimension, the public at large sounds very Democratic in tone.

The most powerful item associated with Economic Justice asks whether the federal government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep. Sixty-two percent of the populace say yes, a clear advantage for the Democratic stance. Among Median Americans, the percentage saying yes to food and shelter jumps to 76 percent, a clear indication that the

(*Continued on page 59*)

ELECTION PREVIEW
Setting the Stage

ALSO IN
OPINION ROUNDUP

- Attitudes about the Economy
- Issues and Problems
- Polls on the Presidential Contests: 1948 to Today

Question: How much attention have you been able to pay to the (1980, 1984, 1988) presidential campaign?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of May 9-12, 1988.

Question: Some people are quite active in politics, while others prefer not to take an active part. During the last three to four years, have you done any of the things listed on this card? . . .


In the last three to four years, have . . .
Asked someone to vote for your party or candidate
27%
Gone to a political meeting to hear a candidate speak
22%
Worn a campaign button or displayed a campaign poster
19%
Worked for a political party or candidate
14%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 30 - November 12, 1986.

Question: We would like to find out about some of the things people do during a presidential campaign. Which of the following have you done, if any, within the last year or so?


Within the last year have . . .
Watched a debate between presidential candidates
59%
Contributed money to a presidential candidate
11%
Contributed money to a political organization
11%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times-Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988.

CONVENTION(AL) WISDOM

Question: How important are the activities at the party conventions to your decision on voting for president?

Democratic/Republican conventions



Source: Survey by Research & Forecasts, Inc. for The Hearst Corporation, October 15 - November 1, 1987.

Percent of U.S. TV households viewing some part of the (Democratic/Republican) conventions



	1968 Dem.	1968 Rep.	1972 Dem.	1972 Rep.	1976 Dem.	1976 Rep.	1980 Dem.	1980 Rep.	1984 Dem.	1984 Rep.
Average hours and minutes of convention viewed by households	9:28	7:53	6:42	4:12	5:53	7:09	5:29	4:49	3:25	2:41
Network hours of convention aired	39.1	34.0	36.7	19.8	30.4	29.5	24.1	22.7	12.9	11.9

Note: From 1968 to 1980, the three networks provided extensive prime-time coverage. In 1984, the three networks reduced prime-time coverage. In 1980 and 1984 CNN and C-SPAN provided gavel-to-gavel coverage.

Source: A.C. Nielsen Reports.

Question: How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?

When vote decision made



Note: The response categories varied slightly over the years. "Other" excluded = 2% or less each year.

Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Election Studies, latest that of 1984.

Question: Which of the following best describes a political party platform?

Best description of a platform:


A party's position on current political issues
61%
The founding document of a political party
13%
A collection of the speeches given by a political party's presidential nominee
10%
Don't know/No answer
16%

Note: In a 1952 question posed by the Gallup Organization, 71% correctly identified what is meant by a party's platform.

Source: Survey by Research & Forecasts, Inc. for The Hearst Corporation, October 15 - November 1, 1987.

PRESS EXCESS?

Question: How much influence do you feel news organizations have on which candidates become presidential nominees . . .

News organizations have . . .



Question: So far, do you think news organizations are giving . . .

News organizations are giving . . .



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for the Times-Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988.

1988

Number of Press Credentials Issued for Each Convention*

15,000

Note: *Estimate includes domestic and foreign press.

Source: Republican National Committee and Democratic National Committee convention press offices, 1988.

WHO THE DELEGATES ARE

	1968		1972		1976		1980		1984	
	Dem %	Rep %	Dem %	Rep %	Dem %	Rep %	Dem %	Rep %	Dem %	Rep %
Selected demographic characteristics % who are:										
Women	13	16	40	29	33	31	49	29	49	44
Black	5	2	15	4	11	3	15	3	18	4
Under thirty	3	4	22	8	15	7	11	5	8	4
Lawyers	28	22	12	—	16	15	13	15	17	14
Teachers	8	2	11	—	12	4	15	4	16	6
Union members	—	—	16	—	21	3	27	4	25	4
First convention attendees	67	66	83	78	80	78	87	84	78	69
Protestant	—	—	42	—	47	73	47	72	49	71
Catholic	—	—	26	—	34	18	37	22	29	22
Jewish	—	—	9	—	9	3	8	3	8	2
Liberal	—	—	—	—	40	3	46	2	48	1
Moderate	—	—	—	—	47	45	42	36	42	35
Conservative	—	—	—	—	8	48	6	58	4	60
Median age	49	49	42	—	43	48	44	49	43	51

Source: Delegate surveys conducted by CBS News, latest that of 1984.

Convention Firsts

1832	First national party convention; the Democrats meet in Baltimore.
1856	First Republican convention.
1860	Chicago hosts its first convention; the city goes on to host 14 Republican and 10 Democratic conventions.
1868	Republicans give their candidate 100% on the first ballot for the first time.
1876	Both major parties nominate incumbent governors for the first time.
1888	Frederick Douglass is the first black to receive a vote in presidential balloting—one vote on the fourth ballot at the Republican convention.
1900	First women delegates—one for each party.
1908	Theodore Roosevelt becomes the first who succeeded a deceased president to be nominated in his own right.
1912	Republicans renominate incumbents, Taft and Sherman.
1916	Democrats renominate incumbents, Wilson and Marshall.
1924	First radio coverage of conventions.
1928	Democrats choose Al Smith, the first Catholic candidate of a major party.
1932	Franklin Roosevelt becomes the first nominee to accept nomination at a convention, rather than at a later ceremony.
1940	First television coverage of a convention—the Republican convention in Philadelphia.
1944	Tom Dewey becomes the first Republican to accept nomination at a convention.
1948	Dewey becomes first defeated Republican presidential candidate to be renominated.
1960	Nixon becomes the first Republican vice-president to be nominated at the completion of his term.
1964	Senator Margaret Chase Smith becomes first woman to have her name placed in nomination by a major party.
1984	Congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro is the first woman to be placed on a national ticket by a major party.
1988	New Orleans and Atlanta host party conventions for the first time.

Source: Multiple sources including *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections.*

CONSUMER



	University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment	Conference Board: Consumer Confidence Index	Conference Board: Present Situation Index	Conference Board: Expectations Index
1987				
October	89	115	124	109
November	88	101	116	91
December	87	108	120	100
1988				
January	91	110	122	102
February	92	115	129	106
March	95	113	125	105
April	91	116	120	113
May	95	119	129	113

Note: See *Public Opinion* March/April 1988 page 38 for question wording.

Source: Surveys by Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of May 1988.

Note: The Conference Board survey is a mail survey. 1985 = 100. PRESENT SITUATION INDEX is compiled from these two questions: How would you rate the present business conditions in your area? Good, normal, or bad? What would you say about available jobs in your area right now? Plenty, not so many, hard to get? EXPECTATIONS INDEX is compiled from these three questions: Six months from now do you think business conditions in your area will be better, same, or worse?; Six months from now will there be more (jobs), fewer, or same?; How would you guess your total family income to be six months from now? Higher, the same, lower?

Source: Surveys by National Family Opinion, Inc., latest that of May 1988.

CONFIDENCE

Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index by Income



THE NATION'S ECONOMIC PICTURE:

Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the U.S. at this time?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 1986, the Gallup Organization for the Times-Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988.

Question: Would you describe the state of the nation's economy these days as excellent, good, not so good, or poor?



	Excellent/ Good	Not so good	Poor
Dec. 1985	40%	41%	19%
Jan. 1986	44	37	19
Feb.	44	40	16
March	44	40	16
April	50	34	16
May	47	38	15
June	48	37	15
July	45	37	18
Aug.	43	39	18
Sept.	39	43	18
Oct.	40	43	17
Nov.	40	39	21
Dec.	39	37	24
Jan. 1987	38	41	21
Feb.	40	41	19
March	42	42	16
April	39	41	20
May	37	42	21
June	40	40	20
July	42	40	18
Aug.	43	40	17
Sept.	45	36	19
Oct.	38	44	18
Nov.	35	42	23
Dec.	34	47	19
Jan. 1988	34	48	18
Feb.	35	45	20
March	39	44	17
April	38	42	20
May	40	46	14

Note: These percentages are rolling averages of polls conducted over a four week period. Every week ABC News releases data that are an average of the four previous weeks. As each new weekly poll is added to the average, the oldest set of weekly data are dropped. The latest point for each month is shown here.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Money*, latest that of April 11-May 8, 1988.

PUBLIC SAYS IT'S JUST SO-SO

Question: A year from now, do you expect that economic conditions in the country as a whole will be better than they are at present, or worse, or just about the same as now?

A year from now, economic conditions in the country will be . . . than now



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization latest that of 1984, and the Gallup Organization for the Times-Mirror Company, latest that of May 13-22, 1988.

Question: Do you think the economic outlook for the United States over the next five years is bright, just so-so, or gloomy?

Economic outlook for the next five years is . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report*, March 30-31, 1988.

Question: I'm going to read you four statements and I'd like you to tell me which one of them best describes how well or badly you think the United States is competing with other industrialized nations of the world. A. We are number one and will remain the strongest, most dynamic economy in the world. B. We are still number one, but other nations are catching up with us very quickly. C. We are slipping dangerously but can still turn it around if we act decisively. D. We are in a period of long term economic decline and will eventually lose our position as number one.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report*, March 30-31, 1988.

Question: Do you think things in this country are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have gotten pretty seriously off on the wrong track?

Question: Do you think the nation's economy is getting better, getting worse, or staying the same?



Source: Survey ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 19-25, 1988.

Americans' Split Personality on the Economy

The incumbent party is usually helped when voters are satisfied about the economy and hurt when they are dissatisfied. Today the striking feature of public opinion is the sharp split between people's perceptions of the record of the economy at large and what they see as their own place in it.

Pages 26 to 28 show that many Americans believe the country's economy isn't doing all that well. In May 40 percent in an ABC News/*Money* poll said that the nation's economy was excellent or good, while 46 percent rated it not so good and 14 percent poor. Adding to this pessimistic picture, only 17 percent in a Roper Organization poll thought the economic picture for the next five years is bright, while nearly 60 percent described it as "just so-so."

The closer you get to home, though, the more optimistic are economic assessments. A near majority, 47 percent, in a May Gallup poll felt that their personal financial situation was better than a year ago. Fifty-four percent in the Times Mirror/Gallup poll believed that they would be financially better off at this time next year. Only 10 percent expected to be worse off (pages 29-31).

Voters, then, seem to be tugged in opposite directions. We don't yet know much about the intensity with which these opposing assessments are held, and that intensity is likely to determine how the tension is resolved electorally.

Right now, voters are split about which party and which candidate can best handle different economic problems. When asked in May which party can keep the country prosperous, voters split evenly (page 32).

E.C.L.

PERSONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: TEMPERED OPTIMISM

Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in your personal life?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization latest that of September 1986, and by the Gallup Organization for the Times-Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988.

Question: Would you describe the state of your own personal finances these days as excellent, good, not so good, or poor?



PERSONAL FINANCES

	Excellent/ Good	Not so good	Poor
Dec. 1985	59%	28%	13%
Jan. 1986	57	29	14
Feb.	55	32	13
March	50	35	15
April	59	28	13
May	56	32	12
June	58	30	12
July	58	30	12
Aug.	58	32	10
Sept.	55	33	12
Oct.	56	33	11
Nov.	56	30	14
Dec.	59	31	10
Jan. 1987	54	30	16
Feb.	52	34	14
March	56	33	11
April	56	31	13
May	56	33	11
June	57	31	12
July	55	31	14
Aug.	57	31	12
Sept.	59	30	11
Oct.	58	30	12
Nov.	60	27	13
Dec.	60	29	11
Jan. 1988	57	32	11
Feb.	57	29	14
March	58	28	14
April	57	31	12
May	56	30	14

Note: These percentages are rolling averages of polls conducted over a four week period. Every week ABC News releases data that are an average of the four previous weeks. As each new weekly poll is added to the average, the oldest set of weekly data are dropped. The latest point for each month is shown here.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Money*, latest that of April 11-May 8, 1988.

Question: We are interested in how people's financial situations may have changed. Would you say that you are financially better off now than you were a year ago, or are you financially worse off now?

Current financial situation is . . . than a year ago



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May 2-8, 1988.

Question: Now looking ahead—do you expect that at this time next year you will be financially better off than now, or worse off than now?

This time next year will you be financially . . . than now



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 1986, and the Gallup Organization for the Times-Mirror Company, May 13-22,1988.

Question: During the next year, do you think your family will be financially better off than it is today, about the same, or worse off?

During the next year, family will be . . .



Note: June 1988 bar = registered voters.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, May 1978-August 1983; NBC News, January 1984-May 1985; NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, latest that of June 9-12, 1988.

Question: Are you personally better off now than in 1980—when Reagan was first elected president—or worse off, or about the same?

Question: During the coming year, 1988, do you expect your personal financial situation will improve, get worse, or stay about the same?

Question: Looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you personally will be better off financially, worse off, or in about the same state as now?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report*, December 14-16, 1987.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 19-25, 1988.

Party Images

Question: Which political party—the Republican or the Democratic—will do a better job of keeping the country prosperous?

	Rep.	Dem.
Mar. 1978	23%	42%
July	26	40
Oct.	27	38
June 1980	31	37
Sept.	35	36
Oct.	35	36
April 1981	41	28
Oct.	41	31
Feb. 1982	32	42
June	34	43
Oct.	32	42
Sept. 1983	33	40
April 1984	44	36
Aug.	48	36
Sept.	49	33
Mar. 1985	48	32
June	44	35
Mar. 1986	51	33
Oct.	41	30
Jan. 1987	38	37
July	34	36
Oct.	41	33
Dec.	41	38
Jan. 1988	42	35
May	41	39

Note: "No difference," "No opinion," not shown.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May 13-15, 1988.



Question: Now I am going to read you a list of issues that face our country today, and would like you to tell me whether you think the Republican party or the Democratic party can best handle that problem.



Note: In a CBS News/*NYT* poll, May 9-12, 1988, 51% thought the Democratic party would be better able to handle unemployment, 31% chose the Republican party, 5% volunteered that there was no difference between the parties and 13% responded "don't know."

Source: Survey by The Wirthlin Group, latest that of April 4-7, 1988.

PROBLEMS OR VOTING ISSUES?

A PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS

Gauging issues and their impact in a presidential campaign is always tricky. A person's vote is shaped by so many different factors. Still, we add needlessly to our confusion by being unclear about what an issue actually is in the context of an election, and how different kinds of issues exert themselves.

Recently, for example, we have been told that drugs are a major issue in Campaign '88. Others that have been mentioned this year are education, trade, crime, ethics/corruption, child care, and deficits. Polls seem to confirm the emergence of drugs when, for example, they show more Americans citing drug use than anything else as the country's biggest problem (see page 35). But *problems* aren't necessarily *issues.* A problem becomes a voting issue only when people believe that the parties differ—and what is more, differ significantly—in their approach to it or in their capacity to solve it. Thus far in this campaign Americans do not seem to view drugs as a voting issue, though they do consider it a terrible problem.

Over the years deep public concerns have often failed to develop into issues that shape the presidential choice. Crime is probably the best example. When the rates of violent crime soared in the late 1960s, polls quickly picked up a vast increase in public concern over this problem. But wavering voters never concluded in presidential elections that the problem would be better managed by a particular choice of president or party.

Another set of concerns that are indeed voting issues often fail to arouse much interest in a given presidential election; they have long since exerted their influence by shaping views of the political parties. "Role of government" questions are an example here. Voters who favor a larger government role in social welfare learned long before the 1988 campaign that the Democratic party was the better instrument for their preference. Those who want smaller government were led similarly to the Republicans. Michael Dukakis or George Bush may be able, however, to move some among a large middle group in the population who in recent years have had ambivalent feelings about the scope of government's role.

Every four years presidential contenders try to stake out new positions to distinguish themselves favorably from their opponents. They rarely succeed. There just aren't many things, apart from settled party commitments, about which substantial numbers of potentially movable voters care enough to be moved one way or the other by them. In recent years foreign trade questions have been promoted as a potential new voting issue—to absolutely no avail. When a campaign looks at a problem, it can attempt to make it a voting issue. Some of the items shown on our cover may have potential, but right now that is not clear. Nor is it clear whether either party can mobilize whatever potential exists.

The above helps us understand why, in so many presidential campaigns, the big issue involves a debate over how the country is doing. The issue is new because every four years the condition of the country is different from what it was four years earlier. The desired state of affairs on our central concerns is universally accepted. Voters are united in their call for a prospering economy, peace, and the protection of vital national interests, including our interest in freedom, the sound and ethical conduct of governmental affairs, and so on. The new issue is: How successful are we at present in obtaining these conditions, and which candidate/party is the best able to advance them over the next four years?

With voter support of the two parties evenly balanced, and with neither candidate likely to pin down a decisive advantage on strictly personal assessments like character and leadership, this year's election may well hinge on the question, "How are we doing?" Neither Bush nor Dukakis can escape the election being a referendum on the Reagan years. How well will the candidates make their cases on this overriding issue? That is the key question. Everything else is likely to pale as Campaign '88 enters the stretch. E.C.L.

On pages 34 and 35, we show the responses to the question, "What is the most important problem facing this country today?" We have chosen a point early in each of the Reagan years and highlighted the categories that were mentioned by more than 10 percent. Economic concerns clearly dominated the early years: since then, nothing has achieved that intensity. On page 36, we look at attitudes about child care. While Americans clearly think that the Democratic party can do a better job than the Republicans handling child care needs, these data do not tell us whether child care will be a campaign issue. The most profound feeling about child care appears to be ambivalence, even among those most directly affected.

Most Important Problems

1981

Economic

Inflation 72%
Unemployment/ recession 8%
Energy 5%

Social

Crime 2%
Morality 2%

Government

Dissatisfaction with government 2%

Foreign

International problems 2%
Fear of war 2%

1982

Economic

Inflation/ high prices 49%
Unemployment/ recession 28%
Reagan budget cuts 7%
Excessive govt spending 3%
Interest rates 2%

Social

Crime 5%
Morality 4%

Government

—

Foreign

International problems 5%
Fear of war 5%

1983

Economic

Unemployment/ recession 54%
Inflation/high prices 18%
The economy 8%
Excessive govt spending 5%
Reagan budget cuts 3%
Interest rates 2%

Social

Morality 4%
Crime 2%

Government

Dissatisfaction with government 2%

Foreign

Fear of war 11%
National defense 3%
International problems 2%

1984

Economic

Unemployment/ recession 29%
Excessive govt spending 12%
Inflation/ high prices 10%
Reagan budget cuts 7%
The economy 5%

Social

Morality 7%
Crime 4%

Government

Dissatisfaction with government 2%

Foreign

International problems 11%
Fear of war 11%
Nuclear arms race 5%

Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May, 1988.

Question: Is there any one issue that is so important to you that you would change your vote because you disagreed with a candidate's position on that single issue? . . . What issue is that?



Note: No other issue was mentioned by more than 3% of those surveyed as an issue that would change their votes.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of September 28-October 1, 1986.

1985

Economic

Unemployment/ recession 17%
Budget deficit 14%
Inflation/ high prices 6%
The economy 5%
Poverty/hunger 5%
Excessive govt. spending 2%

Social

Crime 3%
Morality 2%

Government

—

Foreign

Fear of war
Nuclear arms race 5%
International problems 2%

1986

Economic

Unemployment/ recession 16%
Budget deficit 11%
Poverty/hunger 6%
inflation/ high prices 5%
The economy 4%
Agriculture 3%
Taxes 2%
Foreign trade 2%
Elderly/Social Security 2%

Social

Morality 3%
Drugs 2%
Crime 2%

Government

—

Foreign

Fear of war 7%
Middle East 5%
Terrorism/hostages 5%
International problems 3%
Nuclear arms race 3%

1987

Economic

Unemployment/ recession 12%
Budget deficit 9%
The economy 8%
Poverty/hunger 4%
Inflation/ high prices 2%
Excessive govt. spending 2%
Taxes 2%
Foreign trade 2%

Social

Drugs 8%
Morality 4%
Crime 3%
AIDS 2%

Government

Dissatisfaction with government 3%

Foreign

Fear of war 7%
International problems 5%
Nuclear arms race 5%
Iran/Contra 2%

1988

Economic

Unemployment/ recession 8%
Budget deficit 8%
The economy 7%
Poverty/hunger 4%
Homelessness 3%
Inflation/ high prices 2%
Foreign trade 2%

Social

Drugs 16%
Morality 4%
AIDS 3%
Crime 2%

Government

The government 3%

Foreign

Fear of war 5%
International problems 4%
Arms control 3%

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 10-13, 1987, and CBS News/ *New York Times*, May 9-12, 1988.



CHILD CARE: A PROBLEM OR A VOTING ISSUE?

Question: Do you think women should stay at home if they have young (pre-school) children?

Question: I am going to read some statements to you about current issues. Please indicate if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, or strongly disagree: I would be afraid to leave my child at a day care center; . . . child care facilities should be more available to workers; . . . day care centers provide a nurturing environment for children; . . . if I could afford it, I would rather stay home with my children.



Note: Sample = 800 women.

Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research, Inc. for *Glamour* August 6-29, 1987.

Question: Now I would like you to consider some concerns that people may have. For each one that I read, tell me how concerned you are, if at all, that it will happen . . .



Note: *The numbers at the left of the categories are the percentages of people who volunteered that the category did not apply to them. The responses in the bars are for those who said the category applied to them.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Times-Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988.

Question: I am going to read you a list of issues that face our country today, and I would like you to tell me whether you think the Republican party or the Democratic party can best handle that problem . . .



Source: Survey by The Wirthlin Group, April 4-7, 1988.

Question: Following is a list of changes some people say have occurred that are different from the practices of their parents' generation. Do you think each has been a change for the better or a change for the worse?



Note: Sample = 816 eighteen to forty-four year olds.

Source: Survey by Peter D. Hart Research Associates for *Rolling Stone*, September 11-20, 1987.

IT'S A LONG TIME FROM JUNE TO NOVEMBER

1948



1948	Dewey	Truman	H. Wallace	Thurmond
May/June	49%	38%	6%	—
Republican Convention				
Democratic Convention				
July	48	37	5	—
August (middle)	48	37	4	—
August (late)	49	36	5	—
September (early)	47	39	3	2%
September (middle)	47	39	3	2
September (late)	46	40	4	2
October/November	50	45	4	2
Actual Vote	45.1	49.5	2.4	2.4

1952

1952	Eisenhower	Stevenson
June	59%	31%
Republican Convention		
Democratic Convention		
July	50	43
September (early)	55	40
September (late)	55	41
September/October	53	41
October (early)	48	39
October (middle)	48	39
November	51	49
Actual Vote	55.1	44.4



1956



1956	Eisenhower	Stevenson
June	62%	35%
July	61	37
Democratic Convention		
Republican Convention		
August (late)	52	41
September (early)	52	41
October (early)	51	41
November	60	41
Actual Vote	57.4	42

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, 1948 through 1984. Actual vote from *Congressional Quarterly*.

1960



1960	Kennedy	Nixon
June	50%	46%
Democratic Convention		
Republican Convention		
July/August	44	50
August (middle)	47	47
August (late)	48	47
September	46	47
September/October	49	46
October	49	45
November	51	49
Actual Vote	49.7	49.5

1964



1964	Johnson	Goldwater
June (middle)	77%	18%
June (late)	75	16
July (early)	62	26
Republican Convention		
July (late)	59	31
August	65	29
Democratic Convention		
August/September	65	29
September	62	32
October	64	29
November	64	36
Actual Vote	61.1	38.5

1968



1968	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace
June	37%	42%	14%
June/July	35	40	16
July	40	38	16
Republican Convention			
August	45	29	18
Democratic Convention			
September (early)	43	31	19
September (middle)	43	28	21
September (late)	44	29	20
October (early)	43	31	20
October (middle)	44	36	15
November	43	42	15
Actual Vote	43.4	42.7	13.5

1972



1972	Nixon	McGovern
June	53%	37%
Democratic Convention		
July	56	37
August (early)	57	31
Republican Convention		
August (late)	64	30
September	61	33
September/October	60	34
October	59	36
November	62	38
Actual Vote	60.7	37.5

1976

1976	Carter	Ford	McCarthy
June (middle)	55%	37%	—
June (late)	53	36	- -
Democratic Convention			
July	62	29	—
August (early)	54	32	6%
Republican Convention			
August (middle)	50	37	—
August (late)	51	36	3
September	51	40	4
September/October	47	45	1
October (early)	48	42	2
October (middle)	47	41	2
October (late)	49	44	2
October/November	48	44	2
November	49	48	2
Actual Vote	50.1	48	.9

Note: McCarthy was not included regularly in the trials until late August.



1980



1980	Carter	Reagan	Anderson
June (middle)	35%	33%	24%
June (late)	32	37	21
July (middle)	34	37	21
Republican Convention			
August (early)	29	45	14
Democratic Convention			
September	39	39	14
October (middle)	44	40	9
October (late)	47	39	9
October/November	44	47	8
Actual Vote	41	50.7	6 6

1984

1984	Reagan	Mondale
June (early)	53%	44%
June (late)	56	37
July (middle)	53	39
Democratic Convention		
July (late)	53	41
August (early)	52	41
Republican Convention		
September (early)	55	40
September (middle)	57	39
September (late)	56	39
October (middle)	58	38
October (late)	57	40
November	59	41
Actual Vote	58.7	40.5



NATIONAL TRIAL HEATS

Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	Sample
Harris	4/10-15/87	55%	39%	LV
Harris	5/8-12/87	51	43	LV
ABC News/*W. Post*	9/17-23/87	61	29	Adults
Penn + Schoen	10/30-11/5/87	50	30	Adults
Los Angeles Times	12/10-14/87	49	23	Adults
Roper for *U.S. News*/CNN	12/14-16/87	48	30	Adults
Harris	2/18-23/88	47	50	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	3/9/88	44	38	RV
Harris	3/9-13/88	47	50	RV
Gallup	3/10-12/88	52	40	RV
Time/YCS	3/10/88	42	37	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	3/17-21/88	45	50	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	3/19-22/88	46	45	RV
Gallup	3/25-27/88	41	48	RV
Gallup/*Newsweek*	3/30-31/88	49	44	RV
Roper for *U.S. News*/CNN	3/30-31/88	44	43	RV
Harris	4/1-5/88	45	50	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	4/5-7/88	43	48	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	4/20-21/88	43	45	RV
Time/YCS	4/20-21/88	39	50	RV
Gallup	4/21-23/88	45	43	RV
Harris	5/5-10/88	43	50	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	5/9-12/88	39	49	RV
Gallup	5/13-15/88	38	54	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	5/19-26/88	40	53	RV
Gallup/Times-Mirror	5/13-22/88	40	53	RV
Harris	6/1-6/88	44	49	LV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	6/7-9/88	38	45	RV
Darden Poll*	6/8-13/88	42	45	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	6/9-12/88	34	49	Adults
Gallup	6/10-12/88	38	52	RV
Mckeon and Assoc.	6/14-15/88	34	52	RV
Washington Post	6/15-19/88	39	51	RV
Gallup	6/24-26/88	41	46	RV

*Darden polled voters in 9 southern states including AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC,SC, TN, and VA.

COMING IN THE NEXT
OPINION ROUNDUP

State-by-state trial heats

Note: LV = likely voters; RV = registered voters.

WILL THE REAL NONVOTER PLEASE STAND UP?

by Ruy Teixeira

At times the American left seems like the spurned suitor who, seeing his beloved around town with someone else, insists, "It's really me she loves, she just doesn't know how to express it." One may find such sentiments understandable but still think them ridiculous.

The latest version of such wishful thinking is that nonvoters in America, if allowed and encouraged to come forward, would provide the left with the political support it currently lacks. Before this it was the poor, and before that racial minorities, and before that women, and before that the "new working class" who were going to transform politics. The list is long, but the claim is always the same: "I know these people are for us. They just don't know how to express it."

And now nonvoters have their chance to step forward and be counted. The exemplar of this viewpoint—that nonvoters are a potential force for radical social change—is a new book, *Why Americans Don't Vote* by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, two well-known academics traditionally associated with the political left.[1]

The New Argument

Piven and Cloward's main points are two, one pertaining to the history of American politics and the other to its contemporary practice. On the historical level they claim that the effective disenfranchisement of a large proportion of the population through personal registration statutes has seriously distorted twentieth century American politics. They further claim that this distortion has allowed elite economic interests to dominate the interests of working and poor people.

On the contemporary situation the authors assert that the large number of nonvoters (almost 82 million in the 1984 presidential election) continues to distort American politics. If these nonvoters were allowed and encouraged to vote, they would be likely to vote in such a way that politics would move substantially to the left.

These are both interesting arguments. There is not a shred of evidence, however, that either one of them is true.

To begin, it is true that voter registration requirements in the early twentieth century (the "Progressive Era") probably played a substantial role in reducing voter turnout between 1896 and 1912 (down twenty points). But this does not mean that American politics was distorted as a result. For this to be true it would have to be shown that: (a) those who refrained from voting because of registration requirements had political views that were substantially different from those who did vote; and (b) these differences, when multiplied by the number of nonvoters, would have been large enough to affect election results substantially.

Piven and Cloward assert that personal registration statutes probably affected working and poor people more than the affluent. This may have been true (I believe that it was), but it does not prove either (a) or (b) above. It simply means that the pool of nonvoters was probably somewhat different demographically from the pool of voters. It is a leap of faith to go from this demographic difference (of unknown scope) to the assertion of large *political* differences and from there to the existence of large political *effects*.

It is a further leap to tie these hypothesized political effects to the ability of economic elites to dominate twentieth century American politics (assuming for the moment that this domination has existed). Even grant-

ing that the votes of nonvoters would have had large political effects, for all we know they may have promoted a different version of the same general policies.

In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for example, between 1898 and 1916, the Social Democrats succeeded in reaching working-class voters—the group Piven and Cloward presumably think would have shifted early twentieth-century America to the left—with a political program focused not on socialism but on clean government and municipal ownership of utilities. The program, in effect, "out-Progressived" the Progressives. It was only *after* the Social Democrats made their program less class-conscious and more Progressive that the working-class voters flocked to their banners.[2] The moral of the story: twentieth century politics may have been the way it was because, for whatever reason, people preferred it that way, not because important actors (the nonvoters) were missing from the stage.

Piven and Cloward's claims about the contemporary situation face roughly the same set of empirical problems. Again, to show that the pool of nonvoters is distorting current American politics, one would have to show that they are substantially different from voters, and that the differences between nonvoters and voters would, if expressed at the polls, have a serious impact on election outcomes.

By and large, the evidence that Piven and Cloward bring forward does not suggest serious differences in the political attitudes of voters and nonvoters, and some of it even suggests remarkable similarities (the weight, I might add, of the scholarly evidence on this question). And nowhere do they carry through their assessment to an empirical evaluation of the impact of nonvoters' participation on election outcomes, should they decide to vote. Piven and Cloward state that nonvoters are different from voters, especially in terms of demographics, and leave the argument at that.

But demographic differences are really not the issue. After all, virtually no one claims that there are *no* differences between voters and nonvoters, and pretty much everyone acknowledges that there are at least some differences between them, especially demographic. The question is instead *how* different are nonvoters, and would this difference change outcomes?

Cost and Benefits

What, then, are the facts? One need not share Piven and Cloward's viewpoint to believe 82 million American nonvoters constitute a problem. It is still worthwhile to try to understand why, in general, Americans don't vote and why, in particular, Americans have voted even less in the recent past (a ten-point drop between 1960 and 1980). In its broadest outlines, the answer to the first question is simple. By and large, the costs of voting are higher in the United States than in other industrialized democracies, while the perceived benefits are lower. This reflects our *individual* system of voting responsibility. In our system the individual must surmount certain bureaucratic obstacles in order to vote. He must make sense out of a relatively narrow range of political alternatives, within which his viewpoint may not be represented. And the individual must, by and large, mobilize himself to go down to the polls and cast a ballot. In short the burden of voting falls on each voter's shoulders.

In contrast, other industrialized democracies typically have a *collective* system of voting responsibility where the state and political parties share the burden of getting voters to the polls. Most other democracies have state-initiated voter registration, for example, where the state assumes the responsibility for registering its citizens. In addition the political parties in these other democracies play a stronger role in making elections meaningful to voters and in mobilizing voters to cast their ballots.

The benefits of voting—thought of in the sense of expressing one's informed viewpoint and feeling commitment toward party or cause—tend to be lower. (Most voting theorists see these as the key benefits of voting since the probability that a lone vote will actually affect an election outcome is so minuscule.) Because of this relatively unfavorable relationship between benefits and costs, Americans tend to vote at a lower rate than their counterparts in other industrialized democracies. Quite simply, for many Americans voting just doesn't seem worth the bother. Whatever one thinks of such an attitude toward a civic responsibility, it hardly makes nonvoting an indicator of suppressed radicalism or of any political viewpoint.

The Ups and Downs of Nonvoting

This is the basic story behind chronically low voter turnout in the United States. Why, then, did turnout go down ten points in the recent past—that is, what further weakened our already weak system of voter participation? To understand this, it is necessary to understand that, by some very important criteria, turnout should actually have gone *up* in this period.

Registration requirements became somewhat looser between 1960 and 1980, and levels of educational attainment—the single strongest promoter of voter participation—increased sharply. Real income went up, and there was an upgrading of the occupation structure in the direction of white-collar work. As I show in *Why Americans Don't Vote* (coincidentally, my book has the same title as Piven and Cloward's book), this socioeconomic upgrading should have increased voter participation substantially, all other things being equal.[3] But all other things were not equal.

Another series of demographic changes depressed turnout levels. These changes, the product of the rise of the Baby Boom generation and of a society in economic and cultural flux, produced an electorate that was less rooted in the social fabric. Voters were younger, more likely to be single, and more likely to have moved recently. As shown in table 1, these

changes pushed turnout downward in a way that roughly counterbalanced the upward push on turnout from socioeconomic upgrading.

Table 1
FACTORS EXPLAINING TURNOUT DECLINE BETWEEN 1960 AND 1980

	% of predicted decline
Socioeconomic (SES) Characteristics	
Education	−50.3%
Occupation, Income	−15.4
Total[1]	−65.7
Non-SES Demographic Characteristics	
Age	26.2
Marital status	17.8
Residential mobility	13.0
Race, Region, Sex	5.5
Total	62.5
Sociopolitical Characteristics	
Partisanship	18.2
Campaign newspaper reading	41.1
Political efficacy	43.9
Total	103.2
Total Drop in Probit Model[2]	100.0

[1]SES = socioeconomic status
[2]The Probit model is a statistical model used to predict the probability of occurrence of a given event, like voting.

Note: The percentage point decline in turnout predicted by the Probit model was 7.0. The percentage point decline in turnout reported in the Michigan American National Elections Study was 8.0. The percentage of turnout differential explained by the model was 87.5.

The other changes that depressed turnout levels concerned feelings about the political system. Given the weak American party system, such feelings probably play a particularly important role in making elections meaningful. Americans became less partisan, had less faith in their ability to influence the government (less "political efficacy"), and paid less attention to political campaigns. As shown in table 1, this disconnection from the political system substantially accounts for the rest of the drop in turnout.

This hardly suggests a romantic story of radical nonvoters searching for alternatives; it is instead a pedestrian tale of generalized withdrawal from the political world. It seems more reasonable to assume that most nonvoters lack a basic interest in politics than that they understand the status quo and reject it.

Results from the 1984 election suggest that a basic lack of engagement with politics is still with us. In a situation where observers and statistical models (including my own) predicted a large turnout increase due to favorable social and demographic trends, only a tiny half-point increase occurred. It could be that Americans' disenchantment with politics is only getting deeper as time goes on.

The Changing American Nonvoter

The story told above helps explain why the profile of the American nonvoter has changed so much since 1960. At that time it was justifiable to think of the typical nonvoter as being on the lowest socioeconomic rung of society—a poor high school dropout, for example—and, therefore, among the most deprived members of the social structure. The changes described above in fact *decreased* the concentration of nonvoters in the lowest socioeconomic categories. Proportionally fewer people were in these categories—thus fewer nonvoters for socioeconomic reasons—and more people were moving into the nonvoting camp for non-socioeconomic reasons. These two trends added up to a substantial shift in the nonvoters' profile, as shown in table 2.

Table 2
PERCENTAGES OF VOTERS AND NONVOTERS IN SELECTED POPULATION CATEGORIES, 1960 AND 1980

	1960			1980		
	All	Voters	Non-voters	All	Voters	Non-voters
Education						
0-11 years	49%	42%	72%	26%	20%	39%
12	29	32	17	35	35	38
13-15	12	13	7	21	22	18
16 or more	10	12	4	18	23	6
Age						
18-24 years	3	2	7	15	10	25
25-28	9	7	13	10	9	15
29-32	9	8	12	9	9	9
33-36	10	11	7	9	9	9
37 or more	69	72	61	58	64	43
Marital Status						
Single	20	18	26	39	35	50
Married-SP[1]	82	80	75	61	65	50
Residential Mobility						
Moved within two years	25	23	37	33	26	50
Did not	75	78	63	67	74	50
Occupation						
Housewife	25	22	37	16	15	18
Blue collar[2]	28	28	30	24	20	32
White collar and other	47	50	33	60	65	50
Family Income						
Poor[3]	43	39	60	35	31	44
Nonpoor	57	61	40	65	69	56

[1]SP = spouse present
[2]Blue collar includes service workers
[3]Poor is defined as less than $5000 in 1960 dollars

In 1960, 72 percent of nonvoters had less than a high school education; by 1980 this figure had dropped to 39 percent. Similarly, in 1960, 60 percent of nonvoters were poor (less than $5,000 family income in 1960 dollars), whereas in 1980 only 44 percent were poor (using the same criterion). About 7 percent of nonvoters were under age twenty-five in 1960, while in 1980, 25 percent were under age twenty-five. Thirty-seven percent were mobile, and 26 percent were single in 1960; by 1980 each of these categories captured half of the nonvoting population.

Although in 1960 it might have been quite reasonable to describe the American nonvoter as a poor high school dropout, that definition was no longer so compelling by 1980. These days the pool of nonvoters is much more dispersed among socioeconomic and other categories, so that nonvoters can no longer be easily typecast as the most deprived or oppressed.

If Nonvoters Voted

These, then, are the American nonvoters, for better or worse. What if we could bring them, or a large proportion of them, to the polls? Would it make a difference? If so, how much?

The answer to the first question is, yes, it would make a difference. On this everyone agrees. This is because the nonvoting pool is demographically different from the rest of society (younger, less educated, poorer). And, since there are partisan differences among demographic groups (obviously, and most commonly, poorer individuals are more likely to be Democratic), there would be some differences if everyone voted.

These differences would, however, probably not be large. This is because (a) the nonvoting pool, while not a faithful representation of the entire population, is hardly a monolith of the disadvantaged; (b) partisan skews by demographic group, especially compared to other countries, are not overwhelming (skews in political attitudes even less so); and (c) partisan preference itself is a less and less reliable guide to how any individual votes in a given election. These mediating factors mean that massive increases in voting by nonvoters would not necessarily translate into much of an advantage for either party.

Political scientists Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone have shown that even the most liberal voter registration laws would produce about a 9-percentage-point increase in the voting rate but only a .3 percent increase for the Democrats.[4] This is based on partisanship, which is becoming a poorer and poorer guide to the actual vote. Some scholarly evidence, in fact, indicates that nonvoters are *less* likely to follow their partisan preference than those who do vote.[5]

In short nonvoters are different from voters, but not so different that their participation in an election is likely to change the outcome dramatically. This is why a poll of newly registered voters in 1984 by Peter Hart Research, Inc. showed a 61 percent majority for Reagan—roughly the same as the rest of the electorate. The average nonvoter is simply too much like the average voter for results to be much different.

This suggests that, from a partisan point of view, the question of mobilizing nonvoters is logically inseparable from the question of mobilizing voters. A party unable to sway the existing pool of voters with its message would be unlikely to change its fortunes by mobilizing more nonvoters to vote. Conversely, if a party is able to reach the current electorate with its message, it could expect an additional increment of support from newly mobilized nonvoters. Hopes of a quick fix from the nonvoting pool are misguided, and the basic problem of winning an election remains the familiar one of getting the American people to support one's policies.

Bringing the Nonvoter Back In

Clearly, then, the question of increasing voter participation is not fundamentally a partisan one. It is more about the overall political health of the society—the value we place on the concept and practice of a participatory society. The foundation of American democracy is that the millions of ordinary people should be the final arbiters of public policy. The larger the proportion of society that abdicates that right, the more freedom it gives for elites and organized interests to assert their priorities within the governmental process.

It also seems plausible that low participation and voter apathy may damage social cohesion in American life. The democratic political system is supposed to bind citizens, communities, and social groups together. Choosing not to participate in the common activity of governance weakens those ties. A more participatory society, by enhancing recognition of common interests, could increase its citizens' motivation to play productive roles in both their economic and social lives.

For these reasons, or simply because in a democratic society more participation seems intrinsically better than less, increased voter turnout can be viewed as desirable, independent of its partisan implications. Assuming that increased voter turnout is a social good, how could this goal be attained?

The basic answer is quite simple: decrease the costs and increase the benefits. The obvious thing to do would be to change the registration process so that it becomes substantially easier for citizens to vote. One way would be to make voting and registration a one-step process. This would probably increase turnout by at most the 9 percentage points estimated by Wolfinger and Rosenstone.

If the government were to take responsibility for registering voters—which effectively reduces registration costs to zero—increases as high as 14 percentage points may be possible.[6] Even an increase of this magnitude (putting us at 68 percent) would bring the United States up to the level of relatively low turnout democracies such as Canada and Japan, still far from the high levels of Austria and Sweden, where average turnout is about 90 percent.

How to increase the benefits of voting is a knottier problem. At root it is a question of how meaningful Americans find politics, which, in turn, depends on our party system, our method of party organization, and the ways that parties frame political issues. Without presuming to have a blueprint for all this, I would say that all of these things could be substantially improved without seriously damaging our basic institutions. It also seems safe to say that turnout will never get very high without such improvements since people need a positive motivation for going through the voting process. Registration reform alone cannot supply such a motivation.

Thus, serious increases in voter participation depend on modifications to the overall legal and political structure of our society, rather than on the actions of

(*Continued on page 59*)

How the Press Covered the Primaries

by S. Robert Lichter

Critics have been accusing the media of distorting the electoral process ever since television became a prominent political actor. The three most persistent complaints about TV news are: (1) Television provides saturation coverage of the horse race and ignores policy issues; (2) The networks favor liberals over conservatives, or Democrats over Republicans; (3) Television bestows precious momentum on some candidates and withholds it from others by its sometimes arbitrary coverage.

How do these charges stack up against the evidence this time around? To find out, we turned to the Center for Media and Public Affairs and its ongoing content analysis of TV news election coverage. We examined all 1,338 election stories on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening newscasts from February 1987 through the final primaries on June 7, 1988. On each charge there was some evidence to support the critics but not enough to clinch their case.

Making an Issue of Issues

There's no doubt that television loves the horse race and dislikes the issues. The medium thrives on excitement, conflict, and contests that are structured like sports events. All of these are built into elections but must sometimes be teased out of policy debates. Virtually every study of election coverage has noted (if not decried) the primacy of horse-race news, and ours is no exception. As table 1 shows, over 500 stories dealt with the horse race, two and one-half times the number that addressed policy issues. And that figure doesn't include over 300 discussions of campaign strategies and tactics, which also outdistanced the policy debate. Even when TV went looking for issues, it found more ephemeral campaign matters than enduring policy concerns—things such as disputes over the current behavior of candidates, like Hart's sexual escapades or Bush's impromptu debate with Dan Rather.

Table 1
TOP FIVE STORY TOPICS

	Stories
Horse race	537
Campaign issues	312
Strategy and tactics	280
Policy issues	215
Candidate politics	88

Source: Center for Media and Public Affairs, election news coverage, February 1987 - June 7, 1988.

Yet all the attention to the horse race and the daily campaign agenda failed to drive issue coverage off the airwaves. The issue coverage may look thin by comparison to the contest coverage, but 215 stories can take in quite a lot. Table 2 lists the top ten policy issues in order of the number of stories in which each was mentioned. Some of these were only passing mentions, but others involved extensive discussions. (The latter was required for an issue to be considered a story topic.)

Table 2
TOP TEN ISSUES

	Stories
Iran-Contra	114
Taxes	97
Unemployment	85
Economy	83
Central America	78
Trade	73
Drugs	68
Education	58
Civil rights	57
Budget deficit	55

The Iran-Contra affair was brought up in over 100 election stories, reflecting questions over Bush's role. Then came the "big four" economic issues of 1988—taxes, trade, unemployment, and the state of the economy—along with Central American policy. Close on their heels came issues that emerged after the campaign was in full swing (like the drug problem) and others that simmered slightly more slowly throughout (like the budget deficit).

Each of the top ten issues came up in over fifty

stories, and a total of twenty-five issues in at least twenty stories. That total doesn't include discussions of these issues aired outside the context of election coverage. The moral is that when you run well over 1,000 stories that take up over thirty-five hours of airtime, you can cover the horse race *and* the issues, at least all the issues the candidates want to talk about.

That raises a rarely noted problem with criticism of runaway horse-race news. Pundits and political scientists may be the only ones who complain about the lack of issue coverage. The candidates complain instead that the media don't carry their "message," a message usually calculated to fuzz over distinctions on policy issues and to avoid alienating potential supporters. Nor is it clear that average viewers usually thirst for more thorough and detailed debates on the INF treaty or the Middle East peace process. If they did, MacNeil and Lehrer would pass Rather, Brokaw, and Jennings in the Nielsen ratings.

The deeper problem with complaints about horse-race coverage is that the critics are asking the media to do just what they criticize it for doing otherwise—to shape the campaign agenda by forcing the candidates to march to the media's tune. The media don't discuss policy issues in greater depth at least partly because the candidates don't, and the candidates don't because it's frequently counterproductive. It just didn't pay for Walter Mondale to be so forthright about raising taxes, and Dick Gephardt discovered this year how quickly his trade proposals became a lightning rod for criticism. Policy debates can even backfire on journalists, as Dan Rather learned when he tried to force a reluctant George Bush to discuss Iran-Contra policy.

Horse-race news predominates because it flows

Heeeeeere's Politics

by Daniel Amundson and S. Robert Lichter

How the candidates must envy Johnny Carson. They have to plan hard and pay dearly for almost every minute of TV time, while Carson is guaranteed princely sums and vast audiences and five hours of network air every week. What he says about the candidates probably gets more attention than what they say about themselves.

We examined Carson's and David Letterman's monologues for political humor from January 1 through June 7. Carson was far more political than Letterman. Almost every new episode of "The Tonight Show" included jokes about at least one candidate, while only a handful of "Late Night" episodes poked fun at any of them.

Most of the late-night political jokes steered clear of pure politics: instead, the candidates' verbal gaffes, their offbeat proposals, and their character flaws were big favorites. Pat Robertson was the only contender to be skewered for his policy suggestions; Richard Gephardt alone faced a chorus of personal appearance jokes. While Gary Hart continued to star as the campaign Lothario, George Bush was tweaked for his lack of passion.

Republican contenders were most often the butt of these jokes, outdistancing Democrats by a two-to-one margin. The punch line lineup for the GOP: George Bush had thirty-two aimed at him, Bob Dole eighteen, and Pat Robertson seventeen. Pete du Pont, Al Haig, and Jack Kemp received less attention than Ed McMahon's Publisher's Clearinghouse Sweepstakes. In the early weeks of 1988, Bush edged out Bob Dole as the comedy front-runner and held onto that lead throughout the campaign.

Poor George Bush endured a veritable comedic vivisection: the late-night hosts carved up his record, his campaign tactics, and his manhood. The wimp image offered the richest vein. "[Bush] graduated from the Andy Rooney Columbia School of Whining," Carson explained in January. And following the Bush-Rather confrontation, Carson described the vice-president's new assertiveness: "George Bush went on 'Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood' to kick some butt." The next day, "George Bush has been trying to act tough, trying to lose the wimp image, especially with the press. Last night he pistol-whipped Diane Sawyer and said [Carson adopts a Bogart drawl], 'I never met a dame who didn't respond to a slap in the puss with a .44'." In mid-May Carson quipped, "The last time George Bush gave a speech someone came up and drew a chalk outline around his body."

Carson also lampooned Bush for his efforts to be "just folks." After the Republican debate in Iowa, Carson suggested, "I think George Bush went too far when he stuffed straw in his overalls and started to sing, 'If I only had a brain.'" As Bush moved south, Carson followed. "Down south he went into a truck stop wearing a pair of overalls, but he had a little alligator sewn over the pocket."

Carson, who's still getting mileage from Jim and Tammy jokes, has poked fun at Pat Robertson's prospects from the beginning. He suggested that Robertson had "called Oral Roberts to see if he could raise his campaign from the dead."

Robertson also became a target for some of Carson's rare issue-oriented material. On Robertson's support of gun ownership, for example: "Pat Robertson suggested that the hunters of this nation, armed with rifles, might defend democracy. Now I don't know about you, but I'm not so sure I want the country defended by a guy named Bubba with a shotgun and a six-pack of Bud Light." Carson also doubted Robertson's claim to know where the hostages are in the Middle East: "If Robertson knew where the hostages were in Lebanon, how come

from news values. It concerns what just happened and what's about to happen. That's also why campaign issues outstrip policy issues. The candidates' daily behavior on the campaign trail is less predictable, hence more potentially newsworthy than their stump speeches. In sum the critics don't want to let journalists be journalists. But do they really want journalists to be more like political scientists?

Television's Tilt

The scholars may grumble about horse-race coverage, but it's partisan bias that brings cries of outrage from the politicians and their supporters. Conservatives have been the quickest to cry foul, and they got some support from a controversial study by Edith Efron claiming network bias against Richard Nixon in 1972. They also drew sustenance from the 1980 Rothman-Lichter survey of media elites, which found that four out of five major media journalists vote for the Democratic presidential candidate. That same year, however, a study directed by Michael Robinson failed to add fuel to conservative complaints. It found that liberal favorite Ted Kennedy had more negative print and broadcast coverage than Jimmy Carter in the primaries, and Carter got worse press than Ronald Reagan in the general election. But Robinson's study of the 1984 election found dramatic differences in the networks' treatment of the two tickets. While Mondale and Ferraro each received slightly more positive than negative spin, Reagan's spin index was ten to one negative, and Bush had the dubious distinction of getting *only* negative spin. And in a study of the 1984 primaries, Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston found that Jesse Jack-

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he didn't know where Swaggart was on Saturday night?"

On the Democratic side Gary Hart attracted fifteen Carson jokes, followed by Dick Gephardt with nine and Bruce Babbitt with five. Paul Simon, Jesse Jackson, and Michael Dukakis each figured in only three jokes, and Al Gore trailed with just one. These lower numbers for the Democrats reflect the writers' strike that put "The Tonight Show" on reruns during the peak of Democratic campaigning in the Midwest and New York. It certainly doesn't mean they were any less laughable than the Republicans.

Jokes about Gary Hart may go on forever. In early January, Carson observed, "Gary Hart made a stunning statement today. He said if he was elected he would not be the first adulterer in the White House, but he would be the best." During the Iowa contest Carson suggested that the new Hart campaign slogan should be, "Let's go somewhere that's a little quieter." Carson even managed to joke about Hart's affairs while discussing the Robertson campaign, "Pat Robertson had a concept to increase the birthrate in the U.S. He will offer a $500 incentive for people to conceive —the first volunteer was Gary Hart." Even the normally apolitical David Letterman joked about Hart's affairs. On the day of Reagan's annual physical, Letterman remarked, "Reagan says he has the body of a twenty-year-old—which if I remember correctly is very much like the Gary Hart campaign slogan."

Hart's campaign prospects were also Carson fodder: two weeks before Iowa, Johnny joked, "Gary is hanging in there. He has a new proposal for a halfway house for girls who won't go all the way." In the same vein, Letterman cracked, "Experts tell us that the Hart campaign has had to operate on a shoestring. They're staying in inexpensive motels, they're eating at inexpensive restaurants, and Gary himself has pretty much limited his activities to phone sex."

Richard Gephardt attracted almost as much attention for the way he looks, especially the mysterious appearance of his eyebrows prior to the Iowa caucuses. Carson noted, "I'm not sure if I want a president who has to draw in his face."

While jokes about most candidates exploited some flaw for comic relief, it was the utter hopelessness of the Babbitt campaign that provoked laughs. Almost all of the Babbitt jokes were delivered in postmortems the day he left the race. For instance, "Bruce Babbitt called it quits today—right now he's meeting with his transition team to help him ease from obscurity to oblivion." Once Babbitt had lined up behind Dukakis, Carson joked, "Babbitt lending support to Dukakis is like Sandy Duncan lending her bra to Oprah Winfrey."

Carson's monologues also treated the campaign itself as a running joke. He repeatedly ridiculed the choice of candidates, the length of the campaign, and the large number of debates: "If you have thirteen chairs in your home, they'll have a debate there. By the fifteenth debate they'll be running out of issues and will be yelling 'Tastes great—Less filling.'"

Letterman also made light of the election process in "Bob Rooney's Top 10 Election Tips": "(10) Practice voting by switching the light on and off; (9) Always find out how the candidate feels about Sunday beer sales; (8) If you repeat the name Dukakis 100 times out loud, it begins to sound real funny; (7) We want a president who will stand up to Iran or Iraq or whoever has the bearded guy; (6) Close the curtain in the voting booth and shout 'Hey, who used all the hot water?'; (5) Voting is important. . .but who'd blame you if you stayed home to watch 'Hardbodies' on cable again; (4) If a station preempts wrestling for primary coverage, call and complain; (3) Introduce yourself in bars as Al Gore; who'd know? (2) President Stallone: It won't happen unless we make it happen; (1) Remember, your vote counts as much as people who know who the candidates are."

We would add an eleventh tip to Letterman's list: Don't take these jokes too lightly. Bush campaign chairman Lee Atwater pays close attention to the Carson monologues as a barometer of how the candidates play in the "real" America beyond the beltway. In an election year, political humor is no laughing matter.


I GOTTA GO WITH THIS LUNDEEN FELLA, PERVIS.... HIS TV SPOTS HAVE SLICKER PRODUCTION VALUE AND HAVE POSITIONED THE CANDIDATE WELL WITH A MEDIA BUY THAT TARGETS AN UPSCALE MARKET, VOTE-WISE.
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MAYFIELD Chicago Tribune
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son received the most positive wire service coverage among the Democratic contenders.

With this mixed bag of findings as prelude, we examined the good and bad press meted out to the various candidates for 1988. Specifically, we coded every assessment of each candidate as either positive, negative, mixed, or neutral. We included only judgments about whether a candidate would make a good president, not whether he is likely to become president.

By this definition good press was CBS's Bruce Morton's closer on Jesse Jackson campaigning in Illinois: "He's neon and fireworks. All the rest this week have been pastel." Bad press was political analyst Kevin Phillips calling George Bush "an overstuffed resumé" on NBC. Even after excluding mixed and neutral statements, we coded 1,823 clearly positive or negative statements on the fourteen announced candidates—1,062 for the Democrats and 761 for the Republicans. The results are of more than academic interest.

This has been a banner year for charges of media bias. Columnist Mark Shields accused journalists of "pervasive intellectual elitism" for rejecting Gephardt's trade proposals. Pat Robertson was moved to "thank the Lord" that "most Christians read neither the *New York Times* nor the *Washington Post*." Columnist Dorothy Gilliam traced some of Jackson's bad press to "the veiled demons of racism and white supremacy." And Bob Dole complained that Republicans were subjected to a "double standard" of negative coverage by journalists who "see the world through liberal-colored glasses."

How do the claims of bias stack up against a systematic content analysis? Table 3 shows the percentage of good press received by each candidate, and the average score for candidates from each party. The left-hand column includes assessments from all sources who appear or are quoted on the air, the best overall portrait of how each candidate was treated. The right-hand column considers only nonaligned sources like reporters, election analysts, and voters. It excludes the candidates, their families, and their campaign staffs. This is often done in academic studies to highlight the sources that reflect the greatest journalistic discretion and carry the most influence on public opinion.

Among Democrats Jesse Jackson stands out for favorable press—he received the most positive cover-

Table 3
GOOD PRESS

	All sources		Nonpartisan sources	
Jackson	74%	(250)*	75%	(167)*
Dukakis	55	(249)	58	(107)
Gephardt	48	(164)	63	(54)
Gore	54	(56)	45	(22)
Simon	53	(57)	75	(12)
Babbitt	89	(37)	86	(21)
Biden	54	(61)	39	(28)
Hart	38	(188)	21	(121)
All Democrats	57	(1062)	56	(532)
Bush	50	(379)	49	(127)
Dole	64	(181)	65	(59)
Robertson	49	(122)	37	(46)
Kemp	58	(50)	64	(22)
Haig	67	(15)	50	(6)
DuPont	50	(14)	17	(6)
All Republicans	54	(761)	49	(266)

Note: * = Number of clearly positive or negative evaluations of candidates' desirability.

age of any major candidate from both partisan and nonpartisan sources. Apart from the early days when Bruce Babbitt was the media favorite, Jackson headed the field during every phase of the campaign. Michael Dukakis's coverage hovered near the average for all candidates. Dukakis, Gephardt, Gore, and Simon all received nearly equal amounts of good and bad press. Gephardt was the only one to fall below the 50 percent mark, but that reflects attacks from other candidates, as his 63 percent positive rating from nonpartisans attests. Hart's dismal rating didn't improve after he reentered the race in January.

Among Republicans Dole easily outdistanced both Bush and Robertson. Bush's ratings were mainly negative throughout the campaign, except for a brief spurt to 65 percent positive during the New Hampshire primary run, the only time that he was not the front-runner. Robertson, in contrast, received favorable early press—about two to one positive through New Hampshire. After that he was done in by controversies over his "funny facts" and received the worst press of any candidate still in the running—over two to one negative.

Was there a partisan bias? When we compared the two parties' overall good press/bad press ratios, the result was a slight edge for the Democrats—56 percent good press versus 53 percent for the Republicans. After extensive coverage of fourteen candidates over more than a year of campaigning, a partisan difference of only 3 percent looks more like balance than bias.

That impression is reinforced by focusing on the category that might be expected to produce the most partisan tilt—assessments of the candidates' issue positions. On the issue of "the issues," the level of good press dropped substantially for both parties. But the Democrats retained their 3-percent margin, by 40 to 37 percent positive evaluations.

When the comparisons focused on nonpartisan sources, however, the gap between the parties widened somewhat. The Democrats held steady at a 55 percent positive rating, while the Republicans dropped to 48 percent. And when we narrowed the focus to comments by journalists themselves, the gap widened further. The Democrats received 65 percent good press from journalists' on-air evaluations, compared to 51 percent for Republicans. So reporters and anchors spoke favorably of the Democrats nearly two-thirds of the time that they ventured assessments, while they found favor with Republicans only half the time.

Journalists, themselves, however, accounted for only about one in seven assessments that were broadcast. Most of their comments were directed toward the candidates' performances as campaigners rather than their professional qualifications, personal qualities, or issue stands. This was in keeping with a general tendency by journalists to direct their on-air opinions toward the horse race rather than the candidates' desirability.

All in all the evidence for Senator Dole's charge of bias is less than compelling. Democrats were favored over Republicans, but by margins that ranged from trivial to modest.

Media Momentum

Finally, what about the media's vaunted role in bestowing precious momentum on winners or "hot" contenders in the early primaries? Iowa winners Dole and Gephardt have been asking the same question. It's not that TV news abandoned its tradition of frontloading. More stories were broadcast about Iowa and New Hampshire this year than all the other primaries put together, although those two states selected only 2 percent of the parties' convention delegates. Moreover, frontloading did have a measurable impact. Both Dole and Gephardt jumped 12 percentage points in the New Hampshire tracking polls the day after the Iowa vote. Similarly, Jesse Jackson climbed ten points in the polls during the month after New Hampshire, during which he received extremely favorable coverage. It's just that these modest gains pale before the 31-percentage-point gain by Gary Hart in ten days after his better-than-expected 1984 Iowa finish.

What caused big mo' to downshift into this year's little mo'? Two explanations stand out. First, nonmedia factors placed a cap on the benefits available to the would-be media candidates. Dole and Gephardt both had to battle opponents who had advantages in New Hampshire. Bush's tie to Reagan became a plus there, and Dukakis already had a positive image among his home state's next-door neighbors. As for Jackson, analysts and partisans have heatedly debated whether his appeal is limited by his race or his ideology. That such limits exist is not debated.

Second, what television gave with one hand, it took back with the other. Gephardt received the most negative coverage of the major Democratic contenders after Iowa. Dole's ill-chosen remarks the night of the New Hampshire vote became a major "mediality" (an event whose impact is vastly inflated by media attention) by resurrecting the "mean Bob Dole" story. By avoiding such blunders, Jackson gained the same lasting benefit that Hart did in 1984—a new prominence whose payoff may come in future elections. One of momentum's benefits is deferred compensation.

As in earlier elections, the media were dealing the cards in 1988. But it's not just the hand you're dealt, it's how you play it that counts in politics. Whatever else has changed in the age of mediated elections, you've still got to know when to hold 'em and know when to fold 'em. ☑

I would like to thank Dan Amundson and Richard Noyes for their help in conducting the content analysis of 1988 TV news election coverage.

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THE CHANGING JACKSON VOTER

by Martin Plissner and Warren Mitofsky

No presidential candidacy has ever drawn as much attention to exit polls as the Reverend Jesse Jackson. When it turned out this March that no one had done an exit poll in Michigan, where Jackson won his most striking victory, the *New York Times* solemnly assessed the causes of this irrevocable loss to human knowledge The Jackson candidacy, in both 1984 and 1988, has invited just the kind of demographic analysis at which exit polls excel.

For all Jackson's aspiration to a "rainbow coalition" in 1984, 80 percent of his voters were black. In the Democratic primaries, he won only 5 percent of whites. Among white voters in the 1984 Democratic primaries, liberals were about three times as likely to vote for him as any other whites, whites under forty-five were twice as likely to vote for him as those who were older, and college graduates were four times as likely to vote for Jackson as those who hadn't been to college. But mostly, and by huge margins, however you looked at them, whites in 1984 did not vote for Jackson.

Jackson had entered that race with little support from the country's leading black politicians, many of whom then had greater stature among blacks than he. Walter Mondale, the national front-runner, was widely known to blacks and had a genuine following among them. Mondale, moreover, had a great deal of support from the same black political establishment that was cool to Jackson.

In the early southern primaries of 1984—Jackson's first encounters with major black electorates—he won barely a majority of the black vote. His percentages among black voters increased sharply once the field dwindled to three candidates. In most of the later primaries, from New York on, Jackson scored 80 percent or more among blacks. He tried to win support from other minority groups, especially Hispanics, who generally went for Walter Mondale or even Gary Hart instead.

Having secured his black base in 1984, Jackson set out in 1988 to win a larger share of the party's white vote. A relatively modest increase in that vote, combined with a virtually solid black vote, would get him a far larger share of delegates than he had won in 1984. That in turn would make him a major force at the convention and, under the right circumstances, he insisted, a potential nominee.

A CBS News/*New York Times* national poll last November showed a significantly enhanced white vote for Jackson to be a real possibility. Thirteen percent of white likely primary voters said then that Jackson was their first choice. This placed him on a par with the leading white candidates at that time, Michael Dukakis and Paul Simon. In overall support, including blacks, Jackson at that point was a clear front-runner.

Jackson's acknowledged support among blacks last fall was only 62 percent, but black support for any other candidate was negligible. Those who predicted then that Jackson's black support would top 90 percent were proved right. Overall, 92 percent of all blacks picked Jackson in twenty-four CBS News and *New York Times* exit polls. Blacks who called themselves conser-

vatives (18 percent) voted for him to about the same degree as those who said they were liberals (30 percent). There was no age gap among blacks—Jackson support from all cohorts was over 90 percent. Nor was there any difference in Jackson's black support at different educational levels.

It was the white Jackson voters, however, who made the biggest difference between 1984 and 1988. They vastly enhanced his overall stature and made him one of the two contestants left standing when the primary season closed. Jackson got 13 percent of the white Democratic primary vote, the same percentage as in the fall CBS News/*New York Times* poll. Combined with nearly unanimous black support, it enabled Jackson to win almost 30 percent of the total primary and caucus vote and nearly 30 percent of the convention delegates based on primaries and caucuses (27 percent if you include the unelected superdelegates). These are remarkable achievements.

Yuppies for Jackson

Neither the black nor the white Jackson voter represented an underclass. Roughly half the black Jackson voters attended college. Nearly half his black voters had family incomes of $25,000 or more per year.

Table 1

PRIMARY VOTE FOR JACKSON

		White		Black	
		1984	1988	1984	1988
All States	(13)	5%	13%	77%	92%
Region					
Northeast	(5)	4	13	82	93
Midwest	(3)	4	11	79	90
South	(4)	2	6	68	94
West	(1)	9	25	78	93
Sex					
Men	(47%)	5	14	76	90
Women	(53%)	4	14	78	94
Ideology					
Liberal	(28%)	9	26	82	93
Moderate	(49%)	3	10	76	92
Conservative	(23%)	3	8	75	93
Religion					
Catholic	(25%)	3	11	72	83
Protestant	(36%)	NA	13	NA	93
Jewish	(6%)	4	8	NA	NA
Age					
18-29	(15%)	6	18	83	93
30-44	(31%)	7	21	83	93
45-59	(24%)	4	13	74	93
60+	(30%)	2	6	66	92
Education					
Less than HS	(11%)	1	10	67	95
High school	(31%)	2	8	77	93
Some college	(26%)	5	14	82	93
College grad	(32%)	9	21	80	91

Note: Table based on thirteen states holding presidential primaries where CBS News and the *New York Times* conducted exit polls in both 1984 and 1988. A comparison of the 1988 Jackson vote within any category in the thirteen states presented in this table and all twenty-four states where exit polls were conducted shows a difference of no more than two percentage points. The thirteen states are: Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee. In 1984, 17% of Hispanics voted for Jackson; in 1988, 33% did.

The true elite this Democratic primary season, however, were the white Jackson voters. Seventy percent had attended college, and one in four had been to graduate school. Looked at another way, 23 percent of whites who had been to graduate school voted for Jackson, the highest for any educational cohort. The higher a white voter's income, the more likely he or she was to vote for Jackson.

Most white Jackson primary voters were on the sunny side of forty-five: 20 percent of that age group voted for Jackson. He did only half as well among voters over forty-five. One in four white liberals voted for Jackson, but he drew fewer than one in ten among moderates and conservatives.

One traditional component of most left-of-center Democratic coalitions continued to elude Jackson. His 4 percent of the Jewish primary vote in 1984 grew to merely 8 percent this year, well behind his support from other white voters. In New York, where a large portion of the national Jewish electorate votes and where Jackson's relations with Jews dominated the primary campaign, only 7 percent of Jewish voters picked him. Jackson did twice as well in New York among white Catholics and nearly four times as well among white Protestants.

Jackson fared the worst by far among white voters in the South, the region whose black voters gave him his only state primary victories and the largest portion of his national vote. Only 6 percent of the white vote in Super Tuesday's southern Democratic primaries went to Jackson. That was triple his 1984 showing for the region but barely half this year's national average, well behind the 11 to 13 percent registered in the Midwest and Northeast and far behind the 25 percent in California where most of the West's presidential primary vote was cast.

Jackson's lowest level of white support came in two states, Mississippi and Louisiana, where he won the primaries on the strength of the black vote. His four strongest showings among white voters, exceeding 17 percent, came from states most of which had relatively few black voters: Oregon, California, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts. All have exceptionally liberal Democratic primary electorates. All were won in 1984 by Gary Hart and in 1972 by George McGovern.

For Jackson, who is forty-seven, there are apt to be more opportunities down the road to expand the political base that his two campaigns for president have brought him thus far among Democratic primary voters. His ability to build upon that base in the years to come can be greatly influenced by the manner in which he closes out the current campaign during the coming days in Atlanta. ☑

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Teixeira

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one or the other political parties. Political parties may, however, be interested to note one possible outcome of increased participation. Under certain circumstances, such as the rise of the New Deal coalition in the 1930s, nonvoters do tend to stick with the party that brought them into the voting pool.[7] If recruited in large enough numbers and treated correctly by the successful party, nonvoters may provide important political support for years to come. This suggests that nonvoters, while not the quick fix envisioned by Piven and Cloward, may still play a key role in the political future. ☑

[1] Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Why Americans Don't Vote* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).
[2] Ruy A. Teixeira, *From the Politics of Class to Working Class Progressivism: The Story of Milwaukee's Social Democrats, 1897-1916*. Unpublished Masters thesis (University of Wisconsin, Madison: 1981).
[3] Ruy A. Teixeira, *Why Americans Don't Vote: Turnout Decline in the United States, 1960-1984* (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn.: 1987).
[4] Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.: 1980).
[5] John R. Petrocik, "Voter Turnout and Electoral Oscillation." *American Politics Quarterly* 9, 1981: pp. 161-80.
[6] G. Bingham Powell, "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." A.P.S. Rev. 80, 1986: pp. 17-43.
[7] Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority* (University of Chicago Press: 1979).

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Robinson

(*Continued from page 13*)

distribution is sharply skewed on this value in favor of the Democrats.

Most Americans argue that the federal government should do more to help needy people, even if it means going deeper into debt (52 percent agree, 40 percent disagree). But again the distribution of opinion on this dimension is skewed in favor of the Democrats, with the Median American somewhat more likely to agree (56 percent versus 33 percent).

If the Democrats could figure out a way to define this campaign in a one-dimensional space—with Economic Justice serving as that dimension—Michael Dukakis would surely win everywhere.

Dukakis would also win if the election were decided on the second most powerful value—Orientations toward Big Business and Corporate Power. On the item that loads most heavily on this factor, 78 percent of the public feel that too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few big companies. Americans are skeptical of bigness and great wealth, and they particularly don't like the two in combination.

But the Median American—reflecting the Democratic skew of the distribution on this central value—is dramatically more likely to see big companies as too powerful: 92 percent of Median Americans believe that.

The Real-World Variable

A final variable is reality, or real-world events. Traditionally, pundits have used peace and prosperity as the two most weighty political predictors. The assumption is that if the in-party seeks reelection when peace and prosperity exist, then the in-party wins. Obviously, we have peace. And objectively we have prosperity. What's more, the Median American senses the prosperity. Among the nearly 600 respondents who land at the median on this factor—labeled by Gallup the Financial Pressure factor—the overwhelming feeling is that things are going well financially for them. While 43 percent of the national sample say that they often don't have enough money to make ends meet, none of the Median Americans say that! So, all the people in the middle in this critical dimension of perceived financial pressure believe that they're doing OK.

Financial circumstances, then, should be a big plus for Bush and the Republicans. But what's really astounding is that this hasn't yet benefited the GOP. Even among these Median Americans who so fervently sense their own economic well-being, the Democrats hold a slight lead. It seems almost inconceivable at this point that voters who are so satisfied with their own economic condition would be willing to throw the "ins" out. But unless Bush can make Median Americans feel better about the *nation's* economy, or persuade them he's played a role in their personal prosperity, he stands to lose even this group of voters.

Bad News for Bush, Good News for Us

For almost all of the last thirty-five years the Republicans have held control over the elective presidency. They've done it by winning on two of the big three—on candidates and on issues—while losing on party identification.

Two out of three ain't bad. But right now, the Republicans have lost their most important historic advantage: Candidate Appeal, the advantage that has helped sustain them from Eisenhower through Reagan.

Republicans have to hope that the most unpredictable political variable of all—the campaign variable—will break their way before November. Otherwise, come January we'll almost certainly have our first-ever president named Michael. And we'll continue our string of thirty-nine consecutive presidents not named George.

The one surprising Republican plus, values, should give Bush some ideas his party can use. Unfortunately for the GOP, George Bush has managed to avoid not just values thus far, but issues, too. To win, Bush must start talking about issues and about values like traditionalism, God, strength, and American exceptionalism.

As for the Democrats, their strategy should be easy. The Democrats ought to make an issue of cowboy capitalism—unfettered, irresponsible corporate power and wealth. Above all, Democrats ought to raise those

issues of economic justice that they've spoken about since at least the 1920s.

Et Nous

So things look bright for Dukakis and his Democrats; pretty bleak for Bush and the GOP. But what about the rest of us, and the political system at large?

These data suggest a fairly healthy prognosis for the two-party system in America, if by healthy we mean two parties that hold practical and ideological advantages over each other. And that's just what's going on here—different kinds and shapes of advantages for both parties.

The Democrats remain the party of membership but the Republicans are the party of values. That's a pluralist standoff.

Even within the values arena, both parties do well. The Republicans win a majority of values; the Democrats win the two that have typically counted the most. Pluralist standoff again.

A long time ago, in the late nineteenth century, things weren't so pluralistic. By the 1890s the Republicans were the party of values and of membership. At a later point the Democrats would become the party of both, back in the salad days of FDR. But since the sixties, and certainly in the eighties, the Democrats and the Republicans have divided the advantages and disadvantages of politics quite nicely, thank you. With both parties facing the electorate with fundamental strengths and weaknesses, the winner will be, once again, American pluralism. ☑

[1] The Times Mirror/Gallup survey in late May interviewed in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia. Bush leads in only sixteen—New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Kansas, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Texas, Montana, Arizona, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada. These states represent 114 electoral votes.

[2] Herbert Asher, *Presidential Elections and American Politics* (Dorsey), 1988 edition, page 125.

[3] Norman Ornstein, Lawrence McCarthy, Andrew Kohut, *The People, Press and Politics* (Addison Wesley, 1988). The groups identified in that research are: Enterprisers, Moralists, Upbeats, Disaffecteds, Seculars, Sixties Democrats, New Dealers, God-and-Country Democrats, Followers, Partisan Poor, and Bystanders.

[4] Factor analysis is a statistical technique that allows a researcher to extract from large amounts of information (data) the most important patterns in that information.

[5] I have set aside one dimension—attitudes toward personal financial circumstances—and consider it below as a "condition," not as a "value," the label that Gallup has assigned to these several dimensions.

[6] One could use the Mean American, too, or look at the entire distribution on each dimension. I've chosen the Median American. To talk of the entire distribution on each dimension is very cumbersome, and to talk of a Mean American is to give too much weight to the extreme cases on the dimension.

[7] Political alienation provides a clear direction of skew and the direction is toward alienation. But I consider neither party to be the party of alienation, so it is not part of this analysis.

Michael J. Robinson is associate professor of government at Georgetown University and academic adviser to the Times Mirror/Gallup surveys.

Schambra

(*Continued from page 19*)

metaphors—with stirring appeals to national oneness and self-sacrifice, urging citizens to put the selfishness and rapacity of the Reagan years behind them in order to serve the higher national purpose. Indeed, they may well go so far as to embrace a national service corps—floated in the primaries by Biden and others—whose explicit purpose would be to rekindle the national idealism once sparked by the Peace Corps.

Republicans could insist that, if we are in fact entering a "we decade," then it is important to do things right this time. When calls for commitment, civic virtue, and public-spiritedness lead simply to expanded federal programs—as they have so often in the past—then the essence of those virtues is altogether lost, they might suggest. Commitment and self-sacrifice truly mean something only when experienced concretely, by each citizen, within the immediate sphere of neighborhood, church, and local community. Only this sort of tangible participation and sacrifice produces good citizens—not writing larger checks to the IRS, the Republicans could insist.

One final way to contrast these visions, perhaps, is to suggest that the Democrats offer a "soft" community, while Republican community tends to be "hard." According to the national community idea, mitigated as it is by civil libertarianism, all groups and individuals, no matter how marginal, are included in the great family. All must share and share alike. The only people excluded are foreign nations. (It helps sometimes to be a bit belligerent toward such outsiders, to remind those "inside" of their oneness—hence the Japan-bashing and "we're all in this together" competitiveness rhetoric of the Democratic primaries.)

The Republican doctrine of community, by contrast, can have a hard edge. Strong neighborhoods, for instance, may require fairly harsh social sanctions and law enforcement measures against drug users, pornographers, criminals, and other marginal elements. Such things, of course, make civil libertarians and Democrats queasy. Strong neighborhoods can also mean giving parents, through tax credits and vouchers, the freedom to seek out the schools and child care facilities they wish to use. But the neighborhood institutions strengthened thereby are so often disciplined religious facilities that civil libertarians decry the collapse of the church/state distinction and the coming of an Ayatollah-like theocracy. Republicans, of course, may try to turn this "hard edge" to their advantage by accusing Democrats of being too soft on criminals and too permissive with kids.

Perhaps the best way to summarize the postures the two parties are likely to assume toward community in 1988 is to say that Dukakis will try hard to *embody* family and local community values, while Bush will be better able and more willing to *speak* for those principles in a policy-relevant way. However the community issue is handled, it promises once again to be a critical part of American presidential politics. ☑

William A. Schambra is communications adviser to the director of the Office of Personnel Management. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

$5.00

Public Opinion

3



10th ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

Trends for Ten Years (or more): Polls and Politicians; Intellectuals and Amateurs; The Politics of Sleaze; Conventions: The Players and How They Played and in Opinion Roundup
A Decade of Public Opinion—Ambivalence, Continuity, and Poetry; Where Bush and Dukakis Stand

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From the Publisher: Public opinion has achieved a position of singular influence in modern politics and government, to the extent of transforming many long-established institutions of representative democracy. Vast resources are devoted to calibrating public sentiments concerning every conceivable question of policy, preference, and conduct. The results are attended closely by office seekers, legislators, bureaucrats, and even, one suspects, judges. The pollster has in important respects supplanted the state party chairman and legislative whip, the lobbyist, the editorialist, and the economist.

While many deplore these developments, few doubt that they are permanent features of modern democratic politics. At AEI's *Public Opinion* magazine we have aimed to understand them. For ten years we have been assembling masses of survey data and presenting them, in our regular "Opinion Roundup" section. More important, we have sought—and we think achieved—a deeper understanding of the meaning of "public opinion" as revealed by surveys and its bearing on contemporary issues. We are thankful to the survey organizations that have contributed their data, time, and ideas to this enterprise; to the students and practitioners of American politics who have written in our pages; and to our financial supporters, who make all of AEI's work possible.

Christopher DeMuth, President, AEI

TEN YEARS OF PUBLIC OPINION
An Ambivalent Public

What are the most important things we have learned over the last ten years about American public opinion?

Looking back on all the surveys reviewed for this magazine, we are most struck by how they have enlarged and sharpened our understanding of the *properties* of public opinion. *Ambivalence* is one of those essential properties. We have come to see that the public's being pulled this way and that by conflicting or competing values isn't simply an occasional occurrence but instead a fundamental, recurring characteristic of opinion on a wide range of policy questions.

"We Americans have always been ambivalent about government," Paul Volcker remarked last year. Surveys repeatedly attest to the scope of this ambivalence today. We maintain that individuals should try to help themselves—and that government should help individuals in need. In other areas we assert the importance of preventing the spread of communism in Central America—and the importance of not rushing off into armed conflicts in that region. On abortion we insist on the sanctity of life *and* upon the value of individual choice. On the Constitution we pay homage by maintaining that it should not be tampered with *and* by agreeing that contemporary judgments on fundamental values should be incorporated within it.

The pervasiveness of the public's ambivalence speaks volumes to the complex role of public opinion in democratic governance. It also raises basic challenges and standards for opinion research—especially the need to look at all dimensions of the values brought to a policy question, not just at one side.

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First . . .



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February–April 1988.

Question: Do you think we're coddling the poor—that poor people live well on welfare—or do you think poor people can hardly get by on what the government gives them?

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 20-25, 1985.

Question: Do you think that conditions for poor people in this country—like education, housing, job opportunities, health care, and so forth—are very good, or fairly good, or fairly bad, or very bad—or haven't you heard enough about that yet to say?

Not aware 5%
Conditions are bad 36%
Conditions for poor people in this country — like education, housing, job opportunities, and health care — are good 59%

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 20-25, 1985.

GOVERNMENT

Question: Now I am going to read you a series of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things. For each statement, please tell me whether you completely agree with it, mostly agree with it, mostly disagree with it, or completely disagree with it. The first one is . . .

% Agree


The federal government should run only those things that cannot be run at the local level
78%
When something is run by the government it is usually inefficient and wasteful
66%
The federal government controls too much of our daily lives
61%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Times Mirror Company, May 13-22, 1988.

Question: Do you feel that government spending should be increased, decreased, or kept where it is now in the following areas?

Government spending should be increased in . . .

Government spending should be increased on . . .



Note: The responses for "Decreased" and "Kept the same" were: 2% and 18%, 5% and 19%, and 5% and 21%, respectively.

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, February 17-18, 1987.

ABORTION

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion—abortion is the same thing as murdering a child, or abortion is not murder because the fetus really isn't a person?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, August 16-22, 1987.

Question: Do you tend to agree or disagree with this statement: A woman should be able to get an abortion if she decides she wants one no matter what the reason?


No opinion 4%
Disagree 44%
Agree, a woman should be able to get an abortion if she decides she wants one no matter what the reason 53%

Source: Survey by ABC News, August 17-23, 1987.

Question: Which of these positions best represents your views about abortion?


Not sure 3%
Abortion should be illegal in all circumstances 12%
A woman should be able to get an abortion if she decides she wants one no matter what the reason 34%
Abortion should be legal only in certain circumstances, such as when a woman's health is endangered or when pregnancy results from rape or incest 51%

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, August 17-19, 1987.

ATTITUDES ABOUT NICARAGUA

Question: Do you think the government of Nicaragua threatens the security of other Central American countries, or not?

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, March 19-22, 1988.

Question: Do you think Nicaragua will provide military bases for the Soviet Union?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 6-10, 1986.

Question: Should the United States government give military aid to the Contras who are fighting against the government of Nicaragua, or shouldn't it?


Don't know
14%
Should not
46%
The U.S. should give military aid to the Contras who are fighting against the government of Nicaragua
39%

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, March 19-22, 1988.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Question: Are there any amendments you would like to see made to the Constitution?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 11-14, 1987.

Question: Would you favor or oppose . . .?

% Favor

An amendment to the Constitution that would permit organized prayer to be said in the public schools.

The Equal Rights Amendment — also known as the E.R.A. — the constitutional amendment concerning women.



A constitutional amendment requiring the federal government to balance its budget.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 11-14, 1987.

Continuity

Stability or continuity is a second key feature of American public opinion. A great many people are disturbingly inattentive to even the large details of governmental programs and policies—but this does not result in flighty or erratic public opinion.

Alexis de Tocqueville glimpsed this a century and a half ago. "I hear it said that it is in the nature and habit of democracies to be constantly changing their opinions. . . . What struck me in the United States [however] was the difficulty of shaking the majority in an opinion once conceived of. . . . The public is engaged in infinitely varying the consequences of known principles . . . rather than in seeking new principles."

Survey research enlarges upon Tocqueville's brilliant insight. Again and again, we see the public staying with and elaborating a few basic commitments rather than rushing in new directions. Despite all the talk in recent decades of impending religious shifts, for example, in the face of vast social changes, the emergence of new currents in theology, and the like, surveys demonstrate the fundamental continuity in American religious belief and practice. Where changes have occurred—to cite one case, in the rate of church attendance by younger Roman Catholics—they represent responses to specific institutional histories and experience rather than far-reaching shifts in the nation's religious outlook.

Attitudes toward communism and toward the Soviet Union are another instance of the bedrock stability of public opinion. When their presidents pursue *détente* or sign INF agreements, or when Soviet leaders embark on *perestroika*, Americans naturally respond. But through all of the changes that have taken place since World War II, the bright line of some enduring public assessments can readily be seen—from the public's suspicion and caution on Soviet behavior, to its yearning for greater cooperation and a more peaceful world.

Question: Did you, yourself, happen to attend church or synagogue in the last seven days?

Attended church/synagogue in the last seven days



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1987.

Question: Do you ever pray to God?

Yes, pray to God



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1985.

Question: Do you believe in God or a Universal Spirit?

Believe in God or a Universal Spirit



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1986.

Question: How often do you attend religious services?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1988.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIETS: STABILITY

Question: Thinking about the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism as a form of government?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1988.

Question: You will notice that the boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus 5 for a country you like very much, to the lowest position of minus 5 for a country you dislike very much. How far up or down the scale would you rate the following countries? . . . Russia.



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1988.

Coming in the next issue

ELECTION FINALE

Question: How much of a threat would you say the Soviet Union is to the United States these days: a very serious threat, a serious threat, a minor threat, or not a threat at all?



Source: Survey by the Daniel Yankelovich Group for Americans Talk Security, June 25-July 7, 1988.

Question: The United States should take all steps, including the use of force, to prevent the spread of Communism. Do you agree or disagree?



Source: Survey by ABC News *Washington Post*, latest that of July 6-13, 1988.

Question: Do you think such an attempt to work out an agreement with Russia (to control the atom bomb before we try to make a hydrogen bomb) would be successful, or not?


1950
Would be successful 11%
No opinion 19%
An attempt to work out an agreement with Russia to control the atom bomb would not be successful 70%

Note: In the same survey, respondents were asked, "Do you think we should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the atom bomb before we try to make the hydrogen bomb?" 48% said we should, 45% we should not, 7% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 28-February 2, 1950.

Question: For the past few years, the United States and Russia have had a policy of trying to reach agreements which will relax tensions between them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live up to such agreements or don't you think so?



Note: In a June 1978 CBS News/*NYT* question, 64% of those surveyed said the Soviet Union would not live up to its share of the agreement if both countries were to sign one to limit nuclear weapons; 21% said they would; and 15% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 16-17, 1978.

Question: Do you think the Soviets can be trusted to live up to their arms control agreements?



Source: Survey by Associated Press/Media General, April 29-May 5, 1986.

Question: Which one of these four statements do you agree with most?


1946
No opinion 5%
It is very important to keep on friendly terms with Russia even if we have to make many concessions 6%
We will be better off if we have just as little as possible to do with Russia 21%
If Russia wants to be on friendly terms with us, that's all right, but we should not make any special effort to be friendly 18%
It is important that we be on friendly terms with Russia, but we should not make too many concessions to her 50%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 29-September 3, 1947.

Question: There are a number of ways we could begin to cooperate with the Soviets. I'd like to read you some of them. For each, please tell me if you think we should proceed with that idea, or don't you trust the Soviet Union enough to do that now? . . .


1988
Don't know 8%
Don't trust them enough to do that now 21%
We should proceed with the idea of signing a treaty with the Soviets to eliminate most nuclear weapons by the year 2000 71%


1988
Don't know 11%
We should proceed with the idea of agreeing to stop work on Star Wars as part of a nuclear arms agreement 34%
Don't trust them enough to do that now 55%

Source: Survey by the Daniel Yankelovich Group for Americans Talk Security, June 25-July 7, 1988.

Symbolic Data

The third feature of public opinion impressing us is that it *symbolically articulates general values*, rather than responds literally to specific issues presented to it. In a basic sense opinion is more poetry than prose. "Do you favor a nuclear freeze?" polls asked in the early 1980s, and the answers come back a seemingly resounding *yes*. We learned, however, that most Americans did not intend to convey a judgment on the specifics of a nuclear weapons freeze as a technical issue in U.S. defense policy. Instead, they were using the freeze questions to express symbolically a mood and aspiration: "Do what is possible to draw the world back from the possibility of nuclear war." This judgment is at once real and powerful —and very different from what the question literally asked.

"Do you think we are spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on. . . .?" *Foreign aid* has usually occupied last place here, when set against other claimants for governmental expenditures. But we have learned that it is simply not true that Americans are "against foreign aid"; in fact they see lots of needs and reasons for it. They are saying something symbolically —essentially that they believe their country has since World War II shouldered its share of international responsibilities.

A final example of public opinion's expressing itself as poetry rather than prose can be seen in questions that try to measure public confidence. If all of the specific complaints that surveys have uncovered over the last decade or so were intended literally, the United States would have had, or would now be ripe for, a revolution much like France's two centuries ago. The public has been saying something, all right, but it is more like: "Shape up. We can do better than this."

When the poetry of American public opinion—its symbolic articulation of basic values—is read as prose—as literal responses to issues that are technical and specific, to be tallied with "scientific" precision—the result is usually a vast misinterpretation of the public's message.

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE

Question: Would you favor or oppose an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for an immediate, verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons?


Favor an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR for an immediate verifiable freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons
Oppose such an agreement
No opinion
1982
71%
20%
9%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 5-12, 1982.

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . The Soviet Union would try to cheat on any nuclear freeze agreement and get an advantage over the U.S.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982.

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . Public support for a freeze will make the Reagan administration give arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union a much higher priority than it has to date.


Agree, public support for a freeze will make the Reagan administration give arms control negotiations a much higher priority than it has to date
Disagree
Don't know
1982
64%
22%
14%

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982.

Question: Do you think the public can understand the issues involved in a nuclear freeze well enough to vote on it, or is the question of a nuclear freeze too complicated for the public to decide?


The public can understand the issues involved in a nuclear freeze
The question of a nuclear freeze is too complicated for the public to decide
No opinion
1982
35%
59%
6%

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982.

FOREIGN AID

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we are spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First . . .

Foreign aid



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1988.

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount?. . . .



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April 1987.

Question: On the whole, do you favor or oppose our giving economic aid to other nations for purposes of economic development and technical assistance?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 30-November 12, 1986.

Question: If a Central American country with a Democratic government and friendly to the United States is facing severe poverty, would you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose our sending economic aid to that country?

If a Central American country with a democratic government and friendly to the United States is facing severe poverty . . .



Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for Americans Talk Security, April 25-May 1, 1988.

Question: If that same country (in previous question) was also battling Communist revolutionaries backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, would you favor sending that country economic aid, military aid, both kinds of aid, or neither one?

If same country was also battling Communist revolutionaries backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba . . .



Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research for Americans Talk Security, April 25-May 1, 1988.

Question: Some people say that the best way for the US to prevent Marxist governments from coming to power in Latin America and Africa is to promote economic development and human rights. Others say the best way to prevent Marxist takeovers is to provide military aid to US friends and to be prepared to intervene with armed forces. Which comes closest to your view or don't you have an opinion on this?

The best way for the United States to prevent Marxist governments from coming to power in Latin America and Africa is . . .


To promote human rights and economic development
To provide military aid and to be prepared to intervene with armed forces
Don't know
66%
19%
15%

Source: Survey by Mellman and Lazarus for the World Policy Institute, October 15-20, 1987.

QUESTIONS OF CONFIDENCE

Question: Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people?

Government is pretty much . . .

Question: Do you think people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

Government wastes a lot/some of the money we pay in taxes

Source: Surveys by the University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, latest that of November 1981.

Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? —just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?

Can trust the government in Washington to do what is right



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, October 18-22, 1987.

Question: . . . Today it's really true that the rich just get richer while the poor get poorer.

Completely/mostly agree

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Times Mirror, latest that of May 13-22, 1988.

Question: We'd like to know about the things on this list whether you feel generally optimistic about them as far as the future is concerned, or generally pessimistic about them, or uncertain about them? (Card shown respondent). What about . . .



Note: Not all categories shown.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 88-3), February 13-27, 1988.

Question: How much confidence do you have in the future of the United States — quite a lot, some, very little or none at all?



Note: Category "none at all" = 0.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 9-16, 1986.

CANDIDATES' FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE RATINGS

Johnson		Goldwater
	1964	
	May 22-27	
80%-5%	Gallup	38%-24%
	August 8-11	
79%-6%	Gallup	42%-30%

Humphrey		Nixon
	1968	
	May 2-7	
59%-18%	Gallup	59%-20%
	October 17-22	
58%-21%	Gallup	64%-16%

McGovern		Nixon
	1972	
	August 4-7	
50%-19%	Gallup	72%-13%
	October 13-16	
43%-32%	Gallup	61%-17%

Carter		Ford
	1976	
	May 19-23	
40%-31%	CBS/*NYT*	48%-39%
	May 21-24	
62%-11%	Gallup	59%-18%
	June 15-20	
48%-13%	CBS/*NYT*	NA
	July 17-20	
73%-7%	Gallup	63%-17%

Carter		Reagan
	1980	
	March 12-15	
48%-43%	CBS/*NYT*	34%-35%
	April 10-14	
43%-50%	CBS/*NYT*	41%-32%
	May 16-19	
58%-22%	Gallup	54%-19%
	June 18-22	
33%-58%	CBS/*NYT*	42%-30%
	June 29-July 3	
51%-46%	LAT	77%-23%
	July 8-9	
NA	NBC/AP	52%-35%
	August 1-4	
NA	Gallup	59%-18%
	August 2-7	
33%-56%	CBS/*NYT*	46%-27%
	September 2-6	
60%-37%	*LAT*	70%-25%
	September 10-14	
45%-46%	CBS/*NYT*	38%-38%
	September 19-20	
38%-47%	CBS/*NYT*	37%-31%
	September 21	
37%-49%	CBS/*NYT*	40%-34%
	October 5-9	
59%-40%	*LAT*	67%-31%
	October 16-20	
44%-46%	CBS/*NYT*	41%-32%
	October 30-November 1	
40%-48%	CBS/*NYT*	45%-34%
	November 7-12	
39%-49%	CBS/*NYT*	47%-21%

Mondale		Reagan
	1984	
	January 1-4	
	16-17	
49%-32%	ABC/*W. Post*	55%-38%
	January 14-21	
42%-28%	CBS/*NYT*	54%-26%
	February 4-9	
70%-22%	*LAT*	65%-33%
	February 21-25	
40%-31%	CBS/*NYT*	54%-31%
	March 21-24	
32%-37%	CBS/*NYT*	58%-28%
	April 23-26	
40%-36%	CBS/*NYT*	55%-30%
	May 12-17	
44%-47%	Penn & Schoen	61%-37%
	May 30-June 1	
	Gordon Black/	
29%-50%	*USA Today*	54%-33%
	June 23-28	
37%-36%	CBS/*NYT*	57%-28%
	June 29-July 7	
	Gordon Black/	
33%-45%	*USA Today*	53%-34%
	July 27-30	
55%-20%	Gallup	61%-24%
	August 5-9	
29%-32%	CBS/*NYT*	52%-29%
	August 25-30	
53%-40%	*LAT*	70%-28%
	September 7-11	
47%-49%	ABC/*W. Post*	60%-38%
	September 12-16	
27%-39%	CBS/*NYT*	53%-29%
	September 22-October 4	
41%-49%	ABC/*W. Post*	60%-35%
	September 30-October 4	
33%-43%	CBS/*NYT*	56%-30%
	October 4-7	
55%-40%	*LAT*	70%-27%
	October 7-10	
61%-35%	*LAT*	69%-29%
	October 12-15	
61%-36%	*LAT*	70%-29%
	October 14-17	
40%-37%	CBS/*NYT*	53%-32%
	October 23-25	
38%-42%	CBS/*NYT*	56%-30%
	October 31-November 3	
37%-45%	CBS/*NYT*	58%-30%
	Novmeber 8-14	
39%-48%	CBS/*NYT*	66%-27%

Note: The first number underneath each candidate's name is the favorable rating; the second number is the unfavorable rating.

Source: Polls by organization shown, latest that of November 8-14, 1984.

GEORGE BUSH AND





Question: (National) I'm going to mention the names of a few public figures. For each, please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable impression of that person, or if, perhaps, you don't know enough to say. How about . . . . (ABC News/*WP*) I'm going to read you the names of some people who are running for the Democratic nomination for president in 1988. As I read each name, please tell me whether you have generally favorable or generally unfavorable impressions of that candidate, or whether you are not familiar with the candidate to say one way or the other. (*TIME*/YCS) I'm going to name some presidential candidates and ask you what you think of them. If you haven't heard much about someone I name, just tell me. Is your opinion of . . . favorable, not favorable, undecided, or haven't you heard enough



MICHAEL DUKAKIS



about . . . yet to have an opinion? (CBS News/*NYT*) Is your overall opinion of . . . very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable? (Gallup) In general, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of . . . ? (NBC News/*WSJ*) What is your impression of . . . ? As of today, is it very favorable, or somewhat favorable, or somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable—or haven't you heard enough about him yet to say? (*LA Times*) (Massachusetts) Now I am going to read you a list of prominent people and for each one I read please tell me whether your opinion of each is extremely favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or extremely unfavorable. (KRC/Communications)



PARTY SUPPORT: WHAT

Question: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?


Democrat
Republican
Independent
National 36% 30% 33%
% Dem. minus % Rep.
By sex:
Male 40% 29% 31% +11
Female 32% 32% 36% 0
By religion:
Jewish 51% 18% 32% +33
Catholic 40% 27% 33% +13
Protestant 33% 34% 33% −1
By race:
Black 68% 7% 25% +61
Hispanic 52% 20% 28% +32
White 32% 33% 34% −1
By region:
South 40% 28% 32% +12
Northeast 38% 27% 34% +11
West 36% 35% 29% +1
Midwest 30% 32% 38% −2
By education:
Less than high school 50% 20% 30% +30
High school graduate 37% 29% 34% +8
Some college 35% 32% 33% +3
College graduate 30% 35% 34% −5
By region/religion:
Northern white Catholic 36% 28% 36% +8
Southern white Protestant 32% 34% 34% −2
Northern white Protestant 27% 39% 34% −12
By income:
Less than $14,999 48% 22% 31% +26
$35,000-49,999 35% 29% 36% +6
$25,000-34,999 35% 30% 35% +5
$15,000-24,999 37% 33% 31% +4
$50,000-74,999 31% 36% 33% −5
$75,000 and over 24% 43% 34% −19
By age:
55-69 years 40% 27% 33% +13
70 years and over 43% 32% 25% +11
35-44 years 36% 25% 38% +11
30-34 years 35% 32% 33% +3
45-54 years 33% 32% 34% +1
18-29 years 32% 36% 33% −4
% Dem. minus % Rep.
By sex and age:
Male 18-29 years 26% 39% 35% −13
30-44 years 32% 29% 38% +3
45-59 years 34% 31% 35% +3
60 years and over 36% 29% 35% +7
Female 18-29 years 37% 32% 31% +5
30-44 years 39% 26% 35% +13
45-59 years 37% 30% 33% +7
60 years and over 46% 28% 26% +18
By age and income:
18-34 years
Less than $25,000 31% 33% 36% −2
$25,000-34,999 36% 32% 32% +4
$35,000 and over 30% 38% 32% −8
35-49 years
Less than $25,000 41% 21% 38% +20
$25,000-34,999 33% 25% 42% +8
$35,000 and over 34% 32% 34% +2
50 years and over
Less than $25,000 49% 27% 24% +22
$25,000-34,999 36% 31% 33% +5
$35,000 and over 30% 31% 40% −1
By sex and education:
Male Less than high school 44% 24% 32% +20
High school graduate 33% 31% 36% +2
Some college 31% 32% 37% −1
College graduate 27% 36% 37% −9
Female Less than high school 55% 17% 28% +38
High school graduate 39% 27% 34% +12
Some college 37% 33% 30% +4
College graduate 37% 31% 31% +6

Source: Combined surveys for Americans Talk Security, January-June 1988.

RECENT POLLS SHOW

Question: Suppose the presidential election were being held today. If George Bush were the Republican candidate and Michael Dukakis were the Democratic candidate, which would you like to see win? (Gallup and Gallup/*Newsweek* [N])



Question: Of course, this November for president, it will be Vice President George Bush for the Republicans and Governor Michael Dukakis for the Democrats. If you had to choose right now, would you be for Bush or Dukakis? (Harris and Harris/*Business Week* [BW])



Question: If the 1988 presidential election were being held today, and the candidates were George Bush, the Republican, and Michael Dukakis, the Democrat, would you vote for George Bush or Michael Dukakis? (CBS News/*NYT*)



Question: If the election for president were being held today, would you vote for George Bush, the Republican, or Michael Dukakis, the Democrat? (NBC News/*WSJ*)



GEORGE BUSH AND
HOW THEY STAND IN NATIONAL

NATIONAL/REGIONAL TRIAL HEATS

Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
Harris	4/10-15/87	55%	39%	+ 16	LV
Harris	5/8-12/87	51	43	+ 8	LV
ABC News/*W. Post*	9/17-23/87	61	29	+ 32	Adults
Penn + Schoen	10/30-11/5/87	50	30	+ 20	Adults
Los Angeles Times	12/10-14/87	49	23	+ 26	Adults
Roper for *U.S. News*/CNN	12/14-16/87	48	30	+ 18	Adults
Harris	2/18-23/88	47	50	- 3	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	3/9/88	44	38	+ 6	RV
Harris	3/9-13/88	47	50	- 3	RV
Gallup	3/10-12/88	52	40	+ 12	RV
Time/YCS	3/10/88	42	37	+ 5	RV
ABC News/*W.Post*	3/17-21/88	45	50	- 5	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	3/19-22/88	46	45	+ 1	RV
Gallup/*Newsweek*	3/30-31/88	49	44	+ 5	RV
Roper for *U.S. News*/CNN	3/30-31/88	44	43	+ 1	RV
Harris	4/1-5/88	45	50	- 5	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	4/5-7/88	43	48	- 5	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	4/20-21/88	43	45	- 2	RV
Time/YCS	4/20-21/88	39	50	- 11	RV
Gallup	4/21-23/88	45	43	+ 2	RV
Bruskin	4/29/88	40	42	- 2	Adults
Harris	5/5-10/88	43	50	- 7	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	5/9-12/88	39	49	- 10	RV
Bruskin	5/13/88	39	37	+ 2	Adults
Gallup	5/13-15/88	38	54	- 16	RV
Gallup for Times Mirror	5/13-22/88	40	53	- 13	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	5/19-26/88	40	53	- 13	RV
Harris	6/1-6/88	44	49	- 5	LV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	6/7-9/88	38	45	- 7	RV
Darden Poll*	6/8-13/88	42	45	- 3	RV
Hamilton Frederick and Schneiders for AMPAC	6/8-19/88	41	50	- 9	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	6/9-12/88	34	49	- 15	RV
Gallup	6/10-12/88	38	52	- 14	RV
McKeon and Assoc.	6/14-15/88	34	52	- 18	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	6/15-19/88	39	51	- 12	RV
ABC News/*Money*	6/22-26/88	42	45	- 3	Adults
AP/Media General	6/22-7/2/88	42	48	- 6	LV
Bruskin	6/24/88	39	45	- 6	Adults
Gallup	6/24-26/88	41	46	- 5	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	7/5-8/88	39	47	- 8	RV
Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune**	7/5-9/88	39	50	- 11	RV
Los Angeles Times	7/5-10/88	38	49	- 11	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	7/6-10/88	47	44	+ 3	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	7/7-11/88	42	48	- 6	RV
Harris for *Business Week*	7/7-12/88	47	50	- 3	LV
Gallup	7/8-10/88	41	47	- 6	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	7/8-11/88	36	46	- 10	RV
ABC News	7/11/88	42	48	- 6	RV

MICHAEL DUKAKIS: AND REGIONAL POLLS

Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
Darden Poll*	7/12-17/88	48	43	+ 5	RV
Bruskin	7/15/88	40	44	– 4	Adults
ABC News	7/17/88	46	45	+ 1	RV
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION	7/18-21/88				
ABC News	7/20/88	41	53	– 12	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	7/20-21/88	40	50	– 10	RV
Gallup for Newsweek	7/21-22/88	38	55	– 17	RV
Bruskin	7/22/88	37	47	– 10	Adults
Gallup	7/22-24/88	37	54	– 17	RV
Harris	7/22-25/88	39	57	– 18	LV
NBC News/*WSJ*	7/23-25/88	32	50	– 18	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	7/31-8/3/88	33	50	– 17	RV
Bendixen and Law/Univision Poll	8/2-8/88	39	52	– 13	RV
Harris/*Business Week*	8/4-9/88	45	51	– 6	RV
Gallup	8/5-7/88	42	49	– 7	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	8/5-8/88	36	50	– 14	RV
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	8/5-8/88	40	52	– 12	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	8/10-16/88	46	49	– 3	RV
KRC for New Orleans *Times-Picayune*	8/12-18/88	42	42	0	RV
REPUBLICAN CONVENTION	8/15-18/88				
Gordon Black for *USA Today*/CNN	8/17-18/88	45	44	+ 1	RV
Gallup/*Newsweek*	8/18-19/88	51	42	+ 9	RV
CBS News/*NYT*	8/19-21/88	46	40	+ 6	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	8/17-23/88	48	46	+ 2	RV
Gallup	8/19-21/88	48	44	+ 4	RV
Harris	8/19-22/88	49	47	+ 2	RV
NBC News/*WSJ*	8/20-22/88	44	39	+ 5	RV
ABC News/*W. Post*	8/24-30/88	47	48	– 1	LV
Time/YCS	8/29-30/88	47	42	+ 5	LV

Note: *denotes a regional poll, or a poll taken in a group of states. Darden polled voters in 9 southern states: AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, and VA. Hart polled voters in 5 states: IL, TX, CA, FL, and NY.

HOW THEY FARE IN STATE POLLS

	Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
AL	*Birmingham News*	8/27-31/88	51%	34%	– 17	RV
AZ	Rocky Mountain Poll	5/1-14/88	49	37	+ 12	RV
	Arizona Republic	6/23-26/88	45	38	+ 7	Adults
	Rocky Mountain Poll	7/88	41	38	+ 3	RV
CA	Field	4/6-10/88	40	50	– 10	NA
	Field	4/15/88	40	55	– 15	NA
	Gallup for WCVB-TV	5/5-7/88	42	46	– 4	RV

	Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
	Los Angeles Times	5/11-16/88	36	53	– 17	LV
	Field	5/16-22/88	40	53	– 13	RV
	Bendixen and Law	5/24-6/1/88	39	50	– 11	RV
	Gallup	6/3-5/88	40	47	– 7	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	7/5-9/88	36	51	– 15	LV
	Field	7/22-29/88	36	52	– 16	RV
	Fairbank, Bregman and Maullin	8/7-9/88	34	49	– 19	LV
	Teichner	8/24-27/88	43	44	– 1	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	8/24-28/88	44	47	– 3	RV
CO	Garin-Hart Research	8/3-4/88	37	51	– 14	RV
	Talmey Research and Strategy for *Denver Post*/KCMC-TV	8/3-10/88	31	49	– 18	RV
CT	Analysis Group	4/10-14/88	35	51	– 16	NA
	Univ. of Conn. for *Hartford Courant* "Connecticut Poll"	4/19-26/88	34	45	– 11	RV
	Univ. of Conn. for *Hartford Courant* "Connecticut Poll"	6/14-23/88	32	48	– 16	RV
	Univ. of Conn. for *Hartford Courant* "Connecticut Poll"	7/11-18/88	35	52	– 17	RV
DE	*Wilmington News-Journal*	8/27-31/88	38	34	+ 4	RV
FL	Mason Dixon	5/7-10/88	48	38	+ 10	LV
	Univ. of Fla.	5/9-25/88	37	32	+ 5	Adults
	Univ. of Fla.	5/9-25/88	38	39	– 1	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	7/5-9/88	49	42	+ 7	LV
	Mason Dixon	7/8-10/88	49	39	+ 10	LV
	Mason Dixon	8/26-28/88	53	37	+ 16	LV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	8/24-28/88	56	37	+ 19	RV
GA	Darden Research	8/10-13/88	42	48	– 6	RV
IL	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	7/5-9/88	36	51	– 15	LV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	8/24-28/88	42	47	– 5	RV
	Midwest Television Poll	8/24-29/88	42	42	+ 0	LV
IN	*The Indiana Star*	4/17-19/88	44	44	+ 0	NA
	The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette	4/24-28/88	45	36	+ 9	RV
	WPTA-TV (4th CD only)	6/9-12/88	38	36	+ 2	Adults
	Gordon Black	8/21-22/88	52	35	+ 17	RV
IA	*The Des Moines Register's Iowa Poll*	6/7-14/88	28	60	– 32	LV
IA	*The Des Moines Register's Iowa Poll*	8/23-31/88	42	47	– 5	LV
KY	Wilkerson and Associates	7/26-8/11/88	34	46	– 12	RV
LA	Mason Dixon	7/7-10/88	42	45	– 3	LV
MD	Mason Dixon	6/14-17/88	37	50	– 13	LV
	Savitz Research Ctr. for *The Evening Sun*	6/28-7/6/88	32	52	– 20	Adults
	Mason Dixon for WJLA-TV	8/25-27/88	41	47	– 6	LV

	Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
MA	KRC/Communications Research for WBZ-TV, *Boston Herald*	6/29-7/1/88	37	51	– 14	LV
	KRC/Communications Research for WBZ-TV, *Boston Herald*	8/31/88	42	42	+ 0	LV
	Finkelstein for Malone (R)	8/27-29/88	42	49	– 7	LV
MI	Gordon Black	3/15-17/88	39	45	– 6	RV
	Charles Hakes Research for *Detroit Free Press*, WXYZ-TV	7/12-14/88	33	42	– 9	LV
	Detroit Free Press Michigan Exit Poll	8/2/88	38	49	– 11	RV
MN	Hickman/Maslin	4/10-13/88	29	55	– 26	LV
	St. Paul Pioneer Press/Dispatch	5/9-12/88	34	55	– 21	Adults
	Drew/Olsen for the *Star Tribune* "Minnesota Poll"	6/21-28/88	34	53	– 19	LV
MS	Social Science Research Center, Miss. State Univ.	4/11-24/88	52	35	+ 17	LV
	Mason Dixon	6/6-12/88	51	38	+ 13	LV
	Mason Dixon	6/9-12/88	53	40	+ 13	LV
	Rick Knox Associates for WJNT-Radio	7/22-23/88	48	39	+ 9	RV
	Mason Dixon	8/1-3/88	50	43	+ 7	LV
	Rick Knox Associates for WJNT-Radio	8/19-20/88	52	36	+ 16	RV
MO	The Missourinet Poll	4/4-7/88	35	40	– 5	RV
	The Missourinet Poll	6/13-16/88	37	47	– 10	RV
	Mason Dixon	7/5-8/88	39	46	– 7	LV
	The Missourinet Poll	7/25-28/88	34	50	– 16	RV
	Market Shares for the *Kansas City Times-Star*	8/20-21/88	48	39	+ 9	LV
NE	SRI Research Center for *The Omaha World-Herald*	4/27-29/88	42	40	+ 2	RV
	The Lincoln Journal-Star	4/27-5/1/88	40	38	+ 2	NA
	Hickman-Maslin	5/22-25/88	46	48	– 2	LV
NV	Survey Research Systems for Nev. State Press Assn.	4/28-5/1/88	42	40	+ 2	RV
	Peter Hart for Nevada Gaming Industry	8/8-12/88	45	43	+ 2	RV
NJ	RL Assoc. for *The Record*	4/27-5/5/88	36	36	+ 0	LV
	The Eagleton Institute for the *Star-Ledger*	5/18-26/88	40	54	– 14	LV
NM	ZIA Research for KOAT-TV	4/27-5/2/88	40	49	– 9	RV
	ZIA Research for KOAT-TV	6/6-10/88	40	51	– 11	RV
NY	Marist Institute	3/13-16/88	41	47	– 6	RV
	Gallup for WCVB-TV	3/25-27/88	41	49	– 8	RV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	7/5-9/88	37	52	– 15	LV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	8/24-28/88	39	49	– 10	RV
NC	Mason-Dixon	4/23-26/88	49	35	+ 14	LV
	The Charlotte Observer	5/18-26/88	40	46	– 6	RV
	Mason Dixon	8/6-8/88	44	44	+ 0	LV
ND	Univ. of N. Dakota	4/19-20/88	46	39	+ 7	Adults

	Organization	Dates	Bush	Dukakis	(B-D)	Sample
	Univ. of N. Dakota	8/29-31/88	40	45	– 5	Adults
OH	Univ. of Akron for *The Akron Beacon-Journal*	4/20-24/88	34	44	– 10	RV
	The Akron Beacon-Journal	4/20-5/1/88	31	47	– 16	RV
	Gallup for WCVB-TV	4/29-5/1/88	41	46	– 5	RV
	The Ohio Poll	5/1-9/88	37	49	– 12	RV
	Hamilton, Frederick and Schneiders for Riffe (D)	7/7-13/88	40	49	– 9	LV
OR	*The Portland Oregonian*	4/11-16/88	38	48	– 10	NA
	Griggs Anderson Research	4/19/88	44	51	– 7	RV
	TH Research for KOIN-TV	8/17-22/88	38	45	– 7	LV
RI	Alpha Research Associates	5/2-5/88	31	58	– 27	LV
	Alfred Taubman Ctr. Brown University	6/20-28/88	26	50	– 24	Adults
	Fleming and Assoc. for WPRI-TV	7/12-13/88	32	56	– 24	RV
	Fairbank, Bregman and Maullin	8/8-9/88	26	48	– 22	LV
SC	Metro Market Research for *The State*	5/16-18/88	53	41	+ 12	Adults
	The Charlotte Observer	5/18-26/88	44	41	+ 3	RV
	Mason Dixon	8/6-8/88	45	42	+ 3	LV
TX	The Texas Poll	5/13-28/88	48	41	+ 7	RV
	Delta Research/AFSCME	5/5-14/88	47	42	+ 5	LV
	Mason Dixon	6/10-13/88	58	35	+ 23	LV
	Peter Hart Research for *Chicago Tribune*	7/5-9/88	46	46	0	LV
	CBS News/*NYT*	7/12-13/88	44	48	– 4	RV
	Univ. of Texas for *Dallas Morning News*/ *Houston Chronicle*	7/14-15/88	45	44	+ 1	LV
	Peter Hart Research	7/22-23/88	40	50	– 10	LV
	Mason Dixon	8/5-7/88	43	49	– 6	LV
	Houston Chronicle/ *Dallas Morning News*	8/26-9/2/88	47	44	+ 3	LV
	Peter Hart for *Chicago Tribune*	8/24-28/88	51	41	+ 10	RV
UT	Bardsley, Hardison, and Neidhart for the *Salt Lake Tribune*	5/18-23/88	42	39	+ 3	RV
	Dan Jones and Assoc. for *Deseret News*/KSL-TV	6/28-29/88	51	36	+ 15	Adults
	Dan Jones and Assoc. for *Deseret News*/KSL-TV	7/26-28/88	46	41	+ 5	Adults
VA	Mason Dixon	6/24-26/88	48	40	+ 8	LV
	Virginia Commonwealth University "Commonwealth Poll"	7/11-18/88	42	39	+ 3	Adults
WA	Tacoma *Morning News Tribune*	6/22-29/88	32	44	– 12	RV
	Elway Research for *The Seattle Times*	7/7-9/88	36	47	– 11	RV
	Fairbank, Bregman and Maullin	7/24-29/88	30	47	– 17	LV
	Consumer Opinion Services for KIRO-TV/*Journal American*	8/25-27	41	41	+ 0	RV
WI	St. Norbert Survey Center "Wisconsin Survey"	3/16-23/88	46	43	+ 3	Adults
	Wisconsin Education Assn.	4/20-5/10/88	32	53	– 21	LV
	Milwaukee Journal poll	6/24-26/88	39	53	– 14	LV
	Milwaukee Sentinel	8/19-24/88	39	50	– 11	LV

Note: All trial heats after 7/12/88 include Bentsen as the Democratic running mate.

COVERING THE CONVENTION COVERAGE

by S. Robert Lichter and Linda S. Lichter

The political conventions are the first media events of the general election campaign. Once they were merely vehicles for selecting the nominees. In the age of media politics, however, conventions have become television pilots that introduce the fall season's cast of characters. They can mean the difference between good and bad early ratings.

At a time when personalities take precedence over institutions in electoral politics, this is the main opportunity for the parties themselves to command center stage. As part of our ongoing study of television's election news this year, we examined the performance of both parties during their conventions.

The three networks lavished nearly 60 hours of air time on the conventions. To be precise, they gave 29 hours and 16 minutes of precious prime-time coverage to the Democrats and 29 hours and 39 minutes to the Republicans. Barely half of that coverage (54 percent) was given over to party activities like speeches, films, and roll calls. That left plenty of time for the networks' own floor reports, film stories, interviews, commentaries, and general punditry.

Researchers at the Center for Media and Public Affairs viewed all prime-time coverage of both conventions and coded the topics of discussion and evaluations of the candidates. The coverage was broken up into self-contained segments, such as speeches, interviews, and round-table discussions. Within each segment, a speaker was coded only once in a given category. So Ted Kennedy wasn't credited with a new anti-Bush evaluation every time he asked where George was. We figured viewers got the point the first time.

The Democrats

The Democratic confab was very much a two-man show, with Michael Dukakis and Jesse Jackson sharing the spotlight. As table 1 shows, Jackson actually attracted more coverage than Dukakis over the four days. But both finished with highly attractive media profiles, as the evaluations in table 2 demonstrate. Dukakis was praised by ninety-one speakers and criticized by only four; Jackson received praise from eighty-five sources and criticism from only one.

Table 1

NETWORK CONVENTION COVERAGE
(Number of Segments Discussing Each Topic)

Democrats			Republicans		
Dukakis	79		Reagan	61	
Jackson	98		Bush	92	
Bentsen	26	} 47	Quayle	125	} 197
V.P. Selection	21		V.P. Selection	72	
Policy Issues	79		Policy Issues	72	
Campaign Strategy	42		Campaign Strategy	68	

Vice presidential nominee Lloyd Bentsen finished a distant third in the coverage. He managed to garner twenty-nine statements of support without a single vote of opposition—not a bad start for a newly named second banana. But George Bush attracted nearly as much attention, most of it in the form of barbs and jibes. Bush was singled out for criticism by twenty-three speakers. His sole defender on camera was his own campaign manager, Lee Atwater, during an interview on ABC. In addition, the Reagan administration was lambasted by twenty speakers and praised by only three. So the Democrats succeeded in giving a big hand to their two stars and the back of their hand to the opposition.

The networks mostly reinforced the sentiments of the delegates. Naturally, clear evaluations of the candidates were less common among reporters. And their attention was focused more on presidential candidate Dukakis than runner-up Jackson. But the proportion of

Table 2

NETWORK EVALUATIONS OF CANDIDATES*

	All Sources		Reporters	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Democratic Convention				
Dukakis	91	4	19	0
Jackson	85	1	11	0
Bentsen	29	0	0	0
Bush	1	23	0	0
Republican Convention				
Bush	114	5	16	0
Quayle	83	12	3	0
Dukakis	0	37	0	0

*Clearly positive or negative judgments.

favorable comments was even higher in the network booths than on the convention floor. All nineteen assessments by reporters favored Dukakis, as did all eleven evaluations of Jackson. Bentsen received all the attention customarily accorded vice presidents—not a single clear evaluation.

Positive evaluations of Dukakis tended to be rather mild. Dan Rather, for example, praised him for orchestrating the convention "remarkably well," and David Brinkley noted that he was "in charge," having rallied behind him even those delegates "who, in the beginning, thought he was a Jimmy Carter without the peanuts." After Dukakis's emotional acceptance speech, however, the praise flowed somewhat more freely. Rather called it "dramatic" and noted that Dukakis "has made a career of exceeding expectation."

Journalistic praise of the runner-up was less frequent but more effusive. In Tom Brokaw's words, "The Reverend Jesse Jackson—a remarkable picture. . . .Here is a man who (as he often says) was born in the slum, but the slum was not born in him." And no speaker received a more enthusiastic introduction than Brokaw's: "Fasten your seatbelts! Jesse Jackson has arrived to deliver the most widely anticipated speech of the convention. . . .He is clearly the most gifted orator in the Democratic party today."

Nor did Jackson have trouble living up to such high expectations. ABC's Jim Wooten summarized the impact of his oratory on members of the party and press alike: "Press and convention officials. . .were rapt as well. I've never seen that happen. A lot of reporters stopped writing, stopped taking notes. A lot of convention officials actually listened to the speech. That's a real change." In a fitting tribute to a campaign that received by far the most favorable TV news coverage during the primaries, ABC's Jeff Greenfield dubbed Jackson the Democratic answer to Ronald Reagan: "He transcends conventional politics, conventional experience, conventional limits."

The Reverend Jackson also figured heavily in the major theme that characterized coverage of the convention itself—that the Democrats had succeeded in unifying their often fractious party. Jackson's positive effect on party unity was praised on twenty-nine separate occasions, and nineteen additional speakers pronounced that unity had been achieved. No speaker either called the party divided or portrayed Jackson as a divisive force.

Once again, the journalists went along with the tide of positive pronouncements. On Monday night Tom Brokaw characterized the sentiment in the hall this way: "A ticket of Dukakis and Bentsen, with the active support and laying on of hands of the Reverend Jesse Jackson, will carry them to victory come the fall." Andrea Mitchell's report was more restrained. She quoted one operative who called the Dukakis-Jackson union "a shotgun wedding." Then Jackson's speech on Tuesday seemed to remove any doubt. Sam Donaldson called it "a speech of unity" and "common ground" that must have left Dukakis "very pleased." And ABC commentator George Will tried out a sports metaphor: "Jackson went into the room this morning a rival quarterback and came out a blocking back for Dukakis."

The Republicans

To a degree that may seem surprising in light of the controversy surrounding Dan Quayle, the Republican ticket nearly matched the Democrats in positive convention coverage. Bush scored even higher than Dukakis, with 114 paeans of praise and only five dissenting voices. Even more striking, he nearly matched his opponent's good press from reporters, drawing sixteen positive statements without any negatives. The night after Bush announced Quayle's selection, for example, Walter Cronkite commented, "He did prove that he's his own man. He's strong, he picked a daring candidate. . . ." It was Bush's speech, however, that drew real kudos. David Brinkley called it "poised and poetic." John Chancellor found it "a splendid piece of work," and Sam Donaldson pronounced it "a much better speech than Dukakis's." Tom Brokaw seemed to sum up his colleagues' sentiments: "George Bush came into this hall and accomplished all that he wanted to." Meanwhile, Republican speakers returned the Democrats' fire by attacking Michael Dukakis thirty-seven times without a single counterattack.

So far the show was going according to the GOP script. But what about the storm that descended on their vice presidential candidate? The damage can be measured less in terms of bad press than in the sheer amount of attention Quayle attracted (and thereby distracted from the head of the ticket). As table 1 shows, Senator Quayle was the number one topic of discussion in the network coverage. He was mentioned more frequently than George Bush and twice as often as Ronald Reagan. Indeed, when all discussion of the vice presidency is added to Quayle's personal total, the second slot on the ticket drew more than twice as much attention as the party's presidential candidate and three times as much as the current president.

The Indiana senator was the subject of ninety-five clear evaluations, eighty-three positive and twelve

negative. That's twelve more negatives than his counterpart on the Democratic ticket received and over twice as much criticism as Dukakis, Jackson, and Bentsen combined during their party's convention. In addition, six speakers asserted that Quayle would hurt the ticket's chances for victory, compared to only one who deprecated Bentsen's contribution. Nonetheless, his evaluations, like those of the other candidates, were predominantly positive. Further, Quayle received only three clear evaluations from reporters, and all were positive.

How can this be, in view of the flap over media coverage that led an angry crowd to hector reporters as they tried to question the candidate in his home state and gave rise to a memorable front-page headline in the conservative *Washington Times*: "Networks toss fairness to the wind, go for jugular"? The answer involves our understanding of good and bad press, in a way that illuminates contemporary journalistic practices as well as the special character of network convention coverage.

Bad News or Bias?

Our coding system was designed to err on the side of caution by charting only clear, direct, and one-sided evaluations. Further, journalists' spoken evaluations of candidates were assigned to other sources if they were attributed, even through phrases such as, "questions have been raised about. . ." or "critics have charged. . . ."

These were precisely the kinds of qualifiers reporters used with virtually every quotation or assertion they aired about Quayle's military service. Typical was CBS's lead story on the convention's final night. Dan Rather's lead-in described the situation in grim terms:

> Bush finds himself under a cloud, a cloud of controversy swirling over his running mate; how and why he chose Sen. Dan Quayle of Indiana, and Quayle's military service record. Questions are being raised over what influence, if any, was used to get Quayle into the Indiana State National Guard at the height of the Vietnam War. . . .That controversy has turned this convention upside down.

After sources were quoted to similar effect, Bruce Morton's summary repeated the main themes of the controversy in a manner that again suggested a crisis atmosphere without endorsing the charges:

> So the matter of Quayle's military service, of what effect family influence had on getting him into the National Guard, what effect *that* might have on the campaign; all of those things remain unresolved. Bush campaign officials have been insisting all day there is no question of dropping Quayle from the ticket.

This certainly sounds ominous, and it raised doubts about Bush's judgment, Quayle's honor, and the party's prospects without even asserting that the



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charges are true or the fallout deserved. So it is bad press, in one sense, without including any overtly negative judgments. Nor does it address whether the substance and magnitude of the controversy are justified by the facts.

Once such a controversy exists, it is news, and bad news at that. Once it has surfaced, therefore, it becomes self-perpetuating. How it came into existence is beside the point to the reporter but very much the point to the target of the report. That is one reason disputes over alleged media bias have become a regular and predictable feature of campaign news. What the journalists define as bad news, the politicians define as biased reporting.

Thus, network reporters seemed to follow a rule of speak no evil, unless you can quote someone. Tom Brokaw was willing to applaud Quayle's Thursday night speech: "He knocked it out of the park from that podium tonight. That's one of the best television speeches we've heard all week. . .He is a modern media candidate." But when NBC's Ken Bode put the knock on Quayle, the criticism was always attributed to other sources:

> One former Republican National Committee official said, "Last night at dinner we were joking about Quayle. We trashed him!" A famous conservative said, "It makes Bush look like he wasn't strong enough to pick Kemp or Dole." And from Indiana today, one of Dan Quayle's home-state politicians said, "It can't be Quayle, can it really?"

This approach is partly a matter of journalistic style, but it seems particularly prevalent in convention coverage. Our study of the networks' 1988 primary coverage found that nearly half the one-sided assessments of candidates were negative; of these almost one in seven was delivered by a journalist without attribution. Even during convention week, the evening news seemed more pointed than the convention coverage itself. It was during the regular newscast, for example, that CBS's Lesley Stahl asserted, "Quayle was the vice president pick that ate the Republican convention. The question now is whether he'll eat the whole campaign." And it was on "CBS This Morning" that Kathleen Sullivan referred to Quayle as "a draft dodger."

Nor are broadcast journalists unique in this regard. It is just that print reporters' confrontations with candidates normally take place out of earshot. Dan Rather found out last January how many people perceive tough questioning of high officials on camera as rude and abrasive. A similar fate befell the *Wall Street Journal*'s Ellen Hume. She faced criticism from the crowd after asking Quayle how he felt when "people were dying in Vietnam while you were writing press releases." Her press conference question was broadcast to an angry hometown pro-Quayle crowd, as well as millions of television viewers around the country.

By contrast, the networks seem to accept grudgingly that the conventions are the parties' opportunity to put their best foot forward. Not only is it difficult to find sources willing to disparage the nominee, but reporters normally lack a newspeg on which to hang any really tough criticism. That may be precisely why their coverage takes on a frenzied quality once such a story breaks. It is not just partisan carping; ask Geraldine Ferraro or Tom Eagleton. Nor is it only a matter of pack journalism, although the presence of hundreds of reporters in search of the same story certainly creates a hothouse atmosphere that magnifies its intensity and impact.

To borrow Brendan Sullivan's memorable phrase, however, journalists are not potted plants. They choose how much time and what tone to give to their coverage of any story. The role of news judgment in pursuing a breaking story is illustrated by differences in the tone and emphasis the three networks gave the Quayle controversy. Specifically, ABC's reporting was far more restrained than that of CBS and NBC, as table 3 illustrates. Quayle was the topic of twenty-eight segments of ABC's coverage, compared to forty-five on CBS and fifty-two on NBC. And ABC broadcast only two evaluations that were entirely negative (including assertions that he would hurt the ticket) compared to seven on NBC and none on CBS. ABC correspondent Jeff Greenfield even warned his colleagues on the air that many journalists had avoided Vietnam service just as they were accusing Quayle of doing.

Table 3

THE QUAYLE WATCH

Network	Segments Mentioning Quayle	Negative Evaluations of Quayle*
ABC	22%	11%
CBS	36	50
NBC	42	39
	100%	100%
Number	125	17

*Includes criticism of his contribution to GOP ticket.

So it was no lemming-like compulsion that created such intense pursuit of the Quayle controversy. It was the reaction of a press freed from captivity to a second week-long orgy of partisan self-congratulation. Political conventions are normally scripted by political consultants rather than network producers. A genuine news story can act like a wake-up call, startling a somnolent press corps into frantic activity. If there was a media "feeding frenzy" in New Orleans, it was partly in reaction to the starvation diet that preceded it. ☑

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THE MAKING OF THE DELEGATES, 1968-1988

by Martin Plissner and Warren J. Mitofsky

This year's Republican convention in New Orleans was the first since 1968 at which Charles McC. (Mac) Mathias, the former senator from Maryland, was not a delegate. Mathias's departure left the Republican convention floor void of any members of Congress or any other major public officeholder who, when asked if he called himself liberal, moderate, or conservative, picked "liberal." Of the entire 2,277 delegates, less than one-half of one percent, nine to be exact, so identified themselves when asked to do so by CBS News. Of the nine, four were among the convention's relatively few blacks; one was Hispanic. The most prominent position held by any of them was mayor of East Washington, Pennsylvania. At Mac Mathias's last convention, four years ago, nearly three times as many (twenty-six) had acknowledged that they were liberals.

Starting in 1968 CBS News has tracked all delegates to national party conventions. The surveys typically reach in excess of 95 percent of the delegates, and there is no statistical error in the findings. They record a great variety of trends, like the near-extinction of the liberal wing of the Republican party. This article brings up to date an earlier review of the CBS News delegate surveys published after the 1980 conventions (*Public Opinion*, October/November 1980).

If liberals have all but vanished from Republican conventions, the Democratic conservative is almost as lonely at his party's conventions. Two decisive lickings in a row by Ronald Reagan and a fairly public effort to dissociate itself from the "L-word" did little to narrow the liberal/conservative ratio among the 4,212 delegates who nominated Michael Dukakis in Atlanta.

Forty-three percent called themselves liberals, the same as at the convention that nominated Walter Mondale. Barely 5 percent weighed in as conservatives. Just four of the seventy-six U.S. senators and governors at the convention were in this tiny minority that made up the Democratic party's right.

Night and Day on the Issues

On specific issues posed in this year's surveys, not just on ideological tags, the delegates to each convention were like night and day. Left to their own judgments, before the Dukakis whips turned them around on a platform vote, Dukakis as well as Jackson supporters in Atlanta overwhelmingly favored higher taxes for people earning over $100,000 a year. Republican delegates, without being whipped, opposed such a tax increase by three to one.

Democratic delegates favored federal funding of abortion by five to two. Republican delegates opposed it by four to one. Democratic delegates favored a gay rights law by nearly four to one. Republicans opposed it by two to one. Asked if defense spending should be cut to permit more spending on social programs, Democrats opted for social programs by seven to one. Republicans stuck with defense by six to one.

Pick any constitutional amendment under discussion, and the delegates at the two conventions were on opposite sides. Democratic delegates favored the equal rights amendment by more than twenty to one; Republicans opposed it by five to three. Democratic delegates opposed a balanced budget amendment by five to four; Republicans favored it by six to one. Democrats opposed a school prayer amendment by three to one; Republicans supported it, five to three. Perhaps most typically, Democrats preferred by four to one a bigger government that would provide more services, to a smaller one that would do less. Republicans chose smaller government by twenty to one.

Delegates Compared to Voters

The delegates surveyed in both parties thus continued the pattern—found in past surveys of both convention delegates and national committee members—of Democratic elites being decidedly more liberal and Republican elites more conservative than ordinary, garden-variety adherents of their respective parties.

In current CBS News/*New York Times* polls of Democratic voters nationally, self-identified conservatives are about as common as liberals. This contrasts sharply to the eight-to-one liberal Democratic delegates and ordinary Democratic voters do take similarly liberal sides on such issues as higher taxes for the rich, the equal rights amendment, spending on social needs rather than defense, and bigger as opposed to smaller government. They do so, however, by generally narrower margins than convention delegates. The voters, moreover, part company with the delegates on federal

Table 1

VIEWS OF THE DELEGATES/VOTERS—1988

	Delegate Survey		CBS/*NYT* Poll July 1988	
	REP.	DEM.	REG. REP.	REG. DEM.
Ideology				
—Liberal	0%	43%	11%	26%
—Moderate	36	43	44	42
—Conservative	59	5	40	28
Size of govt[a]				
—Small	81	14	59	33
—Big	4	56	30	56
Fedl. funding abortion				
—Favor	16	57	28	32
—Oppose	69	22	62	56
Gay rights law				
—Favor	26	65	28	43
—Oppose	58	18	57	40
Sympathy for Palestinians				
—More sympathy	28	50	22	26
—No more	46	22	53	49
Government spending				
—Defense	72	10	53	34
—Social programs	13	75	39	55
Death penalty				
—Favor	88	49	79	64
—Oppose	6	38	15	27
School prayer[b]				
—Favor	51	22	72	67
—Oppose	34	65	25	26
E.R.A.[b]				
—Favor	34	86	68	80
—Oppose	51	4	25	11
Bal. budget amendment[b]				
—Favor	77	38	80	77
—Oppose	13	47	11	9
Top tax rate				
—Increase	19	67	61	63
—No change	64	14	32	27

Note: [a]CBS/*NYT* poll May 1988.
[b]CBS/*NYT* poll August 1988.

funding of abortion, prayer in schools, and a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution. In each of these cases, Democratic delegates are well to the left of their party's voters.

If Democratic delegates veered to the left of their party's voters, Republican delegates on balance veered to the right. Liberals and moderates together outnumber conservatives by five to four among everyday Republicans; among delegates, conservatives led by five to three.

Rank-and-file Republicans went along with their more conservative delegates in opposing federal funds for abortion, in favoring smaller government and the school prayer and balanced budget amendments. But they parted company with the delegates by supporting the ERA and higher taxes for the rich.

The disparity between Republican convention delegates and almost any other definable group of voters is most striking if you compare the three-to-two margin against ERA in New Orleans with the July CBS News/*New York Times* national survey. American voters as a whole favor ERA by a margin of five to one. A solid majority of every one of the seventy-two voter subgroups support it, and in all but one case (Republicans who supported Bush's opponents in the primaries), they support it by margins of at least two to one. Those overwhelming supporters of ERA include not only Democrats who voted for Ronald Reagan in 1984 (four to one) but also Bush's own primary supporters (three to one), conservatives (five to two), and evangelicals (two to one). They do not, however, include the delegates to this year's Republican national convention.

Who They Are—The Democratic Delegates

It was the first CBS News Democratic delegate survey, in 1968, that ascertained that just 13 percent of that year's Democratic delegates were women and just 5 percent were black—far out of line with their share of the population and even more out of line with their share of votes they cast for Democratic candidates. It was these findings, specifically, that caught the eye of the subsequent reform commission, headed by George McGovern, that radically reshaped party practice in selecting future delegates.

At the 1972 convention, the proportion of both blacks and women tripled, and in 1980 the party fixed the division between men and women at a flat fifty-fifty. The "goal" for black participation was set as the black share of the "Democratic electorate." If that share was measured by the portion of Walter Mondale's vote that was found to be black in the November 1984 CBS News/*New York Times* exit poll, it would be 19 percent.

The 1988 convention easily met this standard. Twenty-three percent of the delegates were black, a record for conventions of either party. Eighty-five percent of the pledged black delegates were there as a result of Jesse Jackson's campaign. Twenty-one percent of Jackson's delegates were white, up from 6 percent in 1984, reflecting not too badly his share of the white primary and caucus vote in each of these years.

About half the Democratic delegates were Protestant, 30 percent were Catholic, and 7 percent Jewish. White Protestants were 30 percent of the total. The median income for all delegates was $52,000. The median age was 46.

About a third of the Democratic delegates held public office. Forty percent held party office. One out of four delegates were union members, one in ten were union officials (one in fourteen made their living at it). Forty-one percent of the Democratic delegates held graduate degrees. Eighty-eight percent had attended college. In expanding his delegate base this year, Jesse Jackson did not lower his academic sights a bit. In 1984 his delegates had more master's degrees and Ph.D.s per capita than any other camp. This year Jackson delegates led in these degrees again.

Table 2

WHO THE DELEGATES ARE

	1968		1972		1976		1980		1984		1988	
	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP
Women	13%	16%	40%	29%	33%	31%	49%	29%	49%	44%	48%	33%
Black	5	2	15	4	11	3	15	3	18	4	23	4
Under thirty	3	4	22	8	15	7	11	5	8	4	4	3
Lawyer	28	22	12	—	16	15	13	15	17	14	16	17
Teacher	8	2	11	—	12	4	15	4	16	6	14	5
Union member	—	—	16	—	21	3	27	4	25	4	25	3
Attending first convention	67	66	83	78	80	78	87	84	78	69	65	68
Protestant	—	—	42	—	47	73	47	72	49	71	50	69
Catholic	—	—	26	—	34	18	37	22	29	22	30	22
Jewish	—	—	9	—	9	3	8	3	8	2	7	2
Liberal	—	—	—	—	40	3	46	2	48	1	43	0
Moderate	—	—	—	—	47	45	42	36	42	35	43	35
Conservative	—	—	—	—	8	48	6	58	4	60	5	58
Median age	49	49	42	—	43	48	44	49	43	51	46	51

Who They Are—The Republican Delegates

"It will be surprising to some people," said House Republican Leader Bob Michel to the *Washington Post*'s Paul Taylor last May, "when they look at that Democratic convention out there and see one-third blacks." Michel was overstating things, the Democratic convention was little more than a fifth, not a third black.

But when Michel, as permanent chairman of the Republican convention, brought down his gavel in New Orleans, he was addressing far fewer black delegates. Only 4 percent of the Republican delegates were black, about a third of what they constitute in the voting population.

Women, too, made up a much smaller share of the delegates in New Orleans than they did in Atlanta. Half the Democratic delegates were women, only a third of the Republican delegates were.

This is an unusual case of an actual setback for women's participation. From 1972 through 1980 women consistently made up about 30 percent of the Republican convention delegates. In 1984, through a particular effort on the part of the Reagan campaign, the participation of women rose to 44 percent. In 1988 it fell back to 33 percent, close to the 1972-1980 norm.

Lee Atwater, who was deputy campaign manager for Reagan-Bush in 1984 and ran the Bush primary campaign in 1988, says that, with no primary contest in 1984, getting more women to the convention was a high priority for the national staff. In 1988 the top priority was getting Bush delegates elected. Gender was secondary.

If women and blacks were in relatively short supply, the Republican party's standing as the party of the WASP went unchallenged by the makeup of this year's convention. Sixty-five percent of the delegates were white Protestant, more than twice the percentage in Atlanta. Twenty-two percent were Catholic, 2 percent were Jewish, and 14 percent of the Protestant delegates called themselves Fundamentalists.

Even rarer in New Orleans than blacks, though not so rare as liberals, were union cards. Only 3 percent reported union membership, most of them as teachers or (like the former union chief who has led the party's most successful ticket) entertainers. No Republican delegate made a living working for a union. In Atlanta it was the sixth most prevalent occupation.

As usual Republican delegates were, on the whole, richer than their Democratic counterparts. Half the Republican delegates responding to the survey had annual family incomes over $72,000. The median income for the Democrats was $52,000. On average, Republican delegates were older; the median age in New Orleans was fifty-one, compared to forty-six in Atlanta.

What the great majority of the delegates to both conventions had in common, however, and what distinguished them from the great majority of delegates in 1968, is that their vote for president on the convention's only ballot had been dictated months earlier by the votes cast in primaries. At the 1968 Republican convention, Richard Nixon's majority hinged to a large degree on personal delegate commitments and, for a moment or two, seemed in danger of slipping away. Hubert Humphrey's nomination in Chicago that year was achieved without a single primary victory and could have been taken away in a flash by President Lyndon Johnson. This year's conventions of both parties, in contrast, only ratified the will of the primary voters. The delegates, whoever they might be and whatever their views, were there not to make a choice but to deliver a message. ☑

Martin Plissner is political director of CBS News, and Warren J. Mitofsky is director of the CBS News Election and Survey Unit.

THOSE PESKY PREPRIMARY POLLS

by Irving Crespi

Consider this: In 430 polls on past local, state, and presidential primaries and general elections, the average difference between the winning candidates' share of the popular vote and final poll results was 5.7 percentage points. One-third of those polls were off the winning candidate's actual vote by 6.4 percentage points or more.[1]

A major correlate of the extent to which those 430 polls deviated from the actual vote is the number of days between the end of interviewing and the election: of 104 polls conducted within five days of the election, 45 percent were within three points of the winning candidate's vote. Of the 131 polls conducted more than twelve days before the election, only 24 percent were that close.

Another major correlate of how close polls are to election returns is turnout: of 105 polls conducted on elections in which 56 percent or more of the voting-age population voted, 39 percent were within three points of the winning candidate's vote. Of the 103 polls conducted in elections with turnout rates of less than 33 percent (mostly primaries), only 26 percent were that close.

The polls conducted during the fall and early winter preceding the Campaign 1988 primaries undoubtedly set a record for sheer volume. Less certain is how useful this information was. According to one source, there were 113 published polls on the Republican race and 123 on the Democratic race from September 1987 through January 1988.[2] Of these, twenty-five were national polls that measured preferences among the Republican aspirants, and twenty-nine measured the Democratic hopefuls. The rest were regional or state polls. (In most instances preferences for both the Republican and Democratic races were measured in a single survey; these 236 poll reports, therefore, come from approximately 125 different surveys.) The pace of polling increased sharply in January—thirty-five on the Republican race and thirty-seven on the Democratic—as interest focused on the Iowa caucuses and then the New Hampshire primaries.

The extensive use of polls in the preprimary season demonstrates the news media's reliance upon polls as a major source for their election coverage. To a degree unimaginable even a decade ago, election news coverage consists of—and is conditioned by—the re-

Table 1

NUMBER OF PUBLISHED POLLS ON REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE STANDINGS SEPTEMBER 1, 1987 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1988

	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Total
National	3	9	3	3	7	25
Iowa	—	2	1	1	11	15
New Hampshire	2	1	3	3	5	14
Southern region	2	1	—	—	3	6
Individual Super Tuesday southern states	1	11	8	8	3	31
Midwestern region	—	1	—	—	—	1
All other states	4	3	6	2	6	21
	12	28	21	17	35	113

sults of trial heats. This has enriched the quality of that coverage by making possible analyses of candidate strengths and weaknesses and of shifting trends in voter preferences. The news media's commitment to polls has also led to the well-deserved decline in reporters' reliance on interviews with cab drivers, bellhops, and barbers as exemplars of the electorate. The dark side of this commitment, however, is the unwarranted manner in which the news media used polls last fall and winter.

As the results of the aforementioned examination of polls demonstrate, polls conducted weeks, let alone months, before an election cannot be used to project election outcomes accurately. It is also the case that, regardless of timing, in low-turnout elections such as primaries, poll results are likely to be far off the mark as predictions of voting behavior. Pollsters who were interviewed as part of the study of preelection polls explained that not until voters begin to pay attention to a campaign and crystallize their preferences do poll results provide a meaningful basis for projecting who will be elected. And even then voting intentions are always subject to change in reaction to important events. Those pollsters also emphasized that in primary campaigns it is not until the last week before voting that most voters pay more than a modicum of attention to the campaign. Until the closing days of primary campaigns, candidate standings are little more than measurements of name familiarity. And even when polls are conducted at the last minute, unless an accurate method for identifying likely voters in low-turnout elections is available—which almost all pollsters agree is not—an otherwise well-designed poll could still be a poor indicator of how votes will be cast. In other words, all those polls conducted from September to December, and even most of those conducted in January, were meaningless as harbingers of what eventually happened in the primaries.

What Polls Don't Mean

Did the early polls serve, or could they have served, any useful role in news coverage? Before we can answer that question, we must first realize that the patterns revealed by those early polls were completely predictable. It was to be expected that George Bush and Robert Dole, both well known because of their previous national candidacies and prominent national offices, would dominate early polls on the Republican race, while newcomers Pete du Pont, Alexander Haig, and Pat Robertson would be also-rans. With two such prominent candidates, a small undecided vote in those early polls on the Republican race was also predictable. Nonetheless, the dominance of Bush and Dole in the Republican primaries, particularly compared with the Democratic race, was interpreted to mean that the public saw each as having presidential stature. While both may merit that estimation, the poll results by themselves do not lead to that conclusion.

Similar forces were at work in the Democratic race. The fact that Gary Hart (during those times when he was in the race) and Jesse Jackson were the only candidates in double digits is what any experienced pollster would have predicted. No other declared Democratic candidate had even come close to achieving national prominence, and some were not well known in their home regions. Hart, on the other hand, had figured prominently in the 1984 primaries. Jackson had not only received considerable media attention as a candidate in 1984, he had also achieved considerable prominence as a black leader. Once Hart withdrew, it was a foregone conclusion that a larger proportion of Democrats would express a preference for Jackson than for any one of the other Democratic candidates.

At that early stage it was inevitable that, as newcomers to national politics, Bruce Babbitt, Michael Dukakis, Richard Gephardt, and Paul Simon would languish in the single digits. Under those conditions, it was arithmetically inevitable that "undecided" would be the leading Democratic "candidate." The inference that the large undecided vote in the Democratic race, especially compared with the small Republican undecided vote, was a measure of the public's disdain for the Seven Dwarfs was unwarranted. All it meant was that, not knowing anything about most of the Democratic candidates, much of the public was withholding

Table 2

NUMBER OF PUBLISHED POLLS ON DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE STANDINGS SEPTEMBER 1, 1987 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1988

	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Total
National	4	7	2	9	7	29
Iowa	—	3	1	3	12	19
New Hampshire	3	2	2	7	5	19
Southern region	2	1	—	—	4	7
Individual Super Tuesday southern states	2	12	6	2	3	25
Midwestern region	—	1	—	—	—	1
All other states	5	4	5	3	6	23
	16	30	16	24	37	123

judgment—a demonstration that it has better sense than many political experts.

So what could the polls have done other than measure candidate standings? The significant questions for the polls during the preprimary season were not who was ahead and by how much. They were (a) whether any of the newcomers to the presidential scene were improving their name recognition, and (b) how successful they were in developing a positive image. As the newcomers' campaign staffs well knew (as did the more astute political journalists), their problems focused on a need to seize the electorate's imagination regardless of early standings in the polls. To their credit, a few polls such as CBS News/*New York Times* and Gallup did ask some questions about name recognition and favorability of attitudes. But those few measurements were largely lost in an avalanche of horse-race figures based on surveys of people, most of whom were then uninvolved in the primary campaigns.

Instead of examining the significant dynamics of the early stages of the primary season, media polls largely ignored the bigger picture in favor of small fluctuations in candidate standings. As a result, rather than adding to the quality of news coverage, reliance on polls led to its degradation. Not only was public attention directed to candidate standings that had no meaning as indicators of the eventual outcome of the primaries, but the significance of those standings was also misinterpreted. While many reporters did try to go beyond the horse race and deal with campaign dynamics, the overall tone of news coverage was set by the emphasis of polls on candidate standings.

The Last Call

When the volume of polling in Iowa, New Hampshire, and the South stepped up in January as the dates for their primaries and caucuses neared, the polls were still focused on the horse race and not on campaign dynamics. Some polls were satisfactory indicators of the election outcomes, but, as one might expect, there were also some egregious miscalls. Except for CBS News, which continued polling up through the day before the New Hampshire primary, no published poll picked up George Bush's last-minute resurgence. And the tactical importance of Jesse Jackson's ability to mobilize Michigan's black precincts in that state's caucuses was missed by polls that measured the preferences of rank-and-file Democrats. Yet, to stigmatize these miscalls as "errors," as the news media did, is to miss the point.

All the indications are that the New Hampshire and Michigan polls did a pretty good job in measuring what they did measure, namely, preferences of self-identifying Democrats and Republicans in those states some days before their respective primaries and caucuses. Where those polls went wrong was in timing and screening—missing the final stages in New Hampshire during which voter intentions crystallized and failing to exclude nonparticipants in the Michigan caucuses. These failings were rapidly identified in media postmortems, but the fact that these failings derived from an inordinate preoccupation with horse-race polls has been pretty much ignored. Only if polls are designed to deal with campaign dynamics—recognizing that in primaries, voting intentions often do not firm up until the final days and even hours of a campaign, and that the ability to mobilize supporters and get them to the voting booth often makes the difference between winning and losing—can they avoid the mistakes that were made in New Hampshire and Michigan.

What is truly remarkable, and disheartening, about these observations is that nothing about them is particularly new. Professional pollsters have long known and talked about the need to measure trends and to screen out likely voters. They were fully cognizant of the kinds of pitfalls that lay ahead of them. But they went ahead nevertheless. One likely reason why they did so is that the news editors who pay for and publish poll results are, apparently, less interested in the niceties and technicalities of polling than in having a simple number that they can report to their audiences as a peek into the future.

The reporting of polls during the final weeks of the 1988 primary season is revealing. With Bush's nomination a foregone conclusion, and Dukakis's virtually certain, polls on the June 7 California and New Jersey primaries received little attention in the news media. CBS News and the *New York Times* did not even poll on what had earlier been heralded as potentially decisive events. With Bush's and Dukakis's nominations seen as ordained, preprimary polls were evidently judged to have little news value.

Ratings Redux

With interest in the final primaries diminished, national pollsters began to turn their attention to who would win in November. Even as they carefully proclaimed that the polls conducted in April and May should not be viewed as predictions, the news media began to feature new national polls that told who was up and who was down. The *New York Times* and *Congressional Quarterly* went so far as to publish a review of polls conducted in the spring of past presidential election years, concluding that those polls had correctly forecast the eventual winners. Between the California primary and the end of the GOP convention, the pace of polling seemed to speed up. Forty national polls were conducted in that period, not to mention scores of new state and regional polls. ☑

Here we go again.

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[1] Irving Crespi, *Pre-Election Polling: Sources of Accuracy and Error*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, July 1988.
[2] The files of *Public Opinion* Magazine.

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FROM YIPPIES TO YUPPIES: TWENTY YEARS OF FRESHMAN ATTITUDES

by Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart

The 1960s were a time for the young. John F. Kennedy, the youngest president in American history, pronounced in his inaugural speech, "Let the word go forth. . .that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans," and he launched the New Frontier with programs like the Peace Corps devoted to young people. More youth than ever before went off to college in the 1960s, swelling classrooms, dormitories, and campuses in unprecedented numbers. Public-interest issues such as racism and poverty captured national attention, and young Americans committed themselves to social change in the civil rights movement, Vietnam War protests, and demands for university reform. Armed with placards exclaiming "We Shall Overcome," "Make Love, Not War," and "Do not fold, spindle, or mutilate," youthful political protesters took to the streets in the 1960s, sometimes with violent results, while hippies and yippies eschewed conventional society, flaunting drugs, sex, and contempt for authority.

By contrast, in the 1980s many colleges and universities have to compete to attract students to their campuses. The election of Ronald Reagan, the oldest American president, ushered in a period of conservatism, with a political agenda directed toward business and capitalist interests, anti-Communism, and strong defense, and constraining the role of the federal government in human services. As Reagan declared in his inaugural address: "It is time to reawaken this industrial giant, to get government back within its means and to lighten our punitive tax burden. And these will be our first priorities, and on these principles there will be no compromise." Private interests, not public ones, became the concerns of the day: physical fitness, making money, and indulging oneself in the good things of life. Youth of the 1980s have been described as complacent and politically apathetic, and the hippies and yippies have been replaced by the yuppies.

But what about the attitudes and behavior of the large numbers of young people going to college in the 1960s and 1980s? Are the 1980s freshmen in tune with the conservative times during which they are attending college, or did the youth of the 1960s set a style that has carried through to the 1980s? To address these questions, we examined survey data collected by the American Council on Education (ACE) and the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP). Each year for more than twenty years, ACE-CIRP has conducted nationwide surveys of approximately 200,000 college freshmen from 300 institutions, making this the largest annual survey of college students in the United States. College freshmen are particularly interesting, since they are in the critical stage for forming social and political attitudes. Research has demonstrated that many of the political orientations developed during these youthful years may last a lifetime.

We compared the freshman survey results for 1968 (or the closest years with equivalent survey items) with those for the most recently published ACE-CIRP survey in 1987 in order to assess any changes in the college students' personal activities, career aspirations, objectives in life, as well as their social and political attitudes. In addition, because 1968 to 1987 was a time of awakening to the needs and problems of women in contemporary American society, we will examine the responses for freshman men and women separately, expecting to see marked changes in the attitudes of young college women over the twenty-year period. Selected responses about aspects of their personal, social, and political lives appear in table 1 and, taken together, indicate several trends.

Note: *Not all variables discussed in the text of this article appear in table 1. For a complete presentation of data, see ACE-CIRP surveys.*

Not all things have changed for college freshmen since the early 1970s. About the same percentage of freshmen in 1971 and in 1987 said they go to college to "gain a general education," "learn more about things," and "become more cultured." More young people in 1987 expressed a desire to improve their reading and writing skills and to "meet new, interesting people." More women than men had these goals in 1987, just as in 1971. While career choices have stayed substantially the same over the past twenty years, a dramatic exception is the herd-like movement away from careers in primary and secondary teaching and toward those in business. At least as dramatic is that in 1987, zero percent wanted to be either clergymen or college professors. Some political continuity shows up: not many students in either 1970 or 1987 supported political extremes or had much desire to influence the political structure. In addition to these similarities, however, a number of contrasts are apparent in freshman orientations.

The most significant change has been the women's movement's strong impact on attitudes and behavior. By 1987 freshman women reached parity in career choices with their male counterparts in the traditionally male-dominated fields of business, medicine, and law. The greatest shift for young women was their move away from teaching and toward business. And while preoccupation with money and career success was once thought to be a "man's game," in the 1980s college women can be counted as full-fledged players. In numbers that approach those of young men, freshman women in 1987 wanted to make more money, be very well off financially, be successful in their own businesses, and prepare for graduate or professional school. They also expressed as much interest as freshman men in becoming authorities in their fields and in

Table 1

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF AMERICAN COLLEGE FRESHMEN: 1968-1987

Survey Item	Gender	College Freshmen 1968	College Freshmen 1987	Change 1968-1987
ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN LAST YEAR				
Attended a religious service	All	91%	83%	− 8
	Male	89	81	− 8
	Female	93	86	− 7
Smoked cigarettes	All	16	9	− 7
	Male	18	7	−11
	Female	12	10	− 2
Drank beer	All	52	66	+14
	Male	63	72	+ 9
	Female	39	60	+21
REASONS TO GO TO COLLEGE (VERY IMPORTANT)				
Get a better job	All	74 (1971)*	83	+ 9
	Male	77 (1971)	82	+ 5
	Female	70 (1971)	83	+13
Gain a general education	All	60 (1971)	61	+ 1
	Male	53 (1971)	54	+ 1
	Female	67 (1971)	67	0
Improve reading, writing skills	All	22 (1971)	40	+18
	Male	22 (1971)	36	+14
	Female	23 (1971)	43	+20
Become more cultured	All	29 (1971)	34	+ 5
	Male	25 (1971)	28	+ 3
	Female	34 (1971)	39	+ 5
Make more money	All	50 (1971)	71	+21
	Male	57 (1971)	75	+18
	Female	42 (1971)	68	+26
Learn more about things	All	69 (1971)	72	+ 3
	Male	65 (1971)	68	+ 3
	Female	74 (1971)	76	+ 2
Prepare for graduate, professional school	All	35 (1971)	47	+12
	Male	39 (1971)	44	+ 5
	Female	29 (1971)	50	+21
CAREER CHOICE				
Artist, performer	All	6%	4%	− 2
	Male	4	5	+ 1
	Female	8	4	− 4
Businessman	All	11	26	+15
	Male	18	28	+10
	Female	3	24	+21
Clergyman	All	1	0	− 1
	Male	1	0	− 1
	Female	0	0	0
College professor	All	1	0	− 1
	Male	1	0	− 1
	Female	1	0	− 1
Doctor (M.D., D.D., D.V.S.)	All	4	5	+ 1
	Male	6	5	− 1
	Female	1	5	+ 4
Teacher (Elem. and Second.)	All	24	8	−16
	Male	13	3	−10
	Female	38	12	−26
Engineer	All	8	9	+ 1
	Male	15	15	0
	Female	0	3	+ 3
Farmer, conservation	All	2	1	− 1
	Male	3	2	− 1
	Female	0	0	0
Health professional (non-M.D.)	All	4	3	− 1
	Male	3	1	− 2
	Female	6	5	− 1
Lawyer	All	3	5	+ 2
	Male	6	5	− 1
	Female	1	5	+ 4
Nurse	All	3	2	− 1
	Male	0	0	0
	Female	6	4	− 2
Research scientist	All	3	2	− 1
	Male	4	2	− 2
	Female	2	1	− 1

having administrative responsibility.

The overall trends in activities reported by American college freshmen indicate that beer-drinking and interest in computers are on the rise, while smoking cigarettes and taking tranquilizers are declining. When comparing the mid-1960s to the 1980s, the majority of freshmen continue to attend religious services. Males are smoking less, while females are more likely to drink beer but less apt to take tranquilizers. Freshman women in 1987 were more likely to smoke than the men; beer drinking among these women had increased more sharply than for men; and freshman women were less interested than they used to be in helping others in difficulty and in keeping up with political affairs. Even so, 67 percent of young women and 50 percent of young men said that helping others in difficulty was an "essential" or "very important" life objective.

The widely discussed conservative mood on American college campuses is also partially supported by the ACE-CIRP time-series data. Aside from flocking to business schools to prepare for careers in business and finance—for the primary purpose of making lots of money—student concern with some conservative issues has increased. More college freshmen are feeling that criminals have too many rights, while there is a decline in those who think that college grades should be abolished and that racial understanding needs to be promoted in the 1980s. Somewhat paradoxically, although students are becoming more conservative on certain social, economic, and political issues and behavior, they also continue to support some liberal causes such as national health care, increased taxes for the wealthy, a larger government role in consumer protection, fighting pollution, legalizing abortion, and busing to achieve racial balance. Therefore, while American college youth have been characterized as

OBJECTIVES IN LIFE (ESSENTIAL OR VERY IMPORTANT)				
Become authority in my field	All	58%	77%	+19
	Male	61	78	+17
	Female	55	76	+21
Influence political structure	All	18 (1970)	16	− 2
	Male	22 (1970)	20	− 2
	Female	14 (1970)	14	0
Raise a family	All	68 (1970)	58	−10
	Male	64 (1970)	56	− 8
	Female	72 (1970)	60	−12
Have administrative responsibility	All	23	45	+22
	Male	28	47	+19
	Female	16	43	+27
Be very well off financially	All	41	76	+35
	Male	51	80	+29
	Female	27	72	+45
Help others in difficulty	All	59	59	0
	Male	50	50	0
	Female	71	67	− 4
Successful in own business	All	45	51	+ 6
	Male	55	55	0
	Female	32	46	+14
Involved in environmental cleanup	All	45 (1972)	18	−27
	Male	46 (1972)	21	−25
	Female	44 (1972)	15	−29
Develop a philosophy of life	All	83	39	−44
	Male	79	40	−39
	Female	87	39	−48
Participate in community action	All	29 (1970)	20	− 9
	Male	27 (1970)	18	− 9
	Female	32 (1970)	22	−10
Keep up with political affairs	All	52	38 (1984)	−14
	Male	52	43 (1984)	− 9
	Female	52	33 (1984)	−19
SELECT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES (AGREE STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT)				
Woman's activity best in home	All	57 (1967)	26	−31
	Male	67 (1967)	32	−35
	Female	44 (1967)	20	−24
Live together before marriage	All	45% (1974)	52%	+ 7
	Male	51 (1974)	58	+ 7
	Female	39 (1974)	47	+ 8
Marijuana legalized	All	47 (1972)	19	−28
	Male	50 (1972)	23	−27
	Female	43 (1972)	16	−27
Prohibit homosexual relations	All	47 (1976)	53	+ 6
	Male	55 (1976)	63	+ 8
	Female	39 (1976)	45	+ 6
College has right to ban speakers with extreme views	All	32	26 (1986)	− 6
	Male	34	28 (1986)	− 6
	Female	29	23 (1986)	− 6
Criminals have too many rights	All	52 (1970)	68	+16
	Male	58 (1970)	71	+13
	Female	45 (1970)	66	+21
Can do little to change society	All	32	37 (1985)	+ 5
	Male	35	40 (1985)	+ 5
	Female	28	35 (1985)	+ 7
POLITICAL ORIENTATION				
Far left	All	4 (1970)	2	− 2
	Male	5 (1970)	3	−2
	Female	3 (1970)	2	−1
Liberal	All	41 (1970)	22	−19
	Male	39 (1970)	21	−18
	Female	42 (1970)	23	−19
Middle-of-the-road	All	31 (1970)	56	+25
	Male	31 (1970)	51	+20
	Female	31 (1970)	60	+29
Conservative	All	22 (1970)	18	−4
	Male	22 (1970)	22	0
	Female	22 (1970)	15	−7
Far right	All	2 (1970)	1	−1
	Male	2 (1970)	2	0
	Female	2 (1970)	1	−1

Note: "When attitude or behavioral items were not available for 1968 or 1987, the next earliest year was selected for comparison.

Sources: American Council on Education, *National Norms for Entering College Freshmen*, Washington, D.C.: ACE Office of Research, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972; Cooperative Institutional Research Program and American Council on Education, *The American Freshman: National Norms*, Los Angeles: UCLA Graduate School of Education, 1974, 1976, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987.

moving to the political right—particularly during the Reagan presidency—the findings of this study indicate there is still considerable liberal sentiment among many college freshmen.

As for the direction of their politics, freshmen have shifted away from identifying with ideological labels, although their political and social orientations in 1987 could best be described as "mixed." By 1987 the percentage of freshmen who considered themselves to be political liberals had dropped off noticeably, and identification with the "middle-of-the-road" label had increased substantially. Surprisingly, however, despite the conservative Reagan era, fewer freshmen said they were conservative in 1987 than in 1970.

Since the 1970s, majorities of first-year female and male college students have maintained strong liberal views on the role government should play in protecting citizen rights and health, although the solid support evidenced in the early 1970s has decreased somewhat in the 1980s toward less government protection of consumers, controlling pollution, and energy use. Liberal views remain strong on job equality for women, women's role outside the home (stronger for women), the need for national health care, living together before marriage, free speech on campus, and the view that the wealthy should pay more taxes. More recently, liberal trends were evident for greater endorsement of school busing to achieve racial balance and for less military spending.

During recent times, however, larger percentages of freshmen have embraced conservative views on select social and political issues: they have moved away from abolishing the death penalty and legalizing marijuana, toward prohibiting homosexual behavior (stronger for men), and supporting the view that criminals have too many rights (stronger for women). Fewer freshmen in the 1980s think that grades should be abolished, and women are more concerned with "women's issues" than are men. While recent trends depict many American young people as moving to the right, considerable liberal sentiment continues to exist among college freshmen.

1980s Yuppie Puppies: "Make Money, Not Politics"

Many of the changes in freshman attitudes and behavior support predictions made in the late 1960s by two University of California sociologists, Burton Clark and Marvin Trow. Clark and Trow developed a typology of college student orientation. The result was four subcultural types: "academic," "collegiate," "vocational," and "nonconformist." Clark and Trow predicted the decline of the collegiate type (those oriented to conventional attitudes and having fun) and the rise of the vocational type of students (those focused narrowly on job preparation). The ACE-CIRP freshman survey data confirm the shift to vocationalist values; freshman students in 1987 had withdrawn from concerns about developing a philosophy of life, social issues, and politics in favor of self-interest and personal material success.

This is becoming as true for young women as for young men. Several things may account for this. One explanation revolves around the issue of equality promoted by the women's movement—that women have just as much potential as men and need not fear success or shy away from demanding career choices as they perhaps once did. Second, with a high divorce rate and ever-higher costs of living, many young women going off to college in the 1980s know that they may need to be self-supporting and capable of being independent. Even for those women planning marriage, most realize they will likely hold down full- or part-time jobs even if they raise children.

As Goes the Nation, So Go the Freshmen

To some extent, many of these changes among freshmen over the past twenty years are in keeping with national trends and changes in market and lifestyle forces. Choice of teaching as a career no doubt has declined because of the widely publicized oversupply of school teachers in the mid-1970s, and because the incentives and status associated with the teaching profession in the 1960s have been reduced substantially. At the same time, the rewards of choosing business as a career in the 1980s have increased. The movement toward educational reform and job opportunities in the late 1980s, however, may make teaching an attractive career choice once again for college freshmen.

Adding to the vocational mood on American college campuses is the shift away from the values and behavior so characteristic of the 1960s and the increase in youth who prefer the "middle-of-the-road" political option. This increase in the centrist political position reflects a national trend away from partisan politics. American college students, like many of their parents, are dissatisfied with and distrustful of traditional left-right ideological labels and have embraced instead a kind of fluid, watered-down, post-partisan politics.

The recent cohort of college freshmen, like the 1950s cohort, is more concerned with private gain and profit than with the broader philosophical issues that frame many of their material pursuits. This present period of cautious privatism may be a part of what pollster Daniel Yankelovich means when he calls the current mood on American college campuses a "sorting-out" period. In his opinion American college youth are presently sorting some values from others—carrying some values ahead, while rejecting others. College freshmen are not committing themselves to the wider world of society and politics; they remain in the middle, content to be sorting out the options that best suit their personal needs. ☑

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